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Attorneys for Plaintiff, JOHN DOE			
	ΓΤΗΕ STATE OF CALLEODNIA		
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES			
JOHN DOE ¹ ,	Case No.: 24STCV06716		
Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFF JOHN DOE'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FOR:		
vs.	(1) WHISTLE-BLOWER RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE § 1102.5;		
LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP, TODD CARPENTER, SCOTT BRADEN, and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive,	(2) VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE § 970;		
	(3) DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE FEHA;		
Defendants.			
	 OF THE FEHA; (4) BREACH OF EXPRESS ORAL CONTRACT NOT TO TERMINATE EMPLOYMENT WITHOUT GOOD 		




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	PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

Plaintiff, John Doe, alleges, on the basis of personal knowledge and/or information and belief:

SUMMARY

This is an action by plaintiff, John Doe ("plaintiff" or "Doe"), whose employment with defendant Lynch Carpenter, LLP ("Lynch Carpenter" or "Entity Defendant"), was wrongfully terminated.

Plaintiff brings this action against defendants for economic, non-economic, compensatory, and punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code section 3294, pre-judgment interest pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 3291, and costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to Government Code section 12965(b), Labor Code section 1102.5(j), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5

PARTIES

1. *Plaintiff:* Plaintiff Doe is, and at all times mentioned in this Complaint was, a resident of the County of San Diego, California.

 Defendants: Defendant Lynch Carpenter is, and at all times mentioned in this Complaint was, authorized to operate by the State of California and the United States government and authorized and qualified to do business in the County of Los Angeles. Defendant's place of business, where the following causes of action took place, was and is in the County of Los Angeles, at 117 East Colorado Blvd., Suite 600, Pasadena, California 91105. Defendant Todd Carpenter ("defendant" or "Carpenter") is, and at all times mentioned in this Complaint was, a supervisor with defendants. Defendant Carpenter is, and at all times mentioned in this Complaint was, a resident of San Diego County, California. Defendant Scott Braden ("defendant" or "Braden") is, and at all times mentioned in this Complaint was, a supervisor with defendant Braden is, and at all times mentioned in this Complaint was, a resident of San Diego County, California. Defendant Scott Braden ("defendants. Defendant Braden is, and at all times mentioned in this Complaint was, a resident of San Diego County, California. Defendant Scott Braden ("defendants. Defendant Braden is, and at all times mentioned in this Complaint was, a resident of San Diego County, California. 3. Doe defendants: Defendants Does 1 to 100, inclusive, are sued under fictitious

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 or more of the defendants was the agent or employee, and/or acted under the control or 13 supervision, of one or more of the remaining defendants and, in committing the acts 14 alleged, acted within the course and scope of such agency and employment and/or is or 15 16 are otherwise liable for plaintiff's damages; (c) at all relevant times, there existed a unity of ownership and interest between or among two or more of the defendants such that any 17 individuality and separateness between or among those defendants has ceased, and de-18 fendants are the alter egos of one another. Defendants exercised domination and control 19 over one another to such an extent that any individuality or separateness of defendants 20 does not, and at all times herein mentioned did not, exist. Adherence to the fiction of the 21 separate existence of defendants would permit abuse of the corporate privilege and would 22 sanction fraud and promote injustice. All actions of all defendants were taken by 23 employees, supervisors, executives, officers, and directors during employment with all 24 defendants, were taken on behalf of all defendants, and were engaged in, authorized, rati-25 fied, and approved of by all other defendants. 26 27 ///

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and on that basis alleges, that each of the defendants sued under fictitious names is in some manner responsible for the wrongs and damages alleged below, in so acting was functioning as the agent, servant, partner, and employee of the co-defendants, and in taking the actions mentioned below was acting within the course and scope of his or her authority as such agent, servant, partner, and employee, with the permission and consent of the co-defendants. The named defendants and Doe defendants are sometimes hereafter referred to, collectively and/or individually, as "defendants." 4. Relationship of defendants: All defendants compelled, coerced, aided, and/or abetted the discrimination, retaliation, and harassment alleged in this Complaint. All defendants were responsible for the events and damages alleged herein, including on the following bases: (a) defendants committed the acts alleged; (b) at all relevant times, one

names pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 474. Plaintiff is informed and believes,

5. Finally, at all relevant times mentioned herein, all defendants acted as agents of all other defendants in committing the acts alleged herein.

VENUE

6. The actions at issue in this case occurred in the State of California, in the County of Los Angeles. Under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, this case can alternatively, at Plaintiff's choice, be filed:

[I]n a county in which the department has an office, in a county in which unlawful practices are alleged to have been committed, in the county in which records relevant to the alleged unlawful practices are maintained and administered, in the county in which the person claiming to be aggrieved would have worked or would have had access to public accommodation, but for the alleged unlawful practices, in the county of the defendant's residence or principal office...

(California Government Code § 12965(b).)

7. Here, the plaintiff worked primarily in California in the County of Los Angeles. The location where plaintiff worked was located in Pasadena, California. Pasadena is located in Los Angeles County, California. The majority of the unlawful actions on the part of the defendants occurred at said Pasadena location.

8. "[I]n the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the presumption is that the county in which the title of the actions shows that the case is brought is, prima facie, the proper county for the commencement and trial of the action." (*Mission Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 921, 928.) The FEHA venue statute – section 12965(b) – thus affords a wide choice of venue to persons who bring actions under FEHA. (*Brown v. Superior Court* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 486.) "[T]he special provisions of the FEHA venue statute control in cases involving FEHA claims joined with non-FEHA claims arising from the same facts." (*Id.* at 487.).

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FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

9. *Plaintiff's hiring:* Plaintiff Doe, a young Armenian attorney with an excellent work ethic and great potential, was hired by defendant Lynch Carpenter on or around September 1, 2023, as a litigation associate.

10. *Plaintiff's job performance:* During his employment, Doe did not receive performance reviews, write-ups, or disciplinary actions. In fact, he excelled in his position, as he hit the ground running upon hire and took on several complex and time-sensitive issues for the firm. On several occasions, Doe even requested a heavier case load, as he was able to finish his assignments efficiently, even before they were due, and he sought more work in order to help the firm and improve his skills.

11. *Plaintiff's protected status and activity:* Plaintiff Doe is an Armenian male. During his employment with defendants, plaintiff Doe made protected complaints, including complaints about illegal activity on defendants' part.

12. Defendants' adverse employment actions and behavior:

a. When Doe interviewed for the position at Lynch Carpenter, he was under the impression that he would be working in the Los Angeles office, as Los Angeles attorneys were interviewing him. However, upon receiving his offer of employment, Doe learned that the position was in San Diego, and therefore he moved to San Diego in order to work in Lynch Carpenter's Del Mar office with the expectation and understanding that he would work for Lynch Carpenter long-term. Doe moved from Los Angeles County to San Diego County on the basis of the initial representations defendants made to him. While working for defendants, Doe worked on both San Diego and Los Angeles cases.

b. While working for Lynch Carpenter, Doe witnessed multiple instances of unethical conduct that he believed constituted fraud and/or legal malpractice. For instance, Doe noticed that defendants never discussed their cases with clients, even when the firm was retained and filed the clients' claims in court. This led to legal action taken on behalf of clients without their knowledge or approval, as well as a continuous failure to provide pertinent updates on the status of clients' cases, in clear violation of the California Rules

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of Professional Conduct.

c. This was common knowledge and practice throughout the firm, and it was most egregiously evinced in at least one instance in which Lynch Carpenter's client had been deceased for several years. That fact was learned only through defense counsel's discovery and disclosure, and it resulted in sanctions against defendants and an investigation initiated by the California State Bar.

d. In addition to defendants' complete failure to communicate with their clients and to provide effective representation to those clients, defendants engaged in unethical billing and reporting practices that certainly amount to fraud. Attorneys often fabricated and inflated the number of hours they worked on matters when filing motions for attorneys' fees. In these motions, attorneys are required to provide summaries of their hours worked and the types of work completed. However, defendant Braden, an attorney with Lynch Carpenter, had not input his billable hours for more than four years, and this resulted in his telling the firm's associates and paralegals to make up and input fake hours and make them "look realistic" in an effort to justify millions of dollars in attorneys' fees. Further, Lynch Carpenter's attorneys did not have any mechanism for keeping track of hours, such as Excel spreadsheets or charts that clearly showed what work had been completed and the time spent on each item.

e. Lynch Carpenter's attorneys expressly acknowledged the obvious fraudulent conduct, as one partner, James Drimmer ("Drimmer"), stated that their hours were "complete bullshit" during a meeting with Doe. During this meeting, Drimmer further told Doe to do certain things to prevent the fee motions from looking "questionable," such as not using round numbers so that the hours would look more realistic.

f. After observing this conduct, Doe expressed his concerns to another associate attorney, Connor Porzio ("Porzio"), and a paralegal, Sara Pearson ("Pearson"). Doe specifically stated that he did not want to work at a firm that engaged in these kinds of practices and that he was concerned about the future of the firm. Doe's last such complaint was only approximately two days before his employment was terminated.

g. In or around December of 2023, all of Lynch Carpenter's attorneys, including Doe, were scheduled for performance reviews. At approximately the end of December, 2023, Doe approached one of the firm's partners, defendant Carpenter, to inquire about his annual review, as Doe had been working diligently with very little feedback, and every review typically came with a raise, which Doe believed was well deserved.

h. Carpenter responded that he wanted to postpone Doe's review, which was odd, and that he would meet with Doe the following week for his performance review. However, that meeting never occurred. Instead, on or around January 18, 2024, Doe noticed that everyone from the office except him was out to lunch, while he was left alone. This was not entirely uncommon, as Doe had noticed that he was often excluded from team meetings and lunches.

13. Defendants' termination of plaintiff's employment:

a. Upon returning to his computer on January 18, 2024, Doe noticed that his password had been reset. When he again requested to meet with Carpenter regarding his performance, Carpenter told Doe to meet him in five minutes, after he had returned from the group lunch. However, rather than providing a performance review, Braden and Carpenter terminated Doe's employment, giving pretextual reasons, such as that his performance was not "up to par" and that his writing had not been "at the level [they] expected." However, Doe had never received negative feedback from Braden or Carpenter regarding the quality of his work, even when he asked. Braden claimed that, on the last assignment Doe turned in, Braden had to "rewrite the whole thing," but Doe later learned that that was a lie.

b. Around the time of Doe's termination, Defendant had hired approximately six Caucasian female attorneys. Further, Doe is aware of other Caucasian employees who complained about Braden "destroying" their work, however, these individuals were not terminated.

14. *Economic damages:* As a consequence of defendants' conduct, plaintiff has suffered and will suffer harm, including lost past and future income and employment

benefits, damage to his career, and lost wages, overtime, unpaid expenses, and penalties, as well as interest on unpaid wages at the legal rate from and after each payday on which those wages should have been paid, in a sum to be proven at trial.

15. *Non-economic damages:* As a consequence of defendants' conduct, plaintiff has suffered and will suffer psychological and emotional distress, humiliation, and mental and physical pain and anguish, in a sum to be proven at trial.

16. *Punitive damages:* Defendants' conduct constitutes oppression, fraud, and/or malice under California Civil Code section 3294 and, thus, entitles plaintiff to an award of exemplary and/or punitive damages.

a. *Malice:* Defendants' conduct was committed with malice within the meaning of California Civil Code section 3294, including that (a) defendants acted with intent to cause injury to plaintiff and/or acted with reckless disregard for plaintiff's injury, including by terminating plaintiff's employment and/or taking other adverse job actions against plaintiff because of his good faith complaints, and/or (b) defendants' conduct was despicable and committed in willful and conscious disregard of plaintiff's rights, health, and safety, including plaintiff's right to be free of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and wrongful employment termination.

b. *Oppression:* In addition, and/or alternatively, defendants' conduct was committed with oppression within the meaning of California Civil Code section 3294, including that defendants' actions against plaintiff because of his good faith complaints were "despicable" and subjected plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship, in knowing disregard of plaintiff's rights to a work place free of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and wrongful employment termination.

c. *Fraud:* In addition, and/or alternatively, defendants' conduct, as alleged, was fraudulent within the meaning of California Civil Code section 3294, including that defendants asserted false (pretextual) grounds for terminating plaintiff's employment and/or other adverse job actions, thereby to harm plaintiff and deprive him of legal rights.
 17. *Attorneys' fees:* Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur legal expenses and

attorneys' fees.

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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (Whistle-Blower Retaliation (Labor Code § 1102.5, et seq.)—Against Entity Defendant and Does 1 to 100, Inclusive)

18. The allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

19. At all relevant times, Labor Code section 1102.5 was in effect and was binding on defendants. This statute prohibits defendants from retaliating against any employee, including plaintiff, for actually raising complaints of potential illegality, for providing information about such potential illegality, because the employee is believed to have engaged in such conduct, or because the employee may engage in such conduct. The statute further prohibits defendants from retaliating against any employee, including plaintiff, because the employee refused to participate in activity that would result in a violation of the law.

20. Plaintiff raised complaints of actual and/or potential illegality, including complaints about violations of the California Rules of Professional Conduct and/or the California Constitution, while he worked for defendants, and defendants retaliated against him by taking adverse employment actions, including employment termination, against him.

21. As a proximate result of defendants' willful, knowing, and intentional violations of Labor Code section 1102.5, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, emotional distress, and mental and physical pain and anguish, all to his damage in a sum according to proof.

22. As a result of defendants' adverse employment actions against plaintiff, plaintiff has suffered general and special damages in sums according to proof.

23. Defendants' misconduct was committed intentionally, in a malicious, fraudulent,

and/or oppressive manner, and this entitles plaintiff to punitive damages against defendants.

24. Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur legal expenses and attorneys' fees. Pursuant to California Labor Code section 1102.5(j), plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in an amount according to proof.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (Violation of Labor Code § 970)—Against Entity Defendant and Does 1 to 100, Inclusive)

25. The allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

26. At all relevant times, Labor Code section 970, *et seq.*, was in effect and was binding on defendants. Under this law, employers are statutorily prohibited from inducing employees to change their residences to, from, or within California by making "knowingly false representations" concerning the nature, length, or physical conditions of employment or the compensation to be paid. Labor Code § 970. Violation is a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. Labor Code § 971. In addition, double damages are recoverable in a civil action for violations of this law. Labor Code § 972; *see also* CACI 2710.

27. This law applies to any employment in which the employee has been induced to move to a new locale on the basis of misrepresentations about the nature of the employment. *Seubert v. McKesson Corp.* (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1514, 1522, *disapproved on other grounds* in *Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384 (double damages awarded where employer made false representations to induce employee to move to California to accept regional sales manager position). The "change" of residence contemplated by section 970 includes temporary, as well as permanent, relocation of residence. "The quantitative fact that the change of residence was to be only for two weeks rather than for a longer period would not appear to affect the qualitative misrepresentations, nor does it render the statute inapplicable." *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232,

|| 239-240.

28. Prior to hiring plaintiff, defendants knowingly made false representations concerning the nature and length of his employment and the compensation to be paid during plaintiff's employment with defendants.

29. As a result of defendants' adverse employment actions against plaintiff, plaintiff has suffered general and special damages in sums according to proof.

30. Defendants' misconduct was committed intentionally, in a malicious, fraudulent, and/or oppressive manner, and this entitles plaintiff to punitive damages against defendants.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Discrimination on the Bases of Race, Ancestry, and/or

National Origin, and Sex/Gender

(Violation of Government Code § 12900, *et seq.*)—Against Entity Defendant and Does 1 to 100, Inclusive)

31. The allegations set forth in preceding paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

32. At all times herein mentioned, FEHA, Government Code section 12940, *et seq.*, was in full force and effect and was binding on defendants. This statute requires defendants to refrain from discriminating against any employee because but not limited to the employee's sex/gender, race, ancestry, and/or national origin.

33. Plaintiff's sex/gender, race, ancestry, and/or national origin, and/or other characteristics protected by FEHA, Government Code section 12900, *et seq.*, were substantial motivating reasons in defendants' decision to terminate plaintiff's employment, not to retain, hire, or otherwise employ plaintiff in any position, and/or to take other adverse employment actions against plaintiff.

34. As a proximate result of defendants' willful, knowing, and intentional discrimination against plaintiff, plaintiff has sustained and continues to sustain substantial losses of earnings and other employment benefits.

35. As a proximate result of defendants' willful, knowing, and intentional discrimination against plaintiff, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, emotional distress, and mental and physical pain and anguish, all to his damage in a sum according to proof.

36. Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur legal expenses and attorneys' fees. Pursuant to Government Code section 12965(b), plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs (including expert costs) in an amount according to proof.

37. Defendants' discrimination was committed intentionally, in a malicious, fraudulent, despicable, and/or oppressive manner, and this entitles plaintiff to punitive damages against defendants.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Express Oral Contract Not to Terminate Employment Without Good Cause (*Marvin v. Marvin* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660)—Against Entity Defendant and Does 1 to 100, Inclusive)

38. The allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

39. Defendants, through their agents, entered an oral agreement not to terminate plaintiff's employment except for good cause. Plaintiff and defendants, through their supervisors, made mutual promises of consideration pursuant to this oral agreement. Plaintiff performed all duties required of him under the agreement by performing his job in an exemplary manner.

40. Defendants and their managers and supervisors terminated plaintiff's employment without good cause, violating the express oral contract they had with him.

41. As a proximate result of defendants' willful breach of the express oral contract not to terminate employment without good cause, plaintiff has suffered and continues to

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suffer damages, including losses of earnings and benefits, in a sum according to proof.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Breach of Implied-in-Fact Contract Not to Terminate Employment Without Good Cause (*Marketing West, Inc. v. Sanyo Fisher* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 603; Civil Code § 1622)—Against Entity Defendant and Does 1 to 100, Inclusive)

42. The allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

43. On the basis of oral assurances of continued employment given to plaintiff by defendants' supervisors, the length of plaintiff's employment with defendants, defendants' actual practice of terminating employment only for cause, and the industry standard for the business defendants engaged in of terminating employment only for cause, plaintiff and defendants shared the actual understanding that plaintiff's employment could and would be terminated only for cause. This shared understanding resulted in an implied contract requiring that defendants have good cause to terminate plaintiff's employment.

44. Defendants and their managers and supervisors terminated plaintiff's employment without good cause, violating the implied-in-fact contract they had with him.

45. As a proximate result of defendants' willful breach of the implied-in-fact contract not to terminate employment without good cause, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer damages, including losses of earnings and benefits, in a sum according to proof.

46. Plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees for lost wages under this cause of action under Labor Code section 218.6.

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PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention—Against Entity Defendant and Does 1 to 100, Inclusive)

47. The allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

48. Defendants owed a duty of care to plaintiff to appoint, hire, retain, and supervise persons who would not engage in retaliatory, harassing, or discriminatory conduct. Defendants owed a duty of care to plaintiff not to retain managers or employees who would discriminate against, harass, or retaliate against employees for engaging in protected activities. Defendants owed a duty of care to plaintiff to supervise their managers and employees closely to ensure that they would refrain from harassing and retaliating against plaintiff.

49. Defendants breached these duties. As a result, defendants caused damages to plaintiff. As a proximate result of defendants' negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of their managers and employees, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer damages, including losses of earnings and benefits, according to proof.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (*Hughes v. Pair* (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035)—Against All Defendants and Does 1 to 100, Inclusive)

50. The allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

51. Defendants' retaliatory actions against plaintiff constituted severe and outrageous misconduct and caused plaintiff extreme emotional distress. Defendants were aware that treating plaintiff in the manner alleged above, including depriving plaintiff of his livelihood, would devastate plaintiff and cause him extreme hardship.

52. As a proximate result of defendants' extreme and outrageous conduct, plaintiff

has suffered and continues to suffer severe emotional distress. Plaintiff has sustained and continues to sustain substantial losses of earnings and other employment benefits as a result of being emotionally distressed.

53. As a proximate result of defendants' extreme and outrageous conduct, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, emotional distress, and mental and physical pain and anguish, all to his damage in a sum according to proof.

54. Defendants' misconduct was committed intentionally, in a malicious, fraudulent, and/or oppressive manner, and this entitles plaintiff to punitive damages.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Wrongful Termination of Employment in Violation of Public Policy (*Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167)—Against Entity Defendant and Does 1 to 100, Inclusive)

55. The allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

56. Defendants terminated plaintiff's employment in violation of various fundamental public policies underlying both state and federal laws. Specifically, plaintiff's employment was terminated in part because of his protected activity, specifically making complaints about defendants' illegal actions. These actions were in violation of the California Constitution and California Labor Code section 1102.5.

57. As a proximate result of defendants' wrongful termination of plaintiff's employment in violation of fundamental public policies, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, emotional distress, and mental and physical pain and anguish, all to his damage in a sum according to proof.

58. As a result of defendants' wrongful termination of his employment, plaintiff has suffered general and special damages in sums according to proof.

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59. Defendants' wrongful termination of plaintiff's employment was done inten-

tionally, in a malicious, fraudulent, and/or oppressive manner, and this entitles plaintiff to punitive damages.

60. Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur legal expenses and attorneys' fees. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1021.5 and 1032, *et seq.*, plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in an amount according to proof.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements (Violation of Labor Code §§ 226, *et seq.*, 432, and 1198.5) Against Entity Defendant and Does 1 to 100, Inclusive

61. The allegations set forth in preceding paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

62. Plaintiff alleges that prior to the filing of this action, pursuant to the provisions of the California Labor Code, defendants were required to provide plaintiff with an accounting of each employment document and wage payment containing information required by Labor Code sections 226, 1198.5 and 432, which information includes but is not limited to the number of hours worked, the rates of pay for those hours, and tax withholdings, and failed to do so.

63. California Labor Code section 432 requires employers to give employees a copy of any instrument they sign related to their employment upon request.

64. California Labor Code section 1198.5 requires employers to give current and former employees, or his or her representative, the right to inspect and receive a copy of the personnel records that the employer maintains relating to the employee's performance or to any grievance concerning the employee within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of the employee's request for records.

65. California Labor Code section 226(a) requires each California employer to maintain an accurate itemized statement for each employee of (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked, (3) number of piece-rate units earned and any applicable piece rate

if the employee is paid on a piece-rate basis, (4) all deductions for each employee, provided that all deductions made on written orders of the employee may be aggregated and shown as one item, (5) net wages earned, (6) the inclusive dates of each pay period for which the employee is paid, (7) the name of the employee and only the last four digits of his or her Social Security number or an employee identification number other than a Social Security number, (8) the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer, and (9) all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee. California Labor Code sections 226(b)-(c) require employers to afford current and former employees the right to inspect or receive a copy of records pertaining to their employment within twenty-one (21) calendar days of the employee's request for records.

66. Plaintiff alleges that defendants willfully failed to provide plaintiff with the accounting required by the Labor Code.

67. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that defendants knowingly and intentionally, as a matter of uniform policy and practice, failed to furnish plaintiff with complete and accurate wage statements with respect to their actual regular hours worked, total gross wages earned, all rates of pay, meal and rest period premium wages earned, and total net wages earned, in violation of Labor Code section 226, *et seq.*

68. Defendants' failures create an entitlement to recovery by plaintiff in a civil action for all damages and penalties pursuant to Labor Code sections 226, *et seq.*, 432, and 1198.5, including statutory penalties, civil penalties, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs of suit.

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1	PRAYER	
2	WHEREFORE, plaintiff, John Doe, prays for judgment against defendants	as
3	follows:	
4	1. For general and special damages according to proof;	
5	2. For exemplary damages according to proof;	
6	3. For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on all damages awarded;	
7	4. For reasonable attorneys' fees;	
8	5. For costs of suit incurred;	
9	6. For declaratory relief;	
10	7. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.	
11		
12	ADDITIONALLY, plaintiff, John Doe, demands trial of this matter by jury. The	ne
13	amount demanded exceeds \$35,000.00 (Government Code § 72055).	
14		
15	Dated: March 18, 2024SHEGERIAN & ASSOCIATES, INC.	
16	\square \square	
17	By: <u>Carney Chegerian</u> Carney R Shegerian, Esq.	
18	Attorneys for Plaintiff, JOHN DOE	
19	JOHN ĎOE	
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	PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES	