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6 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
7 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**  
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9 Arizona Student DOE #1,  
10 Plaintiff,  
11 v.  
12 Donald J Trump, et al.,  
13 Defendants.  
14

No. CV-25-00174-TUC-JGZ  
**ORDER**

15 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Arizona Student Doe #1’s Emergency Motion  
16 for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym. (Docs. 2, 3.)  
17 The Motions were briefed, (Docs. 8, 9, 10), and the Court held a hearing on April 17, 2025.  
18 The Court continued the hearing until April 23, 2025 to allow the Government to  
19 investigate Plaintiff’s specific circumstances. (Doc. 12.) The Government filed Notices  
20 informing the Court of the results of their investigation and an updated witness declaration,  
21 (Docs. 15, 17, 19), and Plaintiff filed supplemental briefing, (Docs. 16, 20). The Court  
22 heard additional argument on April 23, 2025. For the following reasons, the Court will  
23 grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion to Proceed Under  
24 Pseudonym.

25 **I. Background**

26 **A. The F-1 Student Visa Program and SEVIS**

27 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), foreign students may enter the  
28 United States to pursue a full course of study at an approved educational institution. 8

1 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i). Students admitted under this provision are classified as F-1  
2 nonimmigrants. 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(2). To be eligible for admission, the student must  
3 present a Form I-20, issued by a school certified by the Student and Exchange Visitor  
4 Program (“SEVP”) for attendance by F-1 foreign students, and provide documentary  
5 evidence of financial support. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(1)(i). If admitted, the State Department  
6 issues a visa (“F-1 visa”) that allows a qualified academic student to enter the country  
7 pursuant to their status under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i) (“F-1 status”). *See* 22 C.F.R. §  
8 41.61(a)(1), (b)(1).

9 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), within the U.S. Department of  
10 Homeland Security (“DHS”), administers the F-1 visa system through the SEVP. *See Jie*  
11 *Fang v. Dir. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft*, 935 F.3d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 2019). SEVP  
12 manages and tracks nonimmigrant students through the Student and Exchange Visitor  
13 Information System (“SEVIS”). (Doc. 19 ¶ 3.) SEVIS is a web-based system that maintains  
14 information on SEVP-certified schools and nonimmigrant students attending those schools.  
15 (Doc. 8 at 8.) Schools must update SEVIS when a student’s information changes, including  
16 when a student fails to maintain F-1 status. 8 C.F.R. § 214.3(g)(2)

17 F-1 students are admitted for the “Duration of status,” or “the time during which an  
18 F-1 student is pursuing a full course of study . . . or engaging in authorized practical training  
19 following completion of studies.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(5)(i). An F-1 student maintains their  
20 F-1 status if they are making normal progress toward completing a course of study,  
21 regardless of whether their F-1 visa expires. *Id.*; (*see* Doc. 8 at 7). A student who fails to  
22 maintain a full course of study without the approval of the Designated School Official  
23 (“DSO”) or otherwise fails to maintain status must depart the United States immediately  
24 or seek reinstatement.<sup>1</sup> *Jie Fang*, 935 F.3d at 175–76 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(5)(iv)).

25 A student can lose their F-1 status by either: (1) failing to meet the regulatory  
26 requirements for maintaining status; or (2) termination of status by DHS. *Doe v. Noem*,

27 <sup>1</sup> A student may seek reinstatement pursuant to the process set out in 8 C.F.R. §  
28 214.2(f)(16), but the decision to reinstate is at the discretion of U.S. Citizenship and  
Immigration Services (“USCIS”), and the student may not appeal the decision. *Jie Fang*,  
935 F.3d at 176 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(16)(ii)).

1 No. 25-CV-00633, 2025 WL 1141279, at \*2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R.  
2 §§ 214.1(d), 214.2(f)(5)(iv)). A student fails to maintain F-1 status if they engage in  
3 unauthorized employment, willfully fail to provide full and truthful information to DHS,  
4 or are convicted for a crime of violence for which a sentence of more than one year  
5 imprisonment may be imposed. 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(e)–(g). DHS may terminate a student’s  
6 F-1 status in three ways: (1) revocation of a waiver authorized under section 212(d)(3) or  
7 212(d)(4) of the INA; (2) introduction of a private bill to confer permanent resident status  
8 on the student; or (3) notification in the Federal Register, on the basis of national security,  
9 diplomatic, or public safety reasons. *Id.* § 214.1(d). “DHS’s ability to terminate an F-1  
10 student’s status is limited to the three ways enumerated in § 214.1(d).” *Doe v. Noem*, 2025  
11 WL 1141279, at \*2 (citing *Jie Fang*, 935 F.3d at 185 n.100).

## 12 **B. Plaintiff Doe**

13 Plaintiff Doe, a citizen of India, is an international graduate student residing in Pima  
14 County, Arizona, who is scheduled to earn her degree and graduate in May 2025. (Doc. 1  
15 ¶ 14; Doc. 18-1 ¶ 13.) Plaintiff was lawfully admitted to the United States as an F-1  
16 nonimmigrant visa holder in December 2021. (Doc. 17 at 1; Doc. 18-1 ¶ 4.) Plaintiff is  
17 married to a U.S. citizen and has a two-year-old daughter, who is also a U.S. citizen. (Doc.  
18 18-1 ¶ 8.)

19 On April 3, 2025, Plaintiff received notice from her educational institution that her  
20 SEVIS record had been terminated. (Doc. 1 ¶ 33.) The stated reason was “Otherwise failing  
21 to maintain status – Individual identified in criminal records check and/or has had their  
22 visa revoked.” (*Id.* ¶ 34.) According to the Government, ICE identified Plaintiff as having  
23 been arrested by the Tucson Police Department for “Assault-Touched to Injure” on October  
24 3, 2023. (Docs. 15, 17.) Based on this information, the Department of State prudentially  
25 revoked Plaintiff’s visa on March 31, 2025, and SEVP terminated Plaintiff’s SEVIS record  
26 on April 2, 2025. (Docs. 15, 17.) Plaintiff maintains her criminal charge was dismissed on  
27 November 7, 2023, and the Government acknowledges that “records indicate that the  
28 charge was dismissed by the court.” (Doc. 18-1 ¶ 9; Doc. 17 at 2.) Plaintiff has complied

1 with all requirements of her F-1 visa and status, including maintaining authorized on-  
2 campus employment, and the Government cites no reason other than the dismissed  
3 misdemeanor criminal charge as a basis for revoking Plaintiff’s visa and terminating her  
4 SEVIS record. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 32, 38–39; *see* Docs. 15, 17.)

5 Plaintiff does not feel safe to return to work because she is unsure what effect the  
6 SEVIS record termination has on her ability to legally work and fears she may be subject  
7 to arrest, detention, incarceration, or deportation if she returns to work. (Doc. 1 ¶ 40.)  
8 Plaintiff fears the loss of post-graduate employment opportunities through Optional  
9 Practice Training (“OPT”).<sup>2</sup> (Doc. 18-1 ¶¶ 13–15.) Plaintiff has been experiencing high  
10 levels of stress and anxiety since receiving notice of her SEVIS record termination and  
11 fears the effect her incarceration or deportation would have on her family. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 40–  
12 42.)

13 Plaintiff brought this action on April 14, 2025, asserting causes of action under the  
14 Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,  
15 and the *Accardi* Doctrine. (*See* Doc. 1.) In Counts I, III, and V, Plaintiff argues her SEVIS  
16 termination is not in accordance with law, arbitrary and capricious, and contrary to her  
17 constitutional right to due process, in violation of the APA. (*Id.* ¶¶ 45–48, 53–56, 58–61.)  
18 In Count II, Plaintiff argues her SEVIS record termination on improper grounds without  
19 prior notice or an opportunity to respond violated her Fifth Amendment right to due  
20 process. (*Id.* ¶¶ 49–52.) In Count IV, Plaintiff argues the Government’s policy of targeting  
21 African, Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and Asian students for removal based on their race  
22 and national origin violates the APA and the *Accardi* doctrine. (*Id.* ¶ 57 (citing *Accardi v.*  
23 *Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260 (1954)).)

24 In the motions pending before the Court, Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed under the  
25 pseudonym “Arizona Student Doe #1” and a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) that:

- 26 a. Requires any Party filing materials with information identifying  
27 Plaintiff redact or file such materials under seal;

28 <sup>2</sup> A F-1 student who has completed their course of study may apply to USCIS for  
authorization to remain in the United States and engage in temporary employment related  
to the student’s area of study. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(10)–(12).

- b. Prevents Defendants from using information disclosed to them about Plaintiff for any purpose outside of this action;
- c. Prohibits Defendants from arresting, detaining, or transferring Plaintiff outside of the jurisdiction of this Court while the instant litigation is pending; and
- d. Declares Defendants’ actions in terminating Plaintiff’s SEVIS record from having any legal effect that would prevent Plaintiff from continuing her existing employment authorization, accruing any unlawful presence in the United States as a result of the SEVIS termination, or participating in any post-graduate employment authorization on Optical [sic] Practical Training (OPT) that she is entitled to enjoy as an F-1 nonimmigrant student. 5 U.S.C. § 705; § 706(2)(A), (C)-(D).

(Doc. 16 at 27–29.)

## II. Legal Standard

A party seeking preliminary injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 must show that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. *Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard*, 775 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see *Stuhlberg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc.*, 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction is substantially identical to the standard for issuing a TRO). The balance of equities and public interest factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).

Where a party “can only show that there are ‘serious questions going to the merits’—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips sharply in the [party]’s favor,’ and the other two *Winter* factors are satisfied.” *Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc.*, 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting *All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)). Under this Ninth Circuit “serious questions” test, “[t]he elements . . . must be balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” *Lopez v. Brewer*, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012).

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1           **III. Discussion**

2           **A. Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym**

3           Generally, a party proceeding anonymously “runs afoul of the public’s common law  
4 right of access to judicial proceedings, . . . and Rule 10(a)’s command that the title of every  
5 complaint ‘include the names of all the parties.’” *Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile*  
6 *Corp.*, 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)). However, when  
7 special circumstances justify secrecy, federal courts may allow parties to proceed under a  
8 pseudonym. *Id.* (collecting cases). In the Ninth Circuit, the standard is whether “the party’s  
9 need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in  
10 knowing the party’s identity.” *Id.* at 1068. Where a pseudonym is used to shield a party  
11 from retaliation, the district court should evaluate three factors: (1) the severity of the  
12 threatened harm; (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears; and (3) the  
13 anonymous party’s vulnerability to such retaliation. *Id.*

14           Here, Plaintiff fears retaliation by Defendants, harassment by the public, and  
15 blacklisting by third parties. (Doc. 3 at 4.) Plaintiff cites the current “environment of threats  
16 and fear of extreme and harsh treatment of immigrants and noncitizens [that] encourages  
17 private individuals to take action against those individuals in a manner they believe is  
18 desired by the government.” (*Id.* at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that because the government  
19 describes the reason for terminating her SEVIS record as criminal activity, her reputation  
20 would be tarnished if such information is revealed to the public and third parties,  
21 prejudicing her future ability to be hired or accepted into a school. (*Id.* at 6–7.)

22           Plaintiff’s need for anonymity outweighs any prejudice to Defendants and the public  
23 interest in knowing Plaintiff’s identity. Plaintiff has already provided Defendants with  
24 identifying information to allow Defendants to investigate and defend this lawsuit, and  
25 thus, they will suffer no prejudice. Plaintiff’s concerns of retaliation and reputational harm  
26 are reasonable and potentially severe. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed  
27 Under Pseudonym.

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1                   **B. Temporary Restraining Order**

2                   1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

3                   Plaintiff’s arguments in Counts I and V, that termination of her SEVIS record was  
4 arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with law under the APA, are likely to  
5 succeed on the merits, or at least, raise serious questions going to the merits.<sup>3</sup>

6                   a. *The Privacy Act & Sovereign Immunity*

7                   The Government argues it has not waived sovereign immunity under the APA  
8 because Plaintiff’s claim sounds in the Privacy Act, which provides an alternative,  
9 adequate remedy to the APA. (Doc. 8 at 11 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(C))); *see* 5 U.S.C.  
10 § 704 (final agency action is reviewable under the APA only if the plaintiff has no other  
11 adequate remedy in a court).

12                   “An alternative remedy will not be adequate ‘if the remedy offers only doubtful and  
13 limited relief.’” *Student Doe v. Noem*, No. 25-CV-01103, 2025 WL 1134977, at \*4 (E.D.  
14 Cal. Apr. 17, 2025) (quoting *Garcia v. Vilsack*, 563 F.3d 519, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).  
15 Because the Privacy Act does not provide Plaintiff, a noncitizen, with any cause of action,  
16 it is, at least likely, that the Privacy Act does not provide her an adequate remedy. (*See*  
17 Doc. 8 at 12 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2)) (the Privacy Act precludes review because  
18 Plaintiff is a foreign national). Additionally, other courts have found that, “Congress did  
19 not intend for the Privacy Act to be an ‘exclusive’ source of claims or remedies for alleged  
20 mishandling of records about individuals that impliedly forbids other relief under the  
21 APA.” *All. for Retired Americans v. Bessent*, No. CV-25-0313, 2025 WL 740401, at \*19  
22 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2025)

23                   b. *Final Agency Action*

24                   Agency action is subject to judicial review if it is either “made reviewable by  
25 statute” or “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5  
26 U.S.C. § 704.<sup>4</sup> To constitute “final” agency action, the action must: (1) mark the

27 <sup>3</sup> Because Plaintiff has established a likelihood of success on the merits of the APA claims  
28 in Counts I and V, the Court does not address Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on Counts  
II, III, or IV.

<sup>4</sup> No statute authorizes judicial review of the termination of SEVIS records; thus, the

1 consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process, i.e., the action must not be of a  
 2 merely tentative or interlocutory nature; and (2) must be one by which rights or obligations  
 3 have been determined or from which legal consequences will flow. *Bennett v. Spear*, 520  
 4 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (citations omitted).

5 The Government argues no legal consequences flow from the termination of  
 6 Plaintiff’s SEVIS record, because terminating a SEVIS record does not terminate an  
 7 individual’s nonimmigrant status, and therefore such termination is not final agency action  
 8 subject to review. (Doc. 8 at 13; Doc. 8-1 ¶¶ 8–9.) At this stage, the Government’s  
 9 argument is contrary to the evidence before the Court.

10 First, the DHS website states:

11 When an F-1/M-1 SEVIS record is terminated, the following happens:

- 12 • Student loses all on- and/or off-campus employment authorization.
- 13 • Student cannot re-enter the United States on the terminated SEVIS record.
- 14 • Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents may investigate to confirm the departure of the student.
- 15 • Any associated F-2 or M-2 dependent records are terminated.

16 *SEVIS Help Hub, Terminate a Student*, DHS, <https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/sevis-help-hub/student-records/completions-and-terminations/terminate-a-student> (last updated Nov.  
 17 7, 2024). The website states that if the termination is for any violation of status, the student  
 18 must apply for reinstatement or immediately leave the United States. *Id.* Clearly, losing  
 19 employment authorization<sup>5</sup> and being required to immediately apply for reinstatement or  
 20 leave the country are legal consequences.

21 Second, Plaintiff and other similarly situated F-1 students have received email

22 termination of Plaintiff’s SEVIS record must be final agency action for which there is no  
 23 other adequate remedy. *Doe v. Noem*, 2025 WL 1141279, at \*3.

24 <sup>5</sup> According to Plaintiff’s evidence, termination of a SEVIS record can affect employment  
 25 in several ways. A school cannot authorize student work if the student’s SEVIS record has  
 26 been terminated. *See* Doc. 16-2, Ex. C, Hearing Transcript at 27:17–29:4, *Nali v. Noem*,  
 27 No. 25-CV-3969 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2025) (explaining that work authorization programs  
 28 require schools to generate updated I-20 forms, which can only be done in the SEVIS  
 system, i.e., only if the student has an active SEVIS record). In addition, to be eligible to  
 apply to USCIS for post-completion OPT, a student must “Obtain the DSO’s  
 recommendation and have the DSO’s recommendation entered into the student’s SEVIS  
 record and annotated on their form I-20.” USCIS Policy Manual,  
<https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-2-part-f-chapter-5> (last visited Apr. 23,  
 2025); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(11)(ii)(B). A DSO may only grant a program extension by  
 updating SEVIS and issuing new Form I-20. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(6)(iv).

1 messages informing them that their F-1 visas have been revoked and stating:

2 Remaining in the United States without lawful immigration status can result  
3 in fines, detention, and/or deportation. It may also make you ineligible for a  
4 future U.S. visa. Please note that deportation can take place at a time that  
5 does not allow the person being deported to secure possessions or conclude  
6 affairs in the United States. Persons being deported may be sent to countries  
7 other than their countries of origin.

8 (Doc. 10-2 ¶ 8; Doc. 16 at 20.) If neither a prudential visa revocation nor a SEVIS record  
9 termination causes a F-1 student to lose their F-1 status, as the Government suggests, it is  
10 a mystery why the Government would inform Plaintiff of the consequences of remaining  
11 in the United States *without lawful immigration status*. (See Doc. 8 at 9.)

12 Third, SEVP’s stated reason for terminating Plaintiff’s SEVIS record is: “Otherwise  
13 Failing to Maintain Status – Individual identified in criminal records check and/or has had  
14 their visa revoked.” (Doc. 2 at 11.) This reason is given only if “[t]he student has not  
15 maintained status.” *SEVIS Help Hub, Termination Reasons*, DHS,  
16 [https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/sevis-help-hub/student-records/completions-and-](https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/sevis-help-hub/student-records/completions-and-terminations/termination-reasons)  
17 [terminations/termination-reasons](https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/sevis-help-hub/student-records/completions-and-terminations/termination-reasons) (last updated Apr. 9, 2025). Again, the Government’s  
18 position is, at best, inconsistent. On one hand, Plaintiff’s SEVIS record was terminated  
19 because she failed to maintain status. Yet, by the Government’s admission, the *only* reason  
20 for terminating Plaintiff’s SEVIS record is her criminal history. (Doc. 19 ¶¶ 7–8.) But  
21 Plaintiff’s one criminal charge was dismissed, which means it could not be a valid basis  
22 for failing to maintain F-1 status. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(g).

23 Essentially, on one hand, the Government says Plaintiff is wrong to conflate the  
24 termination of her SEVIS record with the termination of her F-1 status; on the other hand,  
25 the Government itself appears to conflate the two actions and treat Plaintiff as if she has in  
26 fact failed to maintain status. As other courts facing this issue in recent days have found, it  
27 is likely that the termination of a student’s SEVIS record “effectively terminat[es] [that  
28 student]’s F-1 status.” *Student Doe v. Noem*, 2025 WL 1134977, at \*5 & n.1. The  
Government does not appear to dispute that terminating a student’s F-1 status is a final  
agency action subject to review. *See Jie Fang*, 935 F.3d at 185; (Doc. 8 at 13 (arguing that  
because termination of a SEVIS record does not terminate a student’s nonimmigrant status,

1 Plaintiff fails to allege a challenge to final agency action).

2 Additionally, while ICE claims the inherent authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1372 “to  
3 terminate SEVIS records, as needed, to carry out the purposes of the program,” there does  
4 not appear to be any externally imposed limiting principle to this authority. (Doc. 19 ¶ 4.)  
5 Nor has the Government cited any authority that corroborates the statement of Mr. Watson,  
6 the Government’s declarant, as the statute cited does not explicitly address the termination  
7 of SEVIS records. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1372 (the Government shall “develop and conduct a  
8 program” to collect information on F-1 students and “establish an electronic means to  
9 monitor and verify” such information). If termination of a SEVIS record is the practical  
10 and functional equivalent of termination of a student’s F-1 nonimmigrant status, as seems  
11 likely at this stage of litigation, then ICE does not have inherent authority to terminate  
12 SEVIS records for any reason they choose, as federal regulations limit the means by which  
13 ICE can terminate a student’s F-1 status. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(d).

14 In sum, it is likely that the termination of a SEVIS record is a final agency action  
15 because it either: (1) effectively terminates that student’s F-1 status; or (2) itself implicates  
16 rights and obligations and has legal consequences, such as preventing the student and their  
17 DSO from complying with reporting requirements or maintaining eligibility for  
18 employment authorization. (*See* Doc. 20-1 at 3–5); *see also, e.g., Student Doe v. Noem*,  
19 2025 WL 1134977, at \*5; *Doe v. Noem*, 2025 WL 1141279, at \*3; *Hinge v. Lyons*, No. CV  
20 25-1097, 2025 WL 1134966 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2025); *Patel v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-00101,  
21 2025 WL 1134875, at \*2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2025).

22 *c. Application of APA*

23 Under the APA, reviewing courts shall set aside agency action that is “arbitrary,  
24 capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. §  
25 706(2)(A). An agency must follow its own policies and regulations. *See Nat’l Ass’n of*  
26 *Home Builders v. Norton*, 340 F.3d 835, 852 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing *Steenholdt v. FAA*, 314  
27 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). “Pursuant to the *Accardi* doctrine, an administrative  
28 agency is required to adhere to its own internal operating procedures.” *Church of*

1 *Scientology of Cal. v. United States*, 920 F.2d 1481, 1487 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing *United*  
2 *States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954)).

3 In terminating Plaintiff's SEVIS record, ICE appears to have failed to follow its  
4 own policies and the regulations governing F-1 nonimmigrant students. As discussed  
5 above, ICE appears to have effectively terminated Plaintiff's F-1 status, but it did not do  
6 so in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(d); Plaintiff did not fail to maintain status under 8  
7 C.F.R. § 214.1(e)–(g). Plaintiff has raised serious questions as to the merits of her claim  
8 that ICE's termination of her SEVIS record was not in accordance with law.

9 Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency entirely fails to consider an  
10 important aspect of the problem or offers an explanation for its decision that runs counter  
11 to the evidence before the agency. *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm*  
12 *Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). The agency must "articulate a satisfactory  
13 explanation for its action." *Hernandez v. Garland*, 52 F.4th 757, 768 (9th Cir. 2022)  
14 (quoting *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43).

15 Here, the reason given for Plaintiff's SEVIS record termination was "Otherwise  
16 Failing to Maintain Status – Individual identified in criminal records check and/or has had  
17 their visa revoked." (Doc. 2 at 11.) The reason given is unlikely to be satisfactory and runs  
18 counter to the evidence before the agency. The one criminal charge against Plaintiff was  
19 dismissed, and she has maintained her F-1 status in accordance with all other requirements.  
20 Therefore, her criminal record is an insufficient reason to terminate her SEVIS record, and  
21 the Government does not point to any evidence of an alternative basis for the termination.

22 At this stage, Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of her APA claims in Counts  
23 I and V. At minimum, these claims raise serious questions going to the merits.

## 24 2. Irreparable Harm

25 Plaintiff asserts she faces several forms of irreparable harm as a result of her SEVIS  
26 record termination, including: (1) interruption of her master's program weeks before her  
27 scheduled graduation; (2) loss of benefits of F-1 status, including current and future  
28 employment authorization; (3) potential accrual of unlawful presence time; and (4) risk of

1 immediate enforcement action, including arrest, detention, transfer to another jurisdiction,  
2 and deportation. (Doc. 2 at 21–24; Doc. 16 at 22–24.) The Government maintains that  
3 Plaintiff’s asserted harms are speculative because termination of her SEVIS record does  
4 not terminate her F-1 status. The Government states that Plaintiff has chosen to discontinue  
5 her on-campus employment, but no one has actually told her she cannot continue her  
6 employment or finish her degree.

7 Plaintiff has met her burden to show irreparable harm that is not merely speculative  
8 at this stage. As noted above, DHS’s own website says a terminated SEVIS record results  
9 in loss of on- and off- campus employment authorization and potential investigation by  
10 ICE. *SEVIS Help Hub, Terminate a Student*, DHS, [https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/sevis-](https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/sevis-help-hub/student-records/completions-and-terminations/terminate-a-student)  
11 [help-hub/student-records/completions-and-terminations/terminate-a-student](https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/sevis-help-hub/student-records/completions-and-terminations/terminate-a-student) (last updated  
12 Nov. 7, 2024). DHS’s website also states that if a termination is for a violation of status,  
13 the student must immediately apply for reinstatement or leave the United States. *Id.*  
14 Plaintiff’s declarant, Ms. Shishegar, a DSO with 18 years of experience dealing with F-1  
15 student programs, states that termination of a SEVIS record ends all benefits of F-1 status,  
16 including employment authorization, and that USCIS will not approve a student’s OPT  
17 application if their SEVIS record has been terminated. (Doc. 20-1 ¶¶ 10–11.) Without an  
18 active SEVIS record, Plaintiff will be unable to meet regulatory reporting requirements.  
19 (*Id.* ¶ 30.) In an email, the Government warned Plaintiff of the consequences of remaining  
20 in the United States without lawful status, which include fines, detention, and deportation.  
21 (Doc. 16 at 22.)

22 Additionally, Plaintiff has submitted evidence of four international students in  
23 Minnesota who have been detained and placed in removal proceedings, after having their  
24 student visas revoked and SEVIS records terminated. (Doc. 10-1 at 2.) The Declarant’s  
25 client was charged with removability under § 237(a)(1)(C)(i) of the INA, which states that  
26 a nonimmigrant is deportable if they have failed to maintain their nonimmigrant status. The  
27 Government could not assure the Court that no enforcement action against Plaintiff is  
28 forthcoming. All the Government could say is that Plaintiff has not been arrested or

1 detained yet. ICE has terminated hundreds or thousands of SEVIS records, and some of  
2 those students have been detained and placed in removal proceedings. The Government's  
3 actions, with respect to both Plaintiff and F-1 students nationwide, show that the threat of  
4 unlawful detention and deportation to Plaintiff is more than merely speculative.

### 5 3. Balance of Equities & Public Interest

6 The Court finds the balance of equities weighs in Plaintiff's favor and issuing  
7 temporary injunctive relief will serve the public interest. The Government argues these  
8 factors weigh against injunctive relief because the public has a strong interest in the  
9 enforcement of immigration laws, which are the sovereign prerogative of the political  
10 branches of government. (Doc. 8 at 16.) But the public has an interest in the government  
11 following its own regulations, and "Defendants have provided *no indication* that they  
12 complied with the relevant statutory scheme in 'enforcing immigration laws' in this case."  
13 *Doe v. Noem*, 2025 WL 1141279, at \*9 (emphasis in original). Defendants have not alleged  
14 that temporary relief would cause them injury.

15 The Government also argues that Plaintiff must meet a higher standard than the  
16 ordinary case because the injunctive relief sought would change the status quo rather than  
17 merely preserve it. (Doc. 8 at 9.) However, "The status quo ante litem refers not simply to  
18 any situation before the filing of a lawsuit, but instead to 'the last uncontested status which  
19 preceded the pending controversy.'" *GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.*, 202 F.3d 1199,  
20 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting *Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc.*, 316 F.2d 804, 809  
21 (9th Cir. 1963)). Here, the controversy arose because of the termination of Plaintiff's  
22 SEVIS record, and the last uncontested status was prior to that action, i.e., when Plaintiff's  
23 SEVIS record was active and there was no dispute about whether she maintained lawful F-  
24 1 status. Therefore, a higher TRO standard is not warranted in this case.

### 25 **C. Bond**

26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that a court may issue a preliminary  
27 injunction or TRO "only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers  
28 proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully

1 enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). A district court “may dispense with the filing  
2 of a bond when it concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from  
3 enjoining his or her conduct.” *Johnson v. Couturier*, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009)  
4 (quoting *Jorgensen v. Cassidy*, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003)).

5 Here, the Government faces no realistic likelihood of harm from Plaintiff’s  
6 requested temporary injunctive relief, and the Court will not require Plaintiff to file a bond.

7 **IV. Conclusion**

8 For the reasons discussed above,

9 **IT IS ORDERED:**

10 1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym (Doc. 3) is **granted**. Any  
11 party filing materials with information identifying Plaintiff shall redact or file such  
12 materials under seal. Defendants must not use information disclosed to them about Plaintiff  
13 for any purpose outside of this action.

14 2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2) is **granted**. A  
15 Temporary Restraining Order is entered under the following conditions:

16 (a) Defendants are enjoined from arresting, detaining, or transferring Plaintiff  
17 outside the jurisdiction of this Court (the District of Arizona) while the  
18 instant litigation is pending; and

19 (b) Defendants’ actions in terminating Plaintiff’s SEVIS records shall have  
20 no legal effect that would:

21 (i) prevent Plaintiff from continuing her current course of studies and  
22 existing employment authorization,

23 (ii) cause Plaintiff to accrue any unlawful presence in the United  
24 States, or

25 (iii) cause Plaintiff to lose eligibility for, or prevent Plaintiff from  
26 participating in, any post-graduate employment authorization  
27 (Optional Practical Training) that she is entitled to as an F-1  
28 nonimmigrant student in lawful status.

1           3.     Because the Court has considered the materials provided in Plaintiff's  
2 supplemental briefs, Plaintiff's Motions to Supplement Plaintiff's Consolidated Reply to  
3 Defendants' Responses (Docs. 16, 20) are **granted**.

4           4.     Once Plaintiff has effectuated service on Defendants, Defendants must serve  
5 a responsive pleading within 60 days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(2).

6           5.     Counsel for the parties shall meet and confer and, on or before **May 2, 2025**,  
7 submit a proposed briefing schedule regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary  
8 Injunction. After receiving the proposed briefing schedule, the Court will order a finalized  
9 briefing schedule and set a hearing on Plaintiff's Motion.

10           The parties' proposed briefing schedule shall include a deadline for submitting a  
11 joint pre-hearing statement. In the joint pre-hearing statement, the parties must set forth a  
12 summary of the issues relevant to the motion and the parties' positions; a statement of the  
13 Court's jurisdiction; a list of each party's proposed witnesses and the likelihood of their  
14 appearance; a list of each party's exhibits; and the estimated length of the hearing.

15           Additionally, prior to the hearing, counsel must provide a Notice to Court Reporter  
16 to facilitate the creation of an accurate record. The Notice shall contain the following  
17 information that may be used during the proceeding:

- 18           a. Proper names, including those of witnesses.
- 19           b. Acronyms.
- 20           c. Geographic locations.
- 21           d. Technical/medical terms, names, or jargon.
- 22           e. Table of authorities, in alphabetical order, which includes all the authorities  
23 on which the parties will rely at the proceeding.

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
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1 The Notice to Court Reporter need not be filed but shall be provided by email to  
2 Judge Zipps' Court Reporter, Linda Parks (Linda\_Parks@azd.uscourts.gov), with a  
3 courtesy copy to Judge Zipps' Chambers (zipps\_chambers@azd.uscourts.gov).

4 Dated this 24th day of April, 2025.

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8 Jennifer G. Zipps  
9 Chief United States District Judge  
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