

CAUSE NUMBER _____

Ronald Blasig, PLAINTIFF	§	IN THE DISTRICT COURT
	§	
v.	§	TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
	§	
University of Texas at Austin, DEFENDANT	§	_____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
	§	

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

Comes now Ronald Blasig, Plaintiff, by and through his attorney, Neil Carlton Moss, Esq., and files this, his Original Petition against the University of Texas at Austin, Defendant, and for causes of action would respectfully show as follows:

1.0 Discovery Plan

1.1 Pursuant to TRCP 190.2, Plaintiff respectfully requests that discovery in this case be conducted under Level 2 by further order of this Court, as set forth in TRCP 190.4.

2.0 Parties

2.1 Plaintiff is an individual whose permanent address is 1061 Acorn Street, Giddings, Texas 78942.

2.2 Defendant is an organization named The University of Texas, whose permanent address is 2515 Speedway, Austin, TX 78712.

3.0 Jurisdiction and Venue

3.1 This Court has jurisdiction over this matter for the reason that the amount in controversy is proper for the jurisdictional minimum of this court, exclusive of costs and interest, and for the reason that one or more Defendants are residents of the State of Texas,

maintain their principal place of business in Texas, and/or are doing business in the State of Texas.

3.2 Venue is proper in Travis County under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 15.002(a)(1) because the incident in question giving rise to Plaintiff's claim occurred in Travis County.

FACTS

In March of 2014, Mr. Blasig (Plaintiff) learned that the University of Texas Athletic Department was soliciting ideas for their new southern end zone at the Darrell K Royal-Texas Memorial Stadium. The Athletic Department used several mediums (radio, magazines, internet) to disseminate the solicitation. Upon learning that the University was looking for ideas for the end zone, Plaintiff phoned Steve Patterson, who, at the time, was the Athletic Director of the University of Texas. While on the phone with Plaintiff, Mr. Patterson told Plaintiff that time was running out to submit ideas for the southern end zone, and if Plaintiff wanted to submit a design for the end zone, it needed to be done immediately. That night, Plaintiff drew the two designs that are the focal point of this case. (See Exhibits A and B). The next day, Plaintiff's wife drove him to the offices of the University of Texas Athletics Department, where he attempted to give the designs to Mr. Patterson. (See Exhibit C, Ms. Blasig's Affidavit). (See Also Exhibits D and E, Affidavits from individuals familiar with the event). Unfortunately, Mr. Patterson was not in his office at the time, so Plaintiff left the designs with an Athletics Department employee who told him he would give them to Mr. Patterson.

A few days later Mr. Patterson phoned Plaintiff to tell him he was going to present his designs to whoever was making the design decisions. They also spoke about what Plaintiff wanted in return for his design should it be used – [namely: a luxury suite in the South End Zone through the life of his daughter and for the suite to be forever known as the Blasig Suite in honor of his design being used.] Mr. Patterson told Plaintiff that, at that point, it was too early to discuss such things as Plaintiff’s designs had not been chosen yet. About two weeks later, to Plaintiff’s surprise, Mr. Patterson phoned Plaintiff and told him the University would not be going with his design. Mr. Patterson explained that the University was going to go with its original design – as it resembled the northern end zone. Mr. Patterson subsequently parted ways with the University of Texas Athletics Department the following fall. Plaintiff did not think anything else about it until he learned – to his shock and dismay – that the University had, in fact, used his design for the southern end zone. He learned of this with the rest of the world when he watched the Louisiana Ragin’ Cajuns play the University of Texas on September 4, 2021 on television. He watched the Longhorns enter the stadium through the smoking nose of a gigantic longhorn head – just as he designed and presented to the Athletics Department back in 2014. He was stunned.

The sketch that Plaintiff gave to Mr. Patterson (See Exhibits A and B) is so very similar to what the University of Texas built in the South End Zone (See Exhibits F¹, G², and H³) that no sober, rational individual could deny that the latter were not copied from the

¹ <https://texaslonghorns.com/sports/2021/2/22/dkr-south-end-zone>

² <https://texaslonghorns.com/sports/2021/3/29/sez-blog-the-field-club.aspx?id=988>

³ <https://texaslonghorns.com/facilities/dkr-texas-memorial-stadium/1>

former. Are they exact matches? Not down to every last detail, but, as we shall see, an exact copy made by an infringer is not necessary to prove copyright infringement in Texas.

THE LAW

The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 106. The basics of copyright law in the Western District of Texas are capably outlined in the case of *Durant v. Greenfield & Fortenberry, LLC*, No. A-16-CV-965-RP, 2018 WL 2117638, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:16-CV-965-RP, 2018 WL 3155822 (W.D. Tex. June 28, 2018). In it, the Appeals court wrote:

“To establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement, a copyright owner must prove “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying [by the defendant] of constituent elements of the work that are original.” A certificate of registration, if timely obtained, is *prima facie* evidence both that a copyright is valid and that the registrant owns the copyright.⁴ *Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee*, 379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th Cir. 2004). To prove actionable copying under the second prong, a plaintiff must make two showings. First, the plaintiff must, as a factual matter, prove that the defendant “actually used the copyrighted material to create his own work.” *Id.* If the plaintiff demonstrates factual copying, he must next demonstrate that the copying is legally actionable by showing that the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to protectable elements of the infringed work. “[A] side-by-side comparison must be made between the original and the copy to determine whether a layman would view the two works as ‘substantially similar.’ ” Typically, the question whether two works are substantially similar should be left to the ultimate factfinder, but “summary judgment may be appropriate if the court can conclude, after viewing the evidence and drawing inferences in a manner most favorable to the nonmoving party, that no reasonable juror could find substantial similarity of ideas and expression.” *Durant v. Greenfield & Fortenberry, LLC*, No. A-16-CV-965-RP, 2018 WL 2117638, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:16-CV-965-RP, 2018 WL 3155822 (W.D. Tex. June 28, 2018).

⁴ Plaintiff owns the copyright to UT End Zone Sketch, Copyright Registration #VAU001510246.

A cause of action for copyright infringement accrues when one has knowledge of a violation or is chargeable with such knowledge. 17 U.S.C.A. § 507(b). *See: Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intel., Inc.*, 425 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Tex. 2006). Plaintiff was unaware that his copyright had been infringed upon until he learned of this with the rest of the world when he watched the Louisiana Ragin Cajuns play the University of Texas on September 4, 2021 on television. He watched the Longhorns enter the stadium through the smoking nose of a gigantic longhorn head – just as he designed and presented to the Athletics Department back in 2014. The Copyright Act has a three-year statute of limitations (“No action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.” 17 U.S.C. § 507(b)) *PAR Microsystems, Inc. v. Pinnacle Dev. Corp.*, 105 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1996). Since Plaintiff did not know of the infringement of his copyright until September 4, 2021, this suit is being filed in a timely fashion before the statute of limitations has expired.

How do we determine if a copyright infringement is actionable. The Fifth Circuit tells us: “To determine whether an instance of copying is *legally actionable*, a side-by-side comparison must be made between the original and the copy to determine whether a layman would view the two works as “substantially similar.” *Creations Unlimited, Inc. v. McCain*, 112 F.3d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 1997) See also: *Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc.*, 26 F.3d 1335, 1340–41 (5th Cir. 1994), *opinion supplemented on denial of reh’g*, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995). Who should determine whether the two works are substantially similar? The finder of fact. “that question typically should be left to the factfinder” *Creations Unlimited, Inc. v. McCain*, 112 F.3d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 1997).

If a typical layman were to view Exhibits A and B side by side with Exhibits F, G and H, he would unquestionably surmise that the latter were based on the former. The actual copying can be inferred from the likenesses of the Exhibits.

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AS A TORT

In Texas, copyright infringement is considered a tort and can be addressed by state – as opposed to Federal - courts. An example of this is *Univ. of Houston Sys. v. Jim Olive Photography*, 580 S.W.3d 360, 366 (Tex. App. 2019), aff'd, 624 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. 2021). Plaintiff has reviewed the current Texas Torts Claim Act (See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101) and copyright and the Act still does not exempt the state from suit for copyright infringement. The Texas Supreme Court explains Plaintiff’s position succinctly in *Univ. of Houston Sys. v. Jim Olive Photography* :

Copyright infringement, whether common law or statutory, is a tort. *Porter v. United States*, 473 F.2d 1329, 1337 (5th Cir. 1973); *Ted Browne Music Co. v. Fowler*, 290 F. 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1923) (stating courts “have long recognized that infringement of a copyright is a tort”). Texas has not waived sovereign (governmental) immunity in the Texas Tort Claims Act for copyright infringement by a governmental unit. *See* TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1) (providing for limited waiver of governmental immunity for claims of property damage, personal injury, or death proximately caused by wrongful or negligent conduct of governmental employee arising out of (1) use of publicly owned motor-driven equipment or motor vehicle, (2) premises defects, and (3) conditions or uses of certain property); *see also Schneider v. Ne. Hosp. Auth.*, No. 01-96-01098-CV, 1998 WL 834346, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (“It is up to the legislature to add the tort of trademark infringement to those torts for which immunity is statutorily waived.”). Nor has Texas waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit in federal court for copyright infringement. *See generally Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida*, 517 U.S. 44, 54–55, 67–72 & n.14, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). *Univ. of Houston Sys. v. Jim Olive Photography*, 580 S.W.3d 360, 366 (Tex. App. 2019), aff'd, 624 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. 2021)

Torts oftentimes use the theory of Res Ipsa Loquitur (the thing itself speaks) as a way to infer liability in cases where the damages caused must be proven with circumstantial evidence. Plaintiff is simply asking the Court to replace the usual term of negligence with copying. Plaintiff's counsel recently had a chance to use the theory in a dispute. Counsel's client took his car to a dealership because his air conditioning had quit working. The dealership said the client needed a, b and c parts for the air conditioner and told him what the labor would cost. Several days later they called the client and said that when they were taking for a test drive, something had gone wrong with the catalytic converter. A few more days passed and the dealership reported that the car was undriveable and said maybe they could get the car's manufacturer to help pay the \$5,500 it was going to cost to repair the catalytic converter. After this went on for some time, Plaintiff's counsel was told about the shenanigans the dealership was trying to pull. Plaintiff's counsel wrote the dealership a brief letter explaining the theory of res ipsa loquitur and explain that the dealership had control of client's car when the damage occurred, client had no control of the car at the time, and therefore it could be inferred that the dealership caused the damages to the catalytic converter due to their negligence. Plaintiff's counsel had to visit the dealership with his client, but when he did, the dealership said it would pay for the damages that happened when they had control of the vehicle. Plaintiff is asking this Court to apply the same theory of res ipsa loquitur to the case at bar. However, instead of using negligence as the basis to infer damages, replace negligence with copying. Plaintiff took his sketches to the University of Texas Athletic Department and was called by Mr. Patterson, who confirmed that he had

received the sketches. Plaintiff had no control over the sketches from that point on. The sketches were copied and were used as the basis for the new South End Zone at DKR stadium. Of course they were sent to large companies who were put in charge of building the stadium. However, the fact remains that if an uninterested third party were to look at Plaintiff's sketches and the actual end zone, he would come to the conclusion that the end zone is based on my client's sketches. The copying can be inferred via Res Ipsa Loquitur.

REMEDIES

Under 17 U.S.C.A. § 502 states:

(a) Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title 28, grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.

(b) Any such injunction may be served anywhere in the United States on the person enjoined; it shall be operative throughout the United States and shall be enforceable, by proceedings in contempt or otherwise, by any United States court having jurisdiction of that person. The clerk of the court granting the injunction shall, when requested by any other court in which enforcement of the injunction is sought, transmit promptly to the other court a certified copy of all the papers in the case on file in such clerk's office.

Therefore, Plaintiff could ask this Court to just shut down the South End Zone at DKR Stadium. However, Plaintiff has no desire to do anything that would interfere with the functioning of The University of Texas Athletic Department and their use of DKR Stadium. So, Plaintiff will not be seeking an injunction as relief.

The relief Plaintiff seeks is derived from

17 U.S.C.A. § 504. **(b) Actual Damages and Profits.**--The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. In establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.

In *MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc.*, 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2010), the Fifth Circuit held that “If copyright owner chooses to claim infringer's profits, owner is required to present proof only of infringer's gross revenue, and infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and elements of profit attributable to factors other than copyrighted work.” *MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc.*, 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2010), 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(b).

Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel contacted many accountants, accounting firms and CPAs in an attempt to find someone with the expertise necessary to dig into The University of Texas’ accounting figures so we could prove the South End Zone’s gross revenues for the last two years. Unfortunately, at this point, Plaintiff has been unable to secure the experts we need. However, Plaintiff does not think Defendant will be dishonest when they provide us with their numbers during discovery. Plaintiff did, however, do the research available to a layman, and he discovered while some nine-seat, living room boxes go for \$40,000.00 (See Exhibit J⁵) a year, club level seats go for \$8,000.00 a year (See Exhibit I). Most of the seats in the new South End Zone do not list an actual price. Instead, where the price would be listed, the statement ‘Call the Longhorn Foundation for Availability’ appears. Apparently, what kind of alumni you are can affect your ticket price. (See Exhibit K⁶) The University of Texas claimed to have increased the South End Zone’s capacity by 4,500 seats when it went live. Some seats are probably less than \$8,000.00, while other seats are more expensive. So, for this very rough estimation of the South End Zone’s gross revenues for the last years, we are going to multiply the number of seats added by the average club seat price. Which is 4,500 x \$8,000 x 2 which equals \$72,000,000.00. We know this is less than the South End

⁵ <https://new.express.adobe.com/webpage/Dr3vUHSumXEis>

⁶ https://texaslonghorns.com/documents/2024/2/13/2024_DKR_Season_Ticket_Map.pdf

Zone's actual gross revenue because Plaintiff has not, nor does he desire to, get into all of the money made of concessions, beer sales, apparel sales, etc. Plaintiff is also well aware that the University has many deductions, such as workers' salaries, maintenance, and advertising, from whatever the parties agree on for the gross revenue of the South End Zone. Plaintiff is certain the University will come up with millions in perfectly legal deductions.

PRAYER

For these reasons, Plaintiff asks that the Court issue citation for Defendant to appear and answer, and that Plaintiff be awarded Judgment against Defendant of the following: infringer's profits; actual damages; equitable relief; exemplary damages; prejudgment and post judgment interest; court costs; attorney fees; and all other relief to which Plaintiff is entitled.

Respectfully submitted,


/Neil Carlton Moss/
Neil Carlton Moss, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
TX Bar # 24071392
Moss Law International, PLLC
neil@moss.law
512-906-6988
9902 Marseilles Blvd.
Austin, TX 78750

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on all counsel of record in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure on this the ____ day of _____ 2024.

NEIL CARLTON MOSS

EXHIBIT A



- ① - Glass floors on Bottom suites to watch the team run out
- ② - Party Decks on side of the Longhorn
- Concession Area behind the Longhorn
- Longhorn - covered by black glass
- All suites inside the Longhorn Logo
- Smaller 0 out of the horns nostrils before they run out.

Blj
2014

EXHIBIT B

*** TX REPORT ***

JOB NO. 1193
ST. TIME 03/18 08:37
PCL 1
SEND DOCUMENT NAME

TX INCOMPLETE -----
TRANSACTION OF 1slow-adw@esseniorliving.com RONNIE BLASIG
ERROR -----



Marketing lot




EXHIBIT C

CAUSE NO

RONALD BLASIG PLAINTIFF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

vs. OF TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

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§
§
§

OF TR

THE UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANT

AFFIDAVIT

THE STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF TRAVIS

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared Sandra Blasig, of Giddings, Texas. who swore or affirmed to tell the truth, stated as follows:

My name is Sandra Blasig, I am of sound mind and capable of making this sworn statement. I understand that if I lie in this statement, I may be held criminally responsible. This statement is true.

My daughter Taylor and I told Ronnie that they were needing designs for the new South end zone at The University of Texas. Ronnie called Steve Patterson at the athletic department and Patterson told him they needed the design immediately because they were within a few days of deciding on the new end zone design.

Paterson told Ronnie he needs to have the design done in two or three days. Ronnie drew up a design that same night and presented it to Patterson several days later.

I drove Ronnie to the stadium, and he took his drawing to the athletic department.


Ronnie gave the drawing to a young gentleman in Patterson's office on or around March 18, 2014. The young gentleman said that he would see Patterson in a few hours. About two or three weeks later Patterson called Ronnie and told him that they decided to go with their first design. Patterson said they were going to use the design that matched the other end zone. He thanked Ronnie for the design but said he was not going to use it.

Sandra Blasig
Sandra Blasig

State of Texas County of Lee.

SWORN to and SUBSCRIBED before me, the undersigned authority, on
the 29th day of July, 2024 year, by
SANDRA BLASIG.

Alicia Rodriguez
Notary Public, State of Texas



*** TX REPORT ***

JOB NO. 1193
ST. TIME 03/18 08:37
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SEND DOCUMENT NAME

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ERROR -----



Marketing 101




EXHIBIT D


mine as well and then he took the drawing to the University to show them his design. I saw the original drawing at his house while visiting them one evening.


Brenda Mueller

State of Texas County of Lee.

SWORN to and SUBSCRIBED before me, the undersigned authority, on the 29th
day of July, 2024 year, by
Brenda Mueller


Notary Public, State of Texas



*** TX REPORT ***

JOB NO. 1193
ST. TIME 03/18 08:37
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SEND DOCUMENT NAME

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ERROR -----



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


EXHIBIT E

CAUSE NO _____

RONALD BLASIG
PLAINTIFF

vs.

THE UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS
DEFENDANT

§
§
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§
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§
§
§

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

OF TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT

AFFIDAVIT

THE STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF TRAVIS

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared Tammy Jo Smikle, who swore or affirmed to tell the truth, stated as follows:

My name is Tammy Jo Smikle. I am of sound mind and capable of making this sworn statement. I understand that if I lie in this statement, I may be held criminally responsible. This statement is true.

I worked with Ronnie Blasig at the Isle of Watercrest in Bryan, Texas in 2013 and early 2014. Ronnie was the administrator of the skilled nursing home. Ronnie brought in his drawing/design of the south end zone and said that he was going to present his design to Steve Patterson, the athletic director at the University of Texas. This was on or around March 18, 2014. He stated that the University had been looking for designs for the South end zone. He


showed his drawing to the other employees at work as well and then he took the drawing to the University to show them his design.


Tammy Jo Smikle

State of Texas County of Brazos.

SWORN to and SUBSCRIBED before me, the undersigned authority, on the 27th
day of July, 2024 year, by
Tammy Jo Smikle


Notary Public, State of Texas



*** TX REPORT ***

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ERROR -----



Marketing 101




EXHIBIT F



EXHIBIT G




EXHIBIT H



EXHIBIT I



**Field Club Payment Example:
5-Year Capital Pledge Schedule**

Year	Capital Gift Per Seat *	Season Ticket Cost Per Seat	Total Cost Per Seat
YEAR 1	\$4,000	\$4,000	\$8,000
YEAR 2	\$4,000	\$4,000	\$8,000
YEAR 3	\$4,000	\$4,000	\$8,000
YEAR 4	\$4,000	\$4,000	\$8,000
YEAR 5	\$4,000	\$4,000	\$8,000

** Capital gifts are tax deductible and can be paid up front or pledged over a period of up to five (5) years*

EXHIBIT J

SECTION	ANNUAL PAYMENT	CAPITAL GIFT
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**LIVING ROOM BOX
8-SEAT**

36R - 41R \$40,000

**LIVING ROOM BOX
4-SEAT**

36R - 41R \$20,000

LOGE BOX

37B - 40B \$16,000

*** CALL THE
LONGHORN
FOUNDATION
FOR
ADDITIONAL
DETAILS AND
AVAILABILITY**



EXHIBIT K

2024 SEASON TICKET AND GIFT PRICING MAP

DARRELL K ROYAL-TEXAS MEMORIAL STADIUM



Area	Section	Checkback*	Season Ticket	Seat \$/1
Continental Suite	023-027 (Rows 1-4)	All seats	\$735	\$5,000
	032, 036 (Rows 1-4)	All seats	\$735	\$4,000
	031, 035 (Rows 1-4)	All seats	\$735	\$3,000
	034-039 (Row 5)	All seats	\$735	\$2,000
Texas Club	27C-30C	All seats	\$735	\$3,500
Teachers Club	18C-19C	All seats	\$735	\$2,000
Teachers Club	027-031	Rows 54-64	\$735	\$1,000
Longhorn Lounge	18LL-19LL	Rows 54-64	\$640	\$500
Field Club	36C-40C	All seats		
Living Room Box	36R-40R	All seats		Call The Longhorn Foundation for Availability
Lodge Box	37R-40R	All seats		
Tier 1	4, 5	Rows 6+	\$640	\$3,500
	3, 6	Rows 6+	\$640	\$2,500
	3, 6 (Rows 1-5)		\$640	\$2,000
	20, 29		\$640	\$1,500
	2, 7, 23, 30		\$640	\$1,000
	027-029	Rows 1-6	\$640	\$1,000
	034-036	Rows 1-7	\$640	\$1,000
	032, 037	Rows 1-7	\$640	\$500
	1, 8, 31, 32		\$640	\$500
	026, 100	Rows 1-8	\$640	\$400
101, 102, 103, 109	Rows 1-7	\$640	\$350	
034, 132	Rows 1-6	\$640	\$160	
025, 101	Rows 1-8	\$640	\$160	
Tier 2	9-15		\$525	\$500
	20-23		\$525	\$250
	105 (Rows 41-54)		\$525	\$250
	102-107 (Rows 18-40)		\$525	\$250
031-033	Rows 1-8	\$525	\$160	
Tier 3	104-105 (Rows 9-10)		\$385	\$250
	102-103 (Rows 3-10)		\$385	\$250
	101, 102, 103, 109 (Rows 18-40)		\$385	\$160
Tier 4	101-102, 108-109 (Rows 41-54)		\$385	\$0
	101-103 (Rows 9-10)		\$385	\$0
Students				
Visitors				
Not available				

*Unless otherwise noted, all seats are bleacher seats.

Call The Longhorn Foundation for South End Zone Premium Seating 512-471-4439