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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUSSELL FOUTS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ROB BONTA, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of the State of
California,

Defendant.

Case No.: 19-cv-1662-BEN-JLB

DECISION

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is about a California law that makes it a crime to simply possess or carry a billy.¹ This case is not about whether California can prohibit or restrict the use or possession of a billy for unlawful purposes. The law does not define a “billy.”

¹ California Penal Code § 22210 states:
“ . . . any person in this state who manufactures or causes to be manufactured, imports into the state, keeps for sale, or offers or exposes for sale, or who gives, lends, or possesses any leaded cane, or any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a *billy*, blackjack, sandbag, sandclub, sap, or slungshot, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.” (Emphasis added.)

1 Historically, the short wooden stick that police officers once carried on their beat was
2 known as a billy or billy club.² The term remains vague today and may encompass a
3 metal baton, a little league bat, a wooden table leg, or a broken golf club shaft, all of
4 which are weapons that could be used for self-defense but are less lethal than a firearm.

5 Americans have an individual right to keep and bear arms, whether firearms or less
6 lethal arms.³ The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution “guarantee[s] the
7 individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”⁴ The Second
8 Amendment is incorporated against California through the Due Process Clause of the
9 Fourteenth Amendment.⁵ Some people have made the personal decision to not keep and
10 carry a deadly firearm for self-defense. Instead, they sometimes wish to keep or carry a
11 less lethal arm for self-defense. Plaintiffs are two such citizens.

12 Plaintiffs desire to keep and carry a billy or baton for self-defense, but the State
13 considers that against the best interests of the State and defines it as a serious crime.
14 Perhaps an allegory may illustrate the constitutional defect in the statute Plaintiffs’
15 challenge:

16 A young girl is walking home from school one evening. She is walking through a
17 part of town where robberies, assaults, and rapes have occurred; where youth gangs are
18 known to frequent; and where unrestrained dogs are known to roam.

19 The young girl is wearing a baggy, oversized sweatshirt sometimes associated with
20 gang affiliation. In her hand, she is holding a billy—a baton just like the ones law
21 enforcement officers often carry for their protection. An officer sees her walking and
22 sees that she is in possession of the baton. The officer arrests her for violating California
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26 ² See *Fouts v. Bonta*, 561 F. Supp. 3d 941, 951–53 (S.D. Cal. 2021).

27 ³ *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008).

28 ⁴ *Id.* at 606.

⁵ *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).

1 Penal Code § 22210. She is handcuffed, placed in the back of a police car, transported to
2 the police station, booked, fingerprinted, and initiated into the juvenile court system.

3 Although there is no evidence that she has ever struck or threatened to strike
4 anyone with the baton or that she is in danger of hurting herself with it, her mere
5 possession of it is enough. That she was in possession of the billy to protect herself in
6 self-defense from human or animal predators is not determinate. It is irrelevant. And
7 why does California elect to make this girl a criminal? Because there is a risk, no matter
8 how small, that the girl might use it for an unlawful purpose, or that others may use
9 similar weapons for unlawful purposes. The United States Constitution prohibits such
10 intrusions into an otherwise law-abiding citizen's choice for self-defense.

11 The plaintiff in *Caetano v. Massachusetts*, 577 U.S. 411 (2016), used a less than
12 lethal stun gun to protect herself. The Supreme Court held that her use of the stun gun
13 was protected by the Second Amendment for her self-defense. "By arming herself,
14 Caetano was able to protect against a physical threat that restraining orders had proved
15 useless to prevent. And, commendably, she did so by using a weapon that posed little, if
16 any, danger of permanently harming either herself or the father of her children." *Id.* at
17 413 (Alito, J. concurring). If our hypothetical schoolgirl or the Plaintiffs in California
18 choose to have a billy for self-defense, they will find themselves in the same unenviable
19 position of Ms. Caetano, who "[u]nder Massachusetts law . . . Caetano's mere possession
20 of the stun gun that may have saved her life made her a criminal." *Id.*

21 Though California Penal Code § 22210 criminalizes the possession of a less lethal
22 billy for self-defense, federal courts protect the Constitution, and the Constitution
23 protects this citizen choice. The Second Amendment, "is the very product of an interest
24 balancing by the people and it surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-
25 abiding, responsible citizens to use arms for self-defense."⁶ The American tradition is
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28 ⁶ *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1, 26 (2022).

1 rich and deep in protecting a citizen’s enduring right to keep and bear common arms,
2 whether they be rifles, shotguns, pistols, knives, or less lethal arms like stun guns and
3 billies. It is “this balance—struck by the traditions of the American people—that
4 demands our unqualified deference.”⁷

5 **II. REMAND FOR *BRUEN* REVIEW**

6 Previously, summary judgment was entered in favor of Defendant and the case was
7 appealed.⁸ That decision was based on the conclusion that the state statute (in effect
8 since 1923) was “longstanding,” and because it was deemed “longstanding” under older
9 circuit precedent, no further historical inquiry was to be done.⁹ For example, in *Silvester*
10 *v. Harris*, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016), a state statute imposing a firearm purchase
11 waiting period in existence since 1923 was thought of as sufficiently longstanding. In the
12 same way, *Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale*, 779 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2014), suggested that
13 several state statutes from the early twentieth century might nevertheless demonstrate a
14 longstanding regulation. This was the precedent that the Ninth Circuit had decided, and
15 this was the precedent this Court followed. After these decisions, the Supreme Court
16 decided *Bruen*.

17 This case was remanded from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
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22 ⁷ *Id.*

23 ⁸ *Fouts*, 561 F. Supp. 3d at 941.

24 ⁹ *Id.* at 945–46 (“This Court agrees that Cal. Penal Code § 22210 is a longstanding
25 regulation. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, that ends the matter.”); *id.* at 948 (describing
26 the one-step analysis for longstanding regulations set out in *Young v. Hawaii*, 992 F.3d
27 765, 783 (9th Cir. 2021) (*en banc*)) (“Laws restricting conduct that can be traced to the
28 founding era and are historically understood to fall outside of the Second Amendment’s
scope may be upheld without further analysis. Accordingly, a regulation does not burden
conduct protected by the Second Amendment if the record contains evidence that the
subjects of the regulations have been the subject of longstanding, accepted regulation.”).

1 Circuit specifically to consider the challenged law in light of *Bruen*.¹⁰ Under *Bruen*, the
 2 government must affirmatively prove that its criminal statute prohibiting possession of a
 3 billy is part of our historical traditions. It is the text, history, and tradition standard the
 4 Court used in *Heller* and *McDonald*. What is different today is that a statute enacted in
 5 1923 is no longer given a pass for being “longstanding.” Important for this case, it is
 6 clear now that the critical time period is not the early twentieth century. The most
 7 important period is the years following the adoption of the Second Amendment (1791),
 8 and of lesser importance, the years around the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
 9 (1868). For this case, changing the relevant time period changes the outcome.

10 **A. Covered by the Text of the Second Amendment**

11 Plaintiffs are law-abiding citizens who want to possess a commonly-owned billy or
 12 baton¹¹ for lawful purposes. Plaintiffs would acquire, possess, carry and use a billy to
 13 protect themselves, their homes, their families and their businesses.¹² A billy is not an
 14 unusual weapon and both sides have previously agreed that a billy is an “arm.”¹³
 15 Therefore, Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that the prohibited conduct comes
 16 within the text of the Second Amendment. The State takes issue with this starting point.
 17 While it does not contest the fact that Plaintiffs are law-abiding citizens who wish to
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 20 ¹⁰ *Fouts v. Bonta*, No. 21-56039, 2022 WL 4477732, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 22, 2022)
 21 (“This case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the
 22 United States Supreme Court’s decision in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v.*
 23 *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).”).

24 ¹¹ At least one court has found that an expandable baton is not a billy. *People v. Starks*,
 25 130 N.E.3d 556, 564 (Ill. App. 2019) (“Further, a collapsible metal baton is not a specific
 26 type of billy.”). Whether a collapsible baton is a billy need not be decided here in order
 27 to judge the constitutionality of § 22210 as it applies to a billy.

28 ¹² Complaint, ¶¶ 58, 75. Beyond simple possession, § 22210 makes it a crime to
 manufacture, import, keep for sale, sell, or loan a billy. Plaintiffs do not allege an
 intention to engage in any of these other activities with a billy.

¹³ Def’s Supp. Br., Dkt. 51, at 17 n.12 (“Here, the Attorney General does not dispute that
 the billy is an “arm” as described by the Second Amendment.”).

1 possess a billy, the State contends that a billy is not commonly *used* for self-defense.¹⁴
2 But the State has offered no credible evidence. Even if such evidence did exist, it would
3 only be an argument if the Second Amendment said, “the right of the people to keep and
4 bear only those Arms that are commonly used for self-defense, shall not be infringed.”
5 Of course, that is not the case. Use is not required for Second Amendment protection.

6 In *Caetano*, the fact that Ms. Caetano did not actually energize and fire her stun
7 gun made no difference to the Supreme Court. She simply displayed the weapon.
8 According to the Supreme Court, “[s]he stood her ground [and] displayed the stun gun.”¹⁵
9 Absent from the opinion is any discussion of the average number of times a stun gun is
10 energized in an average self-defense scenario. Absent from the opinion is any objective
11 metric counting the frequency with which stun guns have been energized and fired.
12 Instead, the measure of constitutional protection was that the stun gun was “used” in the
13 sense that stun guns are widely owned to satisfy a subjective need for protection and that
14 the number in existence was in the hundreds of thousands. The Constitution recognizes
15 that citizens may simply keep an “arm” against the day when they might want or need to
16 carry or actively use the weapon.¹⁶

17 **B. The Burden Shifts to the Government**

18 *Bruen* instructs courts to next assess whether the initial conclusion is confirmed
19 by the historical understanding of the Second Amendment. For this phase, the burden
20 shifts fully onto the shoulders of the government. Plaintiffs do not shoulder the burden of
21 proving they are entitled to enjoy Second Amendment rights. The command of the
22 Amendment is that the right to keep and bear arms “shall not be infringed.” It follows
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25 ¹⁴ Def’s Supp. Br., Dkt. 51, at 2, 15–22 (“[T]he Attorney General submits that billies are
26 not protected ‘arms’ under the Second Amendment because they are not commonly used
for self-defense purposes.”).

27 ¹⁵ *Caetano*, 577 U.S. at 413, (Alito, J., concurring).

28 ¹⁶ See generally *Duncan v. Bonta*, 17-cv-1017 BEN-JLB, Decision (9/22/23) Dkt. 149, at
20–25.

1 that when a citizen complains, in a facial challenge, that the government is infringing,
2 then it is the government that must carry the burden of justifying its restriction of Second
3 Amendment rights. To borrow a phrase from *Teter v. Lopez*, whether a billy is a
4 “dangerous and unusual” arm is a contention as to which California bears the burden of
5 proof in the second prong of the *Bruen* analysis.¹⁷ Today, the government is short on
6 evidence. Evidence that billies are not commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for
7 lawful purposes, and, evidence of a historical tradition of prohibiting possession of a billy
8 as a crime. In terms of summary judgment, there are no genuine issues of material fact.

9 **C. Nuanced Analogical Reasoning is Unwarranted**

10 *Bruen* identifies a number of guidelines for conducting the historical inquiry. The
11 parties agree that “in some cases . . . this historical inquiry will be ‘fairly
12 straightforward,’ such as when a challenged law addresses a ‘general societal problem
13 that has persisted since the 18th century.’”¹⁸ On the other hand, where a state law
14 concerns a thoroughly modern weapon or an attempt to deal with a modern social ill,
15 courts may have to engage in more nuanced reasoning and consider historical
16 analogues.¹⁹ While both parties agree on the standard, they disagree on which part of the
17 standard to apply here. Plaintiffs see it as a straightforward historical inquiry. The State
18 contends a nuanced analogical approach is needed. If the State is correct, then it need not
19 identify a historical twin; it may instead resort to regulatory analogues.

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22 ¹⁷ *Teter v. Lopez*, 76 F.4th 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2023), *reh’g en banc granted, opinion*
23 *vacated*, No. 20-15948, 2024 WL 719051 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2024). The government in
24 *Teter* argued that a butterfly knife was not an “arm” and that the plaintiff had the burden
25 to prove it is covered by the Second Amendment’s text. The court said, “whether
26 butterfly knives are ‘dangerous and unusual’ is a contention as to which Hawaii bears the
burden of proof in the second prong of the *Bruen* analysis.”

27 ¹⁸ *See, e.g.*, Def’s Supp. Br. in Resp., Dkt. 51, at 13 (quoting *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2131).

28 ¹⁹ Def’s Supp. Br. in Resp., Dkt. 51, at 13 (quoting *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2132) (“[C]ases
implicating unprecedented societal concerns or dramatic technological changes may
require a more nuanced approach.”).

1 The State contends “the [§ 22210] law addresses ‘unprecedented societal concerns’
2 and ‘dramatic technological changes,’”²⁰ but the contention is unconvincing. The State
3 does not identify an unprecedented societal concern. It does propose that the
4 development of metal or synthetic batons is a dramatic technological change. Using
5 metal or synthetic substances in place of wood for a billy may be a change, but it is
6 doubtful whether a weapons expert would say that type of change qualifies as either
7 dramatic or technological.

8 This case concerns a technologically-simple weapon—in essence a wooden stick—
9 and an age old social ill: criminally assaulting another with a stick. So, the *Bruen* inquiry
10 is straightforward. “[W]hen a challenged regulation addresses a general societal problem
11 that has persisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly similar historical
12 regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is
13 inconsistent with the Second Amendment.”²¹ This is precisely the context presented by
14 the billy prohibition.²²

15 To be clear, this particular case could go a different direction if historical
16 analogues like prohibitions on sword canes and slungshots must be considered. They do
17 not, because *Bruen* takes the approach that when an early American weapon is prohibited
18 by current law and the modern social ill is the same as the early American social ill, then
19 courts need only take a straightforward look at how the particular weapon was regulated
20 in early America. A billy was used for self-defense and keeping the peace and
21 (unsurprisingly) sometimes, for criminal purposes in early America.²³ The State’s expert
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23 ²⁰ Def’s Supp. Br. in Resp., Dkt. 51, at 24.

24 ²¹ *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2131.

25 ²² The State is somewhat vague as to the social ill the California legislature intended to
26 remedy. In its post-remand briefing, the State says, “Section 22210 regulates weapons
27 that are especially likely to be used for criminal purposes,” but it offers no statistics on
28 the criminal use of billies in either historical or modern times.

²³ “Common sense tells us that all portable arms are associated with criminals to some
extent.” *Teter*, 76 F.4th at 950; *see also* Declaration of Dennis Baron, Dkt. 51-1, at ¶ 47.

1 Dennis Baron says that in the 1800s the billy was considered both a criminal’s tool and as
 2 a symbol of law and order.²⁴ Because both the weapon and the societal ill existed in
 3 early America, analogical reasoning is not necessary. Only straightforward historical
 4 prohibitions on possessing billy clubs are relevant.

5 Disagreeing, the State points to historical analogues regulating other handheld
 6 weapons in support of its 21st century billy restriction.²⁵ In so doing, the State engages
 7 in 30,000 feet high generalities. In other words, California argues that if states
 8 historically regulated weapon A, then by analogy it can regulate weapon B. And if a state
 9 can regulate how a weapon can be used, then it can regulate how a weapon may be
 10 carried. And if a state can regulate how a weapon may be carried, then it can regulate
 11 whether a weapon can be possessed, at all. However, the State’s argument sits in tension
 12 with *Bruen*’s instructions, so nuanced analogical reasoning is not applied here.

13 **D. The Most Significant Historical Period is 1791, and Secondarily 1868**

14 This case could also go a different direction if the most significant time period
 15 came long after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and into the early 20th
 16 century. That would also be a misreading of *Bruen*. *Bruen* teaches that the most
 17 significant historical evidence comes from 1791, and secondarily 1868. For the Second
 18 Amendment (and other protections in the Bill of Rights), “Constitutional rights are
 19 enshrined with the scope they were understood to have *when the people adopted them.*”²⁶
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21 _____
 22 ²⁴ Declaration of Dennis Baron, Dkt. 51-1, at ¶ 45.

23 ²⁵ Once again, the State contends “the Attorney General need only show that Section
 24 22210 has relevantly similar historical analogues.” Def’s Supp. Br. in Resp., Dkt. 51, at
 25 24; *Id.* (“*Bruen* does not require the Attorney General to identify a ‘historical twin’ or
 26 ‘dead ringer’ for Section 22210. That is because the law addresses ‘unprecedented
 27 societal concerns’ and ‘dramatic technological changes.’”).

28 ²⁶ *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 34 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 634–35); *cf. Kennedy v. Bremerton*,
 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2428 (2022) (“[T]his Court has instructed that the Establishment Clause
 must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings. The line . . .
 has to accord with history and faithfully reflect the understanding of the Founding

1 The Second Amendment was adopted in 1791. “[W]e have generally assumed that the
2 scope of the [Second Amendment] protection applicable to the Federal Government and
3 States is pegged to the public understanding of the right when the Bill of Rights was
4 adopted in 1791.”²⁷ Courts are to “afford greater weight to historical analogues more
5 contemporaneous to the Second Amendment’s ratification.”²⁸ British sources pre-dating
6 the Constitution are not particularly instructive because the American Revolution was a
7 rejection of British rule. And sources post-enactment are not particularly helpful.²⁹
8 “[T]o the extent later history contradicts what the text says, the text controls Thus,
9 post-ratification adoption or acceptance of laws that are inconsistent with the original
10 meaning of the constitutional text obviously cannot overcome or alter that text.”³⁰ Late
11 19th century evidence is not particularly instructive. “[B]ecause post-Civil War
12 discussions of the right to keep and bear arms ‘took place 75 years after the ratification of
13 the Second Amendment, they do not provide as much insight into its original meaning as
14 earlier sources.’”³¹

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17 Fathers.”) (cleaned up); *Riley v. California*, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (“Our cases have
18 recognized that the Fourth Amendment was the founding generation’s response to the
19 reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era.”).

20 ²⁷ *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 37.

21 ²⁸ *Rahimi*, 61 F.4th at 456; *contra Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bondi*, 61 F.4th 1317, 1323 (11th
22 Cir. 2023) (“For most cases, the Fourteenth Amendment Ratification Era understanding
23 of the right to keep and bear arms will differ from the 1789 understanding. And in those
24 cases, the more appropriate barometer is the public understanding of the right when the
25 States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and made the Second Amendment applicable
26 to the States.”).

27 ²⁹ *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 35 (“Similarly, we must also guard against giving postenactment
28 history more weight than it can rightly bear.”).

³⁰ *Id.* at 36 (citations omitted) (cleaned up).

³¹ *Id.* (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 614). There is little reason to rely on laws from the
later part of the 1800s or the 1900s rather than ones put into effect at the time of the
founding. See *Worth v. Harrington*, No. 21-cv-01348-KMM-LIB, 2023 WL 2745673, at
*12 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2023) (“But the Commissioner offers no persuasive reason why

1 **E. The State’s List of Relevant Laws**

2 The State has had lots of opportunity to discover, identify, and highlight historical
3 laws prohibiting the possession of a billy. There is little. To aid in the task of looking for
4 a national “historical tradition of firearm regulation,” the State was directed to create a
5 list of relevant laws regulating arms dating from the time of the adoption of the Second
6 Amendment (1791) to twenty years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
7 (1868 + 20). A list of 250 laws was produced.³² The list begins with an English law
8 prohibition on possessing a launcegay in 1396. [1] In fact, among the list of laws
9 proffered by the State seven are from the 1300s to the 1600s. From the important
10 historical period between 1791 and 1868, the State’s list of laws includes 71 entries.³³
11 Only two state laws during that time period concerned a billy and both laws came after
12 the Civil War.

13 The Supreme Court focuses on the original understanding of the Second
14 Amendment and thus requires courts to give the greatest weight to evidence from the
15 time period of its adoption. That is because not all history carries the same value.
16 “Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when
17 the people adopted them.”³⁴ The Founders and citizens of our country at the time of the
18 adoption of the Bill of Rights had a general understanding of whether the Second
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21 this Court should rely upon laws from the second half of the nineteenth century to the
22 exclusion of those in effect at the time of the founding in light of *Bruen*’s warnings not to
23 give post-Civil War history more weight than it can rightly bear.”); *Firearms Pol’y*
24 *Coalition, Inc. v. McCraw*, No. 4:21-cv-01245-P, 2022 WL 3656996, at *11 (N.D. Tex.
25 Aug. 25, 2022); *United States v. Harrison*, No. CR 22-00328-PRW, 2023 WL 1771138,
26 at *8 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 3, 2023) (quoting *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2136 (Barrett, J.,
27 concurring)); *but see Hanson*, No. CV 22-2256-RC, 2023 WL 3019777, at *16 (“In this
28 case, it is appropriate to apply 20th century history to the regulation at issue.”).

³² See Dkt. 60-1 (filed 1/11/23). Statutes in the State’s List of Laws are referred to herein
by their number on the list as follows: [##].

³³ On the State’s list 166 laws came after 1868 and up to 1932.

³⁴ *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2136 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 634–35).

1 Amendment would protect the right to possess and carry a billy.

2 However, of the 39 representatives who signed the Constitution in 1787, none were
3 alive fifty years later. Both Thomas Jefferson and John Adams died on July 4, 1826.
4 James Monroe died on July 4, 1831. James Madison, known as the “Father of the
5 Constitution” lived the longest, passing away in 1836. During the time the Founders
6 were alive and all of the way up to the end of the Civil War in 1865, there were no state
7 restrictions in any of the states or territories on possessing or carrying a billy. This is the
8 most persuasive evidence that the original understanding of the Second Amendment
9 protects a person’s right to keep and carry a billy.

10 **F. No Billy Laws Before the End of the Civil War**

11 **1. *Linguistics***

12 The Civil War began in 1861 and ended in 1865. The first billy statute appeared in
13 1866 and the second in 1868. Neither statute prohibited simply possessing or openly
14 carrying a billy in the extreme way that California Penal Code § 22210 does. The State’s
15 expert linguist, Professor Baron, says that the weapon named the “billy” is found in
16 English sources and American newspapers at least as early as the 1840s, and opines that
17 this indicates the general public was already familiar with the term.³⁵ Professor Baron
18 also says, “[i]t is clear from these early citations that by the 1840s, in the U.S., ‘billy’
19 referred to both a common, even stereotypical, police weapon and to a weapon used
20 offensively by criminals.”³⁶ A State expert on martial arts and history, Robert Escobar,
21 says that the billy and the baton existed long before the 1840s. Escobar observes, “[l]ong
22 before England’s invention of modern policing by Sir Robert Peel in 1829, blunt
23 weapons, including billy clubs . . . and batons took on countless variations.”³⁷ In fact,
24 “[b]atons of various sorts were symbols of authority in Europe for centuries prior to the
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27 ³⁵ Declaration of Dennis Baron, Dkt. 51-1, at ¶¶ 34–39.

28 ³⁶ *Id.* at ¶ 39, 58.

³⁷ Declaration of Robert Escobar, Dkt. 51-2, at ¶ 34.

1 establishment of the United States.”³⁸ While Professor Baron or Escobar may have found
 2 news accounts of criminal attacks with a billy in 19th century newspapers, evidence of
 3 misuse does not disprove the common sense observation that law-abiding citizens may
 4 have kept billies for lawful uses. Clayton Cramer, Plaintiffs’ expert, observes that any
 5 criminal misuse of a weapon will receive more attention by news media than the many
 6 non-criminal uses or simple possession of the same weapon.³⁹ Consequently, with the
 7 billy’s presence and use in America throughout the 1800s, statutory analogues for other
 8 weapons are not relevant.

9 **2. *The States in 1866 and 1868***

10 After the Civil War, New York enacted the first billy restriction anywhere in the
 11 United States (in 1866). It criminalized *concealing or furtively possessing* any of eight
 12 weapons when done so *with the intent to use the weapon against a person*. [74] The
 13 weapons included the: slung-shot, *billy*, sand club, metal knuckles, dirk or dagger, sword-
 14 cane, and air-gun. [74] Simple *open* possession of a billy was not prohibited as it is
 15 under § 22210. To be clear, laws that penalize the criminal misuse of a weapon, such as
 16 California Penal Code § 245 (assault with deadly weapon)⁴⁰ are not constitutionally
 17 prohibited nor do they suffer from the same infirmity. These kinds of laws promote and
 18 preserve a peaceful and orderly society. Florida enacted the second state law—a
 19 sentencing enhancement—in 1868 for being armed with a billy while committing a
 20 criminal offense. [82] Simple possession of a billy in any other circumstance was
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 23 ³⁸ *Id.* at ¶ 34 (citing “Portrait of Emperor Domitian” holding a baton, by Barnardino
 24 Campi).

25 ³⁹ Expert Rebuttal of Clayton Cramer, Dkt. 59-1, at 34–35.

26 ⁴⁰ The California Supreme Court in *People v. Grubb*, 63 Cal.2d 614, 621 (1965),
 27 described how criminal intent matters for § 22210: “the statute would encompass the
 28 possession of a table leg, in one sense an obviously useful item, when it is detached from
 the table and carried at night in a ‘tough’ neighborhood to the scene of a riot. On the
 other hand the section would not penalize the Little Leaguer at bat in a baseball game.”
Id.

1 unregulated. In 1873, Massachusetts enacted a sentencing enhancement like Florida’s for
2 having a billy if arrested while committing a crime. [99] Like New York and Florida,
3 Massachusetts did not prohibit the simple possession of a billy. Even if three states did
4 prohibit simple possession of a billy (they did not), three states are insufficient to
5 demonstrate a history and tradition of regulation. But it does not matter here.

6 No other state laws concerning a billy are found in the most important period of
7 history, *i.e.*, 1791 to 1868. Neither the New York law nor the Florida statute, and the few
8 others like it that would come later, offer much insight about the original meaning of the
9 Second Amendment. Rounding out the list of state laws concerning a billy in the 1800s,
10 there is an 1886 Maryland law about possessing a billy at an election day polling place⁴¹
11 [167], two concealed carrying restrictions: 1887 Michigan [171], 1893 Rhode Island
12 [201], and a 1890 Oklahoma territorial law [190].

13 **3. *Most of the State’s Laws Come Too Late***

14 The State’s strongest evidence comes in the form of a dozen or so statutes from the
15 years *after* 1868 and up to the 1930s. But those laws are too recent to establish an earlier
16 tradition of billy regulation, and reliance on these late 19th and 20th century laws cannot
17 bear the weight. *Bruen* instructs clearly that “[b]ecause post-Civil War discussions of the
18 right to keep and bear arms ‘took place 75 years after the ratification of the Second
19 Amendment, they do not provide as much insight into the original meaning as earlier
20 sources.’”⁴² Justice Barret reinforces this point in her *Bruen* concurrence, “today’s
21 decision should not be understood to endorse freewheeling reliance on historical practice
22 from the mid-to-late 19th century to establish the original meaning of the Bill of
23

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25
26 ⁴¹ Although not on the State’s list of laws, in 1886, Maryland may have enacted another
27 law prohibiting the concealed carrying of a billy. *See Lawrence v. State*, 475 Md. 384,
28 402–03 (Ct. App. Md. 2021) (describing an 1886 concealed carrying law including a billy
and 1972 amendment removing billy from the list of regulated weapons).

⁴² *Id.*

1 Rights.”⁴³

2 **4. *State v. Workman* Illustrates the Problem With Late 19th Century**
 3 ***Practice***

4 *State v. Workman*, 35 W. Va. 367, 373 (W. Va. 1891), provides a perfect example
 5 of why these later laws cannot be counted on to represent the original constitutional
 6 understanding. Exactly 100 years after the adoption of the Second Amendment, and 55
 7 years after the last Founder passed away, the first court to consider the constitutionality
 8 of a statute prohibiting the carrying of a billy misapprehended the kinds of arms
 9 constitutionally protected. In 1882, West Virginia enacted a prohibition on carrying a
 10 pistol, dirk, bowie knife, razor, slungshot, metal knuckles or billy. [148] This is one of
 11 the late 19th century statutes the State relies on. When a defendant was convicted of
 12 carrying a pistol, the state supreme court considered the types of weapons protected by
 13 the Second Amendment. Unfortunately, the *Workman* court got it half wrong. *Workman*,
 14 35 W. Va. at 373. The state court mistakenly did not regard the pistol or the billy to be
 15 the sorts of arms protected by the Second Amendment. Instead, only weapons of war
 16 were covered by the Constitution, according to *Workman*. As to other kinds of arms,
 17 *Workman* incorrectly observed,

18 in regard to the kind of arms referred to in the [Second]
 19 amendment, it must be held to refer to the weapons of warfare
 20 to be used by the militia, such as swords, guns, rifles, and
 21 muskets,—arms to be used in defending the State and civil
 22 liberty,—and not to pistols, bowie-knife, brass knuckles, *billies*,
 23 and such other weapons

24 (Emphasis added.). In short, *Workman* held that weapons of war *are* protected by the
 25 Second Amendment but found weapons like the billy are not weapons of war, and
 26

27
 28 ⁴³ *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 82 (Barret, J., concurring).

1 therefore are not protected.⁴⁴

2 *Workman* was wrong in concluding the Second Amendment does not cover arms
3 like the pistol and the billy. But, if that was its viewpoint in 1891, it explains why the
4 state legislature may have (also incorrectly) thought it was not infringing on its citizens'
5 Second Amendment rights by prohibiting the simple possession of a billy. Apparently,
6 too many years had passed since the nation's founding. Along the way, the meaning of
7 the Constitution had become muddled. The *Workman* case provides a reason to suspect
8 that other state legislatures during the late 1800s may have likewise incorrectly regarded
9 a billy as beyond the ambit of the Second Amendment. *Workman* is exactly the reason
10 *Bruen* looks to Founding-era laws, not post-Civil War laws, to understand the Bill of
11 Rights.

12 **5. No Tradition is Evident in the 1800s**

13 To summarize, there were no billy laws before the Civil War and in the years
14 following the Civil War through the end of the 1800s, a billy was the subject of seven
15 state laws and one territorial law. Three states prohibited carrying a billy *concealed*.
16 Two states provided *sentencing enhancements*. One prohibited possession only within
17 300 yards of a polling place on an *election day*. Only one state law prohibited simple
18 possession of a billy (West Virginia in 1882) and in that case the state supreme court
19 misconstrued the Second Amendment.

20 Having reviewed each of the 250 laws listed by Defendant, it is quite clear that

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22 ⁴⁴ See also *United States v. Miller*, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (recognizing Second
23 Amendment protection for weapons useful in warfare, unlike a short-barreled shotgun)
24 (“In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a [short-
25 barreled shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
26 efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
27 guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within
28 judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its
use could contribute to the common defense.”).

1 there is no national historical tradition of prohibiting the simple possession, or the open
 2 carrying, of a billy evident during the important period of history when lawmakers still
 3 had an unmolested conception of the original meaning of the Second Amendment. There
 4 is no genuine issue of material fact as to this most important fact. The most that can be
 5 said is that there was the beginning of a late-breaking post-Civil War tendency to prohibit
 6 the concealed carrying of a billy.⁴⁵

7 **6. The Late 1800s**

8 Only seven states in the 1800s had billy restrictions. So, why does the State and its
 9 expert witness say *fourteen* states had “anti-billy club laws” in the 1800s?⁴⁶ The sentence
 10 is inaccurate. The assertion is misleading. And it is important. By giving the impression
 11 that fourteen states had adopted anti-billy laws in the 1800s, the State implies that state
 12 laws were numerous enough to represent a historical tradition. A different story is told
 13 by the State’s own list of laws. A different story is told by the expert’s own data. The
 14 problem with the “fourteen states” claim is that there were actually half that.

15 Where does one find these *other* so-called state laws? It is a bit of rhetorical
 16 legerdemain. Beyond the seven already discussed, there were no other state-wide anti-
 17 billy laws in the 1800s. However, there were municipal ordinances in mostly very small
 18 cities. Consequently, when the State’s expert says, “[f]ourteen states enacted such [billy]
 19 laws in the 1800s,”⁴⁷ it is more accurate to say that there were seven state laws and seven
 20

21
 22 ⁴⁵ Also listed were a handful of municipal ordinances affecting billies, but like territorial
 23 laws, city ordinances shed very little light on whether a national tradition of regulation
 24 existed. *See, e.g.*, the City of St. Louis, Missouri passed a municipal ordinance in 1871
 25 prohibiting concealed carrying of a billy without permission from the mayor. [91] Two
 26 other cities followed suit in 1872 [95, 96], and a fourth city in 1874. [105]

27 ⁴⁶ *See* Def’s Supp. Br. in Resp., Dkt. 51, at 5 (“By 1900, fourteen states (out of 45 plus
 28 the District of Columbia) had passed anti-billy club laws. Spitzer Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. B”);
Id. at 29–30 (“Throughout the 1800s . . . 14 states restricted “billies’ during this period by
 name.”).

⁴⁷ Declaration of Robert Spitzer, Dkt. 51-3, at ¶ 10.

1 city ordinances. Through the end of the 1800s, seven state legislatures had enacted three
 2 concealed carry laws, two sentencing enhancements, one election-day law, and one
 3 constitutionally-suspect West Virginia carrying prohibition.⁴⁸ And when the State’s
 4 expert says, “the earliest law appears to have been enacted in Kansas in 1862,”⁴⁹ what is
 5 meant is that it was the city of Leavenworth, Kansas (pop. 12,606) that had a municipal
 6 ordinance (against concealed carrying).⁵⁰ No state law, anywhere, about a billy existed
 7 before the end of the Civil War. The State’s attorneys embrace and repeat this rhetorical
 8 flourish, writing about the 1800s:

9 In addition, 14 states restricted “billies” during this period of
 10 time by name. Many of these laws were enacted shortly before
 11 and after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.⁵¹

12 But the Court reads the history differently. Once again, there were not fourteen states
 13 (there were seven), and only two laws came close in time to the ratification of the
 14 Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 (not what most would consider “many”).⁵² The rest

17 ⁴⁸ Professor Spitzer’s chart (Exh B) lists the following states and years, but a cursory
 18 review of the underlying statutes and ordinances makes clear that his reference to Kansas
 19 is about an ordinance limited in application to the city of Leavenworth, Kansas (Dkt. 51-
 20 3, at 25). Other municipal ordinances in Spitzer’s chart in order of age are: Missouri – St.
 21 Louis (1871) and St. Joseph (1897) (Dkt. 51-3, at 37–38); New Jersey – Jersey City
 22 (1871) (Dkt. 51-3, at 45); Maryland – City of Annapolis (1872) (Dkt. 51-3, at 29, 31);
 23 Nebraska – Nebraska City (1872), Omaha (1890), Fairfield (1899) (Dkt. 51-3, 42–43);
 24 Iowa – Sioux City (1882) (Dkt. 51-3, at 23–24); Pennsylvania – Johnstown (1897) (Dkt.
 25 51-3, at 61–62); and Oregon – Oregon City (1898) (Dkt. 51-3, at 60).

26 ⁴⁹ *Id.*

27 ⁵⁰ See Declaration of Robert Spitzer, Dkt. 51-3, at Exh C, p.25; *Bevis v. City of*
 28 *Naperville*, 2023 WL 2077392, *11 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2023) (“The city of Leavenworth,
 Kansas passed the first law regulating the billy club in 1862.”).

⁵¹ See Def’s Supp. Br. in Resp., Dkt. 51, at 30 (citing Spitzer Decl. ¶¶ 9–12, Exh B).

⁵² One statute was enacted shortly before the Fourteenth Amendment (New York’s 1866
 carrying a concealed weapon law [74]) and one statute was enacted the same year as the
 Fourteenth Amendment (Florida’s 1868 law punishing possessing a billy while
 committing another crime [82]).

1 came trickling in with one in 1873 and a handful of others in the 1880s and 1890s. Here
2 is another example of the State’s departure from precision in its briefing. The State
3 writes:

4 Defendant identified several state laws, in addition to the
5 municipal regulations that banned possession of billy clubs.
6 *See* Dkt. 60-1 at [74] (1866 New York law), [136] (1881 Illinois
7 law), [160] (1885 New York law); see also Dkt. 60-2 at [230]
8 (1911 New York law), [233] (1913 New York law), [234]
9 (1915 North Dakota law), [236, 237] (1917 California laws).⁵³

10 The parties may read this discussion as overly-pedantic. But for this case, it is important
11 to know *if* there are historical state laws that banned *possession* of a billy club like
12 California Penal Code § 22210 bans possession of a billy club. Unfortunately, the
13 examples cited are not simple possession bans. The State cites the 1866 New York law⁵⁴
14 [74], but that statute did not prohibit simple possession. The New York law prohibited
15 *concealing or furtively possessing* a billy while using, attempting to use, or *intending to*
16 *use a billy against another person*. Next, the State cites an 1881 Illinois law⁵⁵ [136], but
17 that statute did not mention a billy. Three more iterations of New York’s law (1885
18 [160], 1911 [230], 1913 [233]) are listed next,⁵⁶ but like the predecessor statute, these
19 versions still regulated using and concealing as opposed to simple possession of a billy.
20 Finishing up the list of examples given by the State, is a 1915 North Dakota law⁵⁷ [234].
21 However, the North Dakota law applied to concealing, rather than simple possession, and
22 *expressly permitted possession* “to effect a lawful and legitimate purpose.”⁵⁸ To sum up,
23 based on the State’s own excerpts of historical statutes (provided by State expert

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25 ⁵³ Def’s Br. in Resp., Dkt. 67, at 7:19–23.

26 ⁵⁴ *Id.* at 7:20.

27 ⁵⁵ *Id.* at 7:21.

28 ⁵⁶ *Id.* at 7:21–22.

⁵⁷ *Id.* at 7:22.

⁵⁸ *See also State v. Brown*, 38 N.D. 340 (N.D. 1917).

1 Professor Spitzer and attached to his declaration), of the seven state laws the State claims
2 “banned the possession of billy clubs,” only one did—California’s own 1917 statute.⁵⁹

3 It makes it difficult to properly perform the *Bruen* analysis when the State’s expert
4 who has studied gun regulations for thirty years is imprecise in his language, and when
5 the State’s briefing employs a mischaracterization.⁶⁰ After all, the subject of the
6 regulatory “what and when” is the central historical tradition inquiry under *Bruen*. More
7 importantly, it is the government’s central burden to show a national tradition of
8 regulation by reference to state laws and court decisions in effect during the most
9 important historical time period.

10 **7. *The Historical Laws Were Already Known, and Little has Changed***

11 This Court had already identified five of these post-Civil War billy statutes in its
12 previous decision.⁶¹ If the existence of these late 19th century statutes were sufficient to
13 justify California’s billy prohibition, why did the court of appeals remand the case for
14 further consideration in light of *Bruen*? Apparently, it was to give the government an
15 opportunity to identify earlier billy prohibitions and an earlier tradition. As it turns out,
16 there is nothing. Though given lots of opportunity to do so, the State has not shown a
17 tradition of prohibiting the simple possession of a billy during the most important
18 historical time period. There is no genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs are entitled to
19 summary judgment as a matter of law.

20 **8. *Dirks, Daggers, and Bowie Knives***

21 The State needed to identify laws that are similar to its restrictions on a billy—not
22 just on any weapon. The search is straightforward. After all, it can hardly be argued that:
23 (1) a billy represents a dramatic change in technology; or (2) that the State is attempting
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25 ⁵⁹ Def’s Br. in Resp., Dkt. 67, at 7:23.

26 ⁶⁰ See Def’s Supp. Brief in Resp., Dkt. 51, at 5 (“By 1900, fourteen states (out of 45 plus
27 the District of Columbia) had passed anti-billy club laws. Spitzer Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. B”).

28 ⁶¹ See *Fouts*, 561 F. Supp. 3d at 956–57 (citing New York 1866, West Virginia 1882,
Maryland 1886, Michigan 1887, Oklahoma Territory 1891).

1 to address a “modern” societal danger with its 100-year-old law; or (3) the danger of
2 using a non-lethal weapon against another is a danger about which the Founders had no
3 experience.

4 Nevertheless, the State pushes the 30,000 feet high view that historical restrictions
5 on *other* weapons may be wheeled in as analogues to justify its ban on the billy. After
6 all, there is something of a tradition of concealed carrying regulation for *other* hand-held
7 weapons. Quite a few states prohibited the concealed carrying of dirks, daggers, bowie
8 knives, bludgeons, swords, sword canes, and slungshots in the important years between
9 1791 and 1868. In fact, even California enacted an 1863 law prohibiting the concealed
10 carrying of a dirk, a pistol, a sword cane, or a slungshot. [72] It is significant that
11 California did not include a billy at that time. Perhaps the legislature understood that the
12 Second Amendment protected possession of a billy for lawful purposes like self-
13 defense.⁶²

14 Today, California heavily regulates a number of other non-firearm weapons such
15 as: a dirk or dagger in § 21310, a ballistic knife in § 21110, a writing pen knife in §
16 20910, a lipstick case knife in § 20610, a cane sword in § 20510, and metal knuckles in §
17 21810, to name a few. Some of these current prohibitions may be justified by a historical
18 tradition of regulating these particular weapons. But it is not a correct application of
19 *Bruen* to lump all such arms together in some sort of regulatory potpourri where a
20 traditional prohibition on carrying a dirk or dagger is sort-of-similar-enough to justify
21 criminalizing a person’s possession of a billy.

22 First, a billy is a most basic weapon. A billy can be improvised from common
23 wood sticks, table legs, broom handles, or dowel rods. To manufacture a billy, one does
24 not need metal working skills like one needs to make prohibited metal knuckles. A billy
25 does not require sharpening skills like one requires to fashion prohibited dirks, daggers,
26

27 ⁶² After realizing it hurt law-abiding citizens, California’s statute was repealed in 1870.
28 See Rebuttal of Clayton Cramer, Dkt. 59-1, at 28–29.

1 or bowie knives. A billy does not require blacksmith skills as a person would need to
2 forge a prohibited sword cane. And a billy does not require the tools and leather crafting
3 skills like those required to create a prohibited lead sap or slungshot.

4 Second, it is black letter law that penal statutes are to be drafted and interpreted
5 with specificity so as to give notice to ordinary citizens about what is prohibited to afford
6 due process. That is because “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
7 act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
8 meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of
9 law.”⁶³

10 Consequently, when the State imprecisely argues that regulations on “launcegays”
11 and “demy hakes” suffice to justify a prohibition on a billy,⁶⁴ it does so in the face of an
12 American tradition of employing greater precision of language when defining and
13 proscribing crimes. If state legislatures wanted to include the billy in their lists of
14 regulated hand-held weapons, they surely knew how to do so. From the State’s own
15 briefing comes a handy example. Today, Illinois prohibits the carrying of a billy with the
16 intent to use it unlawfully against another but does not prohibit simple possession. *See*
17 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1(a)(2). At the same time, Illinois prohibits the simple
18 possession of other weapons including a bludgeon, black-jack, slung-shot, sand-bag, and
19 metal knuckles. *See* 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1(a)(1). The legislature knew how to
20 distinguish a bludgeon in subsection (1) from a billy in subsection (2). Being criminal
21 statutes, the Illinois courts are careful to respect these statutory distinctions. In two
22 different cases the Illinois courts distinguished between possession of “a simple
23 nightstick or billy” (permissible) and a bludgeon (prohibited). *People v. Starks*, 130
24 N.E.3d 556 (Ill. 2019); *People v. Fink*, 419 N.E.2d 86 (Ill. 1981). That California (from
25 1863 to 1870), like many other states, specified numerous prohibited weapons by name,
26

27 ⁶³ *Connally v. General Constr. Co.*, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).

28 ⁶⁴ Def’s Br. in Resp., Dkt. 67, at 4.

1 but did not specify as prohibited the billy, is substantial un rebutted evidence that a person
2 had a right to carry the basic everyday arm.

3 Third, even if knife regulations were relevant, they would not help the State much.
4 There were laws restricting bowie knives in some states in the 1800s, but not the vast
5 majority of states. There is little evidence of actual prosecutions for simply possessing a
6 bowie knife, much less a judicial opinion on its purported constitutionality. In fact, one
7 court observed that the Tennessee bowie knife law was generally disregarded.⁶⁵ The
8 argument that a cluster of laws prohibiting the carrying of dangerous knives could justify
9 a gun ban, lost its wind in *McDonald*. If the regulation of knives was not a sufficient
10 basis for restricting handguns in Chicago, neither are historical regulations of dirks,
11 daggers, and bowie knives useful for justifying a prohibition on possessing a billy in
12 California.

13 **G. Severability**

14 California Penal Code § 22210 prohibits the making, selling, and possessing of a
15 long list of non-firearm weapons, including the billy. The prohibitions regarding the billy
16 are unconstitutional. The question then becomes whether the unconstitutional part of
17 § 22210 can be severed from the rest. It can.

18 “‘Severability is of course a matter of state law.’ To determine whether a state
19 statute is severable, we are bound by state statutes and state court opinions.” *Project*
20 *Veritas v. Schmidt*, 72 F.4th 1043, 1063 (9th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). In California,
21 courts first look to a severability clause. *See Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc.*, 784
22 F.3d 1320, 1325 (9th Cir. 2015) (*en banc*) (citing *Cal. Redev. Ass’n v. Matosantos*, 53
23 Cal. 4th 231 (Cal. 2011)). Section 22210 does not have a severability clause.

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26 ⁶⁵ *See, e.g., Day v. State*, 37 Tenn. 496, 499 (Tenn. 1858) (“It is a matter of surprise that
27 these sections of this act, so severe in their penalties, *are so generally disregarded* in our
28 cities and towns.”) (describing state law prohibiting the concealed carrying of bowie
knives) (emphasis added).

1 Nevertheless, there are three additional criteria that may be considered: whether the
2 invalid provision is grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable. *Cal. Redev.*
3 *Ass'n*, 53 Cal. 4th at 271.

4 Here, all three criteria are met. First, removing “billy” from the list in § 22210,
5 does not change the grammatical structure. Grammatical separability exists because the
6 invalid part (billy) can be removed as a whole without affecting the wording or coherence
7 of what remains and the revised provision is perfectly coherent. *Id.* Second, there is
8 functional separability because the remainder of the statute is complete. *Id.* Third, the
9 volitional separability test is met because it seems obvious that the remainder of § 22210
10 would have been adopted by the legislature, had it foreseen the partial invalidation of the
11 statute. *Id.*; *see also Sam Francis Found.*, 784 F.3d at 1326. Accordingly, the term
12 “billy” is hereby severed from the remainder of § 22210.

13 **III. CONCLUSION**

14 The Second Amendment protects a citizen’s right to defend one’s self with
15 dangerous and lethal firearms. But not everybody wants to carry a firearm for self-
16 defense. Some prefer less-lethal weapons. A billy is a less-lethal weapon that may be
17 used for self-defense. It is a simple weapon that most anybody between the ages of eight
18 and eighty can fashion from a wooden stick, or a clothes pole, or a dowel rod. One can
19 easily imagine countless citizens carrying these weapons on daily walks and hikes to
20 defend themselves against attacks by humans or animals. To give full life to the core
21 right of self-defense, every law-abiding responsible individual citizen has a
22 constitutionally protected right to keep and bear arms like the billy for lawful purposes.
23 In early America and today, the Second Amendment right of self-preservation permits a
24 citizen to “‘repel force by force’ when ‘the intervention of society in his behalf, may be
25 too late to prevent that injury.’”⁶⁶ The Founders of our country anticipated that as our
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27

28 ⁶⁶ *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 594.

1 nation matured circumstances might make the previous recognition of rights undesirable
2 or inadequate. For that event, the Founders provided a built-in vehicle by which the
3 Constitution could be amended, but a single state, no matter how well intended, may not
4 do so, and neither can this court.

5 Plaintiffs in this case challenge California Penal Code § 22210 as it applies to a
6 billy. It is declared that the prohibition on a billy unconstitutionally infringes the Second
7 Amendment rights of American citizens and it is hereby enjoined.


8 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:**

9 Summary judgment is entered for Plaintiffs. The following permanent injunction
10 is effective immediately:

11 1. Defendant Attorney General Rob Bonta, and his officers, agents, servants,
12 employees, and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with him,
13 and those duly sworn state peace officers and federal law enforcement officers who gain
14 knowledge of this injunction order or know of the existence of this injunction order, are
15 enjoined from implementing or enforcing California Penal Code § 22210 as it applies to a
16 billy.

17 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

18 Dated: February 23, 2024



19 **HON. ROGER T. BENITEZ**
20 Senior United States District Judge
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