

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

President Donald J. Trump,
Petitioner,

v.

Fani Willis, Esq.,
in her capacity as District Attorney for
the Atlanta Judicial Circuit,

&

Hon. Robert McBurney,
in his capacity as Superior Court
Judge for the Atlanta Judicial Circuit,
Respondents.

No. 2023CV382670

AMENDMENT TO PETITION FOR WRITS OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION

Five days ago, President Donald J. Trump petitioned the Court for writs of mandamus and prohibition to vindicate breaches of his rights under the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Georgia—every other avenue to remedy which he has been stripped of. Those breaches persist and, to ensure the Court can consider the full breadth of Respondents’ transgressions, the related claims for relief, and the evidence to support both, Petitioner files this amendment to his 14 July petition, as OCGA § 9-11-15(a) permits.

☞

Reassertion of Original Grounds

- (1) To begin, Petitioner reasserts every contention of fact and law contained in his original, 13 July petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition. Nothing in the last five days has slowed, much less halted, Respondents’ trespasses on Petitioner’s rights, or the imminent harm they portend. To the contrary, every sign points to Respondents’ staying the course—Petitioner’s rights notwithstanding. Indeed, it is because Respondents remain undeterred that Petitioner files this amendment.

Incorporation of Arguments and Evidence

(2) As indicated above and in his original petition, Petitioner asserted these claims in a motion filed under No. 2022EX24, albeit differently structured. That motion, along with its exhibits, are the background of and foundation for this petition. Petitioner has attached those documents as exhibits to this amendment and incorporates their substance. See OCGA § 9-11-10(c). That document and its exhibits are:

- **Ex. 1:** Mot. to Quash Special Purpose Grand Jury Report, Preclude the Use of Evid. Derived Therefrom & Disqualify the Fulton County Dist. Att’y’s Off. (Mar. 20, 2023);
 - **Ex. 1-1:** Ord. Approving Req. for Special Purpose Grand Jury (Jan. 24, 2021);
 - **Ex. 1-2:** Ltr. Req. Special Purpose Grand Jury (Jan. 20, 2021) ;
 - **Ex. 1-3:** Tr. of Special Purpose Grand Jury Hr’g before Hon. Robert C. McBurney (Jan. 24, 2023);
 - **Ex. 1-4:** Ord. Disqualifying Dist. Att’y’s Off. as to Sen. Jones Only (Jul. 25, 2022);
 - **Ex. 1-5:** List of Fulton Cnty. Dist. Att’y’s Media Appearances and Social Media Posts;
 - **Ex. 1-6:** Ord. Dissolving Special Purpose Grand Jury & Setting Hr’g on Publication (Jan. 9, 2023);
 - **Ex. 1-7:** Ord. re: Special Purpose Grand Jury’s Final Report (Feb. 13, 2023);
 - **Ex. 1-8:** List of Grand Jury Foreperson’s Media Appearances;
 - **Ex. 1-9:** List of Supervising J.’s Media Appearances;
 - **Ex. 1-10:** Ord. Den. Gov. Kemp’s Mot. to Quash (Aug. 29, 2022);

- **Ex. 1-11:** Tr. of Special Purpose Grand Jury Hr’g before Hon. Robert C.I. McBurney (Aug. 25, 2022);
- **Ex. 1-12:** Tr. of Special Purpose Grand Jury Hr’g before Hon. Robert C.I. McBurney (Jul. 25, 2022);
- **Ex. 1-13:** Ord. Den. Mot. to Recons. Disqualification Req. (Aug. 25, 2022);
- **Ex. 1-14:** Cert. of Material Witness Pursuant to the Unif. Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State (OCGA § 24-13-90 et seq.) (Sen. Lindsey Graham); (Jul. 11, 2022);
- **Ex. 1-15:** Cert. of Material Witness Pursuant to the Unif. Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State (OCGA § 24-13-90 et seq.) (Mark Meadows); (Aug. 25, 2022); and
- **Ex. 1-16:** Ord. Entering Portions of the Special Purpose Grand Jury’s Final Report into Ct. Rec. (Jan. 16, 2023).

(3) Petitioner’s filings in No. 2022EX24 do not paint the whole picture. To fairly assess the legal errors that have brought Petitioner to this point, the Court should consider the State and intervenors’ filings, too. Thus, in addition to the documents under ¶ (2), Petitioner includes as exhibits to this amendment:

- **Ex. 2:** State’s Resp. to Mot. (May 15, 2023); and
- **Ex. 3:** Br. of Media Intervenors in Supp. of the Pub. Filing of the Grand Jury Report (Jan. 23, 2023).

(4) Finally in this vein, Petitioner alerts the Court to further, recently revealed, extrajudicial evidence in support of his contentions. These additional items bear principally on the need for the District Attorney’s disqualification from the recently initiated grand-jury proceedings. They include the District

Attorney's recent campaign-finance disclosures, which lay bare her disqualifying personal interest in this case.

- **Ex. 4:** Campaign finance disclosures.¹

(5) Placed next to her extrajudicial social media posts about Petitioner and her pursuit of him—themselves a violation of Ga. R. Professional Conduct 3.8(f), the District Attorney's campaign-finance disclosures expose that she is fundraising for her reelection campaign on the back of this case, just as Petitioner has previously argued:

(a) The District Attorney personally retweeted requests for followers and campaign donations which referenced her prosecution of this investigation. Not only did her followers grow nearly 100-fold (from a couple thousand to one-hundred thousand) in a matter of days, but her campaign also gained most of its 2022 donations as a result of those efforts.²

(b) In 2022, according to her campaign disclosure report, the District Attorney received a total of 737 donations—533 of those donations came in the days immediately following her retweeting requests for donations and followers in light of this investigation, which Petitioner highlighted in his original motion. See Motion to Quash, attached hereto as Exhibit 1, Sec. 4(B)(ii). To be clear, those donations comprise 72.3% of the District Attorney's 2022 individual campaign.³ Despite the District Attorney being a state prosecutor in a single-county circuit, less than 8% of her donations came from Georgians. The other 92% were from 45 other states.

¹ This is a redacted version of the District Attorney's 2022 Campaign Finance Disclosure Report, having removed personally identifiable information. The full, unredacted report is available on the Georgia Campaign Finance Systems website at www.efile.ethics.ga.gov.

² This information was unavailable to Petitioner until June 29, 2023 when the District Attorney filed her 2022 campaign disclosure report.

³ All cited percentages relate to the number of contributions not the monetary amount of such contributions.

Clarification of Disqualification Argument

- (6) When Petitioner first urged the District Attorney's disqualification from this matter, the special purpose grand jury had been dissolved and a regular grand jury had not yet been impaneled. Consequently, the District Attorney rejoined, *inter alia*, that Petitioner's challenge was untimely. That was then, however.
- (7) Now, regarding this investigation, the District Attorney has indicated publicly that she is seeking a bill of indictment from a regular grand jury which was empaneled last week. Regardless of whether Petitioner's disqualification claim vis-à-vis the special purpose grand jury's proceeding was timely, his claim vis-à-vis the *regular* grand jury is. *See generally Shuttleworth v. Rankin-Shuttleworth of Georgia, LLC*, 328 Ga. App. 593, 596 (2014) (explaining how courts evaluate the timeliness of a disqualification challenge).
- (8) Further, the parties debated the correct standard for disqualifying a prosecutor because of an actual conflict of interest, as opposed to forensic misconduct. Petitioner relied on *Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.*, 481 U.S. 787 (1987), which the District Attorney claimed was inapposite.
- (9) Lest there be any doubt, *Young* sets out the *due process* standard for disqualifying a prosecutor. It stands for the proposition that the presence of a prosecutor who has an actual conflict of interest requires disqualification, without further inquiry into whether the conflict affected the prosecutor's conduct.
 - (a) In *Young*, a federal district presiding over a trademark dispute awarded the plaintiffs an injunction, which defendants subsequently violated, subjecting them to contempt. 481 U.S. at 790–91. The district court appointed plaintiff's counsel, who still represented plaintiffs and who had secured from them the injunction, to represent the government in a criminal contempt proceeding. *Id.* at 791.
 - (b) The actual conflict between the lawyers' duty to zealously advocate for plaintiffs (whose interests were contrary to defendants') was in

hopeless conflict with their obligation as prosecutors to see justice done in the criminal matter. *Id.* at 803–05; accord Ga. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(d).

- (c) “Regardless of whether the appointment of private counsel in this case resulted in any prosecutorial impropriety,” the Court held, “that appointment illustrates the *potential* for private interest to influence the discharge of public duty.” *Young*, 481 U.S. at 805 (emphasis original). Thus, it mattered not whether the appointed prosecutors would have behaved identically had they not had conflicting duties; that they were laboring under the actual conflict, without more, tainted the proceedings. Cf. *Cuyler v. Sullivan*, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (holding that a defendant predating an ineffective-assistance claim on *defense counsel’s* having labored under an actual conflict of interest must show that the conflict *affected* the representation).
 - (d) Thus, to prevail under *Young*, Petitioner need show only that the District Attorney is laboring under an actual conflict of interest. He need not prove that she behaved differently because of the conflict than she would have without it. Neither can she claim a lack of effect as a defense. That the District Attorney is conflicted, without more, undermines the fundamental fairness of the proceedings.
- (10) The District Attorney is indeed laboring under an actual conflict in the regular grand jury proceedings. The Respondent Superior Court Judge already found that the District Attorney’s having hosted a fundraiser for a target’s political opponent constituted an actual conflict. Thus, “there [was] a significant risk that ... [her] duties to ... a third person [would] materially and adversely affect” her duty to impartially seek justice in the case underlying this petition. Ga. R. Professional Conduct 1.7(a). That was and is enough to require her disqualification under *Young*.
- (11) If the Court requires more, however, the District Attorney has provided it: She has personally inserted herself into Twitter campaigns requesting donations and followers while referencing her prosecution of this case.

What's more, she retweeted a political cartoon depicting Petitioner in a negative light.⁴ For a District Attorney to personally request donations and followers based on the prosecution or investigation of one named individual, especially when it heightens public condemnation of the accused, is clear evidence of conflict. The District Attorney's desire to fund her reelection incentivizes her to pursue Petitioner more aggressively than she otherwise might. See Ga. R. Prof. Conduct 3.8(a). So again, "there is a significant *risk* that the [District Attorney's] own interests ... will materially and adversely affect" her obligation to impartially administer justice in her attempts to indict Petitioner. Ga. R. Professional Conduct 1.7(a) emphasis added. In such circumstances, *Young* requires her disqualification. Although it may inevitably be the case that the public's interest in a prosecution will drive donations for a prosecutor's reelection, here, the District Attorney's personal involvement in those efforts and her use of politically charged material in so doing creates the conflict which requires her disqualification. *Cf. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar*, 575 U.S. 433 (2015).

Conclusion

As with last week's submission, Petitioner now awaits the product of Respondents' constitutionally flawed process. Petitioner cannot sit on his hands while a prosecutor with a disqualifying personal interest uses unconstitutionally obtained evidence to drag him ultimately into a courtroom. Petitioner requests that this Court issue a Mandamus Nisi and that the matter be scheduled pursuant to the emergency motions provision set forth in Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.7.

⁴ In Respondent's brief in Response to Petitioner's Motion to Quash, the State erroneously indicated that Petitioner ("Movant") was not depicted in that cartoon. That is not the case.

Respectfully submitted on 19 July 2023 by:

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Hon. Robert McBurney,
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No. 2023CV382670

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that I have on this day served copies of the within Amendment to Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition to via email to:

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Respectfully submitted,

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Exhibit 1

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA


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IN RE: SPECIAL PURPOSE
GRAND JURY

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Case No.: 2022-EX-000024

Hearing Requested



**MOTION TO QUASH THE SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY REPORT, TO
PRECLUDE THE USE OF ANY EVIDENCE DERIVED THEREFROM, AND TO
RECUSE THE FULTON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE**

Comes now, President Donald J. Trump, by and through undersigned counsel and files this Motion to Quash the Special Purpose Grand Jury Report and Preclude any State prosecuting agency from presenting or utilizing any evidence or testimony derived by the Special Purpose Grand Jury (hereinafter "SPGJ") in the above-referenced matter. Movant additionally requests that the District Attorney's Office be disqualified from any further involvement in this matter. This motion is based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Ga. Const. Art. I, § I, Paras. I and XVI, and all other applicable federal and state laws.¹

By agreement of the Fulton County Superior Court bench, Chief Judge Christopher Brasher authorized the impaneling of the special purpose grand jury, assigned its supervision to Judge Robert McBurney (hereinafter "Supervising Judge"), and the SPGJ was subsequently dissolved on January 9, 2023. Because this motion raises issues as to the governance of the SPGJ and the propriety of the Supervising Judge's conduct, Movant respectfully requests this motion be heard by the judicial officer responsible for impaneling the SPGJ, the Chief Judge, or a duly assigned Fulton County Superior Court judge other than the Supervising Judge. Undersigned Counsel requests a hearing on the matters set forth below.

¹ Hereinafter, said violations will collectively be referred to as "Fifth Amendment violations."

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Exhibit 2: January 20, 2021 Letter Requesting Special Purpose Grand Jury.

Exhibit 3: Transcript of January 24, 2023 Special Purpose Grand Jury Hearing before the Honorable Robert C.I. McBurney, Atlanta Georgia, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

Exhibit 4: July 25, 2022 Order Disqualifying District Attorney's Office as to Senator Jones Only, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

Exhibit 5: List of Fulton County District Attorney's Media Appearances and Social Media Posts.

Exhibit 6: January 9, 2023 Order Dissolving Special Purpose Grand Jury and Setting Hearing on Publication, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

Exhibit 7: February 13, 2023 Order Re: Special Purpose Grand Jury's Final Report, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

Exhibit 8: List of Foreperson's Media Appearances.

Exhibit 9: List of Supervising Judge's Media Appearances.

Exhibit 10: August 29, 2022 Order Denying Motion to Quash (Governor Kemp), In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

Exhibit 11: Transcript of August 25, 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury Hearing

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Exhibit 12: Transcript of July 25, 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury Hearing before the Honorable Robert C.I. McBurney, Atlanta Georgia, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

Exhibit 13: August 25, 2022 Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Disqualification Request, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

Exhibit 14: July 11, 2022 Certificate of Material Witness Pursuant to the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State, Codified in the State of Georgia as OCGA 24-13-90 et seq (Lindsey Graham), In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

Exhibit 15: August 25, 2022 Certificate of Material Witness Pursuant to the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State, Codified in the State of Georgia as OCGA 24-13-90 et seq (Mark Meadows), In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

Exhibit 16: January 16, 2023 Ordering Entering Portions of Special Purpose Grand Jury's Final Report into Court Record, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 24, 2022, the Chief Judge of the Fulton County Superior Court entered an order approving the request made by the Fulton County District Attorney's Office (hereinafter the "FCDA's Office") to impanel a special purpose grand jury pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 et. seq. Ex. 1. The order of the Court merely echoed the recitation of need outlined by the FCDA's Office in their letter to the Court which specified:

[A] special purpose grand jury [should] be impaneled for the purpose of investigating the facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to possible attempts to disrupt the lawful administration of the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia. Ex. 2.

The letter informed the Court that this rarely used investigative body was necessary because the FCDA's Office anticipated that the investigation would be a lengthy, complex process which a regular sitting grand jury wouldn't be able to complete in addition to their regular duties. *Id.* In the letter, the FCDA's Office made it abundantly clear that they understood that this SPGJ would be without authority to return an indictment. *Id.*

The laws that authorized this special purpose grand jury have existed in the Georgia Code since 1974 but have rarely been utilized and even more rarely litigated. The statutes themselves are vague and have left much to interpretation; further, the case law regarding the process and function of the special purpose grand jury is similarly scant, unclear and sometimes contradictory. This is the framework within which the FCDA's Office has chosen to undertake this investigation of undoubtedly historic and national significance. This is the framework which has been revealed through this process to be erroneous and, more importantly, unconstitutional.

For approximately eight months, the SPGJ met at the direction of the FCDA's Office. Pursuant to the impaneling order, the Supervising Judge was tasked with overseeing and assisting the SPGJ as well as charging said grand jury and receiving its reports. Ex. 1. The SPGJ considered evidence and heard from over 75 witnesses all within the walls of the Fulton County Justice Center. Ex. 3 at 6 (special purpose grand jury heard testimony from 75 witnesses). Over those eight months, movant President Donald J. Trump remained a non-witness as he was never subpoenaed nor asked to testify. Throughout the investigation, the elected District Attorney of Fulton County Fani Willis (hereinafter referred to as "FCDA") was the "very public face of this investigation" and routinely sat for interviews with various media outlets regarding the matter. Ex. 4 at 3, *see also* Ex. 5.

The Supervising Judge dissolved the SPGJ on January 9, 2023. Ex. 6. In his order of dissolution, the Supervising Judge, recognizing that the next steps of this process were unclear, invited briefing from the FCDA's Office and the media (notably excluding any other parties including witnesses and targets), and set a hearing on the issue of publication. Ex. 3 at 2. While stating the statute directed him to release the report, the Supervising Judge cited due process concerns in ultimately ruling that only a small portion of the report would become public at that time. Ex. 7 at 5 ("[T]he consequence of these due process deficiencies is not that the special purpose grand jury's final report is forever suppressed or that its recommendations for or against indictment are in any way flawed or suspect. Rather, the consequence is that those recommendations are for the District Attorney's eyes only – for now. Fundamental fairness requires this[.]").

However, on February 21, 2023, in contravention of the order of the Supervising Judge, the nation was given a view inside the SPGJ process when, in a bizarre turn of events, the SPGJ

foreperson engaged in a media tour where she shared the specifics of her experience publicly.²

Ex. 8. The foreperson's public comments reveal that both the procedures set forth for the SPGJ, as well as the application of those procedures by the Supervising Judge and the FCDA's Office, failed to protect the most basic procedural and substantive constitutional rights of all individuals discussed by this investigative body. Compounding the harm inflicted by the foreperson's public comments, the Supervising Judge then gave numerous media interviews despite still presiding over this pending matter. Ex. 9.

This motion addresses the following issues which violate the principles of fundamental fairness and due process: (1) the unconstitutionality of the special purpose grand jury statutes as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 et. seq., both facially and as applied in this case, (2) the existing, actual conflict suffered by the FCDA's Office (specifically the FCDA) which has been exacerbated by instances of forensic misconduct and improper extrajudicial activity such that the FCDA's Office must be disqualified from this matter, (3) the unconstitutional taint infecting the grand jury proceeding and the corresponding taint on the potential grand jury (and petit jury) pool, and (4) the unconstitutional taint inflicted on the grand jury proceedings and potential grand jury (and petit jury) pool by the in-court as well as the extrajudicial statements made by the Supervising Judge.³

First, the special purpose grand jury statutes are unconstitutionally vague, resulting in disparate application. The statutes are silent as to key powers and duties of the grand jury, and they do not prescribe what shall be included in the report, nor do they specify how or if it should

² Since that time, additional grand jurors have also spoken out. Ex. 8 at No. 11.

³ The concept of fundamental fairness is "essential to the very concept of justice," and is the cornerstone of due process. *Lisenba v. California*, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).

be disseminated. The failures in the statutory framework directly impact the fundamental fairness of the proceedings and violate the due process rights of the individuals involved.

Second, the Supervising Judge applied the statutes in a way that violated the due process rights of the individuals involved when he held, contrary to Georgia precedent, that this SPGJ was a *criminal* grand jury. That determination had a negative ripple effect on the constitutional integrity of the entire process as it permitted the compulsion of testimony from out-of-state witnesses and impacted the application of core constitutional privileges such as the Fifth Amendment and sovereign immunity.

Third, the Supervising Judge improperly disqualified the FCDA's Office from investigating a singular target when it was instead required to exclude the FCDA's Office from the entire investigation. The resulting prejudicial taint cannot be excised from the results of the investigation or any future prosecution by the FCDA's Office. Additionally, the FCDA's media interviews violate prosecutorial standards and constitute forensic misconduct, and her social media activity creates the appearance of impropriety compounding the necessity for disqualification.

Fourth, the foreperson's and grand jurors' comments illuminate the lack of proper instruction and supervision over the grand jury relating to clear evidentiary matters which violates the notions of fundamental fairness and due process. The results of the investigation cannot be relied upon and, therefore, must be suppressed given the constitutional violations. The foreperson's public comments in and of themselves likewise violate notions of fundamental fairness and due process and taint any future grand jury pool.

Finally, the Supervising Judge's improper conduct tainted the proceeding and similarly violated notions of fundamental fairness and due process. The Supervising Judge made inappropriate and prejudicial comments relating to the conduct under investigation as well as potential witnesses' invocation of the Fifth Amendment. He improperly applied the law and subsequently denied appellate review while knowing his application of the law in that manner had vast implications on the constitutionality of the investigation. His nexus to certain aspects of the SPGJ and subsequent drafting of the report, in combination with his prior rulings, necessitate review by the Chief Judge of the Fulton County Superior Court.

Accordingly, President Donald J. Trump hereby moves to quash the SPGJ's report and preclude the use of any evidence derived therefrom, as it was conducted under an unconstitutional statute, through an illegal and unconstitutional process, and by a disqualified District Attorney's Office who violated prosecutorial standards and acted with disregard for the gravity of the circumstances and the constitutional rights of those involved. Movant further requests that this Court disqualify the FCDA from any further proceedings in this matter, including any indictments and/or prosecutions, as her disqualifying conflict already found by the Supervising Judge commanded and commands this result.

II. STANDING

Although Movant, President Donald J. Trump, was not a witness who appeared before the SPGJ, his constitutional rights are clearly implicated in this matter. Georgia jurisprudence broadly recognizes standing of non-parties whose rights have or may be infringed upon by the illegal acts of the State or unconstitutional statutes to challenge the same: "[I]t has been recognized that the only prerequisite to attacking the constitutionality of a statute 'is a showing that it is hurtful to the attacker.'" *Bo Fancy Prods. V. Rabun Cty. Bd. Of Comm'rs*, 267 Ga. 341,

344 (1996) (quoting *Stewart v. Davidson*, 218 Ga. 760, 764 (1963)). “In order to challenge a statute or an administrative action taken pursuant to a statute, the plaintiff must normally show that it has interests or rights which *are or will be affected* by the statute or the action.” *Atlanta Taxicab Co. Owners Ass’n v. City of Atlanta*, 281 Ga. 342, 345 (2006) (quoting *Preservation Alliance of Savannah v. Norfolk Southern Corp.*, 202 Ga. App. 116, 117 (1991) (emphasis added)). Additionally, under Georgia law, parties impacted by grand jury reports have standing to challenge the release of those reports. See *In re Floyd County Grand Jury Presentments for May Term 1996*, 225 Ga. App. 705 (1997) (Attorney General entitled to expungement of grand jury report); *In re July-August, 2003 County Grand Jury*, 265 Ga. App. 870 (2004) (DeKalb County CEO entitled to expungement of ultra vires portions of report); *Kelley v. Tanksley*, 105 Ga. App. 65 (1961) (Solicitor entitled to partial expungement of report which by implication and innuendo accused him of malpractice).

President Trump was inextricably intertwined with this investigation since its inception. The efforts under investigation squarely relate to his bid for a second term as President of the United States. The investigation began as a result of a conference call amongst numerous parties including Secretary of State Raffensperger and President Trump, and the call was the first piece of evidence reviewed by the SPGJ.⁴ President Trump was mentioned in every news report and virtually every filing related to this matter and has remained a central figure, both in public perception and the court record, throughout this investigation.⁵ Each time the FCDA and

⁴ See *The Fulton County District Attorney’s Letter*, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 20, 2021), <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/02/02/us/politics/letters-to-georgia-officials-from-fulton-district-attorney.html>; See also, Ex. 8 at No. 2.

⁵ See Docket, Fulton County Clerk Superior & Magistrate Courts, <http://www.fultonclerk.org/DocumentCenter/Index/94?GridorderBy=LastModifiedDate-desc> (last visited Mar. 17, 2023).

Supervising Judge subpoenaed an out-of-state witness, President Trump or the Trump Campaign was mentioned in the language of the certificate of need as well as the order compelling that witness's testimony; the same was true for most motions filed in the matter. *Id.*

Furthermore, the FCDA has spoken to the media nearly forty times regarding this investigation and each news report references President Trump. Ex. 5. In interviews, the FCDA directly responded when asked about President Trump and personally referred to him by name. *Id.* at No. 20. On multiple occasions, she discussed subpoenaing President Trump and intimated he was the target of the investigation. *See* Ex. 5. In response to the question of whether President Trump would be subpoenaed, FCDA responded, "it is foreseeable that I would subpoena the target of this investigation... A target." *Id.* at No. 27. Even when not referring to him by name, she implied she was speaking about President Trump. *Id.* at No. 7 ("Nobody is above the law..."); *Id.* at No. 25 ("It's not much consequence what title they wore...."); *Id.* at No. 22 ("Everybody is equal before the law no matter what position they hold, no matter how much wealth..."); *Id.* at No. 25 ("I'm not taking on a former president. We're not adversaries. I don't know him personally. He does not know me personally."). In her first interview live on national television, FCDA opined about President Trump's *mens rea* during his call with Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger.⁶

⁶ "When any prosecutor throughout this country is interviewing people trying to determine if a crime was committed, and if they understood what they were doing, the *mens rea* is always important. So you look at facts to see, 'did they really have intent?' [or] 'did they really understand what they were doing?' Detailed facts become important like, asking for a specific number and then going back to investigate and understand that that number is just one more than the number that is needed. It let's you know that someone had a clear mind. They understood what they were doing, and so when you are pursuing the investigation, facts like that that may not seem so important, become very important." Ex. 5 at No. 4.

The foreperson of the SPGJ likewise spoke freely (and directly) about President Trump in each of her interviews:

I will tell you that it was a process where we heard his name a lot. We definitely heard a lot about former President Trump, and we definitely discussed him a lot in the room. And I will say that when this list comes out... there are no major plot twists waiting for you.... We heard a lot of recordings of President Trump on the phone... It is amazing how many hours of footage you can find of that man on the phone... I could see how getting the former president to talk to us would have been a year in negotiation by itself... I'd be fascinated by what he [Trump] said, but do you think he would come in and say anything groundbreaking or just the same kinda thing we've heard?

Ex. 8 at Nos. 3, 4, 5.

The investigation began as a result of the phone call between Secretary of State Raffensperger, President Trump, and others, but came to encompass a variety of actions related to President Trump's candidacy in the 2020 Election. He was mentioned in nearly every interview given by the FCDA as well as the foreperson, and President Trump himself or the 2020 Election was referenced in virtually every court filing. In short, President Trump's rights have been implicated pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as Ga. Const. Art. I, § I, Paras. I and XVI and, therefore, he has standing to make these constitutional, legal, and procedural challenges.

III. THE GEORGIA STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE USE OF A SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The Georgia legislature enacted the special purpose grand jury statutes in 1974. *See* O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 et. seq. These statutes authorize the creation of a county-wide special purpose grand jury for the purpose of investigating any alleged violation of the laws of this state

or any other matter subject to investigation by grand juries, and the statutes grant special purpose grand juries compulsory subpoena power.⁷ Additionally, O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101 states in part:

Once impaneled, the chief judge shall assign a superior court judge to supervise and assist the special grand jury in carrying out its investigation and duties. The judge so assigned shall charge the special grand jury as to its powers and duties and shall require periodic reports of the special grand jury's progress, as well as a final report. When the judge assigned to a special grand jury decides that the special grand jury's investigation has been completed or on the issuance of a report by the special grand jury of the matter investigated by it reporting that the investigation has been completed, the judge so assigned shall recommend to the chief judge that the special grand jury be dissolved.

In practice, these statutes have been infrequently utilized. In those rare cases where they are invoked, special purpose grand juries typically investigate governmental entities and/or employees and issue diverse reports contemplating a wide range of legal options including both criminal and non-criminal, legislative, administrative, or governmental recommendations.⁸ Since

⁷ “While conducting any investigation authorized by this part, investigative grand juries may compel evidence and subpoena witnesses; may inspect records, documents, correspondence, and books of any department, agency, board, bureau, commission, institution, or authority of the state or any of its political subdivisions; and may require the production of records, documents, correspondence, and books of any person, firm, or corporation which relate directly or indirectly to the subject of the investigation being conducted by the investigative grand jury.” O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100.

⁸ Special Purpose Grand Jury Final Report, CHAMPION NEWSPAPER (August 21, 2013), Civil Action No. 13CV1024, <https://thechampionnewspaper.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/000SpecialPurposeGrandJuryFinalReport.pdf> (DeKalb County SPGJ investigated allegations of public corruption surrounding the awarding of contracts within the Watershed Management Department); Cobb County, Ga., Laptop Plan to Be Probed by Grand Jury, MACDAILYNEWS (October 10, 2005), Civil Action No. 05-1-8242, <https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/cobb-county-ga-laptop-plan-to-be-probed-by-grand-jury/2005/10> (Cobb County SPGJ investigated alleged bias and deception in the bidding of a computer laptop program); *State v. Lampl*, 296 Ga. 892 (2015) (Clayton County SPGJ investigating public corruption and various crimes allegedly committed by currently or previously elected county officials and county employees); *Kenerly v. State*, 311 Ga. App. 190 (2011) (Gwinnett SPGJ investigating suspected criminal activity surrounding the acquisition of real property at fraudulently inflated prices).

their enactment, no appellate court has examined the constitutionality of the special purpose grand jury statutes.

A. The Statutes Are Unconstitutional Due to Vagueness.

It is well-established that “a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.” *Giaccio v. Pennsylvania*, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966) (Citing *Lanzetta v. New Jersey*, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)). In *Giaccio*, the Supreme Court reviewed a Pennsylvania statute that governed the procedure by which jurors determined court costs to be paid by an acquitted defendant. *See* 382 U.S. at 401. The Court held that “the law must be one that carries an understandable meaning with legal standards that courts must enforce.” *Id.* at 403. Accordingly, the Court found the statute unconstitutionally vague because it invited arbitrary enforcement. *Id.* (statue allowed jurors to “make determinations of the crucial issue upon their own notions of what the law should be instead of what it is.”). Similarly, in *Jekyll Island State Park Civic Auth. v. Jekyll Island Citizens Ass’n.*, 266 Ga. 152 (1996), the Georgia Supreme Court held that a portion of a civil statute was unconstitutional because it was vague and indefinite, as it contained “insufficient objective standards and guidelines to meet the requirements of Due Process.” *Jekyll Island*, 266 Ga. at 153.

The statutes governing the special purpose grand jury, O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100, et. seq., are so standardless that they have invited arbitrary, amorphous enforcement by the FCDA’s Office and the Supervising Judge. First, they fail to specify whether a SPGJ is a criminal or civil proceeding (or whether a SPGJ can be *either* depending on its scope and purpose). Second, the statutes lack specificity as to the form and substance of the report, the rights of individuals

named in the report, and the publication of the SPGJ's final report. Third, they fail to identify with adequate specificity the roles and responsibilities of the Supervising Judge versus the body requesting the investigation, here the FCDA.

i. The Statutes are Vague as to Whether the SPGJ is a Civil or Criminal Body.

The central constitutional concern at issue here is the conflicting interpretation of the statute - whether the SPGJ is a criminal or civil investigative body. This issue has been argued and repeated by numerous parties during the course of this proceeding with inconsistent and/or unsupported holdings by the Supervising Judge as well as courts in other jurisdictions. The fact that such a foundational aspect of this procedure is unclear under the law is definitive evidence that the statutes are overly vague and unconstitutional on their face.

Even though the Supervising Judge declared that this SPGJ was a criminal investigative grand jury, he offered no basis for this conclusion other than asserting that the impaneling order and scope of the investigation determined the nature of the grand jury proceeding.⁹ There is no Georgia authority that supports the Supervising Judge's theory that the stated purpose of the investigation determines the nature of the body. The decision as to whether the SPGJ is a civil or criminal body is of the utmost significance, as it impacts whether the SPGJ can compel the attendance of out-of-state witnesses, what (if any) inferences can be made upon assertions of privilege, the applicability of sovereign immunity, and more. On these issues, the statutes are silent which renders them unconstitutionally vague.

⁹ "Its purpose is unquestionably and exclusively to conduct a criminal investigation; its convening was sought by the elected official who investigates, lodges, and prosecutes criminal charges in this Circuit, its convening Order specifies its purpose as the investigation of possible criminal activities; and its final output is a report recommending whether criminal charges should be brought." Ex. 10 at 4.

The issue of whether the SPGJ is a civil or criminal proceeding came to have constitutional implications when the FCDA's office sought to compel the attendance of out-of-state witnesses. Civil and criminal compulsory powers differ greatly, and the FCDA compelled testimony from out-of-state witnesses utilizing criminal compulsory power via the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State (hereinafter "Uniform Act"), O.C.G.A. § 24-13-90 et. seq., which can only be utilized in criminal proceedings. Indeed, in the Material Witness Certificates, the Supervising Judge noted the power to compel witnesses from outside the state was predicated upon his ruling that the SPGJ was criminal. *See, e.g.*, August 25, 2022 Ex Parte Order of the Court, Certificate of Material Witness - Mark Randall Meadows ("Further, the authority for a special purpose grand jury to conduct a criminal investigation has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Georgia. *See State v. Lampl*, 296 Ga. 892 (2015). Accordingly, the provisions of the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State apply pursuant to § O.C.G.A. 24-13-92 et. seq."). Over the course of the SPGJ investigation, 19 orders were entered to compel witnesses to appear pursuant to § 24-13-90. This led to a host of litigation across the country where foreign courts were forced to grapple with the novel question of whether the Georgia SPGJ proceeding is criminal in nature such that citizens must travel to Georgia to provide testimony before this investigative body.¹⁰

For example, one witness, Jacki Pick Deason, raised the issue in Texas, where Judge Yearly with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals provided relevant analysis in a dissenting opinion.¹¹ Judge Yearly, joined by three other Texas Court of Appeals judges, reasoned that the

¹⁰ For example, *see In Re Jacki L. Pick*, WR-94, 066-01 (Tex. App. 2022).

¹¹ *In Re Jacki L. Pick*, WR-94, 066-01 (Tex. App. 2022) (Yearly, J. dissenting). The majority opinion did not address the applicability of the Uniform Act to the SPGJ because the subpoena at issue was moot.

subpoena which sought to compel the appearance of Deason in the SPGJ was void because, although Texas has adopted the Uniform Act, it only applies “when the proceedings to be attended are ‘criminal’ in nature, or where they are conducted by an actual ‘grand jury.’” *Id.* at 3. The Texas Court further interpreted Georgia case law, finding that the SPGJ “at least according to present interpretations of the law from that state’s own courts, conducts only *civil* investigations and may not itself present an indictment or initiate a criminal prosecution.” *Id.*

The statutes’ vagueness as to whether this is a criminal or civil body has similarly caused problems for witnesses claiming sovereign immunity. Specifically, United States Senator Lindsey Graham¹² and Georgia Governor Brian Kemp both raised sovereign immunity claims in response to their subpoenas to testify. *See* Ex. 11; *see also* August 17, 2022 Motion to Quash Subpoena Issued to Governor Brian P. Kemp. Counsel for Governor Kemp argued that he could not be compelled to testify before the *civil* SPGJ because he was protected from the subpoena by sovereign immunity. *Id.* While the Supervising Judge agreed that sovereign immunity would apply to a civil special purpose grand jury, he denied the motion and held that the SPGJ is a *criminal* investigative grand jury. Ex. 10 at 5 (“Put simply, there is nothing about this special purpose grand jury that involved or implicates civil practice.”). As explained below, *see infra* Section III(B)(i), this ruling was contrary to established Georgia precedent, but the fact that the issue was raised by multiple witnesses points to the lack of statutory clarity on the subject.

The Supervising Judge's unilateral decision to declare the SPGJ a criminal body (despite its inability to indict and Georgia precedent to the contrary) created a litany of constitutional

¹² *In re Graham*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194033 (N. Dist. Ga.) (2022) (Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-03027-LMM).

violations for the witnesses called before it.¹³ However, because the statutes are devoid of any language that may guide a court in interpreting its meaning, its use, and its application to real-life proceedings, such a determination is arbitrary. The statutes are so vague that they lack the “objective standards and guidelines to meet the requirement of due process.” *Jekyll Isle*, 256 Ga. at 153. This double-bind cannot stand, as the distinction between criminal and civil has pertinent implications on the permissible testimony and evidence which may come before this, and any other, SPGJ body.

ii. The Statutes are Vague as to the Contents and Release of the Report(s).

Pursuant to a majority vote of the Fulton County Superior Court bench, the SPGJ was dissolved on January 9, 2023. Ex. 6. In the order of dissolution, the Supervising Judge, recognizing that the next steps of this process were unclear, invited briefing from the FCDA’s Office and the media (notably excluding any other parties including witnesses as well as targets), and set a hearing on the issue of publication. *Id.* at 2. While stating the statute clearly directed him to release the report, the Supervising Judge cited due process concerns in ultimately ruling that only a small portion of the report should be made public.¹⁴ The parties raised issues as to whether the report was a court record under Rule 21, whether it was a general presentment under

¹³ The Supervising Judge insulated himself from appellate review of this critical and otherwise-unreviewable issue by denying a certificate of immediate review. *See* Ex. 10 FN 8 (“The Court also declines to issue a certificate of immediate review of this decision because it is clear that sovereign immunity does not apply to criminal matters. *See Rivera v. Washington*, 298 Ga. 770, 777 (2016) (recommending issuance of certificate of immediate review when resolution of immunity issue is not clear).”)

¹⁴ Ex. 7 at 4 (“[T]hus, facially, the final report should be published *in toto* pursuant to O.C.G.A § 15-12-80.”); *Id.* at 5 (“[T]he consequence of these due process deficiencies is not that the special purpose grand jury’s final report is forever suppressed or that its recommendation for or against indictment are in any way flawed or suspect. Rather, the consequence is that those recommendations are for the District Attorney’s eyes only – for now. Fundamental fairness requires this[.]”).

O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80, and whether a balancing test is required when rendering a decision regarding publication based upon the due process rights of the named individuals. *Id.*; *see also*, Ex. 3. Unfortunately, the issue of publicly releasing the special grand jury's final report was also not contemplated by the statute. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 et. seq. Now, posed with such a question, the Supervising Judge was left to make his own decisions, create his own standards and, thus, carve out an entirely unique scope of the SPGJ which may or may not have been originally intended by the Georgia legislature.

Upon further analysis, the special purpose grand jury statutes fail to address any aspect of the report; they are completely silent other than to say the Supervising Judge "shall require periodic reports of the special grand jury's progress as well as a final report." O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101(a). The statutes do not specify whether the reports should be oral or written, nor do they prescribe whether the reports should include substantive information such as summaries of evidence or formal recommendations. *Id.* Assuming *arguendo* the report is to be written, the statutes are silent as to whether the SPGJ writes the report alone or with the assistance of either the Supervising Judge or the body requesting the investigation, here the FCDA. *Id.*

Relevant to the due process rights of all those who may be mentioned in the report, the statutes are silent as to its public release. *Id.* It is unclear whether the report is a court record or whether it belongs to and remains in the hands of the body that requested the investigation as the Supervising Judge has held. *Id.*; *see also* Ex. 7. If the report is to be made public, the statutes fail to specify who shall make that determination or how such publishing may occur, especially since the statutes are further silent as to whether the report is considered a general presentment such that O.C.G.A § 15-12-80 applies. *Id.* Finally, the statutes fail to describe how or whether those

individuals named in the report may be offered an opportunity to review the report or otherwise challenge its release given the necessary implication of their due process rights. *Id.*

Given this lack of specificity, courts fail to interpret and apply the statutes in a uniform manner across jurisdictions. As such, the statutes violate the principles of fundamental fairness and are unconstitutionally vague.

B. The Statutes are Unconstitutional As Applied to This SPGJ.

The Georgia special purpose grand jury statutes have been applied to this matter through an unconstitutional framework with little regard to the illegal consequences that resulted in prejudicing and violating the rights of all parties impacted by the investigation. As stated above, the Supervising Judge, along with the FCDA's Office, has operated under the assumption that, although baseless and contrary to established precedent, the SPGJ is a *criminal* investigative body. As the SPGJ is a *civil* investigative body pursuant to Georgia case law, this mischaracterization of its fundamental character resulted in a cascade of unconstitutional consequences. For example, the SPGJ was permitted to compel the attendance and testimony of out-of-state witnesses as well as the testimony of witnesses asserting valid claims of sovereign immunity. Even if, as the Supervising Judge declared, this SPGJ was somehow criminal, it was still unconstitutionally administered because the FCDA improperly and arbitrarily assigned "target" labels, compelled those "targets" to appear, and the grand jurors drew adverse inferences from witnesses' Fifth Amendment assertions. In both civil and criminal interpretations, the substantive due process rights of all parties impacted by the investigation have been violated. The unconstitutional administration of this SPGJ violated all notions of fundamental fairness; witnesses could not depend on the proper application of the law by the Supervising Judge, nor could they rely on statements from the FCDA in assessing how to adequately protect their rights.

i. The Supervising Judge Improperly Designated the SPGJ as a Criminal Investigative Body When Case Law Mandates it is Civil.

The only two cases in Georgia jurisprudence that touch upon the nature of a special purpose grand jury clarify that it is a civil, not a criminal, body. *See State v. Bartel*, 223 Ga. App. 696 (1996); *see also Kenerly v. State*, 311 Ga. App. 190 (2011). This issue was first raised before the Supervising Judge when counsel for Governor Kemp argued the sovereign immunity prevented the SPGJ from compelling his testimony. *See Ex. 11; see also August 17, 2022 Motion to Quash Subpoena Issued to Governor Brian P. Kemp*. The Supervising Judge agreed that a civil SPGJ could not compel such testimony from the Governor. *Ex. 11 at 31* (“And that's your argument that, look, this special purpose grand jury is actually a civil thing. And if you're right, civil, I agree, sovereign immunity. I don't see any waiver anywhere.”). In denying Governor Kemp’s Motion, the Supervising Judge ruled (for the first time in this investigation) that the SPGJ was a *criminal* investigative grand jury – a ruling contrary to established Georgia precedent. *Ex. 10*. This ruling created a ripple effect of constitutional violations which implicated the due process rights of the Movant and other parties subpoenaed by this body.

In coming to this decision, the Supervising Judge drew misplaced conclusions as to the relevant case law. Specifically, he reasoned that the special purpose grand jury in *State v. Bartel*, 223 Ga. App. 696 (1996), was deemed a civil investigative body because it was “convened to conduct a civil investigation.” *Ex. 10 at 4*. In other words, that the stated purpose for impaneling an investigative body determines whether it is a criminal or civil matter – not its inherent powers.

Id. The reasoning employed by the Supervising Judge was not derived from anything the *Bartel* Court held nor can it be traced to any other case.¹⁵

Georgia precedent applies a different standard. The Georgia Court of Appeals in *Kenerly v. State*, 311 Ga. App. 190 (2011), interpreted *Bartel* as “concluding that special purpose grand juries conduct only civil investigations.” *Kenerly* at 194 (citing *Bartel*, 223 Ga. App. at 699) (emphasis added). Moreover, the *Kenerly* court relied on the stated *powers* of the body, rather than the body’s *purpose*, as the Court did here, to interpret the boundaries of the SPGJ under the relevant statutes.¹⁶ *Kenerly*, 311 Ga. App. at 194 (finding that a special purpose grand jury does not have the power to indict: “[B]ecause the powers and duties of a special grand jury *are* specifically provided for, the powers granted to regular grand juries, including the power to indict, do not apply.”).

Counsel for Governor Kemp correctly argued that, “*Bartel* held that special purpose grand juries conduct only civil investigations.” *See* Ex. 11; *see also* August 17, 2022 Motion to Quash Subpoena Issued to Governor Brian P. Kemp. In his Order denying their Motion, the Supervising Judge never addressed the fact that counsel’s argument was a direct quote from binding Georgia precedent but, instead, stated counsel’s “claim” was “unfounded.” Ex. 10 FN 4. The Supervising Judge did not just fail to distinguish the *Kenerly* case - he completely refused to

¹⁵ In *Bartel*, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the oath required for witnesses testifying before a criminal grand jury was “irrelevant” in a civil grand jury proceeding. It was unclear whether the grand jury was impaneled pursuant to the special purpose grand jury statute, the grand jury statutes relating to civil investigations, or both, but the Court held that the result would be the same because they are all civil investigations. The Court noted that it defies logic to require the oath applicable for criminal grand juries to be administered in civil investigations where “there obviously is not and cannot be ‘any indictment or special presentment’ or any individual charged with a particular criminal offense.”

¹⁶ *See also In re Gwinnett County Grand Jury*, 284 Ga. 510, 512 (2008) (distinguishing between the “criminal accusatory and civil investigative roles” of grand juries).

acknowledge or address it. Ex. 10. While utterly ignoring binding precedent, the Supervising Judge then denied appellate review despite the fact that his ruling affected the constitutional integrity of the investigation moving forward. Ex. 10 FN 8 (“The Court also declines to issue a certificate of immediate review of this decision because it is clear that sovereign immunity does not apply to criminal matters. *See Rivera v. Washington*, 298 Ga. 770, 777 (2016) (recommending issuance of certificate of immediate review when resolution of immunity issue is not clear).”).

As stated previously, the Supervising Judge concluded the SPGJ was criminal because it was impaneled to investigate whether certain activity constituted a crime under Georgia law. Ex. 10. In so doing, he ignored the fact that most special purpose grand juries are impaneled to do just that – investigate certain questionable activity, oftentimes public malfeasance, where it is unclear on its face whether the activity is criminal.¹⁷ If there was such a thing as a criminal special purpose grand jury, the Court of Appeals would have said so in *Kenerly*. *Kenerly*, 311 Ga. App. 190. Instead, it affirmed that special purpose grand jury investigations into possible criminal activity are still civil in nature. *Id.* at 194. The *Kenerly* special purpose grand jury was impaneled for the purpose of investigating suspected criminal activity surrounding the acquisition of real property at fraudulently inflated prices, and Gwinnett County Commissioner, Kevin Kenerly, was subsequently criminally indicted for his role in those deals.¹⁸ In affirming

¹⁷ *See infra* FN 6.

¹⁸ *Special grand jury to look at Gwinnett land purchases*, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, (Sep. 25, 2009), <https://www.ajc.com/news/local/special-grand-jury-look-gwinnett-land-purchases/Yf5VPyqKTWSsFBMOUVsdWM/> (District Attorney Danny Porter stated: “I think the grand jury, as a group of citizens, needs to look at these expenditures of county money and try to determine if there’s anything criminal...If there is, it needs to be prosecuted.”); *Grand jury on Gwinnett land to wrap up work*, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Oct. 4, 2010), <https://accesswdun.com/print/2010/10/232745> (investigating allegation that county

the civil nature of that grand jury proceeding, the *Kenerly* Court implicitly rejected the notion that a special purpose grand jury is criminal if investigating potential criminal activity.¹⁹ Yet, this was the sole basis cited by the Supervising Judge in declaring this SPGJ to be criminal. Ex. 10.

In fact, *Kenerly* is the only SPGJ case which provides substantive guidance on statutory interpretation, and the Court of Appeals in that case thoughtfully delineated its use of “the venerable principle of the maxim *expressum facit cessare tacitum*” to “assume *deliberate* omission of actions not listed in a statute and not otherwise addressed elsewhere.” (Emphasis included) *Kenerly*, 311 Ga. App. at 193. *See also Hinton v. State*, 224 Ga. App. 49, 50 (1996). The Supreme Court of Georgia and other Georgia courts have also applied this method of statutory interpretation. *See Hinton v. State*, 224 Ga. App. 49, 50 (1996); *Chase v. State*, 285 Ga. 693, 695-96 (2009); *Battallia v. City of Columbus*, 199 Ga. App. 897, 898 (1991). Thus, the Supervising Judge’s decision that the SPGJ is a criminal body is affirmatively refuted by binding Georgia precedent. This erroneous decision had vast constitutional and procedural implications, and the resulting taint invalidates the constitutionality and validity of the entire proceeding.

ii. The SPGJ Improperly Compelled the Appearance and Testimony of Out-of-State Witnesses.

The Uniform Act cannot be used to compel the attendance of a witness from outside the state in a civil proceeding as discussed above, *see supra* Section III(A)(i). Thus, this SPGJ illegally compelled the attendance and testimony of numerous witnesses from outside the State

commissioner pushed the Commission to purchase property for \$7m more than it was valued at two years earlier due to his friendship with landowner).

¹⁹ Additionally, other SPGJ’s investigating potential criminal activity were filed as civil actions. *See Dekalb County Civil Case No. 13CV1024* (SPGJ investigated allegations of public corruption within the Watershed Management Department); *Cobb County Civil Case No. 05-1-8242* (SPGJ investigated alleged bias and deception in the bidding of a computer laptop program).

of Georgia. Due to the substantial number of witnesses compelled to testify under the Uniform Act, their testimony is inexorably intertwined with the conclusions of the SPGJ, and there is no way to extricate the taint that this improperly compelled testimony caused.

In addition to improperly compelling testimony from out-of-state witnesses, the SPGJ improperly compelled testimony from Governor Kemp despite his valid assertion of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is a constitutional doctrine. Ga. Const. art. I § 2, Para. IX(e). As explained, *see supra* Section III(A)(1), the doctrine of sovereign immunity was overcome by the Judge's decision to classify the SPGJ as a criminal investigative body in contradiction to binding Georgia precedent.

In declaring this was a criminal SPGJ, the Supervising Judge improperly and unconstitutionally imbued the SPGJ with powers it did not, in fact, have. The testimony illegally obtained by the SPGJ violates notions of fundamental fairness and the due process rights of Movant as well as other parties investigated by the SPGJ. This pervasive taint which impermissibly corrupted the investigation can only be remedied by quashing the report and precluding the use of all illegally obtained evidence.

C. The Statutes Were Unconstitutionally Applied to this SPGJ if Classified as Criminal.

Even if, as the Supervising Judge concluded, the SPGJ was somehow criminal, it was still unconstitutionally interpreted and applied. All notions of fundamental fairness were violated by the FCDA's arbitrary assignment of "target" statuses and the adverse inferences the SPGJ drew from witnesses' Fifth Amendment assertions.

i. The FCDA's Arbitrary Use and Subsequent Abandonment of "Target" Statuses Violated Principles of Fundamental Fairness.

Early on in the investigation, the FCDA sent target letters to a group of witnesses affirmatively assigning them "target" status. Generally, a "target" is a definition given by the Department of Justice to an individual contemplated for prosecution: "[a] 'target' is a person as to whom the prosecutor or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him or her to the commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant." *See* United States Attorneys Manual ("USAM") 9-11.151. The label of a target within the federal criminal justice system carries with it both weight as well as presumptive rights. USAM 9-11.150 (subpoenaing targets of grand jury investigation "may carry the appearance of unfairness"); and USAM 9-11.154 (when target of grand recount jury investigation informs government that they plan to invoke their fifth amendment privilege in grand jury, they should ordinarily be excused from appearing). There is no identifiable Georgia law or any other authority that defines a target of an investigation and what that might mean or entail within State proceedings.

As evidenced in the public motions and subsequent hearings held before the Supervising Judge, while the FCDA's Office might have assigned "target" status to a number of individuals whom they sought to subpoena, they offered no parallel rights or protections to those same individuals as would be expected in a constitutionally-sound investigative process (as is done at the federal level). *See* Ex. 12. In fact, neither the Court nor the FCDA's Office appeared to treat those deemed targets any differently than any other witness who was subpoenaed to testify. *Id.*

This raises the question of what constitutional protections a target should have in a *criminal* special purpose grand jury (which has never before been addressed under Georgia law).

Georgia law and the Georgia Constitution prohibit the appearance before a regular grand jury of a witness named in a proposed charging instrument. *See State v. Lampl*, 296 Ga. 892 (2015) (grand juries are prohibited from compelling the appearance of a witness who has been accused in a returned or proposed charging document at the time they are called to testify); *State v. Butler*, 177 Ga. App. 594 (1986) (holding that while it violates the Fifth Amendment to call a witness to testify to the grand jury which is considering an indictment against the witness, such was not the case here where defendant was called to testify to an alleged crime committed by her husband); *Jenkins v. State*, 65 Ga. App. 16 (1941) (grand jury had no lawful right to call the accused before it while considering a bill of indictment against him); O.C.G.A § 24-5-506.

A criminal SPGJ (as created here by the Supervising Judge) tasked with investigating criminal conduct and drafting a report recommending criminal indictment creates unique problems in this context relative to the Fifth Amendment, Ga. Con. Art. I, § I, para. xvi and O.C.G.A § 24-5-506. The SPGJ cannot return an indictment or even consider a proposed charging instrument, so a strict reading of the case law would allow the SPGJ to compel any witness to appear and provide testimony that could then be used in a subsequent grand jury proceeding considering a charging instrument naming that witness (even though that same testimony could not be compelled live before the regular grand jury). This circumvents the Fifth Amendment, Ga. Con. Art. I, § I, para. xvi, and O.C.G.A § 24-5-506 and would permit the use of a special purpose grand jury to obtain and present testimony which would otherwise be unavailable to and unable to be brought before a regular criminal grand jury.

Not only were purported “targets” not given any protections, but they also appear to have been assigned their “target” status on an arbitrary basis. The target notifications were publicly released in July of 2022, and the practice of labeling individuals as targets appeared to be

abandoned by the FCDA's Office soon thereafter. This shift coincided with the Supervising Judge expressing his own concerns about the use of this terminology.²⁰ *See* Ex. 12. During the disqualification hearing, the Supervising Judge pointed out the lack of meaning given to "target" status within State proceedings. *Id.* at 12 ("I don't think the word target is as magical in State proceedings as it is in Federal proceedings..."). Notably, he also warned the FCDA, "you may want to think through in the future labeling someone that and then hailing them in because of how this has played out." *Id.* at 13. Following those comments from the Supervising Judge, no other "targets" were publicly named.

This inconsistency is more than an inconvenience for those who had to make important decisions (both personally and upon advice of counsel) about how to conduct themselves in the public sphere as well as what key constitutional decisions needed to be made regarding the ability to answer questions while under oath. Whether an individual is labeled a target is often the ultimate question for both counsel and the client in deciding how best to defend themselves. The fact that the FCDA's Office chose to label some potential witnesses "targets" (which they certainly could have chosen not to do) but then chose not to label others as such, begs the question: are those "others" by this purposeful omission, "not targets"? If that answer is no: the only logical conclusion is that the target labels were arbitrarily given, and no witnesses called thereafter could rely on the legitimacy of their "witness" status.

²⁰ In his Order disqualifying the FCDA, the Supervising Judge stated: "The designation, borrowed from federal criminal practice, is a bit confusing in the context of this grand jury, which has no power to bring criminal charges against anyone. It is nonetheless A potent investigative signal that the District Attorney views Senator Jones (and the other alternate electors) as persons more closely connected to the alleged electoral improprieties than other witnesses who have come before the grand jury or who may yet do so." Ex. 4 at FN 6.

When witnesses appeared before the SPGJ pursuant to a subpoena and had not been given a target notification (while knowing such labels were already given to others), they made conscious decisions regarding their ability to testify based on that reliance. Either the FCDA's Office must admit that they unconstitutionally assigned target labels to some witnesses while failing to notify others or they must admit their use of target labels was misapplied and arbitrary. To either end, this substantial failure violates all notions of fundamental fairness and due process because no witness called to testify could depend on the designation given by FCDA's Office and were forced to make blind decisions in asserting constitutional privileges. Since the practice of naming "targets" began and ended in the early stages of the investigation (with the first round of Material Witness Certificates), the majority of the testimony heard by this SPGJ suffered from the cancerous and arbitrary application of this otherwise meaningful title with attendant rights.

ii. Jurors Improperly Drew Adverse Inferences from Witnesses' Invocation of the Fifth Amendment.

In a criminal matter, jurors cannot draw negative inferences when a witness asserts his rights under the Fifth Amendment. *Barnes v. State*, 335 Ga. App. 709 (2016). But here, as discussed further in Section V, the special purpose grand jurors plainly did so.²¹ *See* Ex. 8. Further, the grand jurors formed opinions about certain witnesses' credibility based on whether or not a witness took a few moments to consider the question versus quickly asserting privilege. *See infra* Section V. From the foreperson's comments, it appears the grand jurors were not properly instructed on this important constitutional safeguard. As recently revealed, the unnamed jurors shared a completely inaccurate and impermissible understanding of Fifth Amendment

²¹"The scratching of pens on paper could be heard as jurors tallied how many times the person invoked the Fifth Amendment." Ex. 8 at No. 1.

rights. Ex. 8 at No. 10. The jurors attributed this failed understanding to the explanation provided to them by the FCDA's office. *Id.* Moreover, if one or more of the special purpose grand jurors watched the hearing online, they would have heard the Supervising Judge say, "but if they did nothing wrong, why aren't they talking to the grand jury?" Ex. 12 at 27.

Thus, even if the SPGJ was somehow criminal, the SPGJ proceeding was unconstitutionally administered. It violated the rights of impacted parties by arbitrarily assigning "target" status while not providing adequate protections for those individuals. Furthermore, grand jurors improperly drew adverse inferences from witnesses' invocation of the Fifth Amendment and relied upon those inferences in forming their conclusions. Given the pervasive and inextricable taint which ensued from this unconstitutional application, the report must be quashed and all evidence compelled by this SPGJ must be suppressed.

IV. THE FULTON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE MUST BE DISQUALIFIED.

The FCDA's Office must be recused, disqualified, and prevented from any further investigation or prosecution of this matter. The Supervising Judge has already held that the FCDA's Office has an actual, disqualifying conflict in this investigation. Ex. 4. Inexplicably, however, the Supervising Judge refused to disqualify the FCDA from the investigation. Instead, without any supporting authority, the Supervising Judge removed the now Lieutenant Governor of Georgia, Burt Jones, from the investigation and prohibited any future action against him by the FCDA. *Id.*

The FCDA's Office has maintained significant power and control over the SPGJ. It was the FCDA's Office who made the request to impanel the SPGJ and determined the scope of the investigation, it decided who to subpoena to testify, and what evidence to compel. Ex. 7. As the

Supervising Judge noted in his order regarding publication, the structure of this investigation has been “imbalanced, incomplete, and one-sided.” *Id.* at 5.

Given the national attention, gravity and positions of many of the individuals involved, it is even more imperative that the FCDA’s Office remain unattached and impartial, as is required of all prosecutors. *See Berger v. United States*, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (the prosecutor is “a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”); *see also Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.*, 481 U.S. 787, 803 (1987); *Lux v. Commonwealth*, 24 Va. App. 561, 568 (1997). After all, “[t]he prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.” Robert H. Jackson, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., *The Federal Prosecutor*, Address to the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940).

Georgia law delineates two distinct grounds for disqualification of a prosecuting attorney. First, a prosecutor must be disqualified when a conflict of interest exists - when the prosecutor has a personal interest or stake in the defendant’s conviction. *See Williams v. State*, 258 Ga. 305, 315 (1988). Such a conflict may be either actual or perceived. *See Young*, 481 U.S. at 787. Second, a prosecutor can be removed on grounds of “forensic misconduct,” which commonly arises from “improper expression by the prosecuting attorney of his [or her] personal belief in the defendant’s guilt.” *Williams*, 258 Ga. at 315 (citing *Vermont v. Hohman*, 420 A2d 852 (Vt. 1980)).

In this matter, the FCDA’s Office has both an actual and perceived conflict of interest. The Supervising Judge previously found that an actual conflict exists prohibiting the FCDA’s Office from investigating Lieutenant Governor Burt Jones but erred in failing to disqualify the

FCDA's Office from the entirety of the investigation as the law demands. Additionally, the scope of the FCDA's disqualifying conduct extends beyond the actual conflict already found by the Supervising Judge. The FCDA's Office, by and through the elected FCDA, exacerbated the already existing conflict by making extrajudicial statements throughout the entirety of this investigation which violate prosecutorial standards, constitute forensic misconduct and create an untenable appearance of impropriety. For all of the reasons below, the FCDA and the entirety of the FCDA's Office must be disqualified from any further investigation or potential prosecution of this matter.

A. The Supervising Judge Should Have Disqualified the FCDA from the Entire Investigation Rather than Just a Witness.

On July 25, 2022, the Supervising Judge ordered the disqualification of the FCDA's Office from any further investigation and/or prosecution of Lieutenant Governor Burt Jones due to an "actual and untenable" conflict. Ex. 4 at 4. By entering an order of disqualification of the FCDA's Office as to Lt. Governor Jones, the Supervising Judge recognized what Georgia law clearly prescribes - that a prosecutor can be removed from a matter for which a legal conflict exists at any stage in the proceedings, including the investigative stage. The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes that "a Georgia district attorney is of counsel in all criminal cases or matters pending in his circuit. This includes the investigatory stages of matters preparatory to seeking an indictment as well as the pendency of the case." *McLaughlin v. Payne*, 295 Ga. 609 (2014) quoting *King v. State*, 246 Ga. 386, 389 (1980). The Supervising Judge was correct in determining that disqualification was appropriate for the FCDA's Office as it related to both the SPGJ as well as any potential future proceedings such as seeking an indictment or going to trial.

The Supervising Judge was incorrect, however, because the FCDA's conflict extends to the entire investigation - not just one witness.

The SPGJ was impaneled for the purpose of investigating "the facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to possible attempts to disrupt the lawful administration of the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia." Ex. 1. Thus, the FCDA and her office were tasked with a singular purpose. However, pursuant to the Supervising Judge's reasoning in his Disqualification Order, the investigation itself may continue – only with Lt. Governor Jones removed. Accordingly, if charges are lodged against a group of people, particularly in a multi-defendant prosecution, Lt. Gov. Jones will have effectively been preemptively severed out of that prosecution. Prosecutorial disqualification does not apply in such a haphazard or disjointed manner. Rather, when a district attorney is disqualified from a prosecution, as she was here, she must be disqualified from the *entire* prosecution. In those instances, the case remains a singular unit and the conflicted district attorney is excised; it is improper for a court to fragment an investigation or prosecution by carving out a target or defendant while permitting the conflicted district attorney to remain, and for good reason. The parade of unforeseen consequences to the parties remaining in the investigation, as well as the need for the public to have confidence in the judicial process, requires the removal of the conflicted district attorney from the investigation and all other proceedings. To do otherwise would, among other things, permit the district attorney to weaponize these conflicts against the other parties remaining in the proceeding.

The United States Supreme Court in *Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A. et. Al*, 481 U.S. 787 (1987), recognized that the existence of an actual conflict cannot be limited to the investigation or prosecution of one individual but is a conflict that permeates the entire proceeding.

Once we have drawn that conclusion [that a conflict exists], however, we have deemed the prosecutor subject to influences that undermine confidence that a prosecution can be conducted in a disinterested fashion. If this is the case, we cannot have confidence in a *proceeding* in which this officer plays the critical role of preparing and presenting the case...”

Id. at 811. (Emphasis added).

The United States Supreme Court made clear in *Young* that the remedy for an actual conflict could not be made piecemeal, as the Supervising Judge improperly chose to do here:

Appointment of an interested prosecutor is also an error whose effects are pervasive. Such an appointment calls into question, and therefore requires scrutiny of, the conduct of an entire prosecution, rather than simply a discrete prosecutorial decision. Determining the effect of this appointment thus would be extremely difficult. A prosecution contains a myriad of occasions for the exercise of discretion, each of which goes to shape the record in a case, but few of which are part of the record.

Id. at 811.

Lastly, the Court in *Young* emphasized that allowing a matter to continue where a conflicted prosecutor remained constitutes clear error.

Furthermore, appointment of an interested prosecutor creates an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general. The narrow focus of harmless-error analysis is not sensitive to this underlying concern. If a prosecutor uses the expansive prosecutorial powers to gather information for private purposes, the prosecution function has been seriously abused even if, in the process, sufficient evidence is obtained to convict a defendant. Prosecutors "have available a terrible array of coercive methods to obtain information," such as "police investigation and interrogation, warrants, informers and agents whose activities are immunized, authorized wiretapping, civil investigatory demands, [and] enhanced subpoena power." The misuse of those methods "would unfairly harass citizens, give unfair advantage to [the prosecutor's personal interests], and impair public willingness to accept the legitimate use of those powers."

Id. at 811 (quoting C. Wolfram, *Modern Legal Ethics* 460 (1986)(emphasis added). The Supreme Court added that:

Public confidence in the disinterested conduct of that official is essential. Harmless-error analysis is not equal to the task of assuring that confidence. It is best suited for the review

of discrete exercises of judgment by lower courts, where information is available that makes it possible to gauge the effect of a decision on the trial as a whole. In this case, however, we establish a categorical rule against the appointment of an interested prosecutor, adherence to which requires no subtle calculations of judgment. Given the fundamental and pervasive effects of such an appointment, we therefore hold that harmless-error analysis is inappropriate in reviewing the appointment of an interested prosecutor in a case such as this.

Id. at 814 (citing *United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc.*, 463 U.S. 418, 432 (1983))

(prosecutorial use of grand jury to elicit evidence for use in civil case "improper per se")

(emphasis added).

In applying the clear standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court to the actual conflict which exists in this proceeding, it cannot be understated how important this issue is, especially in an investigation of this magnitude. The rights of President Trump, as well as all others impacted by this investigation, are now subject to the prosecutorial discretion and decision-making of a prosecuting body that even the Supervising Judge acknowledged has an actual, disqualifying conflict. This is simply untenable. For this reason alone, the FCDA's Office must be removed from any further investigation or prosecution of this matter.

B. The FCDA's Public Statements Violate Prosecutorial Standards, Constitute Forensic Misconduct, and Create the Appearance of Impropriety Requiring Disqualification.

The FCDA's conflict has been amplified and exacerbated by the FCDA's extrajudicial statements which violate prosecutorial standards and constitute forensic misconduct, further necessitating disqualification. The Georgia Supreme Court has recognized that pretrial publicity poses a serious concern. *See Strong v. State*, 246 Ga. 612, 613 (1980) (citing *United States v. Sweig*, 316 F. Supp. 1148, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).

A prosecutor is the administrator of justice who should exercise sound discretion and independent judgment in serving the public interest and must act with integrity while avoiding the appearance of impropriety. *See* ABA Standard 3-1.2. Prosecutors must be circumspect and not make comments that have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding or that heighten the public condemnation of the accused, and they should limit comments to what is *necessary* to inform the public of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose. *See* ABA Standard 3-1.4; ABA Standard 3-1.10(c); *see also* Georgia Rule 3.8(g) (emphasis added). Furthermore, prosecutors should not allow improper considerations, such as partisan, political or personal considerations, to effect prosecutorial discretion, nor can their judgment be influenced by a personal interest in potential media attention. ABA Standard 3-1.6(a); ABA Standard 3-1.10(h).

Courts have previously looked at violations of the rules of professional conduct in evaluating whether a prosecutorial conflict exists, and these considerations form the foundation of much of the law on disqualification.²² When comments go so far as to address the guilt of the accused, they constitute forensic misconduct thereby requiring disqualification under Georgia law. *See Williams v. State*, 258 Ga. 305 (1988) (“improper expression by the prosecuting attorney of his [or her] personal belief in the defendant’s guilt”) (citing *Vermont v. Hohman* and *In re J.S.*, 140 Vt. 230 (1981)).

i. **The FCDA’s Statements to the Press Violate Prosecutorial Standards and Constitute Forensic Misconduct.**

Since the inception of this investigation, the FCDA has spoken nearly forty times with at least fourteen different media outlets about this matter. Ex. 5. Even the Supervising Judge noted

²² *See generally* *Ventura v. State*, 346 Ga. App. 309 (2018); *Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A. et. Al*, 481 U.S. 787 (1987); *Berger v. United States*, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).

the FCDA’s very public approach, which he described as being “on national media almost nightly talking about the investigation.” Ex. 12 at 47. With each new development in the investigation, the FCDA repeatedly made public statements within days of each other in print articles, press conferences and videotaped interviews, and even live on prime-time national television. Ex. 5. Following each round of interviews, outside media sources repeated her comments, and a wave of additional coverage ensued across various networks for days to come. The FCDA regularly expressed her personal opinions about the criminality of the acts under investigation thereby suggesting the guilt of those who may be accused and has criticized the exercise of constitutional rights of witnesses contrary to the prosecutorial obligations of the FCDA’s office.²³ *Id.*

When the investigation first began in February 2021, the FCDA sat down for a prime time interview on MSNBC and opined about President Trump’s *mens rea* during the call with Secretary of State Raffensperger.²⁴ Similar interviews continued throughout the investigation. *Id.* The statements served no legitimate law enforcement purpose and heightened the public condemnation of the witnesses and those contemplated by the scope of this investigation. *See* Ex. 5.

²³ *In re J.S.*, 140 Vt. 230 (1981) (“it is unconscionable for a prosecutor representing the people... to undermine the rights specifically guaranteed in the Constitution he has taken an oath to uphold.”)

²⁴ “When any prosecutor throughout this country is interviewing people trying to determine if a crime was committed, and if they understood what they were doing, the *mens rea* is always important. So you look at facts to see, ‘did they really have intent?’ [or] ‘did they really understand what they were doing?’ Detailed facts become important like, asking for a specific number and then going back to investigate and understand that that number is just one more than the number that is needed. It lets you know that someone had a clear mind. They understood what they were doing, and so when you are pursuing the investigation, facts like that that may not seem so important, become very important.” Ex. 5 at No. 4.

Only days before the grand jurors would be charged with investigating *whether* the activity under investigation rose to that of a crime, the FCDA publicly and explicitly stated the conduct under investigation was in fact criminal.²⁵ Even after the grand jury was impaneled, the FCDA continued making public statements that the activities to be reviewed by the newly constituted SPGJ were illegal.²⁶ Most concerning, in September of 2022, while the SPGJ was in the middle of their investigation and (we now know, *see infra* Section V) were permitted to consume media coverage, the FCDA commented that “credible allegations of serious crimes” existed and “people are facing prison sentences.” *Id.* at No. 37. In each such statement, the FCDA commented on the ultimate issue the grand jury was impaneled to decide. Given the SPGJ’s daily consumption of the news media, the FCDA’s comments created a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the SPGJ’s decision. The FCDA’s expression of her personal opinions of the criminality of the conduct and the guilt of those being investigated rose to the level of forensic misconduct which creates an actual conflict requiring disqualification. *See Williams v. State*, 258 Ga. 305 (1988).

ii. **The FCDA’s Online Activity Violates Prosecutorial Standards and Creates the Appearance of Impropriety.**

In its order disqualifying the FCDA, the Supervising Judge noted: “[a]n investigation of this significance, garnering the public attention it necessarily does and touching so many political

²⁵ “So in this case, you have an allegation of a human being, of a person, of an American citizen, possibly doing something that would’ve infringed upon the rights of lots of Georgians. Specifically from my county—Fulton County—right to vote being infringed upon. And the allegations, quite frankly, were not a civil wrongdoing, but a crime.” Ex. 5 at No. 22.

²⁶ “...and two, that if we live in a free land in a democracy, we have to have free and fair elections. And so, I am very concerned that if behavior that is illegal goes unchecked, that it could lead to a very bad start and a very, very bad path....[While discussing the electors] There are so many issues that could have come about if somebody participates in submitting a document that they know is false. You can’t do that.” Ex. 5 No. 24.

nerves in our society, cannot be burdened by legitimate doubts about the District Attorney's Motives." Ex. 4 at 5. He concluded, "[t]he District Attorney does not have to be apolitical - but her investigations do." *Id.* Further, the Supervising Judge held, "the fact that concern about the District Attorney's partiality naturally, immediately, and reasonably arises in the minds of the public, the pundits, and – most critically – the subjects of the investigation" is what necessitates disqualification. *Id.* Courts have an interest in ensuring that "legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." *Wheat v. United States*, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988). A concern for actual prejudice misses the point, for what is at stake is the public perception of the integrity of our criminal justice system. *Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A. et. Al*, 481 U.S. 787, 812 (1987).

"Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice," and a prosecutor with conflicting loyalties presents the appearance of precisely the opposite. Society's interest in disinterested prosecution therefore would not be adequately protected by harmless-error analysis, for such analysis would not be sensitive to the fundamental nature of the error committed.

Id. at 812 (quoting *Offutt v. United States*, 346 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).

Between the private life of the citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation stands the prosecutor. That state official has the power to employ the full machinery of the state in scrutinizing any given individual. Even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced immersion in criminal investigation and adjudication is a wrenching disruption of everyday life. For this reason, we must have assurance that those who would wield this power will be guided solely by their sense of public responsibility for the attainment of justice.

Id. at 814.

A court must consider how the facts would appear to a well-informed, thoughtful and objective observer, *U.S. v. Jordan*, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995), and courts should "resolve all doubts in favor of disqualification." *United States v. Clarkson*, 567 F.2d 270, 273 (4th Cir. 1977).

The FCDA’s social media activity during the investigation creates the appearance of impropriety. In July 2022, after subpoenaing a slew of high-profile witnesses, she used her campaign Twitter account to promote a biased political cartoon depicting the FCDA fishing a recently subpoenaed witness out of a swamp.²⁷ Posting a political cartoon depicting the influencing of witnesses in an “investigation of this significance, garnering the public attention it necessarily does and touching so many political nerves in our society,” does not create the appearance of an unbiased and “apolitical” investigation.



Furthermore, the FCDA promoted her own campaign on the shoulders of partisan support for this SPGJ investigation.²⁸ Within a couple of days, the FCDA’s Twitter account increased by

²⁷ On July 18, 2022, the FCDA posted the cartoon depicting her fishing Lyndsey Graham out of a swamp and President Trump stating, “I know you’ll do the right thing for the swamp, Lyndsey.” The timing of this post is particularly relevant because, less than two weeks prior, the SPGJ subpoenaed Lyndsey Graham to testify, and based on the foreperson’s statements, *see supra* Section V, the grand jurors were aware of Senator Graham’s challenges to that subpoena.

²⁸ On July 11, 2022, political strategist Adam Parkhomenko tweeted multiple times asking for 1) users to follow the FCDA’s twitter account, 2) donations to the FCDA’s campaign, and 3) one-thousand retweets of his requests stating, “I can’t think of a better way to celebrate after Lyndsey Graham lost in court today then support the person who is holding them all accountable.” The FCDA personally replied thanking him for his support on July 14, 2022 and her tweet was liked by close to twenty-two thousand followers and retweeted over eight-thousand times. On July 15, 2022, while continuing to solicit followers, Adam again tied his request to this investigation by posting a Yahoo! News article related to the target letters sent out that day. The next day, in a series of tweets, while noting the FCDA now had fifty-thousand new followers, he again tweeted

approximately one-hundred thousand followers, and requests for campaign donations were retweeted thousands of times. On at least three occasions, the FCDA personally inserted herself into this Twitter campaign for “followers, tweets and donations” which specifically referenced this investigation; it is that personal involvement and interest which creates the disqualifying conflict. The FCDA’s posts do not further a legitimate law enforcement purpose but instead portray a biased prosecutor with a personal interest.

While these posts, if standing alone, might not be sufficient for disqualification, they must be considered in combination with the facts giving rise to the disqualifying conflict previously found to exist. The Supervising Judge called the FCDA’s behavior in campaigning for the political opponent of a named target a “what were you thinking moment” resulting in “horrible optics” and “problematic” from a disqualification perspective. Ex. 12 at 46. Those sentiments apply equally to the FCDA’s social media posts which cannot be considered in a vacuum. The cumulative impact of the FCDA’s public behavior casts a shadow of bias over her office and the entire investigation as it touches upon the same concerns referenced by the Supervising Judge. *Id.* (noting the need for the public to believe a “fair and balanced approach” was taken in this “non-partisan” investigation driven only by the facts and following the evidence wherever it leads.”). The FCDA’s behavior does not paint the picture of an open-minded, uninterested prosecutor fairly seeking justice on behalf of the public. Therefore, in

asking for campaign donations, retweets and followers, this time stating, “her account has increased by 50k followers this week. She subpoenaed Lindsey Graham. Let’s help build her platform...” On July 17, 2022, as her followers climbed to eighty-six thousand, he tweeted two additional times asking for more followers. The FCDA again retweeted publicly thanking Adam for his support, and her tweet was retweeted over twenty-five hundred times and liked by over fourteen-thousand followers. She then retweeted his original July 11, 2022 post thereby personally soliciting followers, retweets and campaign donations on the back of his requests which specifically referenced this investigation. Ex. 5 at 8-10.

addition to the actual conflict previously found to exist and the conflict created through forensic misconduct, this appearance of impropriety likewise creates a conflict. The totality of the circumstances demands disqualification.

V. **THE PUBLIC COMMENTS MADE BY THE FOREPERSON AND GRAND JURORS REVEAL THAT THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDING WAS TAINTED BY IMPROPER INFLUENCES, INCOMPLETE OR INACCURATE INSTRUCTIONS, AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL INFERENCES.**

On February 13, 2023, the Supervising Judge ordered the release of a redacted version of the final report as a means of protecting the due process rights of individuals who may be named in such report. Ex. 7. The Court referred to the SPGJ process as a “one-sided exploration,” where lawyers were not allowed to be present, potential future defendants were not allowed to present evidence in their defense, and, in the words of the court “there was very limited due process in this process for those who might now be named as indictment-worthy in the final report.” *Id.* at 5. The process was “imbalanced, incomplete, and one-sided.” *Id.* at 5. Accordingly, the Supervising Judge felt that fundamental fairness required the severe redaction of the report upon its release to the public.

On February 21, 2023, five days after the Supervising Judge consciously decided to release only a limited, redacted version of the SPGJ’s report, the foreperson of the SPGJ decided to speak with the media – first, in an interview with the Associated Press, then with the New York Times, and then the Atlanta Journal Constitution. Ex. 8. The foreperson then sat for a 42-minute interview with NBC’s Blayne Alexander and was subsequently interviewed live on-air by CNN’s Kate Bouldan that evening. *Id.* The foreperson’s now widespread statements have provided a first-hand glimpse inside the SPGJ process – an otherwise historically secretive affair. Additionally, on March 15, 2023, five special purpose grand jurors spoke anonymously to the

Atlanta Journal Constitution. *Id.* at No. 11. Collectively, the six jurors' statements reveal a tainted process incapable of producing valuable evidentiary material and a District Attorney's Office who provided constitutionally flawed instructions.

In Georgia, the rules directed to grand jurors as they relate to grand jury secrecy are relatively permissive compared to other jurisdictions. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-67(b). The only limitation placed on grand jurors is that juror deliberations must remain confidential. *See In re Gwinnett County Grand Jury*, 284 Ga. 510, 512 (2008). Members of the grand jury are sworn to "keep the deliberations of the grand jury secret unless called upon to give evidence thereof in some sort of court of law of this state." *Id.*; O.C.G.A. § 15-12-67(b). It is difficult to take a scalpel to the work of grand juries and parse out what does or does not constitute deliberations, but the foreperson seemingly breached that obligation in her public appearances. The foreperson disclosed grand jurors' opinions as to the credibility of witnesses,²⁹ their strategic decisions in drafting the report,³⁰ and general discussions between the jurors.³¹ She ultimately revealed that the SPGJ recommended at least twelve people for indictment. Ex. 8 at No. 4. That recommendation is, of course, the product of deliberations. In fact, the FCDA's Office would agree, as stated by Assistant District Attorney Wakeford: "The report is the necessary result of the deliberations of the grand jury." Ex. 3 at 38.

The collective grand juror interviews also revealed the many outside influences on the SPGJ during the eight months of their investigation. Specifically, the foreperson revealed that the

²⁹ Witnesses were "honest," "forthcoming," "not very willing to speak," and "genuine." Ex. 8.

³⁰ The foreperson stated the perjury section "ended up included there because it was less pointed of a suggestion" than the recommendations made elsewhere in the report. Ex. 8 at No. 4.

³¹ "We definitely talked about the alternate electors a fair amount, they were absolutely part of the discussion.... We talked a lot about December and things that happened in the Georgia legislature." Ex. 8 at No. 2.

FCDA's Office explicitly told the grand jurors that they were allowed to consume news coverage related to the investigation during the time period they conducted it. *Id.* at No. 1. Not only was the SPGJ permitted to review news coverage, but a grand juror brought a newspaper into the room every day and pointed out stories about the events under investigation. *Id.* The SPGJ's review of outside material must be analyzed in combination with the improper public statements contemporaneously made by both the FCDA's Office as well as the Supervising Judge. The foreperson made statements indicating that the grand jurors considered the viability of litigating legal issues outside of their purview, indicated knowledge of how witnesses responded to questioning in other matters outside of their purview, and that they considered the resources of the FCDA's Office in making their decisions which, again, was outside of their purview.³² The foreperson disclosed that the grand jury reviewed footage and testimony from the Jan. 6 hearings and other pending litigation, as well as media interviews by certain witnesses.³³ Based upon that extraneous information, the grand jurors decided which witnesses to call (or not to call) and drew assumptions regarding what witnesses might testify (or not testify) to.³⁴ For example, the grand jurors assumed, "Trump, had he been summoned would likely have invoked the Fifth

³²“At some point through this investigation, especially as we began to speak to higher profile witnesses, I think some of the combativeness that we experienced meant that the DA's team, as well as us, started to pick our battles. And when someone, like for example, goes before the January 6 Committee and says they plead the 5th 200 times, do you really expect them to come before you and say something different?” Ex. 8 at No. 5.

³³“...The lawyers would show video of the person appearing on television or testifying before the U.S. House committee that investigated the Jan. 6, 2021, riot at the U.S. Capitol, periodically asking the witness to confirm certain things.” Ex. 8 at No. 1.

³⁴“We kind of knew what to expect, and so especially with our time being limited and with our resources being limited, when it came to that it was like “eh, we'd rather get this person, which is a battle that we can win, than this other one.... I could see how getting the former president to talk to us would have been a year in negotiation by itself.... I'd be fascinated by what he said, but do you think he would come in and say anything groundbreaking or just the same kinda thing we've heard? So, at some point you don't need to hear 50 people say the same thing.” Ex. 8 at Nos. 1, 5.

Amendment, which he reportedly did more than 400 times when he sat for a deposition last summer with the New York Attorney General's office." Ex. 8 at No. 11.

Most concerning, the grand jurors spoke about the inferences which they drew from witnesses' invocations of the Fifth Amendment.³⁵ The foreperson described prosecutors engaging in what she came to think of as a "show and tell" process when witnesses refused to answer almost every question and stated, "the scratching of pens on paper could be heard as jurors tallied how many times the person invoked the Fifth Amendment." *Id.* at No. 1. Moreover, when a witness invoked the Fifth, "a prosecutor would play videos of speeches, TV interviews or testimony the witness had given elsewhere." *Id.* at No. 11. The juror's observation indicates the lack of respect for the Fifth Amendment shown by the FCDA's office: "I don't know if it was like cruelty, but they're like, if you're going to take the Fifth, we're going to watch you." *Id.* The fact that the juror had to question whether the prosecutor was acting cruelly speaks for itself.

As a continued display of the FCDA's failed understanding of the Fifth Amendment, the grand jurors recalled that the FCDA's office "repeatedly" told the grand jurors that they "should not perceive someone invoking his or her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as an admission of guilt." In reality, a witnesses' assertion of the Fifth Amendment has nothing to do with guilt. As a refresher, the Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. Amend. V. The instruction given to the grand jurors, that the invocation was not an admission of guilt, was insufficient on its face. *See Barnes v. State*, 335 Ga. App. 709 (2016) (precisely forbidding jurors from drawing *any* inferences from a witness's invocation of the Fifth Amendment). The pattern

³⁵ She continuously says "we." Ex. 8.

and practice of the FCDA's office of forcing witnesses, after invoking the Fifth, to continue to testify while showing videos of them from outside sources violates all notions of the Fifth Amendment privilege.³⁶ As stated in *Barnes*, "too many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are guilty of a crime."

The foreperson, armed with an improper education of the Fifth Amendment, as provided by the FCDA, shared some specific observations in her Fifth Amendment analysis. She said of former chief of staff Mark Meadows, "Mr. Meadows didn't share very much at all and was not very willing to speak on much of anything" and "I asked if he had Twitter, and he pled the Fifth." *Id.* at Nos. 6, 8. In contrast, she felt that Rudy Giuliani "genuinely seemed to consider whether it was merited before declining to answer." *Id.* at No. 1. Senator Lindsay Graham, despite challenging his subpoena, struck her as honest, forthcoming, and very willing to have a conversation. *Id.* at No. 6. Since the Supervising Judge declared this to be a criminal SPGJ, as previously stated, it was improper for a grand juror to draw *any inferences* from a witness invoking his rights under the Fifth Amendment. *See Barnes*, 335 Ga. App. 709 (2016). Not only did this SPGJ arbitrarily draw inferences from witnesses' invocation of the Fifth Amendment, but the foreperson then reiterated those negative inferences through the megaphone of the media, thereby tainting any future grand jury.

³⁶ The foreperson described prosecutors, in response to witnesses invoking the Fifth, engaging in what she came to think of as a "show and tell" process where they would show videos of that witness, periodically asking him or her to confirm certain things, and "the scratching of pens on paper could be heard as jurors tallied how many times the person invoked the Fifth Amendment." Ex. 8 at No. 1. "When people would take the Fifth over and over, we could kind of go, ugh" one juror said. "Not because we're like, oh my gosh you're guilty, whatever. It was like we're going to be here all day." Ex. 8 at No. 11.

The grand jurors' comments reveal a grand jury that relied upon improper outside sources and illegally drawn inferences in directing the course of their investigation and rendering their ultimate decision. Throughout the foreperson's media tour, and the subsequent statements of additional grand jurors, it became apparent that this grand jury was improperly supervised or, worse, improperly instructed from the outset. The public cannot have faith in the impartiality of this constitutionally unsound investigation. The results of this tainted investigation included in the final report will negatively impact the due process rights of the named individuals, and the report must be suppressed as it violates the principles of fundamental fairness.

VI. THE SUPERVISING JUDGE VIOLATED THE RIGHTS OF PARTIES IMPACTED BY THIS INVESTIGATION.

Compounding the various harms already inflicted upon the SPGJ, the Supervising Judge made improper comments – both to the press and in court - regarding the investigation.³⁷ Additionally, during the course of the SPGJ investigation, the Supervising Judge indicated bias on more than one occasion by making prejudicial comments.³⁸ More specifically, he made improper remarks impacting the Fifth Amendment rights of the accused. As argued above, this behavior affected the substantive rights of witnesses and non-witnesses alike, including President Trump.

³⁷ The supervising judge provided interviews to the Atlanta Journal Constitution, the Associated Press, 11 Alive, CNN, Yahoo! News, and ABC News. *See* Ex. 9.

³⁸ In speaking about the electors, the Supervising Judge stated, “we’re not going to get into whether they should be surprised or not that they have become the subject of negative attention based on the decisions they made.” Ex. 12 at 20.

A. The Supervising Judge Made Prejudicial Statements Regarding Witnesses' Invocation of the Fifth Amendment.

On July 21, 2022, the Supervising Judge heard argument from counsel for the Georgia electors who sought to quash their subpoenas. In doing so, counsel argued the electors should not be required to appear before the SPGJ in order to assert their Fifth Amendment rights. In response, the Supervising Judge replied, “but if they did nothing wrong, why aren’t they talking to the grand jury?” Ex. 12 at 27. Counsel for the electors further argued that, because the allegations against them related to signing certificates, questions about their name could conceivably warrant a Fifth Amendment assertion. In response, the Supervising Judge stated, “That may be something that the Grand Jury may want to know, that this person won’t even give her name under oath. That could be instructive to what the Grand Jury is doing but they wouldn’t know if they never met the person.” *Id.* at 28. His statements were made in open-court and streamed live on YouTube to the public.³⁹ As the Supreme Court held in *Ohio v. Reiner*, 532 U.S. 17, 20 (2001):

[W]e have emphasized that one of the Fifth Amendment's "basic functions ... is to protect innocent men ... 'who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.'" In *Grunewald*, we recognized that truthful responses of an innocent witness, as well as those of a wrongdoer, may provide the government with incriminating evidence from the speaker's own mouth.

Id. (quoting *Grunewald v. United States*, 353 U. S. 391, 421-422 (1957) (quoting *Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed. of New York City*, 350 U. S. 551, 557-558 (1956)) (emphasis in original).

The court may not suggest that a witness invoking their Fifth Amendment right is evidence of guilt. *Griffin v. California*, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); *see also Carter v. Ky.*, 450 U.S. 288 (1981)

³⁹ Judge Robert McBurney, YOUTUBE (July 25, 2022), <https://www.youtube.com/@judgerobertmcburney7938/streams>

(“The penalty imposed upon a defendant for the exercise of his constitutional privilege not to testify is severe when there is an adverse comment on his silence.”). Yet the Supervising Judge publicly condemned witnesses who chose to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege, and the comments were livestreamed to his YouTube channel for the world, including the special purpose grand jurors and any future jurors, to see. As discussed in Section V, *supra*, we now know the grand jurors were carefully watching the news as well as following the legal challenges filed by witnesses. Ex. 7. We also know they made impermissible inferences based on the invocation of the Fifth Amendment by various witnesses. *Id.*

The Supervising Judge’s improper remarks to the jurors regarding witnesses’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment violated the rights of those witnesses as well as all parties impacted by this investigation, including Movant. The Supervising Judge’s Fifth Amendment commentary, combined with the FCDA’s Office’s ill-informed understanding and edification to the jurors of the Fifth Amendment, *see supra* Section V, evidences a flawed process. Accordingly, any evidence obtained by this SPGJ, in violation of the rights of witnesses and non-parties alike, must be quashed. *See Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

VII. CONCLUSION

As it relates to this investigation, Fulton County, Georgia has become a topic of conversation across the United States and internationally. The whole world has watched the process of the SPGJ unfold and what they have witnessed was a process that was confusing, flawed and, at-times, blatantly unconstitutional. Given the scrutiny and the gravity of the investigation and those individuals involved—namely, the movant President Donald J. Trump, this process should have been handled correctly, fairly, and with deference to the law and the highest ethical standards. Instead, the SPGJ involved a constant lack of clarity as to the law,


inconsistent applications of basic constitutional protections for individuals brought before it, and a prosecutor's office that was found to have an actual conflict yet continued to pursue the investigation. These collective actions violated all notions of fundamental fairness and due process, Movant suffered an injury-in-fact, and the compounding result is one that the court cannot ignore. The errors and flaws detailed above are fatal to the report and recommendations made by the SPGJ as fruit of the poisonous tree.

WHEREFORE, Movant President Donald J. Trump respectfully requests that:

- (1) The report of the SPGJ is quashed and expunged from the record;
- (2) All evidence derived from the SPGJ is suppressed as unconstitutionally derived and any prosecuting body be prevented from its use; and
- (3) The FCDA's Office be disqualified from any further investigation and/or prosecution of this matter or any related matter derived from their use of the SPGJ.


The Movant further respectfully requests that this motion be heard by the Chief Judge (or other duly assigned judge separate from the Supervising Judge), and that he be granted a hearing on the merits.

Respectfully submitted this 20th day of March, 2023.



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Counsel for President Donald J. Trump

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

IN RE: SPECIAL PURPOSE) Case No.: 2022-EX-000024
GRAND JURY)
)
) Hearing Requested
)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Undersigned counsel hereby confirms that it served the above and foregoing Motion to Quash the Special Purpose Grand Jury Report, to Preclude the Use of Any Evidence Derived Therefrom, and To Recuse the Fulton County District Attorney's Office via email and U.S Postage to:

District Attorney Fani Willis
Fulton County Justice Center
Office of the District Attorney
136 Pryor St. SW, Third Floor
Atlanta, Ga 30303
Email: Fani.WillisDA@fultoncountyga.gov

This 20th day of March, 2023,



DREW FINDLING
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drew@thefindlingfirm.com
Georgia Bar 260425


Counsel for President Donald J. Trump

Exhibit 1

January 24, 2021 Order Approving Request
for Special Purpose Grand Jury, In re 2 May
2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case NO.
2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
STATE OF GEORGIA

IN RE: REQUEST FOR
SPECIAL PURPOSE
GRAND JURY



**ORDER APPROVING REQUEST FOR SPECIAL PURPOSE
GRAND JURY PURSUANT TO O.C.G.A. §15-12-100, et seq.**

The District Attorney for the Atlanta Judicial Circuit submitted to the judges of the Superior Court of Fulton County a request to impanel a special purpose jury for the purposes set forth in that request. This request was considered and approved by a majority of the total number of the judges of this Court, as required by O.C.G.A. §15-12-100(b).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that a special purpose grand jury be drawn and impaneled to serve as provided in O.C.G.A. § 15-12-62.1, 15-12-67, and 15-12-100, to commence on May 2, 2022, and continuing for a period not to exceed 12 months. Such period shall not include any time periods when the supervising judge determines that the special purpose grand jury cannot meet for safety or other reasons, or any time periods when normal court operations are suspended by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the Chief Judge of the Superior Court. The special purpose grand jury shall be authorized to investigate any and all facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to alleged violations of the laws of the State of Georgia, as set forth in the request of the District Attorney referenced herein above.

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101(a), the Honorable Robert C. I. McBurney is hereby assigned to supervise and assist the special purpose grand jury, and shall charge said special purpose grand jury and receive its reports as provided by law.

This authorization shall include the investigation of any overt acts or predicate acts relating to the subject of the special purpose grand jury's investigative purpose. The special purpose grand jury, when making its presentments and reports, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-71 and 15-12-101, may make recommendations concerning criminal prosecution as it shall see fit. Furthermore, the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-83 shall apply.

This Court also notes that the appointment of a special purpose grand jury will permit the time, efforts, and attention of the regular grand jury(ies) impaneled in this Circuit to continue to be devoted to the consideration of the backlog of criminal matters that has accumulated as a result of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of Fulton County.

SO ORDERED, THIS 24 DAY OF January, 2022.


CHRISTOPHER S. BRASHER, CHIEF JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Exhibit 2

January 20, 2021 Letter Requesting Special
Purpose Grand Jury

OFFICE OF THE FULTON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
136 PRYOR STREET SW, 3RD FLOOR
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303


TELEPHONE 404-612-4639

Fani T. Willis
District Attorney



The Honorable Christopher S. Brasher
Chief Judge, Fulton County Superior Court
Fulton County Courthouse
185 Central Avenue SW, Suite T-8905
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

2022-EX-000017



January 20, 2022

Dear Chief Judge Brasher:

I hope this letter finds you well and in good spirits. Please be advised that the District Attorney's Office has received information indicating a reasonable probability that the State of Georgia's administration of elections in 2020, including the State's election of the President of the United States, was subject to possible criminal disruptions. Our office has also learned that individuals associated with these disruptions have contacted other agencies empowered to investigate this matter, including the Georgia Secretary of State, the Georgia Attorney General, and the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Georgia, leaving this office as the sole agency with jurisdiction that is not a potential witness to conduct related to the matter. As a result, our office has opened an investigation into any coordinated attempts to unlawfully alter the outcome of the 2020 elections in this state.

We have made efforts to interview multiple witnesses and gather evidence, and a significant number of witnesses and prospective witnesses have refused to cooperate with the investigation absent a subpoena requiring their testimony. By way of example, Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, an essential witness to the investigation, has indicated that he will not participate in an interview or otherwise offer evidence until he is presented with a subpoena by my office. Please see Exhibit A, attached to this letter.


Therefore, I am hereby requesting, as the elected District Attorney for Fulton County, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 et. seq., that a special purpose grand jury be impaneled for the purpose of investigating the facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to possible attempts to disrupt the lawful administration of the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia. Specifically, a special purpose grand jury, which will not have the authority to return an indictment but may make recommendations concerning criminal prosecution as it shall see fit, is needed for three reasons: first, a special purpose grand jury can be impaneled by the Court for any time period required in order to accomplish its investigation, which will likely exceed a normal grand jury

term; second, the special purpose grand jury would be empowered to review this matter and this matter only, with an investigatory focus appropriate to the complexity of the facts and circumstances involved; and third, the sitting grand jury would not be required to attempt to address this matter in addition to their normal duties.

Additionally, I am requesting that, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101, a Fulton County Superior Court Judge be assigned to assist and supervise the special purpose grand jury in carrying out its investigation and duties.

I have attached a proposed order impaneling the special purpose grand jury for the consideration of the Court.

Respectfully,



Fani T. Willis

District Attorney, Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Exhibit A: Transcript of October 31, 2021 episode of *Meet the Press* on NBC News at 26:04
(video archived at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B71cBRPgt9k>)

Exhibit B: Proposed Order

cc:

The Honorable Kimberly M. Esmond Adams
The Honorable Jane C. Barwick
The Honorable Rachelle Carnesdale
The Honorable Thomas A. Cox, Jr.
The Honorable Eric Dunaway
The Honorable Charles M. Eaton, Jr.
The Honorable Belinda E. Edwards
The Honorable Kelly Lee Ellerbe
The Honorable Kevin M. Farmer
The Honorable Ural Glanville
The Honorable Shakura L. Ingram
The Honorable Rachel R. Krause
The Honorable Melynee Leftridge
The Honorable Robert C.I. McBurney
The Honorable Henry M. Newkirk
The Honorable Emily K. Richardson
The Honorable Craig L. Schwall, Sr.
The Honorable Paige Reese Whitaker
The Honorable Shermela J. Williams
Fulton County Clerk of Superior Court Cathelene "Tina" Robinson

EXHIBIT A

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER:

Well, there's nothing to recalculate because if you look at the numbers, the numbers are the numbers. And so you can slice that, dice that any way you want. But at the end of the day, President Trump came up 11,800 votes short. And I had the numbers. Here are the real facts, though, 28,000 Georgians did not vote for anyone for president of the United States of America in Georgia. They skipped. They didn't vote for Biden. They didn't vote for President Trump. They didn't vote for the libertarian Jo Jorgesen. They just left it blank. And Senator David Perdue got 20,000 more votes in the metropolitan areas of the met-- of metropolitan Atlanta and Athens. And that really tells the big story of why President Trump did not carry the state of Georgia.

CHUCK TODD:

The Fulton County district attorney has been investigating whether the president did break any laws in that phone call to you. Have you -- I know you've turned over documents and various things. Have you been interviewed by investigators? You hadn't the last time we talked. Have you since?

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER:

No, I haven't been. I think she's busy with other matters. She has an awful lot of other cases that she inherited. But we fully complied, sent all the documents that we had, and she actually talked to some of our staff members. So if she wants to interview me, there's a process for that and I will gladly participate in that because I want to make sure that I follow the law, follow the Constitution. And when you get a grand jury summons, you respond to it.

CHUCK TODD:

You believe this investigation is totally -- is very legitimate by the D.A.?

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER:

Well, I'm an engineer, not a lawyer. And so I'll let her follow that process and let her bring it before the people.

CHUCK TODD:

You said that you wouldn't have released the phone call had President Trump not tweeted. That's a little bit disconcerting to some. Here he was asking you to break the law. But you

EXHIBIT B

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

**IN RE:
SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY**

**ORDER IMPANELING SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY
PURSUANT TO O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100, ET SEQ.**

Pursuant to the request of the District Attorney for the Atlanta Judicial Circuit to the Judges of the Superior Court of Fulton County to impanel a Special Purpose Grand Jury under the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 et seq., for the purpose of investigating the facts and circumstances surrounding potential disruptions to the lawful administration of the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia, including the election of the President of the United States; and

This matter having been discussed, considered, and approved by the Judges of this Court at the regularly scheduled DATE meeting;

IT IS ORDERED that a Special Purpose Grand Jury be drawn and serve as provided in O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-62.1, 15-12-67, and 15-12-100 et. seq., by and under the supervision of the Honorable NAME, to commence serving on May 2, 2022, not to exceed 12 months under this Order, excluding any time periods when the supervising judge determines that the Special Purpose Grand Jury cannot meet for safety or other reasons, or any time periods when normal court operations are suspended by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the Chief Judge of the Superior Court. The Special Purpose Grand Jury shall be authorized to investigate any and all facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to alleged violations of the laws of the State of Georgia intended to change, disrupt, or influence the administration or outcome of the 2020 General Election in Georgia and its subsequent runoff, during the period from January 20, 2017,

to the present day. This authorization shall include the investigation of any overt acts or predicate acts relating to the subject of the Special Purpose Grand Jury's investigative purpose. The Special Purpose Grand Jury, when making its presentments and reports, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-71 and 15-12-101, may make recommendations concerning criminal prosecution as it shall see fit. Furthermore, the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-83 shall apply.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order be filed in the Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, and published in the newspaper of record.

SO ORDERED, this DATE,

The Honorable Christopher S. Brasher
Chief Judge, Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

PROPOSED ORDER PREPARED BY:

Fani T. Willis
District Attorney
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
Georgia State Bar No. 223955

Exhibit 3

Transcript of January 24, 2023 Special Purpose Grand Jury Hearing before the Honorable Robert C.I. McBurney, Atlanta, Georgia, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

IN RE: 2 MAY SPECIAL)
PURPOSE GRAND JURY)
)
) 2022-EX-000024

TRANSCRIPT OF SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT C.I. MCBURNEY
ON JANUARY 24, 2023, ATLANTA, GEORGIA

APPEARANCES:

ON BEHALF OF THE STATE:

*FANI WILLIAMS, ESQ.
ELECTED DISTRICT ATTORNEY

ADA FMCDONALD WAKEFORD, ESQ.

ADA WILL WOOTEN, ESQ.

ADA ADAM NEY, ESQ.

ADA NATHAN WADE, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE MEDIA INTERVENORS':

THOMAS M. CLYDE, ESQ.

LESLI GAITHER, ESQ.

KAREN RIVERS, RMR, RPR, CCR-2575
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
FULTON COUNTY JUSTICE CENTER TOWER
185 CENTRAL AVENUE, S.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

1 THE COURT: So, Mr. Ney, if I could have
2 the appearance for the State.

3 MR. NEY: Adam Ney, your Honor.

4 THE COURT: And on behalf of the media
5 interveners?

6 MR. CLYDE: Your Honor, Tom Clyde and
7 Lesli Gaither.

8 THE COURT: Welcome both of you.

9 Mr. Clyde, will you be doing the primary
10 speaking for the Media Intervenors'. I'm happy to
11 have it spread out wherever, but if I have
12 questions for your side, should I just pose them
13 and you guys will flip a coin?

14 MR. CLYDE: I welcome just posing them,
15 and we'll flip a coin, but I anticipate I will be
16 doing the bulk of the argument.

17 THE COURT: Great. Mr. Ney just breathed
18 a side of relief.

19 Mr. Wade, who will be answering questions
20 if I've got any for the District Attorney's Office.

21 MR. WADE: So, Judge, here for the State
22 is myself, Nathan Wade. Donald Wakeford is here as
23 well as well as Adam Ney and Will Wooten. Madam
24 District Attorney will be making an appearance as
25 well, Judge. But, for the bulk of the argument we

1 anticipate it will be Donald Wakeford.

2 THE COURT: Great. Well, welcome all of
3 you.

4 So, we're here to discuss whether the
5 final report that the special purpose grand jury
6 that was created, if you will, by Chief Judge
7 Brasher's order from January 24th of last year and
8 that was empaneled in May of last year. Whether
9 their final report should be made public, in part,
10 in whole or if it should remain where it is, which
11 right now is solely in the District Attorney's
12 custody. So everyone is clear, I hand delivered to
13 the District Attorney the copy of the final report
14 soon after it was available, and my colleagues have
15 voted that the special purpose grand jury had
16 completed its work and should be dissolved., And
17 that's the one copy I'm aware of that is in
18 circulation within the District Attorney's span of
19 control. But the question has come up as to
20 whether it should be shared more broadly. The
21 special purpose grand jury voted pursuant to
22 O.C.G.A. 15-12-80 to have the report made public.
23 We need to work through the consequences, if any,
24 of that vote. We need to talk about whether this
25 final report is the equivalent of a general

1 presentment, if those terms really even make a
2 difference, and we need to talk a little bit about
3 how the final report might be viewed as what the
4 courts have referred to as court records, which
5 enjoy a presumption of public access, or if this
6 final report is somehow something different. And
7 I'll note going in that there are precious and few
8 cases in Georgia dealing with special purpose grand
9 jury's because they are few and far between. But
10 there are some, and they provide some guidance as
11 to what can happen with a final report from a
12 special purpose grand jury. I think there is
13 precedent for their final reports being disclosed.
14 I'm holding one in my hand. It was one of the
15 exhibits to the media intervenors' brief, so it's
16 been done before. That doesn't mean that that was
17 the right thing to do. It also doesn't mean that
18 that special purpose grand jury was sufficiently
19 similar to this one. That this one's report ought
20 to be treated the same way. I just want to be
21 thoughtful about it because there's clearly great
22 interest in the work that the special purpose grand
23 jury completed, and we need to be responsive to
24 what may be competing concerns of the investigative
25 interests of the District Attorney's Office and the

1 public's interest in understanding what its
2 colleagues, the members of the special purpose
3 grand jury did after they heard the evidence that
4 was presented to them.

5 So, Mr. Wakeford, I'm happy, if there's
6 something you want to say up front, but otherwise,
7 I've got questions that I'd love to get a DA's
8 Office prospective on to help me frame this, and
9 then I have similarly for Mr. Clyde and Ms. Gaither
10 some questions.

11 MS. WILLIS: May I address the Court?

12 THE COURT: You may.

13 MS. WILLIS: Fani Willis, the Elected
14 District Attorney for Fulton County, on behalf of
15 the citizens and the state.

16 I believe that Mr. Wakeford will give you
17 some of the answers that you have required. But
18 just as an overview -- first of all, the thought
19 that this is a presentment grand jury, you and I
20 both know it's really kind of a nonsensical
21 question.

22 THE COURT: So, be thoughtful as you work
23 through this. Because don't lump me with you as to
24 who thinks what is nonsensical and what's not. So
25 you tell me what you think, and then I will let you

1 know later on what I think.

2 MS. WILLIS: Fair enough.

3 THE COURT: Excellent.

4 MS. WILLIS: Back in May of last year,
5 the Honorable Chief Brasher swore in 26 members of
6 the public to create a special purpose grand jury.
7 Their entire function was to be an investigative
8 tool. And we are very very thankful to those
9 citizens. As you and I both know, they gave up a
10 great deal of their time. Hopefully, you and I can
11 agree on that.

12 THE COURT: We do.

13 MS. WILLIS: And heard from 75 witnesses,
14 saw countless exhibits, but all for the purpose of
15 investigation. At this point, reaching back to
16 prior experience of both myself and I'm going to
17 say you again, because I know your history is that
18 you've been a prosecutor. Often when a prosecutor
19 is in a trial courtroom they find themselves in
20 this position of not only protecting the rights of
21 the victims, witness and the community, but making
22 sure that Defendant's rights are protected, too.
23 Rights sometimes is a very selfish interest; you
24 don't want the case overturned. And so as the
25 prosecutor we stand in that position of protecting

1 everyone in the courtroom's rights. Having been
2 one of very few people that have had the
3 opportunity to read that report, you being the
4 other one, I think we can assume that fact is also
5 true. In this case, the State's understands the
6 media inquiry and the world interests. But we have
7 to be mindful of protecting future defendant's
8 rights. And so what the State does not want to see
9 happen, and don't think that there's anyway the
10 Court would be able to guarantee, is that if that
11 report was released there somehow could be
12 arguments made that it impacts the right for later
13 individuals, (multiple) to get a fair trial, to
14 have a fair hearing, to be able to be tried in this
15 jurisdiction. The list can go on and on. And so
16 representing the state of Georgia and these
17 citizens, I know we have this common interest, we
18 want to make sure everyone is treated fairly, and
19 we think for future defendants to be treated fairly
20 it's not appropriate at this time to have this
21 report released. I, as the elected District
22 Attorney, have made several commitments to the
23 public understanding, the public interest around
24 this case. The first was before you were assigned
25 to this case. I said by June of that year I would

1 make a decision as to whether we would ask for a
2 special purpose grand jury. In fact, I did so in
3 May, which is why they were ruled on in May. I
4 then asked for a special purpose grand jury to last
5 for a year, but made certain commitments by the end
6 of such year, meaning last year 2022, the special
7 purpose Grand Jury's work would end. At this time,
8 in the interest of justice and the rights of not
9 the state but others, we are asking that the report
10 not be released. Because you haven't seen that
11 report, decisions are imminent.

12 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And I
13 didn't mean to skip over you DA Willis. Mr. Wade
14 had mentioned that you would be appearing at some
15 point, but that Mr. Wakeford would be primary
16 spokesperson. So, I wasn't sure if the way in
17 which you all were going to present, but thank you
18 for sharing those overview comments.

19 Mr. Wakeford?

20 MR. WAKEFORD: Good morning, Judge.

21 THE COURT: Or afternoon. How are you
22 doing?

23 MR. WAKEFORD: I'm just fine, Judge.

24 THE COURT: Good.

25 MR. WAKEFORD: So I understand, your Honor

1 -- I have a question for your Honor first, and then
2 I understand that your Honor has questions for me.
3 If you'll indulge me?

4 THE COURT: I will. Maybe.

5 MR. WAKEFORD: Sure. That's your
6 prerogative, Judge.

7 Your order actually calling for this
8 hearing made mention of a certification from the
9 grand jury that they asked that their report be
10 published under O.C.G.A. 15-12-80. To my knowledge
11 standing here, I also -- I don't want to make
12 comments about the contents of a report whose
13 confidentiality is the subject of this hearing.

14 THE COURT: Sure.

15 MR. WAKEFORD: But I'm prepared to say
16 that a mention of 15-12-80 is not in the report.

17 THE COURT: Sure.

18 MR. WAKEFORD: So I'm asking your Honor
19 what the source of the certification mentioned in
20 your order is.

21 THE COURT: The grand jurors. So, it's
22 not -- you're correct, it's not in the report. It
23 is something that they did after they completed
24 their work.

25 MR. WAKEFORD: Okay. All right. Thank

1 you, your Honor. That was not one thing I was not
2 able to ascertain.

3 THE COURT: Sure. You didn't miss
4 anything nor was I reading between the lines or
5 there's a footnote that was omitted.

6 MR. WAKEFORD: Okay. And I understand
7 your Honor has questions for me. I'm fully
8 prepared to engage in a dialogue if that's the way
9 you would prefer to proceed.

10 THE COURT: Well, let me ask some
11 threshold questions because that may help focus the
12 dialogue and also focus the dialogue with Mr. Clyde
13 and Ms. Gaither. I'm trying to understand the
14 basis for the request for nondisclosure, and I'm
15 approaching it from a number of angles. One is the
16 fairly limited scope of secrecy of grand jury work
17 in Georgia, and with that I'm particularly
18 influenced by the Olsen case where the Supreme
19 Court made plain that their view of the statutory
20 framework for grand jury's is that really only
21 deliberations are secret. Secret isn't the only
22 touchstone here, but that's what's in the oath, is
23 that deliberations are kept secret. You, had you
24 been present for anything that happened in front of
25 the grand jury are not bound by any statute or oath

1 to maintain secrecy about anything that happened.
2 None of the witnesses who appeared are bound by any
3 oath. Their oath is simply to provide truthful
4 testimony. Not to then not disclose their
5 testimony to the media, their uncle or anything
6 like that. And grand jurors are bound by their
7 oath only not to discuss deliberations. So unless
8 we -- and I believe it's a stretch. Unless we
9 somehow stretch to say their final report is their
10 deliberations then, I think, we're already outside
11 the statutory realm of what's secret. That doesn't
12 mean something should be disclosed just because
13 it's not secret as part of the grand jury. But
14 going into this my thinking was everything with the
15 grand jury is secret and there had to be an
16 exception. And in Georgia it seems like it's
17 almost the reverse. It's very different from
18 federal grand jury. And I know I asked you to
19 share some thoughts about how we're going to work
20 with the special grand jurors going forward. And
21 there are lessons to be drawn from federal practice
22 but are not driving our decisions. So talk me
23 through just first this question of secrecy and why
24 if that's one of the arguments you think that -- it
25 really doesn't matter what you want to do, Judge,

1 it's secret statutorily the final report. And then
2 we'll evolve to a court record or not or this
3 notion that in some ways may be nonsensical that a
4 final report is equivalent to a presentment of the
5 special purpose grand jury.

6 MR. WAKEFORD: Okay. Yes, your Honor.

7 And let me say also, if there are questions -- I
8 would ask your Honor if there are questions at the
9 end of the hearing today that I feel that I can
10 request us to provide a written response or more
11 research on, I would simply ask for the opportunity
12 to do that.

13 THE COURT: Sure.

14 MR. WAKEFORD: So, in other words, that
15 the report is not -- a decision is not rendered and
16 the report is not released at 12:59 pm on today.

17 THE COURT: That's not how it will
18 happen. They'll be notice in case there's decisions
19 that want to be made after you understand what the
20 decision is.

21 MR. WAKEFORD: Understood. I also will
22 -- sorry for all the prefaces. I have to be a
23 little bit circumspect because I have to talk about
24 this report while attempting not to divulge the
25 contents of the report.

1 THE COURT: And I intend to do the same.
2 So none of my questions will be about -- well, what
3 about page six, if there's even a page six, if the
4 pages are numbered. That's not -- I promise I won't
5 be trying to drag you into -- oh, but wait this
6 part here or tell me what part you think ought to
7 be redacted. That assumes that I would have
8 decided some part ought to be made public. I
9 haven't. We can keep it at the very high level, and
10 in why is it a secret.

11 MR. WAKEFORD: I'm glad to here that your
12 Honor. I just didn't want to try your patience if
13 I keep talking about the report could be rather
14 than what the report is. But, I'm glad you
15 understand the position that we're in.

16 THE COURT: And I think it helps Mr.
17 Clyde and Ms. Gaither are necessarily going to have
18 to approach it that way. They don't know what
19 color paper it was printed on. Is it double
20 spaced, and what's in it. By you and me having
21 exchanges at that level as well will make it easier
22 for the different prospective's to share their
23 views.

24 MR. WAKEFORD: Right. Okay. So, then
25 the question of secrecy, your Honor -- I would say

1 that the special purpose grand jury's report in
2 these circumstances -- well, actually in all
3 circumstances. Special grand jury's are special.
4 We have learned that over the course of the past
5 year. As your Honor referred to at the outset of
6 this hearing, there is precious little litigation
7 on this topic.

8 THE COURT: They are special. I'm going
9 to pause you from time to time because if I don't
10 write my question down I need to ask it. There are
11 only two statutes about special purpose grand jury.
12 And one of them says, use all the other statutes
13 about grand jury's unless they somehow conflict. I
14 don't know how they conflict because there's so
15 little in 101 and 102. So, there are many things
16 we know because we look at all the statutory
17 framework for regular grand jury's. Same oath.
18 And that oath says your deliberations are secret.
19 Your oath wasn't different, if you took one. It
20 doesn't bind you in anyway. The witness's take the
21 same oath and they're not bound in any way by any
22 sense of secrecy. Yes, special purpose grand
23 jury's are different. They last longer. They
24 investigate in a different way. They cannot hand
25 down a bill of indictment or anything like that.

1 But, in lots of ways their grand jury's. And so I
2 think that needs to guide our discussion. And a
3 regular grand jury per Olsen this is the pretty
4 narrow parameters of what's secret. Their
5 deliberations. You can't be in there for them.
6 Grand jurors can't discuss their deliberations.
7 But when they're done, here's our indictment, our
8 presentment, whatever it may be. And so I'm
9 analogizing, perhaps, mistakenly, and you can help
10 me work through that. When we slide over here it's
11 a special purpose grand jury. Those grand jurors
12 ought not talk about their deliberation, but when
13 we're done what pops out of the toaster. Instead
14 of an indictment is a final report. I don't see
15 how that's secret based on the statutory framework
16 in which we're working. Again, not dispositive.
17 But, you may be able to convince me it is secret
18 because of this case or that case. I know you
19 don't have a case, you would have sent it to me
20 long before, but I'm interested in your analysis.

21 MR. WAKEFORD: Thank you, Judge. I guess,
22 let's start up here then. And the first point to
23 be made is that special purpose grand jury's can be
24 empaneled at the explicit request of the District
25 Attorney, the prosecutor, which is, in fact, what

1 happened in this case. It was empaneled with the
2 request that they investigate certain matters and
3 also be in power to provide charging
4 recommendations, if any, to the District Attorney'
5 who would then not be bound by those
6 recommendations but could be advised by them moving
7 forward.

8 THE COURT: Right. The special purpose
9 grand jury whose report is Exhibit C of the media
10 intervenors' filing, which was Dekalb, presided
11 over by Judge Scott, do you know -- I don't, that's
12 why I'm asking. Was that special purpose grand
13 Jury convened at the request of Robert James, who
14 would be Ms. Willis's counterpart at that time in
15 Dekalb County.

16 MR. WAKEFORD: I actually do not know the
17 answer to that question.

18 THE COURT: That would be an interesting
19 question to answer.

20 MR. WAKEFORD: But I will endeavor to find
21 out, of course.

22 THE COURT: Me, too.

23 MR. WAKEFORD: But in this case
24 specifically, I think the specialness of special
25 purpose grand jury's in someways point to how

1 individual they are. So, in that case that's a
2 fine example. The ambit of the authority for the
3 special purpose grand jury in that case was to look
4 into a civil investigation. That is not what this
5 case is about. This case, as we have litigated it
6 constantly, and as your Honor had purpose to look
7 into constantly, has been a criminal investigation
8 at the request of the District Attorney. And the
9 report --

10 THE COURT: I'm going to pause you for a
11 second. Page six, pursuant to the relevant
12 statutes. On September 7, 2011, the District
13 Attorney -- so Robert James -- requested that a
14 special purpose grand jury be empaneled. Dekalb
15 Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit voted to approve.
16 Entered an order, and thus, was created that
17 special purpose grand jury. So structurally, it's
18 the same or similar. DA James said, I need a
19 special purpose grand jury to investigate
20 something. And as a result of their investigation
21 there was a report and it was published.

22 MR. WAKEFORD: Yes, your Honor. What I'm
23 saying is then in this case it was requested by the
24 District Attorney for the sole purpose of
25 conducting an investigation into possible criminal

1 activity. And that the report, therefore, could
2 consist of several different types of information.
3 There could be a summary of what the grand jury
4 came to find out in the course of its
5 investigation. There could be a list of statutes
6 that the grand jury thinks might have been violated
7 by someone. There could be a list of individuals
8 with accompanying activities that the grand jury
9 believes could be-- could have broken the law. It
10 could even get more detailed than that. And so the
11 actual content of the report I think gives us some
12 guidance here as to how secret to perceive-- how
13 much respect to provide the secrecy of this report.
14 Because as your Honor knows ongoing criminal
15 investigations having different --a different
16 understanding as far as court records are concerned
17 in this case. And in fact, records that are part
18 of an ongoing investigation are not subject to
19 public scrutiny. When the District Attorney
20 requested that the special purpose grand jury
21 engage in this investigation and provide
22 recommendations if they saw fit, it was as part of
23 -- at that time and at this time ongoing criminal
24 investigation. If that report contains information
25 it is for the use of the District Attorney per the

1 empaneling order. If that report contains charging
2 recommendations that is certainly solely for the
3 use of the District Attorney, and I would argue
4 that under the law what the law tells us under
5 15-12-101, I believe, is that the only required
6 recipient of the special purpose grand jury's final
7 report is you as the supervising judge except in
8 this case where it was also the district attorney.
9 Because if -- whether there are recommendations or
10 not the District Attorney has to ascertain that.
11 So has to see the report. So I think that's a
12 lesson right there, in that the content of the
13 report and the nature of the empaneling order in a
14 specific special purpose grand jury can affect how
15 we view it under the law. And of course, I will
16 speak to court records and presentment versus
17 reports in greater detail. But I think that is an
18 indication of what we are operating under with
19 regard to the statutory language. The content of
20 the report should be the guide for this court as to
21 exercising its discretion and how to move forward
22 with respect to secrecy and publication.

23 THE COURT: But what -- I follow. But
24 what about the process makes it secret? I'm trying
25 to understand. We need to be guided by the

1 statutes that are not there for optional
2 consideration and the deliberations are secret.
3 Are you saying this is deliberations or you're
4 saying you know what, judge, let's table the whole
5 secrecy thing. Because I don't think you can
6 stretch the statutes to say the report is secret,
7 but maybe this is where you want to go next. The
8 report is not a court record, so we don't get to
9 Uniform Superior Court Rule 21 analysis.

10 MR. WAKEFORD: That's exactly where I
11 would head next.

12 THE COURT: Okay. Let's go there.

13 MR. WAKEFORD: I would flip the question.
14 I would say in what respects is it secret is one
15 way in looking at it. And certainly, I'm sure that
16 my colleagues from the intervenors' would look at
17 it from that prospective. I think I have looked at
18 this question as what makes it subject to
19 publication. And there's nothing in 15-12-100 or
20 101 that indicates that there is any contemplation
21 of publication. Any special contemplation of
22 publication. And I know where your Honor's going.
23 Because 15-12-102 says that part one of the grand
24 jury code sections applies unless otherwise
25 indicated. But 15-12-80 which is with regard to

1 publication applies only to general presentments.
2 And again, the content of a special purpose grand
3 jury report can contain elements of both a general
4 and a special presentment. Making it a third kind
5 of thing. A special purpose grand jury report it's
6 an isolated instance under the law.

7 THE COURT: But I want to --I think we
8 may be able to dispose of one term so we don't get
9 too confused. My understanding is that this concept
10 of special presentment has gone away. That
11 basically indictments and special presentments, one
12 in the same. We don't do special presentments
13 anymore. A grand jury can indict someone if they
14 are presented --first, if it's not a special
15 purpose grand jury. But in reviewing case law that
16 you've provided and that I'd received from the
17 media intervenors', I got the sense that we really
18 don't even use that term "special presentment"
19 anymore. You're welcome to. I don't know that--I
20 think it's going to cloud things a little bit. I
21 think in one corner you've got charging documents
22 which this body had no authority to present. And
23 we have a history. There's at least one Supreme
24 Court case dealing with a rogue special purpose
25 grand jury that this said not only do we think you

1 should do this DA, but we've indicted him for you.
2 Thank you. That's a step you can't take. That's
3 the District Attorney's decision to make and then
4 ultimately a regular grand jury hearing the
5 evidence deciding whether there ought to be a true
6 bill.

7 MR. WAKEFORD: That was an court of
8 appeals decision.

9 THE COURT: Court of appeals. Either
10 way, it was out of Gwinnett County. That is not
11 what we're dealing with here. So I don't know that
12 we get into special presentment. Why is the final
13 report so distinct that it ought not to be treated
14 as a general presentment, and 15-12-80 ought to be
15 so narrowly read that it's only a general
16 presentment, whatever the heck a general
17 presentment is.

18 MR. WAKEFORD: That's sort of the problem
19 right there, your Honor. Is that -- first of all,
20 special presentments just to put that to bed, I
21 think the distinction is not only that they are
22 charging, but they make specific allegations of
23 wrong doing under the law. So there is a
24 possibility that the report can contain what is
25 essentially a special presentment within it because

1 they were empowered to do precisely that. So I'm
2 coming back to this thing again. The content of
3 the report should guide their analysis. The
4 special purpose grand jury was authorized to return
5 a report that was in all but name took the form
6 after of a special presentment. That's something
7 they had been authorized to do. They were also
8 authorized -- I mean, it just says report. They
9 could have come back and just provided a summary of
10 what they heard everyday. Or they could have
11 provided a two page summary of what overall they
12 thought the picture -- the picture painted for them
13 was. That they are authorized to do any number of
14 these things. And the report can take any of those
15 forms. So a special purpose grand jury report as
16 we'll see can take the form of something akin to a
17 special presentment or to a general presentment or
18 have elements of either. And where 15-12-80
19 specifically says general presentments I don't
20 think that we can say it applies without question
21 to a report issued by a special purpose grand jury.
22 Additionally, I would point your Honor to 15-12-71.
23 That is the duties of the grand jury statute.
24 There's something interesting within this statute
25 in a couple of instances. It was actually pointed

1 out by the intervenors' in their submission to the
2 court. Which is that 15-12-80 is specifically
3 mentioned in 15-12-71 with regards to presentments.
4 What's interesting is that when it appears the
5 legislature has taken pains to point out that a
6 report or presentment provided as a result of a
7 civil investigation conducted by a regular grand
8 jury is subject to 15-12-80 also. They also later
9 say a decision by a grand jury not to pursue
10 charges or recommend charges against a peace
11 officer who has been accused of an unlawful use of
12 force is also subject to 15-12-80. That report or
13 presentment is. If they recommend that charges are
14 pursued, they can recommend it by either requesting
15 an indictment or special presentment. So, in these
16 other places the legislature has not assumed that
17 15-12-80 applies to any report that a grand jury is
18 empowered to produce. When they have to produce
19 these two reports as they are required to under the
20 law they have taken pains to say, oh, and 15-12-80
21 applies, and that is within part one of the grand
22 jury code sections. Part two, which says that
23 unless contradicted everything in part one applies.
24 There's just no mention of 15-12-80 in the special
25 purpose grand jury statutes.

1 THE COURT: There's not. They don't
2 mention any other statute from that first part.
3 They simply say all of the first part is
4 incorporated insofar as it's not specifically in
5 conflict.

6 MR. WAKEFORD: And the other term --Well,
7 it's specifically in conflict, I would say the term
8 they use is report, it is not general presentment.
9 Now, I understand the position of the intervenors'.
10 We're not closing our eyes to their position that
11 come on, there's no distinction between a report
12 and a general presentment. I would refer you,
13 though, to where I began, which is that in this
14 situation the law has created a situation where
15 special purpose grand jury can return something
16 that is either special presentment, a general
17 presentment or has elements of both. And so it
18 just cannot be considered to not be in conflict
19 with 15-12-80, which says general only.

20 THE COURT: If it has elements of both
21 then are the general presentment elements
22 publishable at the special purpose grand jury's
23 direction but not the special presentment parts. I
24 want to move away from labels. They called that a
25 report. They could have written on there general

1 presentment. I think you would still be arguing
2 what you're arguing. Even though they called it
3 general presentment, and thus literally under
4 15-12-80, the Court shall publish other than ultra
5 vires stuff that I am empowered to take out. They
6 called it a final report. I told them to call it a
7 final report. You asked for a final report so
8 that's why it says final report. But what if there
9 are -- as you said, it can contain components of
10 both if there are things that call out at you as
11 general presentment then what do we do with
12 15-12-80?

13 MR. WAKEFORD: Right. And at that point
14 if it's not something that could be considered
15 solely a general presentment then it's not a
16 general presentment under the law.

17 THE COURT: A hybrid presentment?

18 MR. WAKEFORD: Hybrid --it's a special
19 purpose grand jury report. We have a special
20 purpose grand jury statute that makes a special
21 grand jury that produces a report. These are
22 isolated under the law and therefore fall outside
23 of the general understanding in certain instances.
24 One thing that's also not in 15-12-100 or 101 is
25 that a special purpose grand jury cannot indict.

1 So 15-12-102 says all the rest of the first part
2 applies. That doesn't say they can indict. So the
3 court of appeals in its wisdom has decided well
4 that means they can't indict. So just because
5 these two statutes are brief and you have the catch
6 all statute does not mean we are incorporating a
7 single component of part 1 unless there is
8 something glaringly obvious. It actually takes a
9 little bit of -- a lot of analysis to look into
10 this. And I think were the choice of words is
11 report and where the report can take on this sort
12 of strange hybrid form that you cannot assume that
13 the general presentment as used in 15-12-80 applies
14 to a special purpose grand jury report. I think
15 the content of that report again is going to guide
16 this court's analysis as to how really to look at
17 that. And that ultimately if there is something
18 that isn't clearly a general presentment 15-12-80 I
19 cannot apply.

20 THE COURT: Okay.

21 MR. WAKEFORD: I also think that we can
22 reach to the conclusion there is a discretionary
23 aspect here, and that is something Madam DA was
24 actually speaking to. If there are recommendations
25 the District Attorney requested those. And if

1 there are any in there or if there are not any in
2 there the District Attorney in its ongoing
3 investigation has to assess what has been provided
4 by the special purpose grand jury. This report was
5 issued 10 days ago. I'm not even --

6 THE COURT: I don't remember when we had
7 our hand off, but it's recent.

8 MR. WAKEFORD: It's extremely recent.
9 There has been no opportunity whatsoever for this
10 office to incorporate anything in the document into
11 an ongoing investigation in a meaningful way, and
12 to make the ultimate decision that only the
13 District Attorney is empowered to make, which is
14 either there will be -- the investigation's over
15 and no charges will be pursued or the investigation
16 is over and charges will be pursued. And where the
17 express purpose of the report is to investigate a
18 set of circumstances and provide or not provide
19 recommendations to the District Attorney, we think
20 immediately releasing before the District Attorney
21 has even had an opportunity to address publicly
22 whether there will be charges or not, because there
23 has not been a meaningful enough amount of time to
24 assess it, is dangerous. It's dangerous to the
25 people who may or may not be named in the report

1 for various reasons. It's also a disservice to the
2 witnesses who came to the grand jury and spoke the
3 truth to the grand jury.

4 THE COURT: So, how do -- how does one
5 reconcile this prospective with the parallel highly
6 public proceedings with the January 6th commission?
7 Many of the same witnesses hopefully saying similar
8 things if they were asked the same question, but
9 that's not my business, and the commission actually
10 referring to the Department of Justice, you need to
11 look at these people for these things. Dangerous.
12 Pressure on the Department of Justice. They seem
13 to withstand that, and they're doing what they're
14 doing. Maybe they'll bring charges, maybe they
15 won't. Those were recommendations. I think they
16 were called referrals. But clearly congress, one
17 branch, doesn't tell the executive DOJ, another
18 branch, what to do. But there was nothing
19 clandestine, secret, tucked into a report that the
20 public didn't get to see about that process. And
21 that's different. That was not a special purpose
22 grand jury. But that is another situation that has
23 been ongoing that I think I need to assess and
24 reconcile with how it's happening here. Our
25 legislature didn't choose to have hearings like

1 that, and so the way the District Attorney explored
2 it was through the one means she had, a special
3 purpose grand jury. Parts of it secret. Some of
4 it, maybe not. But this danger and impact balance
5 it against the fact that the January 6th commission
6 seem to do what it did and DOJ didn't have to shut
7 down after those referrals came.

8 MR. WAKEFORD: Well, first of all they
9 were looking at issues in a different light than
10 the special purpose grand jury was asked to look at
11 them. Obviously, Congress addresses the entire
12 nation. Special purpose grand jury is focusing on
13 Georgia and possible criminal activity within the
14 state of Georgia or the touches upon the state of
15 Georgia. Additionally, Congress doesn't have to
16 contend with 15-12-101 and 102. I'm not making
17 fun. We are traveling under the law here. So
18 Congress -- if there's danger created because they
19 are not bound similarly by concerns of grand jury
20 secrecy or traditional secrecy here or the -- I'll
21 put it this way. Congress was going to conduct
22 this investigation because Congress can conduct
23 investigations. That's something it is empowered
24 to do. It was not conducting an investigation at
25 the request of the Department of Justice to provide

1 recommendations which would inform it's ongoing
2 investigation. That's what happened here. So to
3 --

4 THE COURT: But I guess the point I'm
5 making through that observation is --it's 21. I
6 don't know that you pointed to any law that says
7 the final report must not be disclosed. Reasons
8 for it. Policy reasons. But it may not, must not,
9 I don't think that's what statute or case law says.
10 So I think it's going to be a balancing -- and I
11 don't mean the balancing of Rule 21. We may get
12 there. I'm not saying that's where we are. But I
13 see nothing that says thou shalt not disclose. And
14 so many some of the very powerful policy arguments
15 that I've been hearing from you and from the
16 District Attorney we need to be thoughtful about
17 lots of stakeholders. And you and I both heard the
18 District Attorney whisper "dangerous," and then you
19 said "dangerous." And I was merely observing a
20 parallel process occurred in Washington DC and the
21 world kept spinning and referrals were made and DOJ
22 processed that and they're going to do what they're
23 doing. And clearly they didn't feel like, well, we
24 better do something right now because very publicly
25 the January 6th Commission referred certain charges

1 against certain people. So, if an argument you're
2 making, the District Attorney's Office is making
3 whomever the person is. But that your office is
4 making is look it may be post indictment. It makes
5 all the sense in the world to disclose the report.
6 But before then you're hamstringing an
7 investigation. Maybe putting inordinate pressure
8 on someone. I get these things, but that doesn't
9 seem to have caused the wheels to fall off the DOJ
10 bus.

11 MR. WAKEFORD: Well, we don't know, your
12 Honor. We don't know because the DOJ operates in
13 such complete secrecy and their grand jury
14 proceedings are subject to much more powerful
15 secretive requirements. So we don't quite know the
16 answer to that question. Additionally, Congress's
17 proceedings happened in public. They were
18 nationally televised. They had witnesses come and
19 testify to the entire nation. And then so when
20 they made recommendations it was based on
21 information that they were publicly releasing.
22 Sometimes live and in living color.

23 THE COURT: Understood. But if Fred
24 Jones was testifying up there and Fred Jones came
25 down here --I mean, that's the only point I'm

1 making. Is that some of this -- well, we don't
2 know what happened in the grand jury insofar as
3 there's overlap. Maybe people do and things -- we
4 don't need to get into that. You've shared with me
5 your prospective on how-- I understand it. How
6 January 6th Commission was different and the fact
7 that they very publicly referred certain charges
8 against certain people to the Department of Justice
9 is sufficiently different that you don't think that
10 there should be a parallel drawn with the concerns
11 here.

12 MR. WAKEFORD: I would also add, your
13 Honor, that while by the necessity of the laws
14 governing serving subpoenas in different states
15 some of the witnesses have been made public. But
16 the public does not know who the witnesses were for
17 the special purpose grand jury.

18 THE COURT: That wasn't my point. I
19 agree. That wasn't my point at all. We heard 75.
20 We heard a number but not names. I was merely
21 observing that the public actually does know a fair
22 number, and some of those names overlapped with the
23 very public presentations to or refusal to share
24 thoughts and ideas and testimony with the January
25 6th Commission. We can move pass that.

1 Talk to me about court record and Rule
2 21. Why is this not -- you may have already
3 answered it because you were analogizing it, I
4 think, aptly to it's an investigative report. And
5 if a detective wrote a final report saying I
6 recommend this person be prosecuted for this
7 homicide, that is not something that the public has
8 traditionally enjoyed right of access unless and
9 until it's part of discovery or it's introduced as
10 an exhibit at trial.

11 MR. WAKEFORD: I think that is exactly
12 how to conceptualize the report at this time, your
13 Honor. I also want to highlight a point that you
14 sort of alluded to a couple of minutes ago, which
15 is that the time for this conversation really
16 should be after the District Attorney -- what to do
17 with the report. What is the nature of the public
18 or secret nature of the report should come after
19 the District Attorney has had an opportunity to
20 state I am not pursuing charges or I am pursuing
21 charges or even I have sought charges and here is
22 the indictment that has been true billed. At that
23 point, the relative stance, the status of everyone
24 involved will be much clearer, and we will have a
25 much better road map for how to handle secrecy or

1 publication. So, I actually think that this entire
2 conversation would be better handled after that
3 decision is made, which the District Attorney began
4 by stating that when she has made assurances as to
5 time frame she has held up or exceeded those
6 assurances. But I will also want to point to
7 another thing. The statute regarding court records
8 is very specific in that ongoing criminal
9 investigations are not subject to public scrutiny.
10 There is no presumption of public access to those.
11 This we think commonsensically falls within those.

12 THE COURT: When you say the statute,
13 you're not referring to Rule 21?

14 MR. WAKEFORD: I mean, Rule 21. In re:
15 Gwinnett County Grand Jury, which is cited, I
16 believe, by intervenors' in their submission
17 actually clarifies that with regard to the kinds of
18 civil investigations which regular grand jury's are
19 empowered to pursue, and which they can produce
20 reports or presentments as a result of, in which
21 the statute says specifically 15-12-80 applies to.
22 They say that the term court records as used in
23 USCR 21 encompasses only the presentments made by
24 the grand jury in open court at the conclusions of
25 the grand jury's investigation. There is a

1 longstanding requirement for which documents must
2 be presented in open court, including special
3 presentments and indictments. Here, the report
4 under 15-12-71 had to be presented in open court
5 and actually already had been. That is not a
6 requirement under 15-12-100 or 101. The only
7 requirement for the final report is that it go to
8 you as the supervising judge, and then in this case
9 go to the jury District Attorney as recipient of
10 either a recommendation for charges or no
11 recommendation for charges. So, there is no open
12 court requirement for special purpose grand jury
13 reports. It's just not there. And the Gwinnett
14 County case points to the fact that the
15 presentments-- it's not that they're presentments,
16 it's that they're made in open court that makes
17 them a court record. You couple that with the
18 presumption that documents attached to an ongoing
19 criminal investigation are not subject to a
20 presumption of public scrutiny or access. And I
21 think it's clear that the report in this case is
22 not a court record as contemplated by Rule 21. I
23 think it's another indication that discretion and
24 the wise choice at this time is -- cannot be that
25 it's released at this time. And everything about

1 the nature of this report indicates that it is
2 premature to make the report public at this time.
3 That I think is the strongest stance I will take
4 before your Honor today.

5 THE COURT: Okay. Let me throw a little
6 bit of a wrinkle at you. What would prevent a
7 special purpose grand juror from reaching out to
8 the media saying I'll tell you what's in the report
9 other than me telling them? But what would be the
10 basis for me telling them because it's not
11 deliberation. So we can step back from
12 presentments and Rule 21 and all these things.
13 It's not deliberations. Maybe it's investigative.
14 It is investigative. Maybe it's disclosable, maybe
15 it's not. Maybe it's disclosable after the
16 investigation is done. That's the reason rule
17 you're proposing. But now I'm special purpose
18 grand jury member McBurney and I disagree with that
19 approach. I'm not going to tell you our
20 deliberation. I'm going to tell you how we came up
21 with what we came up with; why we did. I'm going
22 to tell you what several witnesses said because I
23 didn't like what they said or I really liked what
24 they said. Because their testimony isn't protected
25 in any way. Why could that not happen, or on what

1 basis could I forbid it from happening so that
2 there could be contempt if it did happen?

3 MR. WAKEFORD: Because the report is the
4 necessary result of the deliberations of the grand
5 jury.

6 THE COURT: So is a jury verdict. So is
7 an indictment. So is a general presentment or a
8 special presentment. It's the synthesis of. It's
9 the end product of. But it's not the
10 deliberations. And that's where if we end where we
11 began our part of the conversation that's what
12 Olsen is all about. It's just the deliberation.
13 You can't be in there. I can't be in there while
14 they're deliberating. What goes into it, witness
15 testimony. You actually could have had five
16 assistant district attorneys in there even if only
17 one of them was asking a question. No harm, no
18 foul. Once they're done -- again, why is it not
19 something that is disclosable? And if they can
20 disclose it, why wouldn't it then just generally be
21 disclosable. And that's sort of the end of the
22 curve ball.

23 MR. WAKEFORD: Right.

24 THE COURT: You either hit it or miss it.

25 MR. WAKEFORD: All of the results that

1 you've mentioned like an indictment or verdict,
2 there is a requirement under the law that those be
3 made public which we're sort of --we're going
4 around in circles. There is no requirement that
5 the special purpose grand jury be made public.
6 There is not a requirement. And again, we're going
7 to come -- we're going to see that the intervenors'
8 will likely come from the angle there's nothing
9 that says it has to be secret. Well, we're saying
10 there's nothing that requires it to be public.
11 It's its own document. And your Honor could forbid
12 them from speaking about its contents because right
13 now it hasn't been published in open court. It's
14 not in the possession of anyone in the state of
15 Georgia or in the United States of America other
16 than briefly your Honor and the District Attorney,
17 who is engaging in an on going criminal
18 investigation. And so it hasn't been publicized.
19 It hasn't been released. There's nothing that
20 indicates a requirement that it be released, and
21 the only result of a grand juror talking about it
22 would be to shed light on the deliberations and
23 also in the bargain interfere with the ongoing
24 criminal investigation which their report was meant
25 to be a part of.

1 THE COURT: So what odds do you give an
2 appeal of an order that I would enter forbidding
3 them from talking about the contents of the final
4 report? It gets appealed. Restrain of speech,
5 first amendment violation and special purpose grand
6 juror X just sends the Supreme Court or Court of
7 Appeals (Olsen). So how's that going to play out?
8 I appreciate I could do things to help maintain the
9 investigation and not get it prematurely derailed
10 by things that it ought not to have to deal with
11 until the time is right, and that's a decision that
12 the District Attorney and her team would make as to
13 when the time is right. That's an important
14 interest to uphold. You've got my full support of
15 that interest. But, I don't know. I need to think
16 through how that plays out. And if we have a grand
17 juror who says that's fascinating, you're not going
18 to release the report, but I'm going to talk. I
19 muzzle you. I suspect there'd be an appeal. I'm
20 not interested entering an order that we know is
21 DOA (dead on appeal).

22 MR. WAKEFORD: So, (1) your Honor,
23 respectfully. One thing I refuse to do is ever
24 handicaps odds of what the court of appeals will
25 and will not do.

1 THE COURT: We do that all the time, and
2 we're always wrong.

3 MR. WAKEFORD: You're right, your Honor.
4 What I'm saying is that the -- can I actually
5 confer with the District Attorney for one second?

6 THE COURT: Sure. Please. And you're
7 almost done.

8 (Pause in record for counsel to confer.)

9 (Record resumed.)

10 MR. WAKEFORD: So, there's two things I
11 wanted to highlight. And I appreciate you letting
12 me confer with Madam District Attorney.

13 THE COURT: Not a problem.

14 MR. WAKEFORD: The first is that our
15 position should not be understood to be a blanket
16 opposition to release of the report forever and
17 until the end of time.

18 THE COURT: I have not, not heard that
19 once. I have heard, I think, a reasoned approach
20 of not now and here's why. Likely later and here's
21 why. I haven't heard forever, bottle it up. So,
22 that's not my take away from what you've been
23 saying.

24 MR. WAKEFORD: But to your question what
25 will a future appellate court do? I think that's

1 an extremely relevant fact is that this is not
2 opposition that is intended to go to March to the
3 end of time and prevent public disclosure of what's
4 in this report forever. That's not the position.
5 It is simply saying that now is not the time, and
6 that your Honor has the power to pursue that.

7 THE COURT: It's like a temporary
8 sealing. We're going to seal this to include seal
9 the mouths of some the people until --and that may
10 put some additional pressure onto reach a finish
11 line sooner, but it's not the same pressure that
12 what's actually in the report. And if it says
13 certain things that complicates and maybe
14 compromises a more thoughtful approach to charging
15 decisions.

16 MR. WAKEFORD: I think that there is a
17 clear time to have this conversation when we have a
18 much better idea of how to proceed, and it is after
19 the District Attorney has announced either we will
20 not be pursuing charges or we will or --and here
21 they are. That I think is really what I'm saying.
22 But additionally, there are other constitutional
23 rights that are impacted. And those are the rights
24 of anyone who is possibly named in the report.

25 THE COURT: So I'm going to ask the media

1 intervenors' about that. But I guess we can end
2 with that. So let's say that your special purpose
3 grand juror X says, you know what, Oscar the Grouch
4 should be indicted. And we talked about it. And
5 my gosh, Oscar the Grouch should be indicted for
6 treason-- if that's a state crime-- for inciting a
7 riot based on what happened here in Georgia.
8 What's Oscar the Grouch --who's he suing? What
9 constitutional rights is he going to be invoking to
10 say, wait a minute, I can't believe someone said
11 that. And of course the someone isn't the District
12 Attorney. It's not you. It's either in the report
13 because it's published or it's coming from someone
14 who is not bound by any oath of secrecy to not talk
15 about witness testimony or the final decision of
16 the special purpose grand jury. Because the DA
17 brought this up as well. I get it in part, but I'm
18 -- crystalize it for me. So what does Oscar the
19 Grouch do? He hires a lawyer and that lawyer has
20 conference -- a press conference to say we're
21 outraged. We'll prove our innocence even though we
22 don't have to prove anything because we're innocent
23 until proven guilty.

24 MR. WAKEFORD: Well, we know that the
25 cases exist which your Honor actually refer to in

1 your order where there were discussions of public
2 officials seeking expungement of statements made by
3 grand jury's that were different in color than a
4 special presentment or an indictment. So, I guess
5 the simplest answer to this question is I'm not
6 totally sure, but we can avoid that question
7 entirely by not publicizing the report until after
8 the District Attorney has made --

9 THE COURT: Why tangle with it if you
10 don't have to.

11 MR. WAKEFORD: Exactly. There's just no
12 reason when the report is sure to be eventually
13 disclosed because the District Attorney is not
14 going to forever oppose it. There is no reason to
15 contemplate the release until there has been a
16 public decision made by the District Attorney of
17 the three options I have mentioned many times.
18 We're not pursuing anything. We plan to pursue
19 something or we have pursued it and here is a bill
20 of indictment. At that point we have a much better
21 idea of -- we don't have to worry about statements
22 made about individuals because they will either not
23 be any and we have a better idea of what to do or
24 there are and they are contained in a bill of
25 indictment.

1 THE COURT: Right. If Oscar gets
2 indicted and it's released and it says Oscar should
3 have been indicted, sort of I told you so. And if
4 Oscar's not indicted and the report said he should
5 be then someone could choose to explain from the
6 District Attorney's Office why Oscar the Grouch
7 wasn't indicted, but there isn't that cloud hanging
8 over Oscar's head in the interim.

9 MR. WAKEFORD: That's precisely right,
10 your Honor.

11 THE COURT: I'm not sure that it
12 necessarily invokes constitutional rights, but I
13 get the policy concern.

14 MR. WAKEFORD: Well, it also marches in
15 lock step with the concerns about an ongoing
16 criminal investigation. It's sidesteps all of
17 those problems. It also solves the issue of is
18 this a general or is this a special or is it -- it
19 sort of everything becomes clearer at a later date.
20 And we can come back and discuss in the clear light
21 of day as opposed to a lot of me standing here and
22 going well it could be this or it could be that and
23 you agreeing it could be that or this. And I think
24 the main point is today is not the time. Now is
25 not the time. But eventually, we will have a

1 better idea of when the time will be. And the
2 District Attorney's Office is not opposed to the
3 eventual release. It's opposed to it right now,
4 and it's opposed to releasing it without very
5 careful consideration in light of all the other
6 factors that are in play. I just ask your Honor
7 once again to consider the contents of what the
8 actual report ends up being. Because the law has
9 set up a situation where it could be little of
10 this, a little of that or something completely
11 different. And I think that's part of the reason
12 why we're here to sort of get an idea of what are
13 we even dealing with. And I would ask again if
14 there are further points of law, points of policy
15 or any other position that the District Attorney
16 should illuminate, that you will allow us a chance
17 to dig in on that and provide a written submission.
18 And otherwise, I remain available to answer any
19 other questions. Thank you.

20 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you so much.
21 Appreciate it.

22 So, Mr. Clyde, you're client's are going
23 to get the report eventually; can we go home?

24 MR. CLYDE: No, your Honor. Obviously,
25 we believe the report should be released now and in

1 its entirety. And that approach is consistent with
2 the way the american judicial system operates. In
3 other words, it is not unusual for a District
4 Attorney or a prosecuting authority to be generally
5 uncomfortable with having to release information
6 during the progress of a case. That occurs all the
7 time. But the judicial system time and time again
8 has said when matters are brought to the court
9 system we are going to be -- require them to be
10 made public because the faith of the public and the
11 court system is much improved by operating in a
12 public way. And so it's only in the most
13 extraordinary situations where our appellate courts
14 and where United States Supreme Court has allowed
15 the sealing of records or and including, as you
16 articulated, the outcome of grand jury activity.
17 We acknowledge the operations of the grand jury
18 while it was ongoing were subject to a veil of
19 secrecy. But that, as the Court has explained,
20 that has come to an end, and they have issued a
21 final report, and that final report is the outcome
22 of the judicial process, not an executive branch,
23 criminal investigation. They invoked the judicial
24 process of the special purpose grand jury statutes
25 and now that's special purpose grand jury has

1 issued a report and the jurors themselves have
2 asked for it to be published. There's enormous
3 public interest in what they have said, and that
4 exist in this state. It exist the across nation.
5 It exist beyond the nation. And we believe the
6 statutory law supports its public release right
7 now. We believe the case law supports its public
8 release right now. And we believe constitutional
9 law, including our own state constitution, requires
10 its release right now.

11 THE COURT: So why isn't this one of
12 those extraordinary circumstances where disclosure
13 wouldn't be the standard? I appreciate that you're
14 characterizing it as a judicial proceeding.
15 Because, of course, a judge had to be appointed to
16 supervise and ultimately received the report. But
17 I don't think Mr. Wakeford was misdescribing it all
18 that much. He didn't use the word "conduit," but
19 it basically was here, Judge, here's our report
20 that we prepared ultimately at the request of the
21 District Attorney to answer the questions that the
22 District Attorney had, not the Court had. The
23 Court didn't sua sponte-- could have-- but it
24 didn't, to be clear in this case. We want to know
25 more about what went on with the general election

1 in 2020. That was something that the District
2 Attorney asked for. Had to pull some levers to do
3 that, judicial levers. But it was executive branch
4 saying we want to investigate this. The mechanism
5 by which we investigate it is a grand jury, okay.
6 That means the courts have to be procedurally, not
7 substantively, but procedurally involved. And then
8 we get our report. We, the District Attorney's
9 Office, so we can figure out what we're going to do
10 next. How is that -- that's how things flowed.
11 And it did pass through a court proceeding because
12 I had to swear the jurors in and what not. But it
13 wasn't a trial. It wasn't a hearing. I didn't
14 issue any ruling. So I'm pulling it out of that
15 framework. I'm wondering how you say no, no, no,
16 it needs to stay in, in that framework. Or at
17 least why is it not one of these extraordinary
18 uncommon situations where it's really not a court
19 record that came out. I haven't filed it. There's
20 nothing that says I need to file it, which is
21 usually -- when you are invoking -- I asked you a
22 bunch of questions. So you'll get to answer. Rule
23 21 kicks in usually because there's something in
24 the docket that your clients can't get their hands
25 on. There's nothing in the docket and there's not

1 going to be anything in the docket unless I decided
2 that something needs to be published, and it
3 probably will be published by putting it in the
4 docket. There is no requirement it go in the
5 docket. So there isn't even a court filing that
6 we're talking about.

7 MR. CLYDE: Okay. Your Honor --

8 THE COURT: I'm done.

9 MR. CLYDE: I see that as three questions
10 and I'm going to answer them in order. Number (1)
11 I understand your analogy that this is a conduit
12 situation and I'm going to speak to that. And then
13 I'm going to speak to why there's really no
14 circumstances. There's none of the extraordinary
15 circumstances that would justify sealing, and why
16 in the end this is a Rule 21 document. And so let
17 me start first with this is a judicial process. I
18 understand your Honor's point that it was requested
19 by the grand jury. But it's actually an
20 extraordinary judicial process. In other words,
21 that request is made to this court and this court's
22 -- this -- not just Judge Robert McBurney's
23 courtroom, but the Superior Court of Fulton
24 County's power is invoked. Grand jurors are
25 required to come to this courthouse. Those -- and

1 that can't happen until a majority of the Superior
2 Court judges agree that this is a worthy thing to
3 undertake. So, it's actually an extraordinary
4 exercise of judicial power. And so I don't think
5 it can be characterized as just a we helped out the
6 executive branch. It is fully invoking the
7 judicial branch's power and requiring jurors to
8 come and devote their time and their energy to
9 carry out a purpose for this court system. And
10 that is the kind of environment where the case law
11 says that's judicial.

12 So the next question you asked is, all
13 right, isn't this one of those extraordinary
14 circumstances. And respectfully, I don't think the
15 State has made any showing of any substance that
16 this is -- that's one of those extraordinary
17 circumstances, and let me explain that. I respect
18 the District Attorney's statement about the
19 protection of other people, and that is an admiral
20 statement for a - for any District Attorney to
21 make. But other people, particularly the other
22 people that were involved in this grand jury are
23 represented by their own counsel. This hearing
24 took place, was widely published. Their counsel
25 aren't here. The risk of prejudice to them is

1 actually much less than it is with many many
2 documents that are disclosed during the judicial
3 process. Indictments get entered as the Court is
4 very well -- indictments get entered by the State
5 or by the federal government with a great deal of
6 detail. Sometimes press conferences that drive
7 defense counsel crazy. But there's never been any
8 suggestion, and there couldn't be that that process
9 should be closed. Hearings take place about the
10 exclusion of evidence or the exclusion of
11 witnesses. All those hearings take place publicly.
12 The documents related to them have to be disclosed
13 as court records. Those are much more --much
14 closer in time to a trial, so there's a much
15 greater risk involved in those documents. Here
16 we're -- if we're talking about risk to potential
17 defendants facing a trial years into the future
18 that this document is reeling, doesn't rise to the
19 level of the routine kind of documents that are
20 disclosed publicly during the judicial process. So
21 I don't think there's a compelling case for
22 protecting other people's rights.

23 The Court asked about, well, who does
24 somebody sue? The Court's exactly right; they can't
25 sue anybody. Long ago, the United States Supreme

1 Court in 1976, in Paul vs. Davis said no.
2 Government institutions are going to make
3 statements that have negative impact on people's
4 reputation. That alone will not ever create a
5 cause of action. You have to show something called
6 stigma plus. It has to be a deprivation of other
7 kind of rights. Simply reputational interest
8 aren't enough. So what the State is pointing to is
9 simply not the kind of information that justifies
10 sealing. And there hasn't been any suggestion, any
11 evidence, any presentation that really makes a
12 compelling demonstration that there should be a
13 sealing in this case. Ongoing investigation
14 --investigations obviously when people are indicted
15 they don't necessarily close. They continue
16 throughout a case. And so ongoing investigations
17 frequently continue after there is significant
18 disclosures of information about an investigation.
19 That's exactly what would occur here. As the Court
20 has pointed out, the House of Representatives
21 January 6th committee also has disclosed enormous
22 amounts of information. There's really no precise
23 showing that can support the kind of sealing that
24 they're asking for.

25 And finally, the Court asked, all right,

1 Rule 21. Really, why is this triggering Rule 21;
2 it's not filed. And your Honor, it is filed for
3 purposes of Rule 21. Let me explain what that is
4 for purposes of Rule 21. The question is not
5 whether it's submitted to the clerk. The question
6 is whether it is submitted to a judicial officer
7 that needs to take action on it. And that's what
8 triggers Rule 21. The -- I will give you a case
9 cite to that.

10 THE COURT: Please.

11 MR. CLYDE: And we're happy to provide
12 more authority on this issue. This is -- I'm going
13 to give you Forsyth vs. Hale. It is at 166 Ga.
14 App. 340. I'm quoting a part of it here. "A paper
15 is said to be filed when it is delivered to the
16 proper officer and by him received to be kept on
17 file." In this case that special report was by law
18 submitted to you as the supervising judge. Based
19 on that, immediately you had responsibilities. You
20 had to provide it to other judges and everybody to
21 reach a decision about whether this grand jury
22 could be dissolved. There were decisions that had
23 to be made. The power of this Court was invoked.
24 The decisions by you as the supervising judge had
25 to be made. And so overall it falls exactly within

1 the category of Rule 21. Now, I acknowledge that
2 there is a secrecy with respect-- that the Gwinnett
3 County grand jury decision recognize there's a
4 line. That Court -- the records that the grand
5 jury looked at during its ongoing process are not
6 accessible as court records. Because historically
7 they haven't been. But then the Gwinnett County
8 Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals in the
9 Gwinnett -- the Supreme Court in the Gwinnett
10 County decision emphasized the -- in that case that
11 general presentment had to be made public because
12 it was the outcome of this process. And so it was
13 subject to Rule 21, and essentially the same
14 process would apply here.

15 THE COURT: Was that grand jury a special
16 purpose grand jury or a regular grand jury?
17 Because regular grand jury's can do general
18 presentments as well. They're empowered to
19 investigate the Clerk's office. They could --
20 they're not going to indict the Clerk, but they
21 could say, hey, we noticed that they use too much
22 paper in the copy machines and we should be more
23 environmentally conscious.

24 MR. CLYDE: Exactly.

25 THE COURT: So if the case you're

1 referring to -- there are lots of Gwinnett cases.
2 So I'm not necessarily seizing upon the same one.
3 Was that a special purpose grand jury in which the
4 Supreme Court said that -- I know they use the term
5 general presentment, and we'll talk about report
6 versus presentment. But, setting that aside they
7 were saying that special purpose grand jury's,
8 general presentment must be made public because it
9 is effectively a filing.

10 MR. CLYDE: Correct. And it was a
11 general presentment from a grand jury, and in a
12 civil context. And I'm talking about 2008 In re:
13 Gwinnett County grand jury case. Justice Benham
14 held that that document was subject to Rule 21.
15 And we would submit the same thing would be --with
16 the same conclusion would be reached with respect
17 to the final report.

18 Your Honor has, and I understand the
19 questions relating to 15-12-80, and we're eager to
20 address that. But one of the things I want to
21 emphasize, I think, from the Court's questions, you
22 fully understand this, but those are two
23 independent basis for the disclosure of the report.

24 THE COURT: No, they are. And I pressed
25 Mr. Wakeford on them because it's sort of mounting

1 pressure, if you will. The grand jury itself said
2 you need to publish it. And if one travels to
3 15-12-80 -- actually, it's a "shall." There aren't
4 a lot of statutes that say the Court "shall." And
5 I've learned what that means. If it applies, if 80
6 applies. But I appreciate that that is a separate
7 basis. If I were to find that the final report is
8 effectively a Rule 21 filing, then Rule 21. And
9 all the case law that you and Ms. Gaither cited
10 that talk about the competing interest, and it
11 really is extraordinary and exceptional not to
12 disclose something that would fall under or within
13 Rule 21's gambit. So that would be a second and
14 compelling reason if I were to find the final
15 report is a Rule 21 filing.

16 MR. CLYDE: Exactly, your Honor. If I
17 may add one item to your desk is -- today we're
18 also going to provide the Court with another
19 example of a special report that was published.
20 This -- and this is a -- I'm going to provide a
21 copy to you in just a moment. It involves the
22 Gwinnett County Grand Jury, and it is from 2009.
23 It was then looking at land transactions, and Judge
24 Clark at the end where I put that -- may I
25 approach?

1 THE COURT: You may.

2 MR. CLYDE: Where I put the blue tab is
3 where Judge Clark has ordered this special purpose
4 grand jury report to be published in the legal
5 orbit. It is an example -- and I would say that
6 just as -- in a sense I would think that the two
7 special purpose grand jury reports that are before
8 the Court are in a sense examples of the two ends
9 of the spectrum. Obviously, in the Dekalb special
10 purpose grand jury they recommended prosecutions of
11 a named individual. And that was disclosed and
12 published by Judge Adams in the Dekalb situation.
13 In the Gwinnett situation, this is a grand jury
14 that found a great deal of discomfort and
15 criticized various aspects of the land purchasing
16 decisions made by Gwinnett, but generally is not
17 recommend prosecution, is moving in the other
18 direction. But in both cases they were published
19 in their entirety at the direction of the
20 supervising court judges in both cases. These are
21 special purpose grand jury's.

22 THE COURT: So these would be then
23 examples that it is possible to do it, and I
24 assumed it had been legally challenged, and -- and
25 a higher court had said the trial judge was in

1 error to do that, then Mr. Wakeford would have
2 shown me those opinions. So those are out there.
3 But what about his argument that if -- and I know
4 you don't know the content of the final report for
5 lots of good reasons. But what about the argument
6 that the contents should drive the decision making
7 process?

8 MR. CLYDE: So, your Honor, I'm going to
9 address--

10 THE COURT: Did I interrupt you before
11 you got all the--

12 MR. CLYDE: No, no, no. You raised
13 another issue that I'd like to cover, and I will
14 directly answer that question.

15 THE COURT: Okay.

16 MR. CLYDE: With respect to the Dekalb
17 special purpose grand jury -- and the Court may
18 already be aware of this.

19 THE COURT: Full disclosure. I was a
20 brand new judge and all of a sudden Mark Scott
21 Defendant was in front of me. There was a whole
22 lawsuit that came out of Dekalb about not handing
23 over that report to the rest of the bench. And it
24 -- so I'm a little familiar with that. Nothing
25 about publication. It was news -- I wasn't

1 interested in whether it was made public. I was
2 interested in getting Judge Scott out of my
3 courtroom.

4 MR. CLYDE: And the only thing I want to
5 point out is Burrell Ellis is ultimately prosecuted
6 for perjury in the aftermath of that special
7 purpose grand jury based on his testimony that was
8 presented at that special purpose grand jury. He's
9 prosecuted. He is --there's a verdict. He was
10 convicted at trial. And he ultimately on appeal --
11 parts of his conviction are affirmed. Parts of it
12 are reversed. But there's nowhere in that opinion,
13 and that opinion does recount the history of
14 special purpose grand jury, that it is anyway
15 critical of the release of the report nor did
16 Burrell Ellis and his counsel ever make any
17 argument that the release of the report somehow put
18 him in an impossible position at his trial. It was
19 -- it obviously as the Court has pointed out there
20 hasn't been a decision directly on point with the
21 issue that we're taking on today. But it is an
22 example of somebody who is prosecuted in the
23 aftermath of the release of a report, and it never
24 rose to the level of an issue worthy of appeal.

25 Then, your Honor, I'm going to address --

1 I apologize, I'm having trouble remembering --

2 THE COURT: It's all right. Mr. Wakeford
3 was making the argument that we could -- when I was
4 exploring reports, special presentment, general
5 presentment, that really depends on the content of
6 the document. And the more it is like a special
7 presentment, the more it is something that is an
8 investigative tool for the District Attorney as
9 opposed to a general report on here's the things we
10 learned and saw and what not. That would militate
11 towards not disclosing now because it's much more
12 like a detective's homicide report. That's not a
13 court filing. That doesn't get filed with the
14 Court. But that's someone thinking long and hard
15 about should the District Attorney bring charges
16 against someone for killing someone.

17 MR. CLYDE: And your Honor, in terms of
18 suggesting to the Court that it has discretion to
19 make independent judgments about what should be
20 public and what shouldn't be public, I do not
21 believe that that discretion exist in anything
22 other than the law of Rule 21 and the law of
23 essentially expungement of ultra vires activity.
24 In other words, what do we believe the case law
25 supports. We believe the Court is within its

1 rights to read the report. If this grand jury and
2 occasionally that happens -- and if this grand
3 jury has gotten outside the ambit of its mandate
4 and made statements that have nothing to do with
5 what its actual role was, that is appropriate for
6 expungement, we aren't disputing that. We only
7 note that that by implication suggest everything
8 within the scope of their mandate they're suppose
9 to be made public.

10 The second part is does the Court have
11 the authority to seal under Rule 21? Absolutely, it
12 does. But, it has to meet the Rule 21 standards.
13 And there is the -- there is -- the argument that
14 has generally come from the State today is, it is
15 uncomfortable this report being released until
16 we've made these decisions. And I don't fault the
17 expression of discomfort or --

18 THE COURT: I fully understand it. I
19 think it is a reasonable concern to raise. But if
20 I find that we're within the realm of Rule 21, it's
21 just not one that weighs really heavily in the
22 scale that I understand the analysis that higher
23 courts have performed. One doesn't ignore it, but
24 it's a lighter weight than the public's interest
25 and the general presumption that court filings are

1 to be made public.

2 MR. CLYDE: And your Honor, I guess we
3 would say it's not just a lighter presumption; it
4 doesn't meet the standard. In other words, the
5 discomfort of the prosecuting authority in
6 disclosing court records isn't enough to make them
7 sealed. It has to be significant identifiable
8 evidence that's going to cause a problem. And your
9 Honor, I don't think that submission has been made.

10 THE COURT: I have a question about that
11 standard. In your brief, page 18, you use the
12 phrase "clear and convincing proof." And clear and
13 convincing evidence, that is a standard out there
14 which is different from a preponderance. Much more
15 than that. It's not well-defined. It's less than
16 a reasonable doubt. It's actually what the JQC has
17 to use for judges. "Clear and convincing," and
18 that's the phrase you used. It's a whole lot more
19 than a preponderance. And I'm wondering if you
20 have case law for that or it was just a colorful
21 phrase trying to show that there is a burden that
22 the parties seeking to seal something has to meet.
23 And there is. But I'm not familiar with it being
24 clear and convincing evidence. That is a higher
25 burden than I weigh it and find in which way do the

1 scales lean. Where is the preponderance? Sealing
2 and not sealing. And that's why I was saying the
3 District Attorney's concern about timing and not
4 having the investigation unnecessarily rushed. I
5 think that is a factor that I can weigh. Your
6 point was -- my point was how heavily do I weigh
7 it. You said, oh, it doesn't weigh as much as
8 public interest. It might not, but there are other
9 concerns that the District Attorney raised. The
10 rights of folks who may be named in an unfavorable
11 report if that's how it works. So I envision the
12 process, the Rule 21 process to be stacking weights
13 on a scale just like a jury would in a civil trial.
14 I think that's a fair way to think about it. There
15 are heavier and lighter weights, but in the end I
16 need to decide are the scales leaning in the
17 direction of sealing or in the direction of having
18 this be an open record. I think I just need to see
19 that it is leaning in a direction. I don't think
20 it has to be leaning in a particularly strong way,
21 and clear convincing is that it has to be leaning
22 in a particularly strong way. So that was a long
23 way of saying where do you get clear and convincing
24 evidence as the standard?

25 MR. CLYDE: Your Honor, I believe clear

1 and convincing is the standard for closing the
2 courtroom. I would say the way you've described
3 the sealing of records is correct with this caveat.
4 The items that you are putting on the scale have to
5 be constitutionally cognizable issues. So, in
6 other words, a general statement that people's
7 reputations might get hurt has repeatedly been
8 identified by our appellate courts as not enough.
9 Not even beginning the discussion.

10 THE COURT: Okay. Because there's two
11 different things. Not enough is what you keep
12 saying, and I'm saying, okay, it's not enough
13 standing alone, but maybe there's more, other
14 factors. But then you shifted towards the end
15 saying actually that's not a factor at all. It
16 would be improper to put that on the scale because
17 it's not constitutionally cognizable. I'm not
18 disagreeing with you. I'm asking you to educate
19 me. Can I put whatever ought to be deemed
20 reasonable factors or there are cases out there
21 that say these kinds of thing might be someone's
22 concern but you may not put them on that scale to
23 decide which way the scales are leaning.

24 MR. CLYDE: I would say it's the latter.
25 In other words, that's simply -- that kind of

1 general articulation of potential injury to
2 reputation simply doesn't get -- make the scale.

3 THE COURT: It's not a factor to be
4 considered. Whether one considers it lightly or
5 greatly, it's not a factor.

6 MR. CLYDE: And if there is a detailed
7 showing about an individual made by their counsel
8 and the -- it was an extraordinary situation --

9 THE COURT: Stigma plus.

10 MR. CLYDE: Well, extraordinary typically
11 involves juveniles. Typically involves highly
12 private information. It doesn't involve public
13 officials who are involved in activities following
14 a national election. And so that's the part where
15 the fit is just not very tight. And so that's --
16 so -- but your Honor also brings up a good point
17 that I would like to react to. The only
18 organization that filed a brief in advance of this
19 hearing is us. The State has articulated their
20 argument today. We will plan to respond to that
21 argument with more detail so the Court has some of
22 the case law that has rejected sort of generic
23 concerns about reputation as a basis for sealing.
24 But I do think that is well established. And so
25 what we would submit is when it comes to that

1 weighing process, and Rule 21 itself requires that
2 it significantly outweigh that presumption of
3 openness. That when it comes to that weighing
4 process, I'd let the weight that you can put on the
5 closure side are really not compelling in the
6 situation that's before us here. And then on our
7 side we're talking about really one of the most
8 compelling situations for legitimate public
9 interest that I can think of in this courthouse.
10 In other words, there is genuine public interest in
11 what these grand jurors found after they sifted the
12 evidence. After they heard from all the witnesses
13 and its interest not just because of the role they
14 played on the grand jury but also because they are
15 community citizens. And speaking to these issues
16 from that vantage point as well. And so that's
17 also important and part of the public interest.

18 THE COURT: What is your response if I'm
19 the special purpose grand juror whose been told by
20 this judge you can't talk about your final report
21 to anyone, it's secret or at least I'm telling you
22 can't do it. And they look in the online person
23 and the lawyer Tom Clyde pops up. And you get a
24 call from the special purpose grand juror saying,
25 judge is telling me I can't talk about

1 deliberations, but I also can't talk about what any
2 witness testified about. In particular, I want to
3 tell people about this special purpose --our final
4 report because the judge isn't publishing it, but I
5 want to talk to folks about it. Can the judge tell
6 me I can't? I mean, yes, he can, because he did.
7 Can we challenge this judge, and what's our
8 strategy?

9 MR. CLYDE: Your Honor, I think they
10 could challenge that. In other words, as the Olsen
11 case makes clear they are now required to take a
12 oath and that oath was narrowed by the general
13 assembly. And so they are bound by that oath.
14 Could this court in extraordinary circumstances
15 impose what would be a prior restraint on their
16 speech? Yes, in extraordinary circumstances. But
17 as the court knows the extraordinary circumstances
18 to warrant a prior restraint are typically
19 situations, they're putting the national security
20 of the nation at risk. In other words, the
21 examples that have been used by the United State's
22 Supreme Court are the location of warships and time
23 of war, things like that. That can justify a prior
24 restraint. But here, as long as that grand juror
25 abided by the oath they were required to take and

1 the general assembly approved I think they're
2 within their rights speaking about the experience.
3 And this is specifically what the Supreme Court
4 case, USC Supreme Court case that says witnesses
5 that appear before the grand jury are allowed to
6 speak about their experience before the grand jury.

7 THE COURT: I think that the Olsen case
8 makes that clear. I'm not talking about witnesses,
9 they're going to do what they do. So you contend
10 that that would constitute a prior restraint saying
11 you can't talk about this. Well, what about the
12 notion that the final report is really just an
13 extension of their deliberations? It's not a
14 presentment. It's not the kind of thing that grand
15 jury's --it is specifically what this grand jury
16 came up with at the end, but it's not a general
17 presentment. It's not a special presentment. So
18 really they shouldn't talk about the final report
19 because it is just an extension of those
20 deliberations.

21 MR. CLYDE: Your Honor --

22 THE COURT: I'm not really compelled by
23 that question.

24 MR. CLYDE: It's a step too far. In
25 other words, as the Court has indicated the outcome

1 of grand jury process, the outcome of those
2 deliberations is a public document and
3 historically. And so that process of the
4 deliberations and an outcome gets rendered to the
5 court system is a significant and important step in
6 the process, but I don't think you could seal the
7 final report as being part of their deliberations.
8 And candidly, I think the statement by the special
9 purpose grand jurors that they wanted their report
10 published speaks to that. I don't think they see
11 it as an exposure of their deliberations. They see
12 it as this is the judgment -- I read it as they see
13 it. This is the judgment that we've reached, and
14 that's what the court system historically said that
15 document becomes public.

16 Your Honor, unless you have other
17 questions, I will not take any further of your
18 time, but what we would propose is that just as
19 Judge Adams did in Dekalb, that you order that the
20 report be filed with the Clerk's office, and I
21 think the expression you used was spread among the
22 minutes of the Court. And that it be published
23 pursuant to 15-12-80.

24 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Gaither,
25 anything you want to add? Did he cover it?

1 MS. GATHER: No, your Honor, he did a
2 pretty good job.

3 THE COURT: Mr. Wakeford, I have seen the
4 Post it notes flying in your direction, so why
5 don't you come on up here and let me hear any brief
6 rebuttal you may have.

7 MR. WAKEFORD: Brief, right, your Honor?

8 THE COURT: That's what the lawyer always
9 say and 30 minutes later we're still hearing. I'm
10 interested in what you've got to say in response.
11 And in particular, touch upon -- I'm not familiar
12 with the Forsyth case, *166 Ga. App. 340*. I'll read
13 it, and I'll look for other cases like it. But I
14 was intrigued by this notion that there's case law
15 out there that one could use to characterize the
16 final report as a filing. Certainly not in the
17 clerk's possession right now and won't be anytime
18 soon. But because it came into the Court's
19 possession then it's a filing. And we are within
20 the realm of Rule 21 and not some place you'd
21 rather be.

22 MR. WAKEFORD: Right, your Honor. And I
23 think opposing counsel or counsel for the
24 intervenors' used an interesting phrase just a
25 moment ago. We progressed away from filing in open

1 court to just maybe sort of filing to render to the
2 court system, which is now we're so far from the
3 language that is contained in the case they cited,
4 In Re: Gwinnett County jury, that we're no longer
5 talking about a presentment made by the grand jury
6 in open court, which is what the language that the
7 Court chose, the Supreme Court chose in that case.
8 Additionally, they cite to a portion of the
9 language of that case in their brief at page 11. A
10 block quote from the Supreme Court's language where
11 they talk about Rule 21. And it's at the top of
12 page 11. They say "Rule 21 embodies the right of
13 access to court records which the public and press
14 in Georgia have traditionally enjoyed." And as
15 opposing counsel also pointed out there's no law on
16 point as to what to do here because there's
17 actually nothing traditional about special purpose
18 grand jury.

19 THE COURT: That's not the strong
20 argument for disclosure is that this report falls
21 into that category of traditional act. There's
22 nothing traditional about this report or this
23 process. I get that. That doesn't mean; however,
24 that it falls outside of Rule 21. It's just --it's
25 not a simple one, which is why we're having to have

1 this hearing. If this were an indictment, it's a
2 simple one and we don't have this discussion. And
3 it may be that there is the name of a critical
4 witness that the State is seeking to redact from
5 the indictment until it's appropriate to unseal
6 that piece because people haven't been arrested yet
7 or something. That happens all the time. That's
8 not this. This is different.

9 MR. WAKEFORD: Well, I would say that the
10 question of whether Rule 21 is applied in this
11 specific way -- going to your Honor's point, that
12 may be something that requires additional argument
13 from the District Attorney's Office because I
14 really think that demonstrates ably that we are not
15 within the realm court Rule 21, and that we are
16 much -- if we are this is a document that is much
17 more akin to a piece of an ongoing criminal
18 investigation, but you've heard me a lot on that.
19 I also want to point out that we got to take what
20 guidance we have, and 15-12-101 refers to a final
21 report not a general presentment. In other places
22 where reports are mentioned like 15-12-71 they say
23 report or presentment. That is not the choice that
24 was made in 15-12-101. Additionally, there is no
25 open court requirement there. There is only that

1 it goes to the supervising judge, and as we said in
2 this case to the District Attorney. That would --
3 that seems to indicate something to me that is
4 significant, but mainly that we are not in the
5 realm of a general presentment and certainly my
6 comments about the content guiding the analysis
7 remain. But let's go all the way to saying, okay,
8 fine, it is a general presentment. Even then
9 15-12-80 just says that the Court shall order
10 publication. But it also empower's the grand jury
11 to direct the manner. And there is no indication
12 from your Honor that the manner was prescribed by
13 the grand jury indicating to me that says once
14 again the district attorney is not opposing the
15 eternal oppression of the report. That your Honor
16 has discretion about the manner of publication.

17 THE COURT: Which here would be timing as
18 opposed to --

19 MR. WAKEFORD: Precisely.

20 THE COURT: No one's fussing about is it
21 put on a website or is it in a docket. It's really
22 all about the clock. When does it go to whatever
23 place that would be.

24 MR. WAKEFORD: Precisely, your Honor.
25 There could be conversations about specific

1 portions depending again on what the content of the
2 report is. But really going back to where we began
3 this is about timing. Yes, your Honor. That is
4 exactly correct. And since the grand jury's
5 preference has been afforded great weight as it
6 should be. And I'll take this opportunity to say
7 the District Attorney's Office, as I'm sure your
8 Honor is, are enormously grateful to these citizens
9 for the really above and beyond contribution of
10 their time, energy and efforts to this process. We
11 want to act with respect to their wishes, but we
12 also have to act in as stewards of an ongoing
13 criminal investigation of which they were a vital
14 part. And so with regard to the timing aspect we
15 think that that -- since they did not speak to
16 manner, your Honor has a discretion there, if this
17 is a general presentment. And so no matter which
18 route we take to get -- where we end up is it's a
19 question of timing and now it's just not the time.
20 The time will come and the District Attorney
21 committed to that idea, it's just not immediate.

22 THE COURT: Got it.

23 MR. WAKEFORD: Thank you, your Honor.

24 THE COURT: Thank you. Well, I want to
25 thank both sides for being prepared and having

1 these thoughtful presentations. This is not
2 simple. I think the fact that we had to discuss
3 this for 90 minutes shows that it is somewhat
4 extraordinary, Mr. Clyde. Partly what's
5 extraordinary is what's at issue here, the alleged
6 interference with a presidential election. But
7 it's also extraordinary in the plain meaning of
8 that word. Is that it's not ordinary to have
9 special purpose grand jury doing things. That
10 doesn't mean, however, that there hasn't been
11 course of conduct developed over time as to what
12 happens with special purpose grand jury reports or
13 presentments. It also doesn't mean that we can't
14 -- I can't figure out a way to assess the final
15 report through the lens of grand jury secrecy and
16 the statutory scheme for grand jury's as well as
17 viewing it through the lens of Rule 21 to decide if
18 it falls within the reach and scope of Rule 21, and
19 that's what I'll need to do. My proposal is that I
20 think about this a little bit and then contact both
21 groups, the District Attorney's Office and the
22 intervenors' if I've got specific questions for
23 which I'd like more input. And then you're welcome
24 to file something or provide an email that these
25 are the cases you should look at. I won't dictate

1 the format in which you respond. I will be sure if
2 I have questions, even though they may be for one
3 group and not the other --I won't say side. One
4 group and not the other -- they go out to both
5 groups because I may have a question for Mr. Clyde
6 and Ms. Gather, but Ms. Willis, your team may want
7 to be heard on that question even though it is
8 poking more at the media's position. As I said
9 early on they'll be no rash decisions. There's not
10 going to be an order that pops out with no notice
11 and attached to it is the report. There will be an
12 order if there's going to be disclosure that
13 perhaps says this is when it happens so that both
14 sides have a chance to react and take whatever
15 steps they want to take in light of an order that
16 says this is going to happen a little ways down the
17 line. So no one is going to wake up with the Court
18 having disclosed the report on the front page of a
19 newspaper. The report, of course, exist in the
20 District Attorney's control. So if it does show up
21 folks will need to work through that. But I will
22 circle back, and we'll figure out the best way to
23 move forward with this.

24 Ms. Willis, anything else from the
25 District Attorney's side?

1 MS. WILLIS: No. Thank you for allowing us
2 to be heard today.

3 THE COURT: Thank you for being here, all
4 your team.

5 THE COURT: Mr. Clyde, anything else on
6 behalf of the interveners?

7 MR. CLYDE: Your Honor, could I speak just
8 very briefly to one of the last things that you
9 mentioned?

10 We understand the Court will give the
11 opportunity for either side to take whatever action
12 they want in terms of appellate issues. We believe
13 the proper court -- if there's an appeal in this
14 case, we believe the proper court should be the
15 Georgia Supreme Court. And we believe the Georgia
16 Supreme Court would be interested if that's the
17 direction it takes. But I will point out to your
18 Honor that the constitutional argument we are
19 making would have to be reached by your Honor in
20 order for that to be the clear choice and the
21 clearly appropriate court for resolution of the
22 issue. So that is an area we hope the Court will
23 reach.

24 THE COURT: I appreciate your concern.
25 And I think if there is a ruling of nondisclosure

1 it would need to address the different basis and
2 each of the basis that you raised. That it's not
3 secret. That it does fall within Rule 21. And so
4 I think you'd find the tell holds you need to do
5 what you need to do if you feel that's appropriate
6 what you need to do it. That's the end result.


7 MR. CLYDE: Thank you, your Honor.

8 THE COURT: That's it. Thank you
9 everyone.

10 (Whereupon, the proceedings are
11 concluded.)
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Exhibit 4

July 25, 2022 Order Disqualifying District
Attorney's Office as to Senator Jones Only,
In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand
Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co.
Sup. Court).



IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

IN RE 2 MAY 2022 SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY	2022-EX-000024
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ORDER DISQUALIFYING DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

On 20 January 2022, the District Attorney of Fulton County petitioned the Chief Judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County to convene the Superior Court bench to consider approving the District Attorney's request for impaneling a special purpose grand jury to investigate possible criminal interference in the November 2020 general election in Georgia. On 24 January 2022, the Chief Judge, having received a majority of the twenty judges' assent, issued an Order authorizing the special purpose grand jury. Among the various instances of possible electoral interference this body would be investigating was the decision by State Republican party officials to draft an alternate slate of Presidential electors -- despite the vote count indicating their candidate had lost by thousands of votes. One of the more prominent persons who chose to participate in this scheme was State Senator Burt Jones.

On 2 May 2022, the special purpose grand jury was selected and sworn in; in June 2022 it began receiving evidence.¹ The District Attorney serves as the "legal advisor" to the grand jury; she and her team of prosecutors also largely shape the grand jury's investigation by subpoenaing witnesses and leading their questioning. As forecast, the District Attorney -- and thus the grand jury -- began to investigate the alternate electors

¹ Notably, the District Attorney explained her pause in initiating the special purpose grand jury's investigative activity by referencing the 24 May 2022 primary elections in Georgia, indicating an awareness that her work with the grand jury could have an impact on electoral outcomes.

stratagem. The District Attorney has issued subpoenas to at least twelve of the alternate electors, including one to Senator Burt Jones, who is the Republican candidate for Lieutenant Governor in the upcoming 2022 general election.

Senator Jones has filed a motion to disqualify the District Attorney and her office from further investigation into his connection to the apparent efforts to interfere with or otherwise undermine the outcome of the 2020 general election. Eleven other alternate electors have jointly filed a motion to quash their grand jury subpoenas, asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory incrimination. Senator Jones subsequently joined in his fellow electors' motion and they adopted his. On 21 July 2022, the Court held a hearing on these motions. Based on the arguments and evidence presented, and a review of relevant legal authorities, the Court GRANTS Senator Jones's motion to disqualify the District Attorney and her office -- as to Senator Jones only. The Court DENIES the motion to disqualify as to the other eleven alternate electors and also DENIES the motion to quash as to those eleven.²

DISQUALIFICATION

On 24 May 2022, Senator Jones won outright the Republican primary for Lieutenant Governor, earning over 50% of the vote.³ On the Democratic side, a runoff was necessary, as Kwanza Hall, the top vote getter, secured only 30% of the vote. Trailing him with 18% of the vote was the second-place finisher, Charlie Bailey. Hall and Bailey

² Given the Court's ruling on Senator Jones's motion to disqualify, his adopted motion to quash is moot, as he is no longer a permissible subject (or target or object) of *this* special purpose grand jury's investigation and so may not be compelled to appear before the grand jury. As discussed below, this prohibition does not mean the grand jury cannot receive evidence about Senator Jones's involvement in efforts to undo legitimate electoral results; rather, such evidence simply may not come from Senator Jones and he may not be included in any final recommendations from the grand jury.

³ All 2022 state primary election information for the lieutenant governor's race is taken from https://ballotpedia.org/Georgia_lieutenant_gubernatorial_election,_2022.

stood for a run-off election on 21 June 2022. Bailey turned the tide and triumphed; he now faces Senator Jones in the 8 November 2022 general election.

On 14 June 2022, well after the grand jury had begun receiving evidence from witnesses called and examined by the District Attorney's team of prosecutors, the District Attorney hosted and headlined a fundraiser for Bailey. By this time, media coverage of the grand jury proceedings was national and non-stop and the District Attorney was the very public face of those proceedings. She also was one of the faces on the Bailey fundraiser announcement: it prominently featured the District Attorney's name, photo, and title and was widely shared on Bailey's campaign's social media outlets. The fundraiser appears to have been a success, earning Bailey's campaign thousands of dollars. It is important to note that, as counsel for the District Attorney rightly pointed out at the hearing on the motion to disqualify, the fundraiser was entitled a "Runoff Fundraiser" and occurred when Bailey was battling Kwanza Hall for the Democratic nomination. But more relevant -- and harmful -- to the integrity of the grand jury investigation is that the die was already cast on the other side of the political divide: whoever won the Bailey-Hall runoff would face Senator Jones. Thus, the District Attorney pledged her name, likeness, and office to Bailey as her candidate of choice at a time when, if Bailey were successful (which he was), he would face Senator Jones.⁴

⁴ The District Attorney also, as a private citizen and in her personal capacity only, donated to Bailey's campaign. Senator Jones points to this private donation as another basis for disqualification. Alone, that is an insufficient basis for disqualification. *See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.*, 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009) ("Not every campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that requires ... recusal."); *Gude v. State*, 289 Ga. 46, 50 (2011) (same) (both cases involve judicial recusals, where rules are more stringent). However, it does add to the weight of the conflict created by the more extensive, direct, public, and job-related campaign work the District Attorney performed on behalf of candidate Bailey.

This choice -- which the District Attorney was within her rights as an elected official to make -- has consequences. She has bestowed her office's imprimatur upon Senator Jones's opponent. And since then, she has publicly (in her pleadings) labeled Senator Jones a "target" of the grand jury's investigation.⁵ This scenario creates a plain -- and actual and untenable -- conflict.⁶ Any decision the District Attorney makes about Senator Jones in connection with the grand jury investigation is necessarily infected by it. To label Jones a target or merely a subject, to subpoena him or instead allow him to proffer, to question him aggressively or mildly, to challenge or accept invocations of legislative privilege or assertions of Fifth Amendment privilege, to immunize or not -- each of these critical investigative decisions is different for him because of the District Attorney's actions taken on behalf of the Senator's electoral challenger. Perhaps the evidence shows that there should be a tighter, stricter focus on Senator Jones than on some of the other alternate electors.⁷ Yet any effort to treat him differently -- even if justified -- will prompt

⁵ The designation, borrowed from federal criminal practice, is a bit confusing in the context of this grand jury, which has no power to bring criminal charges against anyone. It is nonetheless a potent investigative signal that the District Attorney views Senator Jones (and the other alternate electors) as persons more closely connected to the alleged electoral improprieties than other witnesses who have come before the grand jury or who may yet do so.

⁶ The Court appreciates the affidavit provided by Robert Smith, General Counsel for the Prosecuting Attorneys' Council of Georgia, on behalf of the District Attorney. His reliance on *Whitworth v. State*, 275 Ga. App. 79 (2005) and *Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist*, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2nd Cir. 1979) is instructive but not persuasive. He is correct that a mere appearance of impropriety is generally not enough to support disqualification, except, as noted in *Nyquist*, in the "rarest of cases." This is one of those cases. But it is also a case where the conflict is actual and palpable, not speculative and remote.

⁷ This is an entirely plausible scenario given the Senator's political experience and public responsibility. That is, if the District Attorney (or the grand jury) decides that participation in the alternate elector scheme constituted impermissible interference in the 2020 general election, someone of the Senator's public stature, influence, and presumed sophistication ought to be treated differently from an alternate elector who had no representative responsibility and who participated in the scheme merely out of partisan loyalty.

entirely reasonable concerns of politically motivated prosecution: is Senator Jones being singled out because of a desire to further assist the Bailey campaign?⁸

Of course, the actual answer does not matter.⁹ It is the fact that concern about the District Attorney's partiality naturally, immediately, and reasonably arises in the minds of the public, the pundits, and -- most critically -- the subjects of the investigation that necessitates the disqualification. An investigation of this significance, garnering the public attention it necessarily does and touching so many political nerves in our society, cannot be burdened by legitimate doubts about the District Attorney's motives. The District Attorney does not have to be apolitical, but her investigations do. The Bailey fundraiser she sponsored -- in her official capacity -- makes that impossible when it comes to investigating Bailey's direct political opponent.¹⁰

The Court GRANTS Senator Jones's motion to disqualify the District Attorney and her office.¹¹ This District Attorney and her special prosecution team may no longer investigate Senator Jones in the following sense: they may not subpoena him (or seek to

⁸ Candidate Bailey has wielded the District Attorney's investigation as a cudgel in his campaign against Jones. See, e.g., <https://www.ajc.com/politics/contrasts-on-voting-laws-and-ballot-access-define-georgia-candidates/7Q17XHSAGNGVXBNOPZ64AX56OU/> in which Bailey is quoted as saying "The only danger to safe and secure elections is people like Burt Jones, who come in and substitute their will for the will of the voters and try to overturn the election."

⁹ Nor is it knowable, which is another reason to separate the District Attorney and her office from any investigation into Senator Jones. An "actual" conflict does not mean that Senator Jones has definitive proof that an investigative decision was made explicitly to benefit candidate Bailey. This rarely, if ever, occurs, absent wiretaps or leaked e-mails. The conflict is "actual" because *any* public criminal investigation into Senator Jones plainly benefits candidate Bailey's campaign, of which the District Attorney is an open, avid, and official supporter.

¹⁰ Senator Jones also sought to disqualify Special Prosecutor Nathan Wade for a campaign donation he made to Charlie Bailey's earlier aborted campaign for Attorney General. As discussed above, a routine campaign contribution is not enough -- and this one was to a different campaign altogether, with no connection to Senator Jones.

¹¹ When the elected District Attorney is disqualified, so, too, is her entire office. *McLaughlin v. Payne*, 295 Ga. 609, 613 (2014).

obtain any records from him via subpoena), they may not publicly categorize him as a subject or target (or anything else) of the grand jury's investigation, and they may not ask the grand jury to include any recommendations about him in their final report. This does not mean that the District Attorney cannot gather evidence about Senator Jones's involvement in efforts to interfere with or undermine the 2020 general election results. Her office may ask witnesses about the Senator's role in the various efforts the State Republican party undertook to call into question the legitimacy of the results of the election. What her office may *not* do is make use of any such evidence to develop a case against the Senator. That decision, as to whether any charges should be brought, and what they should be, will be left to a different prosecutor's office, as determined by the Attorney General.

The Court DENIES the motion to disqualify as adopted by the other eleven electors. There has been no showing that the District Attorney or any member of her prosecution team is impaired by a conflict of interest vis-à-vis any of these individuals. One of those eleven, Shawn Still, is running for the State Senate but he has offered no evidence that the District Attorney or anyone else from her office has materially supported either his campaign or the campaign of his opponent.¹²

¹² Counsel for the eleven also raised the specter of the District Attorney releasing the special purpose grand jury's final report on the eve of the November 2022 general election in an effort to advantage Democratic candidates over Republican ones. Apart from offering no basis for this claim beyond unsubstantiated hearsay, counsel's concern displays a misunderstanding of the investigative grand jury process. The grand jury will prepare a final report recommending action (or inaction). That report is released to the undersigned, who in turn passes it to the Chief Judge. Only after a majority of the Superior Court bench subsequently votes to dissolve the grand jury will the report be released to the District Attorney. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101(b). The undersigned will not begin this dissolution process at or near the time of the 2022 general election, should the grand jury complete its work by then.

QUASHAL


The eleven other alternate electors have moved to quash their subpoenas on the basis of their collective, blanket assertion of their Fifth Amendment privilege. This group assertion came after the District Attorney upgraded their status from witness to target in late June 2022 (following several alternate electors' voluntary interviews with the District Attorney's team (and the Bailey fundraiser)). These eleven now characterize the subpoenas for their testimony as "unreasonable and oppressive." The Court disagrees. Counsel for the eleven presented several creative legal arguments concerning the possible (in)validity of future charges that might conceivably be brought against these alternate electors. While intriguing, such argumentation is premature. This grand jury has no authority to bring charges. *Kenerly v. State*, 311 Ga. App. 190 (2011). It is merely investigating who did what after the 2020 general election and developing a perspective about whether anyone's post-election actions merit criminal prosecution in Fulton County.

The eleven electors' conduct falls well within the reach of this broad charter. It is not unreasonable to seek their testimony and it is not oppressive to require an appearance by way of subpoena. Nothing about that process deprives the electors of their Fifth Amendment privilege, which they may freely assert *as applicable* when they appear before the grand jury.¹³ Their subpoenas will not be quashed. *See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States*, 487 U.S. 250, 258-59 (1988); *State v. Lampl*, 296 Ga. 892, 898-99

¹³ Counsel for the eleven revealed at the 21 July 2022 hearing that her advice to her clients will be to assert privilege as to *any and every* question asked, even something as mundane as name and profession. While this strikes the Court as a rather expansive view of what might be self-incriminating, that determination can be made at the time of the electors' appearances. *See State v. Pauldo*, 309 Ga. 130, 135 (2020) (investigating authorities may ask basic biographical questions, even in the face of the assertion of Fifth Amendment rights).

(2015) (target of grand jury investigation may be compelled to appear before grand jury);
O.C.G.A. § 24-5-506(a) (only persons charged with the commission of a criminal offense
are not compellable to testify).

SO ORDERED this 25th day of July 2022.



Judge Robert C.I. McBurney
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Exhibit 5

List of Media Appearances and Social
Media Posts by FCDA and/or FCDA's
Office

List of Media Appearances and Social Media Posts by FCDA and/or FCDA's Office

1. January 4, 2021 - Jerry Lambe, *This is the Democratic DA for Atlanta Looking to Investigate Trump's Phone Call with Georgia's Secretary of State*, LAW AND CRIME (Jan. 4, 2021), <https://lawandcrime.com/2020-election/this-is-the-democratic-da-for-atlanta-looking-to-investigate-trumps-phone-call-with-georgias-secretary-of-state/>; *see also* Justin Gray (@JustinGrayWSB), Twitter (Jan. 4, 2021, 11:10 AM), <https://twitter.com/JustinGrayWSB/status/1346126903141408772?s=20>. (FCDA called “the President’s telephone call with Georgia Secretary of State disturbing... anyone who commits a felony violation of Georgia law in my jurisdiction will be held accountable.”)
2. February 10, 2021 - Christian Boone, Greg Bluestein, *Fulton's DA opens criminal investigation into Trump attempt to overturn Georgia's election*, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Feb. 10, 2021), <https://www.ajc.com/politics/fultons-da-opens-criminal-investigation-into-trump-demand-to-overturnelection/YWJPS4B4BREHDLHQCYDDWBVIA/?d>. (FCDA would not say whether anyone else besides the president was under investigation but stated she had no reason to believe that any Georgia official is a target of the investigation.)
3. February 12, 2021 - Fox 5 Atlanta, *Exclusive: Fulton County district attorney on decision to open investigation into Trump call*, YOUTUBE, (Feb. 12, 2021), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mKcczSo5tK8>.
4. February 12, 2021 - Rachel Maddow, MSNBC, *GA Probe Of Trump Likely To Look Beyond Raffensperger Call: Fulton's D.A. Willis*, YOUTUBE, (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQz_v2hmtHQ. (FCDA discussed the investigation and stated, “When any prosecutor throughout this country is interviewing people trying to determine if a crime was committed, and if they understood what they were doing, the *mens rea* is always important. So you look at facts to see, ‘did they really have intent?’ [or] ‘did they really understand what they were doing?’ Detailed facts become important like, asking for a specific number and then going back to investigate and understand that that number is just one more than the number that is needed. It lets you know that someone had a clear mind. They understood what they were doing, and so when you are pursuing the investigation, facts like that that may not seem so important, become very important.”)
5. February 13, 2021 - Danny Hakim, Richard Fausset, *In Georgia, a New District Attorney Starts Circling Trump and His Allies*, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 13, 2021), <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/13/us/politics/fani-willis-trump.html>. (FCDA was “open to considering not just conspiracy but racketeering charges” and even “criminal solicitation to commit election fraud.” She explained that RICO charges apply to otherwise lawful organizations that are used to break the law, “if you have various overt acts for an illegal purpose, I think you can – you may – get there.”)
6. February 10, 2021 - Danny Hakim, Richard Fausset, *Georgia Prosecutors Open Criminal Inquiry Into Trump's Efforts to Subvert Election*, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 10, 2021), <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/10/us/politics/trump-georgia-investigation.html>.

7. February 19, 2021 - Christian Boone, Tamar Hallerman, *New Fulton DA balances Trump probe, massive local workload*, ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, (Feb. 19, 2021), <https://www.ajc.com/news/crime/new-fulton-da-balances-trump-probe-massive-localworkload/AHWEA3OAI55CTWB6LQBMS5R4/>. (FCDA suggested she had no timetable for the investigation or her decision about whether to bring charges against President Trump. She insisted politics played no role in her probe stating that she took “no pleasure in this,” and commented, “who else is going to do it. Nobody is above the law.”)
8. February 25, 2021 - Kate Brumback, *Georgia prosecutor investigating Trump call urges patience*, FOX 5 ATLANTA (AP), (Feb. 26, 2021), <https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/georgia-prosecutor-investigating-trump-call-urges-patience> (FCDA discussed various aspects of the investigation and called the resignation of Byung J. ‘Bjay’ Pak “particularly peculiar.”)
9. February 25, 2021 - Associated Press, *Georgia prosecutor discusses election inquiry*, YOUTUBE (Feb. 25, 2021), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2KfEdxsSwzE>.
10. February 25, 2021 - Associated Press, *Georgia prosecutor discusses election inquiry*, YOUTUBE (Feb. 25, 2021), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2KfEdxsSwzE>.
11. March 8, 2021 - Dale Russell, *Fulton County DA talks to the Fox 5 I-Team about Trump grand jury investigation*, FOX 5 ATLANTA (Mar. 8, 2021), <https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/grand-jury-investigation-of-former-president-trump-set-to-begin>.
12. September 8, 2021 - Closer Look With Rose Scott, *District Attorney Willis Discusses COVID Crime Across Fulton County*, NPR-WABE, (Sep., 8, 2021), <https://www.npr.org/podcasts/832218152/closer-look-with-rose-scott>.
13. September 17, 2021 - Sara Murray, Jason Morris, *Georgia criminal probe into Trump’s attempts to overturn 2020 election quietly moves forward*, CNN (Sep. 17, 2021), <https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/17/politics/georgia-probe-trump-election/index.html> (FCDA states, “I do not have the right to look the other way on any crime that may have happened in my jurisdiction.” She further comments that she hopes to strike a formal cooperation agreement with congressional committees investigating the insurrection stating, “it is certainly information my office needs to see.”)
14. September 28, 2021 - Janell Ross, *Atlanta’s First Black Female District Attorney Is at the Center of America’s Converging Crises*, TIME, (Sep. 28, 2021), <https://time.com/6099301/fani-willis-atlanta/> (She explained the moment when she heard the call and had one of those, Wait. What in the hell moments.)
15. September 29, 2021 - 11 Alive, *Fulton County DA to discuss backlog, possibility of violent criminals being released*, YOUTUBE, (Sep. 29, 2021), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sjGgiF0Wt9g> (She told the crowd: “certainly, if someone did something as serious as interfere with people’s right to vote—which you know as a woman, and a person of color, is a sacred right where people lost a lot of lives, we are going to invest in that.”)

16. January 4, 2022 - Kate Brumback, Associated Press, *Fulton County DA investigating Trump closer to decision on charges*, FOX 5 ATLANTA, (Jan. 11, 2022), <https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/fulton-county-da-investigating-trump-closer-to-decision-on-charges>.
17. January 24, 2022 - Janell Ross, *As Atlanta DA's Trump Election Probe Advances, She Explains Her Approach*, TIME, (Jan. 25, 2021), <https://time.com/6141873/georgia-election-probe-trump-fani-willis/>.
18. February 3, 2022 - Atlanta Journal Constitution, *Fulton DA details next stage of Trump probe*, YOUTUBE (Feb. 3, 2022), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LHbIZK8v0-k>.
19. February 3, 2022 - Dale Russell, *Former President Trump's comments prompt new security measures for Fulton DA*, FOX 5 ATLANTA, (Feb. 3, 2022), <https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/former-president-trumps-comments-prompt-new-security-measures-for-fulton-da>.
20. February 7, 2022 - Sara Murray, Devan Cole, *Atlanta DA investigating Trump's election interference: 'We're not here playing a game'* CNN, (Feb. 7, 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/07/politics/fani-willis-donald-trump-election-investigation/index.html>. (FCDA stated, "this is a criminal investigation, we're not here playing games. I plan to use the power of the law. We are all citizens. Mr. Trump, just as any other American citizen, is entitled to dignity. He is entitled to being treated fairly. He will be treated fairly in this jurisdiction, but I plan to do my job, and my job is to make sure that we get the evidence that gives us the truth. I'm not concerned at all about games to delay this." The FCDA disclosed the previously unknown fact that President Trump had retained counsel in the Georgia investigation. She stated, "Last calendar year, I met with them and I assured them what I knew – we would not bring forth an indictment in the 2021 year. I met with them at the end of 2021 to tell them that I would be moving forward, not necessarily with an indictment, but with the next steps of the investigation."(video embedded within article))
21. February 14, 2022 - USA Today, *Georgia DA Fani Willis talks about Trump election*, YOUTUBE, (Feb. 14, 2022), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SuxGeLf3Mk4>. FCDA said of the phone call, "almost immediately I knew that there was something to be investigated.")
22. April 19, 2022 - Tamar Hallerman, *Fulton DA clarifies timeline for witness testimony in Trump probe*, ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, (April 19, 2022), <https://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-news/fulton-da-clarifies-timeline-for-witness-testimony-in-trump-probe/QPKS7EJWYZHDRDXHYH5NOR3KXGE/>. (FCDA states, "I think it is also equally and fundamentally important that the government makes sure that in a free society that people can vote and that is not infringed upon by anyone. So in this case, you have an allegation of a human being, of a person, of an American citizen, possibly doing something that would've infringed upon the rights of lots of Georgians. Specifically from my county—Fulton County—right to vote being infringed upon. And the allegations, quite frankly, were not a civil wrongdoing, but a crime. And so everybody is equal before the law no matter what position they hold, no matter how much wealth, no matter how poor they are, no matter how educated, no matter how uneducated...People have many, many days of legal arguments. A

judge, and my guess is even the Supreme Court of Georgia will weigh in on that issue. I do not think that executive immunity would protect against prosecution in this case.”)

23. April 29, 2022 - Ben Brasch, Tamar Hallerman, *Fulton DA faces biggest decision of career as Trump grand jury looms*, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, (April 29, 2022), <https://www.ajc.com/politics/fulton-da-faces-biggest-decision-of-career-as-trump-grand-jury-looms/6OKYH6PMRZB3TPBSQZJSHL5CCU> (FCDA said she has yet to make up her mind about whether the former president or his advocates broke the law and reiterates that she will treat President Trump like anyone else who crosses her desk.)
24. May 2, 2022 - Anderson Cooper, CNN, *Georgia district attorney: Trump grand jury subpoenas will be enforced*, YOUTUBE, (May 2, 2022), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vHcu0ex8e7Q>. (FCDA discusses upcoming subpoenas to uncooperative witnesses, communications with President Trump’s legal counsel and, in reference to the slate of electors, states, “...and two, that if we live in a free land in a democracy, we have to have free and fair elections. And so, I am very concerned that if behavior that is illegal, goes unchecked, that it could lead to a very bad start and a very, very bad path.”)
25. May 26, 2022 - Danny Hakim, Richard Fausset, *Up to 50 Subpoenas Expected as Grand Jury Begins Trump Inquiry*, NEW YORK TIMES, (May 27, 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/27/us/trump-grand-jury-georgia.html>. (FCDA referenced President Trump stating, “it’s not of much consequence what title they wore,” and, “I’m not taking on a former president. We’re not adversaries. I don’t know him personally. He does not know me personally. We should have no personal feelings about him.” She discussed the slate of electors and compared it to her 2014 RICO case stating, “There are so many issues that could have come about if somebody participates in submitting a document that they know is false. You can’t do that. If you go back and look at Atlanta Public Schools, that’s one of the things that happened, is they certified these test results that they knew were false. You cannot do that.” She again disclosed the number of people who had declined to speak with her and plans for subpoenas. She discussed challenges to subpoenas stating, “I don’t know how many games folks are going to play. I don’t know how many times we’re going to have to fight someone just to get them to come speak to a grand jury and tell the truth. And there could be delays for those reasons.” FCDA said that there had been “no formal coordination” between her office and the Jan. 6 committee and further stated, “but, I mean, obviously, we’re looking at everything that relates to Georgia that that committee is overturning.”)
26. June 6, 2022 - Michael Isikoff, Daniel Klaidman, *Georgia DA Fani Willis is confident as her Trump probe takes shape*, YAHOO! NEWS, (June 6, 2022), <https://news.yahoo.com/georgia-da-fani-willis-is-confident-as-her-trump-probe-takes-shape-145829588.html>. (The outlet reported, “Willis spoke freely in her office for over an hour” just after Raffensperger spent 5 hours testifying. The FCDA commented directly on pending and future challenges to the investigation stating, “that’s nothing for prosecutors.” She further stated, “I did not choose this. I did not choose for Donald Trump to be on my plate,” but noted that she had no choice. She again discussed RICO and what a great tool it is to use so the jury can see the “whole story.” She commented that “since I was a very little bitty girl, you get dragged to the polls. So you understand very, very early on, voting is such an intrinsic right. And so I understand

how important the infraction on someone's right to vote is. So I do get the significance." In discussing the upcoming hearing on a motion to quash subpoenas by members of the Georgia legislature, she commented that, should they choose to challenge their subpoena further, they would need to do so from a jail cell: She will get a 'material witness' warrant commanding them to comply or face arrest. It's "just what you do," she said. "I've had a witness arrested before because they ignore my subpoena. And you do not expect to have to do it. But I will." She stated she would not bring an indictment once early voting begins but noted that she has plenty of time before that — "and after.")

27. June 27, 2022 - Breakdown, *A force of nature*, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (June 27, 2022), <https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/a-force-of-nature/id992983540?i=1000567810613> (In response to the question of whether she would subpoena President Trump, she responded, "it is foreseeable that I would subpoena the target of this investigation, A target.")
28. June 30, 2022 - Tamar Hallerman, *Fulton DA pushes back against legislators fighting subpoenas*, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, (June 30, 2022), <https://www.ajc.com/politics/fulton-da-pushes-back-against-legislators-fighting-subpoenas/COOXST6FYND3VNL7FZQLW514FA/>.
29. July 6, 2022 - MSNBC, *Fulton County DA on Issuing Subpoenas: 'This Is Not A Game, At All'*, YOUTUBE, (July 6, 2022), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gThpjjlTxO4>. (FCDA said she expects to subpoena additional members of Trump's inner circle and further stated, "I think that people thought that we came into this as some kind of game. This is not a game at all. What I am doing is very serious. It's very important work. And we're going to do our due diligence and make sure that we look at all aspects of the case"); <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HHWp82iyWgE> (When asked about Senator Graham's comment that the investigation was a fishing expedition, FCDA replied "what do I have to gain from these politics? It's an inaccurate estimation. It's someone that doesn't understand the seriousness of what we're doing. I hope they don't come and testify truthfully before the grand jury." FCDA stated, "election interference is a very important subject... I think it's important that they hear from people that may have had something to do with an election interference." When asked about a subpoena for President Trump, she replied, "anything's possible." When asked how she would respond to resistance, FCDA stated, "we'll take you before the judge and the judge will make a ruling if we have a legal right to bring them before the court . . . that's why you have the power of the state, and the power of the subpoena to bring them here. My job is not to bring you here because you want to come, my job is to make sure the grand jurors get all of the evidence they want.")
30. July 13, 2022 - Tamar Hallerman, *Graham moves to quash Fulton subpoena in Trump probe*, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, (July 13, 2022), <https://www.ajc.com/politics/graham-moves-to-quash-fulton-subpoena-in-trumpprobe/CQX4KUFVABHMNBVPAAGI4FA53Q/>. (FCDA confirmed that her team informed multiple people that they were "targets" of the investigation.)
31. July 14, 2022 - Tamar Hallerman, *AJC subpoena shows grand jury's interest in U.S. attorney tumult*, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, (July 14, 2022),

<https://www.ajc.com/politics/ajc-subpoena-shows-grand-jurys-interest-in-us-attorneytumult/YVPTG7QF35FGBNTW2VSMSEZ3HI/>. (FCDA indicated she was open to subpoenaing others who worked in the White House, including President Trump and his former Chief of Staff, Mark Meadows: "I think it would be safe to say that if people have information in particular about Georgia and interference in the Georgia elections, and they were in the White House, that will not bar us from wanting to talk to them." She again confirmed that multiple targets of her investigation have been identified.)

32. July 15, 2022 - Tamar Hallerman, Greg Bluestein, *Top Georgia Republicans informed they're targets of Fulton DA probe*, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, (July 15, 2022), <https://www.ajc.com/politics/top-ga-republicans-informed-theyre-targets-of-fulton-daprobe/3CZJHEYOD5ADFDCVP3372HROFQ/>.
33. August 2, 2022 - 11 Alive, *Fulton DA Fani Willis talks gangs, Donald Trump grand jury probe*, YOUTUBE (Aug. 2, 2022), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sUZVs6zDSME>. (FCDA discussed whether to subpoena President Trump and stated, "the grand jury needs to hear as much information from as many people that are willing to come and testify truthfully.")
34. August 3, 2022 - Michael Isikoff, *Exclusive: Trump allies launch effort to recall Fulton County DA Fani Willis*, YAHOO! NEWS, (Aug. 3, 2022), <https://ca.news.yahoo.com/exclusive-trump-allies-launch-effort-to-recall-fulton-county-da-fani-willis-224315547.html>.
35. August 29, 2022 - 11 Alive, *Fulton County DA to announce 'major' gang arrests, indictments*, YOUTUBE, (Aug. 29, 2022), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qzcyw-OnpG0>. ("I think we're about 60% through of all of the people we need to be brought up.... You know, there can't be any predictions. As you know, many people are unsuccessfully fighting our subpoenas. We will continue to fight to make sure that the grand jury and the public gets the truth.")
36. September 12, 2022 - Richard Fausset, *In Atlanta, a Local Prosecutor Takes on Murder, Street Gangs and a President*, NEW YORK TIMES, (Sep. 12, 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/12/us/fani-t-willis-trump-atlanta.html> (FCDA stated, "I mean, if crime happens in my jurisdiction, who's going to investigate it? I do not have the right to look the other way on a crime that could have impacted a major right of people in this community and throughout the nation." The authors of the article noted, her comfort in the public eye stands in marked contrast to the low-key approach of another Trump legal pursuer, Attorney General Merrick B. Garland.").
37. September 15, 2022 - Matthew Brown, Tom Hamburger, *Georgia 2020 election inquiry may lead to prison sentences, prosecutor says*, THE WASHINGTON POST, (Sep. 15, 2022), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/15/fani-willis-georgia-prison/> (FCDA suggested that serious crimes have been committed and "people are facing prison sentences." FCDA declined to comment on recent filings related to pressure on [Ruby] Freeman except to say: "I hate a bully. Obviously, I think we would find it offensive to bully an election official to influence an election." The author notes, "Willis's open and frank assessment is unusual for a prosecutor, as such high-profile investigations are often shrouded

in secrecy. Her approach in this inquiry has drawn criticism from some in the legal community, and it contrasts with the general reticence of Attorney General Merrick Garland. Willis said she believes transparency is a requirement of her job.”)

38. November 2022 - Mark Binelli, *She Took On Atlanta's Gangs. Now She May Be Coming for Trump.*, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, (Feb. 2, 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/02/magazine/fani-willis-trump.html?fbclid=IwAR0Yii9Uk3ySFRc2oIlgkUVvSm2NXkjc-AbpW5zJwnTWSJeI-D0uQhKDMmec>.
39. February 13, 2023 - Tamar Hallerman, Bill Rankin, *Fulton judge: Portions of Trump grand jury report to be released this week*, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, (Feb. 13, 2023), <https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/trump-investigations-georgia-prosecutor/85-e08fc996-8305-4fed92c5-62ac57547bf2>.



Adam Parkhomenko [@AdamParkhomenko](#)

Can we get 1,000 retweets on this: The Fulton County DA is Fani Willis. Her campaign twitter account only has 13K followers. She is exactly the kind of candidate we must not only elect but re-elect. Can you retweet and follow [@FaniWillisForDA](#).

4:29 PM · Jul 11, 2022

13.3K Retweets 339 Quote Tweets 15.8K Likes



Tweet your reply

Reply



Adam Parkhomenko [@AdamParkhomenko](#) · Jul 11, 2022

Replying to [@AdamParkhomenko](#)
Please consider taking a moment and making a contribution directly to her campaign account so she has the resources she needs when she needs them. Republicans will do everything they can to stop her when she is up for re-election:



[secure.actblue.com](#)
I just gave to Fani Willis
Show your support with a contribution.

49 1,248 2,482



Adam Parkhomenko [@AdamParkhomenko](#) · Jul 11, 2022

I can't think of a better way to celebrate after Lindsey Graham lost in court today than support the person who is holding all of them accountable.

13 632 2,886



Adam Parkhomenko [@AdamParkhomenko](#) · Jul 11, 2022

Thank you. 4,500 new followers and counting for Fulton County DA Fani Willis.

23 253 1,554



Adam Parkhomenko [@AdamParkhomenko](#) · Jul 15, 2022

Let's go!!

Hugo Lowell [@hugolowell](#) · Jul 15, 2022
Breaking via Yahoo News: Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis has sent so-called "target" letters to prominent Georgia Republicans informing them they could be indicted for their role in the fake electors scheme.

8 200 908



Adam Parkhomenko [@AdamParkhomenko](#) · Jul 16, 2022

50,000 new followers in four days for [@FaniWillisForDA](#)! Keep spreading the word!

7 99 359



Carmen Ge [@c4rmenge](#) · Jul 11, 2022

Replying to [@AdamParkhomenko](#)
How does Twitter following help get her reelected? I am always confused by such requests

5 17 78



Adam Parkhomenko [@AdamParkhomenko](#) · Jul 11, 2022

Replying to [@c4rmenge](#)
It will help her get her campaign message out and raise money for her re-election. Neither of which you can do through official accounts.

5 84 457

34 80 521 523.2K

Promoted

Fani T. Willis Retweeted



Adam Parkhomenko @AdamParkhomenko · Jul 11, 2022

Can we get 1,000 retweets on this: The Fulton County DA is Fani Willis. Her campaign twitter account only has 13K followers. She is exactly the kind of candidate we must not only elect but re-elect. Can you retweet and follow @FaniWillisForDA

559 13.6K 15.9K

Show this thread



Fani T. Willis @FaniForDA · Jul 18, 2022

This is my first cartoon, and likely the only time a boat will ever bear my name. #EmbracingHumor #talentedartist #FCDA #FirstwomanDA #Nolaughing#wttr



Illustration by Steve Stegelin

95 424 2,127



Fani T. Willis @FaniForDA · Jul 17, 2022

Adam, I am so humbled by your support. This week has been amazing! 60k - WOW. THANK YOU.



Adam Parkhomenko @AdamParkhomenko · Jul 17, 2022

60,000 new followers and counting this week thanks to all of you for the incredible Fulton County District Attorney @FaniWillisForDA. She is not at 73K followers. Let's get her to 100,000 and finish this week strong.

Show this thread

319 2,510 14.5K



Fani T. Willis @FaniForDA · Jul 14, 2022

Thank you so much for the support and kind words, Adam.



Adam Parkhomenko @AdamParkhomenko · Jul 11, 2022

Can we get 1,000 retweets on this: The Fulton County DA is Fani Willis. Her campaign twitter account only has 13K followers. She is exactly the kind of candidate we must not only elect but re-elect. Can you retweet and follow @FaniWillisForDA

Show this thread

Adam Parkhomenko @AdamParkhomenko · Jul 16, 2022
Can we get 500 retweets on this: The Fulton County DA is Fani Willis. Her campaign twitter account has increased by 50K followers this week. She subpoenaed Lindsey Graham. Let's help build her platform while she is focused on her work. Can you retweet and follow @FaniWillisForDA

Adam Parkhomenko @AdamParkhomenko · Jul 16, 2022
Please consider taking a moment and making a contribution directly to Fani Willis's campaign account so she has the resources she needs when she needs them for re-election. Republicans will do everything they can to stop her when she is up for re-election:



secure.actblue.com
I just gave to Fani Willis!
Show your support with a contribution.

Adam Parkhomenko @AdamParkhomenko

60,000 new followers and counting this week thanks to all of you for the incredible Fulton County District Attorney @FaniWillisForDA. She is not at 73K followers. Let's get her to 100,000 and finish this week strong.

10:48 AM · Jul 17, 2022

542 Retweets 24 Quote Tweets 1,528 Likes

Tweet your reply Reply

Adam Parkhomenko @AdamParkhomenko · Jul 17, 2022
Replying to @AdamParkhomenko
Fulton County District Attorney @FaniWillisForDA is now only 13.7K away from hitting 100,000 followers. Please follow her and retweet to ask others to do the same!

Patricia @TrishaLa2012 · Jul 17, 2022
Replying to @AdamParkhomenko
Been there, Done that with Pleasure Several weeks ago.
#SupportFaniWillis

Marvin Seton @marvin_seton · Jul 17, 2022
Replying to @AdamParkhomenko
Aside from pushing for the 100k+ followers this week, let her also apply for @verified.

K. Murphy/Codify Roe @MDHillRaiser · Jul 17, 2022
Replying to @AdamParkhomenko
Following and retweeted. Let's get her up to 100k. @FaniWillisForDA


Julie Tyers @julieanttyers · Jul 21, 2022
Replying to @AdamParkhomenko
94.2k today! 7/21

Katpotmac @Kathlee37509960 · Jul 17, 2022
Replying to @AdamParkhomenko and @kattychism
Already following but will retweet!❤️

Exhibit 6

January 9, 2023 Order Dissolving Special Purpose Grand Jury and Setting Hearing on Publication, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA



IN RE 2 MAY 2022 SPECIAL PURPOSE
GRAND JURY

2022-EX-000024

**ORDER DISSOLVING SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY
AND SETTING HEARING ON QUESTION OF PUBLICATION**


On 20 January 2022, the District Attorney of Fulton County petitioned the Chief Judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County to convene the entire Superior Court bench to consider the District Attorney's request for a special purpose grand jury. That grand jury's charter, if approved, would be to conduct a criminal investigation into "the facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to possible attempts to disrupt the lawful administration of the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia" and to prepare a report on whether anyone should be prosecuted for such potential crimes. On 24 January 2022, the Chief Judge, having received a majority of the twenty judges' assent, issued an Order authorizing the convening of a special purpose grand jury for this criminal investigation.

On 2 May 2022, the special purpose grand jury was selected and sworn in; in June 2022 it began receiving evidence and investigating the possibility of criminal interference in the 2020 general election. The special purpose grand jury, after many months of witness testimony, has now issued its final report pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101(a). Based on the completion of that report, the undersigned subsequently recommended to the Honorable Chief Judge Ural Glanville that the special purpose grand jury be dissolved. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101(b). Chief Judge Glanville then polled the entire Superior Court bench, a majority of which voted to dissolve the special purpose grand jury. *Id.*

Given the special purpose grand jury's delivery of its final report, the undersigned's recommendation, and the Superior Court bench's vote, it is the ORDER of this Court that the special purpose grand jury now stands DISSOLVED. The Court thanks the grand jurors for their dedication, professionalism, and significant commitment of time and attention to this important matter. It was no small sacrifice to serve.

Remaining is the question of publication of the final report. The special purpose grand jury certified that it voted to recommend that its report be published pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80. That provision is mandatory: "the judge shall order the publication as recommended." And that provision appears to apply to the work of special purpose grand juries. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-102. Unresolved is the question of whether the special purpose grand jury's final report constitutes a presentment. The Court invites argument on this issue and sets the matter down for a hearing on **24 January 2023 at noon in Courtroom 8-D**. The District Attorney's Office shall be given an opportunity at that time to provide its perspective as will any consolidated media intervenors. Argument should focus on the applicability of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 to the special purpose grand jury's work as well as the precedential impact of *In re July-August, 2003 DeKalb Cnty. Grand Jury*, 265 Ga. App. 870, 872-73 (2004); *In re Floyd Cnty. Grand Jury Presentments for May Term 1996*, 225 Ga. App. 705, 707 (1997); and *Kelley v. Tanksley*, 105 Ga. App. 65, 66-67 (1961).

SO ORDERED this 9th day of January 2023




Judge Robert C.I. McBurney
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Exhibit 7

February 13, 2023 Order Re: Special Purpose Grand Jury's Final Report, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA



IN RE 2 MAY 2022 SPECIAL PURPOSE
GRAND JURY

2022-EX-000024

ORDER RE: SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY'S FINAL REPORT

On 20 January 2022, the District Attorney of Fulton County petitioned the Chief Judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County to convene the Superior Court bench to consider the District Attorney's request for a special purpose grand jury. That grand jury's charter, if approved by the Court, would be to conduct a criminal investigation into "the facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to possible attempts to disrupt the lawful administration of the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia" and to draft and submit a report recommending whether anyone should be prosecuted for such potential crimes. On 24 January 2022, the Chief Judge, having received a majority of the twenty judges' assent, issued an Order authorizing the convening of a special purpose grand jury for this criminal investigation.

On 2 May 2022, the special purpose grand jury was selected and sworn in; in June 2022 it began receiving evidence and investigating the possibility of criminal interference in the 2020 general election. The special purpose grand jury, after hearing months of testimony from dozens of witnesses, submitted its final report to the undersigned in December 2022 pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101(a). In issuing its final report, the special purpose grand jury also recommended that its report be published. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80. Upon reviewing that report, the undersigned subsequently recommended to the Honorable Chief Judge Ural Glanville that the special purpose grand jury be dissolved.

O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101(b). Chief Judge Glanville then polled the Superior Court bench, a majority of which voted to dissolve the special purpose grand jury. Following that vote, the undersigned dissolved the special purpose grand jury by way of an Order entered on 9 January 2023.

On 17 January 2023, the undersigned convened a hearing on the question of whether the special purpose grand jury's final report should be made public. The District Attorney presented argument, as did counsel for a broad collection of media interests. Having considered those arguments and relevant statutory and case law, and for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned concludes that much of the final report should not be disclosed until such time as the District Attorney completes her investigation, although two parts may now be published, consistent with protecting the due process rights of all involved.

As a threshold matter, the Court rejects the media intervenors' contention that the special purpose grand jury's final report is somehow a "court record" and thus subject to the public's general right of access to such things.¹ *See, e.g., In re Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, 271 Ga. 436, 437 (1999). The media intervenors' literalist argument that the final report is a court record because (1) the Court convened the special purpose grand jury and (2) the final report was delivered to the Court is unpersuasive. The final report, as the District Attorney argued, was ultimately destined for her, not the Court. It will inform her investigative decision-making process, not the Court's. She requested it, she petitioned the Chief Judge to convene a special purpose grand jury for it, and she and her

¹ A corollary of this conclusion is that the Court is not bound by the sealing requirements of Uniform Superior Court Rule 21, although the Court notes that, incidentally consistent with Uniform Superior Court Rule 21.1, the Court held a hearing on the topic of disclosure and the Court will, in this Order, be addressing many of the factors it would be obligated to consider under Rule 21 if it were making a decision to seal a court record.

staff worked with that special purpose grand jury for months in an effort to provide the grand jury with sufficient evidence to generate the report for her. Moreover, the only physical copy of the report is in the District Attorney's possession, not the Court's; it sits in no docket or official court or clerk file. That the report, per statutory process, incidentally passed through the Court's hands does not make it an official record of the court any more so than a wiretap application or a search warrant affidavit. All three documents -- report, application, and affidavit -- are parts of criminal investigative processes, not court proceedings.²

There is also the matter of the special purpose grand jury's "recommendation," made pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80, that its final report be published. The statutory language is somewhat misleading. An O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 "recommendation" is more than a mere suggestion or request: if a grand jury recommends publication, "the judge *shall* order the publication as recommended." O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 (emphasis added). Indeed, in general, the only screening function the supervising judge has, when faced with an O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 "recommendation" to publish, is to ensure that those portions, if any, that are the product of *ultra vires* investigation by the grand jury are redacted. *In re July-August, 2003 DeKalb Cnty. Grand Jury*, 265 Ga. App. 870, 871 (2004). In other words, if the grand jury exceeded the scope of its authority in investigating (and subsequently reporting), that unauthorized part of the grand jury's presentment must be removed before publication.³

² Later, when the criminal investigation is complete and an indictment has been obtained, the wiretap application and the search warrant affidavit do become part of the court record through discovery and pre-trial litigation. At that point the public's right of access accrues. The special purpose grand jury's final report is no different.

³ The District Attorney argues that O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 does not apply to the special purpose grand jury's final report because § 15-12-80 speaks only to "general presentments" and not "final reports". The Court

Having reviewed the final report, the undersigned concludes that the special purpose grand jury did not exceed the scope of its prescribed mission. Indeed, it provided the District Attorney with exactly what she requested: a roster of who should (or should not) be indicted, and for what, in relation to the conduct (and aftermath) of the 2020 general election in Georgia. Thus, facially, the final report should be published *in toto* pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80.

But, as with many things in the law, it is not that simple. This special purpose grand jury investigation was, appropriately, largely controlled by the District Attorney. She and her team decided who would be subpoenaed, when they would appear, what questions would be asked, and what aspects of the general election would be explored. The grand jurors were, of course, able to question the witnesses as well, but the process was essentially an investigative tool designed to enable the District Attorney to gather more information about what actually happened in the days following the general election in Fulton County (and elsewhere) so that she could make a more informed decision on whether Georgia law was violated and whether anyone should be charged for doing so. It was -- again, entirely appropriately -- a one-sided exploration. There were no lawyers advocating for any targets of the investigation.⁴ Potential future defendants were not able

rejects this semantics-over-substance argument. Regular grand juries issue (1) indictments (and, formerly, "special presentments," which, like indictments, were charging documents in which crimes were formally alleged against a defendant) and (2) general presentments. General presentments are, in both form and substance, *reports* of grand jury investigations. Special purpose grand juries, unlike regular grand juries, may not issue indictments (or special presentments), *Kenerly v. State*, 311 Ga. App. 190 (2011), which leaves them only general presentments (or reports) as an end product. A general presentment by any other name remains subject to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80's strictures.

⁴ Many of the witnesses subpoenaed to appear before the special purpose grand jury had lawyers (and some had many). None, however, was permitted to have those lawyers appear beside him during the questioning, given the rules of grand jury proceedings. There was thus no opportunity for a witness's attorney to object to a question from a prosecutor or to elicit testimony from her client that might rebut or justify or explain the witness's answers or conduct.

to present evidence outside the scope of what the District Attorney asked them. They could not call their own witnesses who might rebut what other State's witnesses had said and they had no ability to present mitigating evidence. Put differently, there was very limited due process in this process for those who might now be named as indictment-worthy in the final report.⁵ That does not mean that the District Attorney's investigative process was flawed or improper or in any way unconstitutional. By all appearances, the special purpose grand jury did its work by the book. The problem here, in discussing public disclosure, is that that book's rules do not allow for the objects of the District Attorney's attention to be heard in the manner we require in a court of law.

The consequence of these due process deficiencies is not that the special purpose grand jury's final report is forever suppressed or that its recommendations for or against indictment are in any way flawed or suspect. Rather, the consequence is that those recommendations are for the District Attorney's eyes only -- for now. Fundamental fairness requires this, as a report that may recommend that criminal charges be sought against specific individuals but which was

drafted after a secret investigation and based on an uncertain standard of proof, may be remembered long after ... denials or objections from its targets are forgotten. And the report's readers may understandably but incorrectly assume that at least the rudiments of due process -- notice and an opportunity to be heard -- were offered the accused.

⁵ It is true that every witness had the ability to pause the proceedings and consult with his or her lawyer outside the grand jury room -- and that lawyer could then escalate concerns to the supervising judge if necessary (which some did quite liberally) -- but that is a poor and insufficient proxy for the right to have counsel present in the grand jury room, able to object, able to examine her own client, and able to call other witnesses. (Again, this is not a critique of the grand jury's investigative process; it occurred exactly as the grand jury rules envisioned. It is rather an effort to highlight how imbalanced, incomplete, and one-sided the process is for someone who might be the target of the District Attorney's (and grand jury's) attention.)

Thompson v. Macon-Bibb Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 246 Ga. 777, 779 (1980), quoting *In re Grand Jury of Hennepin County*, 271 N.W.2d 817, 819 (1978) (punctuation omitted).⁶ This is particularly true if the grand jury's final report includes recommendations involving individuals who never appeared before the grand jury and so had no opportunity, limited or not, to be heard. The constitutionally protected due process rights of anyone who may be named in the final report also require this outcome: when "identifiable individuals referred to in such [reports] are afforded no statutory mechanism by which they may respond to the charges against them, 'serious questions of due process and fairness' are raised." *In re Presentments of Lowndes Cnty. Grand Jury, March Term 1982*, 166 Ga. App. 258, 258 (1983), quoting *Thompson*, 246 Ga. at 778; see also *Kelley v. Tanksley*, 105 Ga. App. 65 (1961) (restriction on publication necessary when grand jury report is critical of identifiable individuals but no indictment is returned).

A rare instance in which a general presentment (a/k/a final report) that was highly critical of the performance of a public figure but which was nonetheless allowed to be published illustrates this point about due process. Vernon Jones, in an earlier political incarnation, served as the Chief Executive Officer of DeKalb County from 2001-2009. A DeKalb County grand jury, following its investigation into Jones's alleged misuse of County funds in demanding and apparently over-deploying a personal security detail, issued a scathing report about his (mis)conduct. Jones sought to quash the report, contending that the grand jury was acting *ultra vires* when it criticized him. A trial judge

⁶ *Thompson* was a somewhat fractured opinion. Its author, Justice Nichols, secured two full concurrences and three special concurrences (two of which were in the judgment only). There was also a wordless dissent. This splintered outcome seems to have had no impact on *Thompson's* precedential value, as it is routinely cited without reservation or reference to the split decision.

sealed everything and sent the issue to the Court of Appeals, which ruled that the report could be published pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 because

Jones had an opportunity to testify before the grand jury under oath [and] those individuals that he would have called as witnesses also testified under subpoena; therefore, any of his due process rights under *Thompson v. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth.*, 246 Ga. 777, 273 S.E.2d 19 (1980), were satisfied.


In re July-August, 2003 DeKalb Cnty. Grand Jury, 265 Ga. App. 870, 871 (2004). In other words, the Court of Appeals determined, in that unique scenario, that Jones -- who testified and who had all witnesses he would have called if presenting his side of the security detail story testify as well -- enjoyed sufficient due process for the report to be published. Here, however, for anyone named in the special purpose grand jury's final report who was not afforded the opportunity to appear before the grand jury, *none* of those due process rights has been satisfied. And for those who did appear -- willingly or not -- only the right to be heard (although without counsel or rebuttal) was protected. Given that, the Court finds that full disclosure of the final report at this time is not proper under *Thompson, Kelley*, and their progeny.

There are, however, three parts of the final report that are ripe for publication. They do not implicate the concerns raised in *Thompson* and *Kelley*, and, while publication may not be convenient for the pacing of the District Attorney's investigation, the compelling public interest in these proceedings and the unquestionable value and importance of transparency require their release. These three portions include the introduction and conclusion to the final report, as well as Section VIII, in which the special purpose grand jury discusses its concern that some witnesses may have lied under oath during their testimony to the grand jury. Because the grand jury does not identify those witnesses, that conclusion may be publicly disclosed at this time.

Therefore, consistent with the special purpose grand jury's recommendation made pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 that its final report be published, those three portions of the report will be placed in the docket for this matter (making those excerpts -- but only those excerpts -- a "court record") on 16 February 2023. The several-day delay will allow the District Attorney's team to meet with the undersigned, if necessary, to discuss logistics of publication and to determine if any portion of those three parts of the final report should be redacted for other reasons (notice of which will be provided in the 16 February 2023 docket entry).

Finally, the Court directs the District Attorney's Office to provide periodic updates on the progress of its investigation so that the Court can reassess if other parts of the special purpose grand jury's final report can properly be disclosed, consistent with the analysis set forth above.

SO ORDERED this 13th day of February 2023



Judge Robert C.I. McBurney
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

EXHIBIT 8:

List of Foreperson and Grand Jurors' Media
Appearances / Public Comments

List of Foreperson and Grand Jurors' Media Appearances / Public Statements

1. February 21, 2023 - Kate Brumback, *Inside the Trump grand jury that probed election meddling*, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 21, 2023), <https://apnews.com/article/politics-new-york-city-only-on-ap-donald-trump-georgia-266e28c4e47e54731b233e0f770f6729>. (Prosecutors played the then-president's phone call with Raffensperger on the first day the jurors met to consider evidence. Prosecutors told jurors they could consume news coverage related to the case but urged them to keep an open mind. As the proceedings moved forward, one of her fellow jurors brought the newspaper every day and pointed out stories about the investigation. When witnesses refused to answer almost every question, the lawyers would engage in what Kohrs came to think of as "show and tell." The lawyers would show video of the person appearing on television or testifying before the U.S. House committee that investigated the Jan. 6, 2021, riot at the U.S. Capitol, periodically asking the witness to confirm certain statements. Then the scratching of pens on paper could be heard as jurors tallied how many times the person invoked the Fifth Amendment.)
2. February 21, 2023 - Danny Hakim, *Jury in Georgia Trump Inquiry Recommended Multiple Indictments, Forewoman Says*, NEW YORK TIMES, (Feb. 21, 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/21/us/trump-georgia-grand-jury-indictments.html> ("We definitely started with the first phone call, the call to Secretary Raffensperger that was so publicized.")
3. February 21, 2023 - Tamar Hallerman, Bill Rankin, *Fulton grand juror: Multiple indictments recommended*, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, (Feb. 21, 2023), <https://www.ajc.com/politics/fulton-grand-juror-multiple-indictments-recommended/KGAJO32SP5CJXO4EYGCONSP5OE/> ("We heard a lot of recordings of President Trump on the phone... It is amazing how many hours of footage you can find of that man on the phone... We kind of knew what to expect, and so especially with our time being limited and with our resources being limited, when it came to that it was like eh, we'd rather get this person, which is a battle that we can win, than this other one." With regard to the investigation, she stated: "It shouldn't have needed to happen and it shouldn't have been so complicated and it just was complicated. It just had all these extra alleys and all these extra twists and turns that it didn't need. I realized there was way too much going on and this should not have been this insane.")
4. February 21, 2023 - Kate Bouldan, CNN, *Foreperson reacts to Trump's claim that he gets total exoneration in GA probe*, YOUTUBE, (Feb. 21, 2023), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_qyEG7Wr7tY ("I will tell you that it was a process where we heard his name a lot. We definitely heard a lot about former President Trump, and we definitely discussed him a lot in the room... and I will say that when this list comes out... there are no major plot twists waiting for you.") (On the section of the report containing perjury recommendations: "I would say that it ended up included there because it was less pointed of a suggestion than some of the other things we may have written in the parts of the report the judge chose to keep confidential . . . we thought it was important to keep it separate as well.") (On whether charges should be brought: "This was too much. Too much information. Too much of my time. Too much of

everyone's time. Too much of their time. Too much argument in court about getting people to appear before us. There was just too much for this to just be, oh okay, we're good. Bye. I will be fine as long as something happens. Personally, I hope to see her take almost any kind of decisive action, to actually do something. There are too many times in recent history that seem to me like someone has gotten called out for something that people had a problem with, and nothing ever happens.”(On how many people were recommended for indictment, when asked if it was more than a dozen she responded, “I believe so. That’s probably a good assumption.”)

5. February 21, 2023 - Lawrence O'Donnell, MSNBC, *Lawrence: Ga grand juror gives most revealing Trump investigation interview ever*, YOUTUBE (Feb. 21, 2023), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c-MG8f5QYVw> (“I could see how getting the former president to talk to us would have been a year in negotiation by itself...I'd be fascinated by what he [Trump] said, but do you think he would come in and say anything groundbreaking or just the same kinda thing we've heard?”) (“At some point through this investigation, especially as we began to speak to higher profile witnesses, I think some of the combativeness that we experienced meant that the DA's team, as well as us, started to pick our battles. And when someone, like for example, goes before the January 6th Committee and says they plead the fifth 200 times, do you really expect them to come before you and say something different?”) (“We kind of knew what to expect, and so especially with our time being limited and with our resources being limited, when it came to that it was like eh, we'd rather get this person, which is a battle that we can win, than this other one.”)
6. February 21, 2023 – Blayne Alexander, Dareh Gregorian, *Georgia grand jury recommended indictments for more than a dozen people in Trump probe, foreperson says*, NBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2023), <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/georgia-grand-jury-recommended-indictments-dozen-people-trump-probe-fo-rcna71675>. (Kohrs said Graham was "fantastic," adding: "He was personable. He was forthcoming. He was very willing to just have a conversation." A witness who did strike her as “honest” was Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who'd fought his subpoena for testimony in the courts).
7. February 21, 2023 - The Reidout, *Did Georgia grand jury recommend charging Trump? 'I'd bet yes,' legal experts say*, MSNBC, (Feb. 21, 2023), <https://www.msnbc.com/the-reidout/watch/special-grand-jury-forewoman-in-trump-georgia-election-interference-probe-on-recommended-indictments-163784261685>.
8. February 22, 2023 - Marshall Cohen, Katie Carver, Devan Cole, *Foreperson on Georgia grand jury investigating Trump and 2020 election says jurors 'definitely discussed him a lot,'* CNN (Feb. 22, 2023), <https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/21/politics/fulton-county-trump-grand-jury-foreperson-ebof/index.html>. (“Can you imagine doing this for eight months and not coming out with a whole list [of recommended indictments]. It's not a short list. It's not.”) (“I would love to see something actually happen. Don't make me take back my faith in the system. The only thing I would be disappointed in, at this point, is if this whole thing just disappears. That's the only thing that would make me sad.”) (The foreperson was “pleasantly surprised” by the friendliness of some witnesses, like

Michael Flynn: “Flynn was honestly a very nice in person. He was a very nice man. He was definitely interesting. But I don’t recall him saying anything earth-shattering.” But revealed disdain for other witnesses who similarly invoked the fifth amendment: “Mark Meadows did not share very much,” she said. “I asked if he had Twitter, and he pled the Fifth.”)

9. February 22, 2023 - Morning Joe, *Fulton County grand jury foreperson speaks out*, MSNBC (Feb. 22, 2023), <https://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/watch/fulton-county-grand-jury-foreperson-speaks-out-163802693545>.
10. February 22, 2023 - Alex Wagner, MSNBC, *Special grand jury foreperson shares details, drops heavy hints in Georgia Trump case*, YOUTUBE (Feb. 22, 2023), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJ0b9WxIfkk>.
11. March 15, 2023 – Tamar Hallerman, Bill Rankin, *Exclusive: Behind the scenes of the Trump grand jury*, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, (March 15, 2023), <https://www.ajc.com/politics/exclusive-behind-the-scenes-of-the-trump-grand-jury/6CXLKTFMKNDU7O6TER4B7UTZPE/>.

Exhibit 9


List of Supervising Judge's Media Appearances

List of Appearances – Supervising Judge

1. February 22, 2023 – Tamar Hallerman, Bill Rankin, *Trump attorneys: Special grand jury probe 'a clown show'*, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Feb. 23, 2023), <https://www.ajc.com/politics/trump-attorneys-special-grand-jury-probe-a-clown-show/ZTR6VUWXGFC2BMOX6FH6DAPCI/>.
2. February 23, 2023 - Kate Brumback, *Trump investigation: Could grand juror's words tank charges?*, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Feb. 23, 2023), <https://apnews.com/article/politics-georgia-donald-trump-9938c36b008aeb7a7b1502b09762bbd>.
3. February 24, 2023 - Jonathan Raymond, *Judge takes question on Georgia Trump jury foreperson giving interviews*, 11 ALIVE (Feb. 24, 2023), <https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/judge-robert-mcburney-question-on-georgia-trump-jury-foreperson-giving-interviews/85-5117a736-09db-4da2-8631-037e9d49e700>.
4. February 24, 2023 - Sara Murray, *Fulton County judge who oversaw special grand jury in Trump probe says jurors are free to discuss final report*, CNN, (Feb. 24, 2023), <https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/24/politics/georgia-grand-jury-trump-final-report-jurors/index.html>.
5. February 24, 2023 - Michael Isikoff, Daniel Klaidman, *Georgia judge gave grand jurors lenient guidance on talking to media about Trump case*, YAHOO! NEWS, (Feb. 24, 2023).
6. February 27, 2023 - Olivia Rubin, *Judge overseeing Trump Georgia grand jury speaks after foreperson's controversial interviews*, ABC NEWS, (Feb. 27, 2023), <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/judge-overseeing-trump-georgia-grand-jury-speaks-after/story?id=97503245>.

Exhibit 10

August 29, 2022 Order Denying Motion to Quash (Governor Kemp), In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).



IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

IN RE 2 MAY 2022 SPECIAL PURPOSE
GRAND JURY -- SUBPOENA FOR
GOVERNOR KEMP

2022-EX-000024

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO QUASH

On 20 January 2022, the District Attorney of Fulton County, the elected official responsible for investigating, charging, and prosecuting felony criminal offenses in this Circuit, petitioned the Chief Judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County to convene the entire Superior Court bench to consider the District Attorney's request for a special purpose grand jury. That grand jury's charter, if approved, would be to conduct a criminal investigation into "the facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to possible attempts to disrupt the lawful administration of the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia" and to prepare a report and recommendation for the District Attorney advising her whether she should seek to prosecute anyone for such potential crimes. On 24 January 2022, the Chief Judge, having received a majority of the twenty judges' assent, issued an Order authorizing the convening of a special purpose grand jury for this criminal investigation.¹

On 2 May 2022, the special purpose grand jury was selected and sworn in; in June 2022 it began receiving evidence and investigating the possibility of criminal interference in the 2020 general election. On 4 August 2022, the District Attorney issued a subpoena to Governor Brian Kemp; that subpoena, just like those received by the Attorney General

¹ Nothing in the convening request (or the subsequent convening Order) indicated that the District Attorney, the Superior Court bench, or the special purpose grand jury would be considering civil violations or the possibility of bringing any civil action. The focus and purpose were and have been ever since to investigate *criminal* violations and consider *criminal* charges.

and the Secretary of State, directed the Governor to appear before the special purpose grand jury so that that investigative body could learn more about whether criminal conduct had occurred in connection with alleged efforts to interfere with the 2020 general election in Georgia. According to both the pleadings from and the lawyers for the Governor and the District Attorney, this subpoena came only after weeks of tortured and tortuous negotiations over obtaining an interview with the Governor -- the details of which do not bear repeating here, other than to note that both sides share responsibility for the torture and the tortuousness.

The date of the Governor's subpoenaed appearance before the special purpose grand jury was changed at least once, at his lawyer's request. On the eve of the most recently agreed-upon date for the Governor to appear, his lawyers filed a motion to quash the subpoena. The motion invoked sovereign immunity and asserted that this Court lacked jurisdiction to issue, enforce, or even consider the subpoena. The State promptly responded and, on 25 August 2022, the Court held a public hearing on the matter. Having considered the pleadings, oral arguments, and relevant case law, the Court finds that it does enjoy jurisdiction and that the subpoena should not be quashed; the motion is DENIED. However, the Court will delay the Governor's appearance before the special purpose grand jury until some date soon after the 8 November 2022 general election.

* * *

In Georgia, one cannot sue "the State" unless the State has enacted a specific waiver, legislative or constitutional, that permits a particular species of civil claim -- tort, contract, declaratory judgment, etc. -- to be brought against it. That is, the State and its agencies and agents (of which the Governor is one) enjoy sovereign immunity, a constitutional doctrine that "forbids our courts to entertain a lawsuit against the State

without its consent.” *Lathrop v. Deal*, 301 Ga. 408, 408 (2017); see also Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, ¶ IX(e). Absent that consent, Georgia’s courts lack jurisdiction to consider the claim brought against the State. *McConnell v. Dept. of Labor*, 302 Ga. 18, 18-19 (2017) (if sovereign immunity applies, a court “lacks authority to decide the merits of a claim that is barred”); see also *City of Coll. Park v. Clayton Cnty.*, 306 Ga. 301, 314-15 (2019).

Both sides agree with the foregoing -- as they should, as it is well-settled law. Where they diverge is whether sovereign immunity applies in the context of this special purpose grand jury’s criminal investigation. The Governor insists he is immune to the subpoena because there is no waiver, legislative or constitutional, that would allow the grand jury to require him (or, presumably, any other state agent, including the Secretary of State and Attorney General²) to appear in what he characterizes as a civil proceeding. The District Attorney argues that sovereign immunity does not apply in this context because, first, there is no lawsuit being brought against the State (or the Governor), and second, sovereign immunity simply has no application in criminal matters.

The Governor relies primarily on *State v. Bartel*, 223 Ga. App. 696 (1996), in support of his claim that what this special purpose grand jury is doing is conducting a civil investigation.³ *Bartel* does not provide the support his claim needs because *Bartel* does

² Who, interestingly, is the lead signatory on the Governor’s motion seeking quashal (despite having himself appeared before the special purpose grand jury without incident, objection, or invocation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity).

³ He additionally relies on two cases that establish that a grand jury cannot conduct *civil* investigations of state offices and officials; rather, a grand jury’s civil authority is limited by statute -- and likely by sovereign immunity, although these cases do not reach that doctrine -- to investigations of county-level entities. These cases are inapposite because this special purpose grand jury is engaged in a criminal investigation. Moreover, one of the two cases, *Floyd Cnty. Grand Jury v. Dep’t of Family & Children Servs.*, 218 Ga. App. 832 (1995), suggests, albeit in dicta, that had the grand jury in that case been engaged in a criminal investigation, it would have been authorized to subpoena state agents. The Governor’s legal team also points the Court to *Kenerly v. State*, 311 Ga. App. 190 (2011), but that case merely reaffirmed what the District Attorney has always acknowledged: special purpose grand juries do not have the authority to issue indictments. *Kenerly* in no way prohibits special purpose grand juries from engaging in criminal investigations and indeed the special purpose grand jury impanelment statute explicitly allows it. O.C.G.A.

not say what he says it does. In *Bartel*, a witness who had appeared before a special purpose grand jury in Floyd County was later prosecuted for allegedly having perjured himself while testifying. The *Bartel* special purpose grand jury was convened to conduct a civil investigation into “alleged irregularities in the operations of the Floyd County Hospital Authority.” 223 Ga. App. at 696. Contrary to the Governor’s presentation at the hearing on his motion to quash, the court in *Bartel* did not “conclude[] that special purpose grand juries conduct only civil investigations.” (Movant’s PowerPoint at Slide 3). No such language can be found in *Bartel*, which dealt with the nature of the oath the witnesses took before testifying.⁴ It is correct to say that the special purpose grand jury in *Bartel* had, as its purpose, a civil investigation. It is incorrect to say that the Court of Appeals in *Bartel* in any way concluded that the *only* purpose a special purpose grand jury can have is civil.

Which brings us back to *this* special purpose grand jury. As described at the outset of this Order, its purpose is unquestionably and exclusively to conduct a criminal investigation: its convening was sought by the elected official who investigates, lodges, and prosecutes criminal charges in this Circuit; its convening Order specifies its purpose as the investigation of possible criminal activities; and its final output is a report recommending whether criminal charges should be brought. Unlike the special purpose grand jury in *Bartel*, it is not investigating “irregularities” in hospital administration. It

§ 15-12-100(a) (“The chief judge of the superior court of any county ... on his or her own motion [or] on motion or petition of the district attorney ... may request the judges of the superior court of the county to impanel a special grand jury for the purpose of investigating any alleged violation of the laws of this state....”). That a special purpose grand jury engaged in a criminal investigation cannot issue an indictment does not diminish the criminal nature of its work or somehow transmogrify that criminal investigation into a civil one. Police officers, too, lack the authority to indict anyone, but their investigations are plainly criminal.

⁴ Indeed, hopefully due only to inadvertence, the Governor’s legal team, in its visual presentation making this unfounded claim about the holding of *Bartel*, directed the Court via citation to a page of the opinion (699) that does not exist.

5

will not be recommending whether anyone should be sued or should be referred for civil administrative proceedings; it will be recommending whether anyone should be prosecuted for crimes. Put simply, there is nothing about this special purpose grand jury that involves or implicates civil practice.⁵

Because neither the special purpose grand jury nor the District Attorney has brought (or is even contemplating) a lawsuit (*i.e.*, a civil proceeding) against the Governor, his office, or any of his agents, there is no sovereign immunity to invoke. Again, to quote *Lathrop*, that doctrine “forbids our courts to entertain a lawsuit against the State without its consent.” 301 Ga. at 408. It is clear that the Governor is not consenting to this subpoena. It is also clear that his lack of consent is of no jurisdictional moment to this Court because there is before it no civil proceeding, suit, or action. The Governor must honor the subpoena -- as have the Secretary of State and the Attorney General and many other agents of the State in these criminal proceedings. Sovereign immunity wards off civil actions, not criminal ones.⁶

Given that decision, the Court turns next to the process concerns raised by the Governor: about what must he testify and when? As with several other witnesses who, in response to their lawful subpoenas, raised concerns about various privileges, the Governor’s questioning will have limits. Neither the District Attorney nor the grand


⁵ The one exception to date has been the lack of civility among the attorneys involved. As the streams of publicly revealed e-mails demonstrate, that all-too-common and always unwelcome aspect of civil litigation has intruded upon these criminal proceedings.

⁶ That this is so was made all the more plain at the hearing by (1) the fact that *every* sovereign immunity case the Governor’s well-resourced legal team cited in court and in its motion to quash involved civil proceedings; (2) the Court’s observation that “the State” is the ultimate instigator of any legal proceedings that will flow from this investigation (*i.e.*, an indictment styled “The State of Georgia versus Defendant X”), which would explain why there are no “criminal” sovereign immunity appellate cases asserting that the State is immune from itself; and (3) the District Attorney’s apt example of what would happen in a world in which sovereign immunity applied to criminal actions: police officers could flout subpoenas, GBI forensic experts could resist summonses on the basis that they work at the State level and not the “local” level, etc.

jurors may ask the Governor about the contents of any attorney-client privileged communications. The Court is aware of several conversations of interest to the investigation in which the Governor participated and to which the attorney-client privilege applies. As with those other witnesses, questioning must cease about the contents of the communications if the privilege is validly raised. Undoubtedly, other issues will arise that do not fall neatly into this category of privilege. If they cannot be resolved by the fleet of lawyers on each side, they should be brought to the Court for resolution (or at least helpful direction).⁷

Remaining is the question of when the Governor will need to honor his subpoena. The answer is after the 8 November 2022 general election. The Governor is in the midst of a re-election campaign and this criminal grand jury investigation should not be used by the District Attorney, the Governor's opponent, or the Governor himself to influence the outcome of that election. The sound and prudent course is to let the election proceed without further litigation or other activity concerning the Governor's involvement in the special purpose grand jury's work. Once the election is over, the Court expects the Governor's legal team promptly to make arrangements for his appearance.⁸

SO ORDERED this 29th day of August 2022.


Judge Robert C.I. McBurney
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

⁷The Court declines the Governor's invitation to import wholesale into Georgia law the concept of executive privilege. Its time may come, but this is not it.


⁸ The Court also declines to issue a certificate of immediate review of this decision because it is clear that sovereign immunity does not apply to criminal matters. *See Rivera v. Washington*, 298 Ga. 770, 777 (2016) (recommending issuance of certificate of immediate review when resolution of immunity issue is not clear).

Exhibit 11

Transcript of August 25, 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury Hearing before the Honorable Robert C.I. McBurney, Atlanta, Georgia, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA



IN RE:)
SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY)

) CASE NUMBER: 2022-EX-00024

2022-EX-00024

SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY MOTIONS TRANSCRIPT
Before the HONORABLE JUDGE ROBERT C.I MCBURNEY
on July 25, 2022, Atlanta, GA 30303

APPEARANCES:

- FOR THE STATE: ADA NATHAN WADE
- FOR THE STATE: ADA DONALD WAKEFORD
- FOR THE STATE: ATTORNEY ANNA GREEN-CROSS
- FOR SENATOR JONES: BILL DILLON & ANNA CLAPP
- FOR THE JURORS: ATTORNEYS MS. PEARSON & MS. DEBORROUGH

HADASSAH J. DAVID, CVR, CCR

#4857 8554 6837 1968

CERTIFIED COURT REPORTER

SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

hadassah.david@fultoncountyga.gov

HADASSAH J. DAVID, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1 PROCEEDINGS

2 THE COURT: Good afternoon. Let's get on the record
3 in 2022-Ex-000024. This is a special purpose Grand Jury.
4 It is about 2:00 o'clock on the 21st of July, and we are
5 going to work through, this afternoon, a couple of motions
6 that have been filed. A motion filed on behalf of Senator
7 Jones seeking to disqualify the DA's office from handling
8 the case, the case that is Senator Jones and then a motion
9 to quash and disqualify, but to disqualify, I think, is
10 merely an adoption of Senator Jones' motion that was filed
11 on behalf of 11 of the -- for today we'll call them
12 alternate electors.

13 Those are the two motions I think we are covering.
14 The State has filed, the District Attorney's Office has
15 filed, an opposition to the motion to disqualify. I let
16 them know, because when I received the motion to quash
17 that they didn't need to file a written response motion
18 which is fine, and hopefully you will be able to address
19 it today. It's a lot of moving parts.

20 We've got a lot of lawyers here, so I want to make
21 sure we get on the record who is here and who will be
22 speaking for the different parties. Before we go any
23 further, though, Rule 22 wise. There were some media
24 outlets that only reached out today to get the green
25 light. If you were able to get equipment in here you are

1 free to use it, but I did not sign your Rule 22 today,
2 because the general Rule 22 is to be signed 24 hours in
3 advance, but you really only need the Rule 22 for purposes
4 of getting in the building with the big cameras, so if you
5 sought Rule 22 approval to record things while you're in
6 here and you've got a handheld device, you are welcome to
7 do that.

8 Going forward it's 24 hours in advance, and it would
9 really help if you could report back to your Rule 22
10 people, if you would designate more clearly on the Rule 22
11 forms what kind of equipment you want to bring in. I am
12 all for having a pool feed rather than four big cameras in
13 here. It gets a little crowded for you all, but I can't
14 tell because everyone who submits a Rule 22 checks
15 everything -- I want to bring in every kind of equipment
16 in. I'm bringing in a drone. I know you're not bringing
17 in a drone, but apparently for everyone bringing in the
18 big cameras we only need one, and like I said, I'm happy
19 to have a pool, but it's hard to tell.

20 With that, let's start with the State. Who will be
21 handling -- it can be more than one person, but I just
22 don't want to omit anyone if I'm looking to the District
23 Attorney's Office for answers or responses to concerns
24 raised by some of these witnesses. Who from the DA's
25 office or affiliated from the DA's office should I be

HADASSAH J. DAVID, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1 expected to hear from?

2 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Good afternoon, Your Honor,
3 I'm Anna Green-Cross. I'm here representing the District
4 Attorney's office on the motion to disqualify prosecutors.

5 THE COURT: So if I have questions about quashal or
6 assertion of Fifth Amendment rights?

7 ADA WADE: Good afternoon, Judge. I'm Nathan Wade,
8 special prosecutor from the District Attorney's office as
9 well as Donald Wakeford.

10 THE COURT: So Wade and Wakeford for Fifth Amendment
11 quashal and Green-Cross for the disqualification.

12 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Yes.

13 THE COURT: Okay, got it. Thank you. All right. If
14 we pivot over to potential witnesses and counsel, Mr.
15 Dillon, good morning. How are you?

16 ATTORNEY DILLON: Good afternoon. I'm fine, Judge.

17 THE COURT: You are representing Senator Jones. Is
18 there anyone else? I don't want to ignore anyone.

19 ATTORNEY DILLON: My associate Anna Clapp is also
20 here.

21 THE COURT: Great. Okay. Clapp as in applause or
22 Platt as in . . .

23 ATTORNEY CLAPP: Clapp as in applause, two P's.

24 THE COURT: Got it. Excellent, and then on behalf of
25 the 11 alternate electors, Ms. Pearson and Ms. Deborroughs

HADASSAH J. DAVID, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1 I see Ms. Deborroughs virtually. She is appearing in
2 Newnan or even further away, but we greenlighted that
3 virtual appearance. It's fine, and we've got Ms. Pearson
4 here.

5 ATTORNEY PEARSON: You do, Your Honor.

6 THE COURT: Okay. Anyone else on behalf of your
7 clients or just the two of you?

8 ATTORNEY PEARSON: No, Your Honor, just us.

9 THE COURT: All right. I want to start with a
10 question for either Mr. Dillon or Ms. Clapp, and that is
11 whether you are joining in the motion that Ms. Pearson
12 filed in which Fifth Amendment concerns are raised as
13 opposed to conflict issues?

14 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor. Insofar as Ms.
15 Pearson's motion, I believe at page 7. It raises the fact
16 that these witnesses who have received both subpoenas and
17 target letters should have their appearances waived. We
18 join in that portion of her motion.

19 THE COURT: What is the status of your client? I
20 know he's received the subpoena, that is the only part
21 that's been disclosed to me.

22 ATTORNEY DILLON: Well, in the government's response
23 to our motion, they actually point out that Senator Jones
24 received a target letter in this case.

25 THE COURT: Okay. Do you disagree with that or . . .

HADASSAH J. DAVID, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1 ATTORNEY DILLON: No, I do not. It is an irrefutable
2 fact at this point. We publicly acknowledge that it is an
3 irrefutable fact.

4 THE COURT: Okay, so my thought is that we talk about
5 some of the Fifth Amendment concerns first because it may
6 make moot for practical purposes the conflict concerns
7 that you raise in your motion. Let me simplify my thought
8 process for you. If in the end I determine that Senator
9 Jones need not appear because of Fifth Amendment reasons,
10 I don't know we need to reach the question of
11 disqualification if that would be his only connection to
12 this grand jury.

13 This Grand Jury is not a Grand Jury that would be
14 voting on a bill of indictment. It is a Grand Jury that
15 has been tasked with generating a report that would
16 contain in it, ideally, a recommendation to the District
17 Attorney as to whether she should pursue charges or not
18 and what those charges might look like, and any other
19 things that that Grand Jury wants to put in there other
20 than a true bill.

21 So the way the Fifth Amendment analysis plays out is
22 that I conclude that Senator Jones doesn't need to appear,
23 if they state his name or something, and we can work
24 through those logistics probably in a smaller group
25 setting. Do you agree that we don't need to reach the

1 question of disqualification?

2 ATTORNEY DILLON: No, Your Honor. I do disagree.

3 THE COURT: Okay.

4 ATTORNEY DILLON: I think that the disqualification
5 issue is right, and I think that it has been exacerbated
6 by the media circus that's been generated out of the
7 Fulton County's DA's office in this case, and that the
8 harm to my client, Senator Jones, is that he's being drug
9 through the mud publicly as a subject of this special
10 Grand Jury.

11 THE COURT: Well, apparently as a target, not a
12 subject.

13 ATTORNEY DILLON: Well, I say a subject as someone
14 who has been affected by this special Grand Jury,
15 particularly as a target, but with the effort and focus
16 being that it's going to have an impact on the Lieutenant
17 Governor's race this fall. And so if the DA's office has
18 a hand in it and they issue a report that says, Well,
19 we're going to recommend an indictment of Senator Jones,
20 it will have a direct impact on the election in November,
21 and that's been reported in the media numerous times.

22 THE COURT: Okay. So I'll correct a couple of things
23 for you. One, and I may have misunderstood what you were
24 saying, but the District Attorney's Office is not offering
25 any report. That would come from the grand jurors as

1 supervised by me. I appreciate that the District Attorney
2 has fashioned herself as the legal adviser to the Grand
3 Jury, and that's an adaptation of the actual language of
4 the role that that office plays, but ultimately it's the
5 Grand Jury's report not the District Attorney's.

6 Second, and a concern we do need to cover today,
7 regardless of how we approach the disqualification piece
8 would be the timing of the release of the report. Now, I
9 think that's something that everyone ought to leave here
10 today with a better understanding of how that will be
11 managed.

12 That is within my purview, and it was helpful to have
13 it brought to my attention that timelines could collide,
14 that the Grand Jury might complete Its work in October,
15 and that might not be the best time for Its work product
16 to be shared publicly in the way that many investigative
17 agencies, that's what the Grand Jury is an effect here,
18 they hold off on taking certain steps until an election
19 has passed with a few exceptions, and we need to see
20 what's going on with that report, if it's even ready by
21 then.

22 The Grand Jury is authorized to continue its work
23 through May 1 of next year, so I don't know that it's
24 right yet to worry about that other than to get a general
25 understanding that I wouldn't be a big fan of an October

1 surprise, so if we talk about when reports would be
2 released and we work through a Fifth Amendment analysis,
3 if that Fifth Amendment analysis is, in light of a target
4 letter, et. cetera, Senator Jones probably doesn't need to
5 -- and it's not my analysis yet, but if the end result of
6 that is that Senator Jones does not need to appear before
7 the Grand Jury, that it strikes me that the
8 disqualification piece is moot.

9 I don't know from what the office would be
10 disqualified if Senator Jones isn't being asked to do
11 anything between now and the release of the report other
12 than the timing of the report, which doesn't necessarily
13 tie into who is investigating. If we were suddenly to
14 switch to the Lowndes County District Attorney's Office,
15 and they finished their work with the Grand Jury in
16 October, we'd be faced with that same chronological
17 challenge.

18 ATTORNEY DILLON: We would, Your Honor, with the
19 exception of the issue that has to do with the press, and
20 the issue that has to do with the public favoring of my
21 client's opponent for Lieutenant Governor, Charlie Bailey,
22 and the the District Attorney in this case has raised
23 \$32,000 for Charlie Bailey in the headliner that she
24 hosted for him in June. Shortly thereafter, she issued my
25 client a target letter and then shortly after that, in

1 fact, two days ago when they filed their brief, that was
2 the first time that it was publicly known that Senator
3 Jones was a target of this Grand Jury investigation, so on
4 one side we have a public target, and on the other side we
5 have a headliner fundraiser raising \$32,000, and we
6 contend that those two things create the appearance of
7 impropriety, that under the Rules of Ethics in the state
8 of Georgia this is prohibited conduct, and then with
9 regard to Senator Jones this investigation in Fulton
10 County should be complete at this point, that this
11 District Attorney's Office needs to be disqualified, and
12 perhaps some other district attorney can be appointed, and
13 in that case, Senator Jones would would be glad to
14 cooperate with that investigation, because he has
15 indicated and indicated early on that he was willing to
16 cooperate and give a statement and meet with their
17 investigators, and then two weeks later he gets a target
18 letter, and then six days after he gets that target
19 letter, and 'm getting ahead of myself.

20 THE COURT: Yes, you are. In fact, I'm going to cut
21 you off, because I simply wanted to know whether you
22 thought it was moot and you do not think it is.

23 ATTORNEY DILLON: I do not think it is, Your Honor.
24 I think it is right at this point.

25 THE COURT: Okay, and we may get to it. I was
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1 expecting a different answer, but I appreciate your
2 answer. I still think we need to start with the Fifth
3 Amendment concerns that were brought to a head in
4 Ms. Peterson's motion, but what I want to do is start with
5 the State on that because your perspective with the
6 District Attorney's Office on that, because your
7 perspective may help me better navigate what to do, and
8 for folks in the room here representatives of the District
9 Attorney's Office and a lawyer for another witness, that
10 witness and I have already had some basic discussions
11 about how we might work through the assertion of Fifth
12 Amendment privilege in certain context, and so we will
13 probably build on that.

14 So if I'm referring to what we talked about
15 yesterday, that is what I mean in connection with that
16 situation. Mr. Wade or Mr. Wakeford, what I would like to
17 hear from you on is is your overarching reaction to
18 Ms. Deborroughs and Ms. Pearson's motion as we discussed in
19 the past. I don't know that there is a blanket, I don't
20 have to answer any questions that would work here, but
21 insofar as their 11 client's sole connection to the
22 investigation is their participation in the alternate
23 electors scheme, and that was going to be the focus of
24 99 percent of your questions, if that is determined to be
25 in light of some of the target news that's been shared,

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1 something that is protected that they don't need to
2 respond to. I'm not sure what the point would be in
3 bringing those folks in on a non-immunized status before
4 the Grand Jury, so help me work through that, please.

5 ADA WAKEFORD: Yes, Your Honor. I would begin by
6 pointing, Your Honor, to the case of State v. Lampl, that
7 is spelled L-A-M-P-L. Your Honor, may be aware of this
8 case.

9 THE COURT: Is that Clayton County -- yes?

10 ADA WAKEFORD: I believe, I'm not sure of the
11 jurisdiction that it began, but it speaks very poignantly
12 to this issue. Specifically what it says is, that "Under
13 Georgia law, the designation as a target without a formal
14 charge being leveled against an individual doesn't change
15 the ability to subpoena someone to appear before a special
16 purpose Grand Jury."

17 THE COURT: Fair point, and a footnote may have been
18 dropped somewhere with something that was provided, but
19 that was not my question. I don't think the word target
20 is as magical in State proceedings as it is in Federal
21 proceedings, but it certainly has caused the temperature
22 in the room to go up and antennas to go up everywhere, and
23 so whether you you call him target or you call him less of
24 a friend, we now have witnesses who are saying, "I'm not
25 comfortable answering those questions, I think I may be

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1 facing criminal liability."

2 In other words, I assert my Fifth Amendment privilege
3 or protection, whatever you want to call it, and that's
4 what Ms. Pearson and Ms. Deborrough have done on behalf of
5 their 11 clients, so my question isn't doesn't target mean
6 you can't go any further. You may want to think through
7 in the future labeling someone that and then hailing them
8 in because of how this is played out.

9 Let's just stick to the topics. If my sole
10 connection to the investigation that you are conducting
11 with this Grand Jury is that I was one of the people who
12 agreed or was nominated, or however it happened to be an
13 alternate elector, you're going to ask me about that, and
14 I have a good-faith basis to believe my decision to agree
15 to be an alternate elector exposes me to potential
16 criminal liability, why shouldn't I be able to say I'm not
17 answering any of those questions in the context of a Grand
18 Jury?

19 ADA WAKEFORD: I understand, Your Honor. Thank you
20 for the clarification. I would say that the 11
21 individuals identified in the motion are not all situated
22 in exactly the same place, so there may be commonality
23 between them, but there is going to need to be an
24 individual determination with regard to each of them. The
25 level of involvement is necessarily individual, so what I

1 think would work is for an individual assessment to be
2 made in each case, since we undoubtedly have the ability
3 under the law under Lampl to ask the witnesses to appear,
4 then there would be ahead of time a discussion between the
5 parties with Your Honor's involvement need be, to discuss
6 areas of inquiry that may lead to an identification of
7 Fifth Amendment rights.

8 If that is the case, I believe we would be able to
9 work out a procedure where there is not a badgering of a
10 witness, but simply an ability for the special purpose
11 Grand Jury to walk up to an area of inquiry and be told
12 this is going to be foreclosed by the Fifth Amendment and
13 move on if there are other areas to pursue, so each them
14 will require, I believe an individual assessment.

15 THE COURT: Are there any of the 11 -- I'm gonna
16 make it 12. I'm going to include Senator Jones in the
17 group, so any of those 12 where the only topic of interest
18 is that witness's participation in the alternate elector
19 scheme.

20 ADA WAKEFORD: The answer to that is no.

21 THE COURT: Every one of them -- it sounds like it's
22 a very diverse group, and one of the concerns Ms.
23 Deborrough and Ms. Pearson had brought up was that some of
24 them are remote, some of them have trouble with mobility,
25 but you are saying all of them have some other potential

1 connection to the investigation or area of interest to the
2 investigation.

3 ADA WAKEFORD: Standing in my place right now, Your
4 Honor, this is an investigative Grand Jury, so we're not
5 at the stage, you know approaching, say a trial, where I
6 can give a statement with the definiteness that you might
7 be seeking. What I can tell you is, right now, can I say
8 unless there's only one thing that we can connect one of
9 these people to, then no, Your Honor.

10 THE COURT: Okay, so just to flip it around to the
11 type of questions asked, you envision, or you and your
12 colleagues envision asking each of the 12, including
13 Senator Jones, questions beyond simply why did you decide
14 to be an alternate elector? Tell me more about that.
15 There are other aspects of the 2020 general election that
16 you would be asking each of the 12 about. Mr. Wade.

17 ADA WADE: Yes, sir, Judge. If I may, much like the
18 witness on yesterday, we have planned categories to touch,
19 and we understand per the Court's instruction, if we can
20 narrow down these buckets, ask the general question about
21 that particular bucket, let the witness assert, at that
22 point ask the witness if they plan to assert their Fifth
23 Amendment privilege to any question concerning that issue,
24 once they say yes, we move on.

25 THE COURT: Sure.

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1 ADA WADE: Not a barrage of like 50 questions where
2 they decide to assert, but just to be able to hit the
3 different buckets though and to answer the Court's
4 question directly, that, yes, sir, there are other areas
5 that we plan to attack.

6 THE COURT: There's more than one bucket for each of
7 the 12 - -

8 ADA WADE: Yes, sir.

9 THE COURT: -- Is what I'm hearing you say - - well,
10 then we would need to work through that. That helps, I
11 appreciate that, and I think there is ample case law,
12 state and federal, that authorizes witnesses who say up
13 front that I'm going to assert the Fifth Amendment to
14 still be called before the Grand Jury to then assert it.

15 Bank of Nova Scotia from the US Supreme Court is the
16 earliest one I found where you sometimes need to have
17 those people get in front of the Grand Jury to actually
18 invoke, because they might not when put in that situation,
19 and then the investigators are not forced to rely on a
20 claim that they will, or to your point, Mr. Wakeford and
21 Mr. Wade, there may be areas that come up that aren't
22 properly covered by that protection.

23 I know we've been bouncing around a lot, but I think
24 it makes sense for me to hear now from Ms. Pearson or Ms.
25 Deborrough about the approach you've taken, which is my

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1 client shouldn't have to come in at all, and you may not
2 yet have been able to speak with Mr. Wade and his team to
3 know about these other buckets, to use his terms, but I
4 will just share with you in working with Mr. Wade and his
5 team yesterday and a different witness and lawyer, there
6 are other areas, they may be minor, but they're still
7 areas where even the lawyer agreed that my client doesn't
8 have the Fifth Amendment right not to say, this is my job.

9 I've had this job for 10 years, and then they move on
10 to what did you have to do with the electors scheme Fifth
11 Amendment, and then they stop. They don't go any further
12 with that topic, but to the District Attorney's offices
13 point it's a broad waterfront, and you have seized upon
14 maybe the big bright lighthouse, vis-a-vis your client's,
15 but there could be some (unintelligible) buildings at that
16 that lighthouse that it's appropriate for questions to be
17 asked and more importantly answered.

18 So tell me why you think that instead the answers
19 should be, and I mean you, go to the extreme, it's
20 quashed, they shouldn't even have to show up to give
21 (unintelligible)

22 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Correct, Your Honor. I think the
23 first place to start is, just to correct a few things or
24 to clarify a few things, from my understanding of what you
25 just said, all of my clients are identically situated from

1 a legal perspective. They were all witnesses, they were
2 all converted to targets, and there has been no
3 differentiation from the DA's office between that.

4 THE COURT: Let me interrupt you for a second. So,
5 you are saying all 11 of them have received target letters
6 or some communication from the District Attorney's Office
7 that uses the "T" word?

8 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Yes.

9 THE COURT: Whatever that may mean in the State
10 context, but just because two of your clients have, you
11 are saying they are similarly situated, it's just a matter
12 of time for the postman to get there.

13 ATTORNEY PEARSON: I have 11 target letters.

14 THE COURT: Okay. So in that way they are similarly
15 situated, but it sounds like they are, and you note it in
16 your own motion, they are also very differently situated.
17 You have, and I apologize if I have the title wrong, Mr.
18 Schaffer as the chair of the Republican Party in Georgia,
19 A very, very, different role in connection with the
20 affairs of election then. I don't remember who the
21 elderly individual difficulty with mobility and whatnot.
22 I've never heard of the person.

23 It is a differently situated individual once you get
24 outside of that lighthouse of, I was an alternate elector.

25 ATTORNEY PEARSON: That's true, Your Honor, but I
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1 don't know what situation you dealt with yesterday or what
2 that person's role was or who they were, but in my
3 client's situation I genuinely cannot think of a single
4 topic or question that they could be asked that would not
5 be either under the Fifth Amendment or a link in the
6 chain.

7 What's your name under these charges that they have
8 said they are going to do by signing your name, by saying
9 who you are, by putting your signature on something could
10 arguably be, as ridiculous as that sounds, an
11 incriminating fact, so I don't think my clients are
12 similarly situated to these other witnesses that you are
13 dealing with, anything they could be asked.

14 What's your name? That is incriminating. What's
15 your job? That could lead to other political links in the
16 chain, that could lead to e-mails where they talked about
17 various issues. It could lead to anything. I don't see
18 any topic that could actually be relevant to the Grand
19 Jury's inquiry, upon which my clients could not invoke
20 their federal, their state, or constitutional rights, and
21 their statutory rights, and I think absence of proffer
22 that there is such a subject that you would agree with
23 that is not incriminating.

24 Eleven people should not be essentially frogmarched
25 in front of the cameras and the Grand Jury to be forced to

1 invoke their rights, and I echo Mr. Dillon's concerns
2 about publicity, you know, we're not use to that. We are
3 federal prosecutors, there is Grand Jury secrecy. We
4 don't have that here, but the damage is being done and has
5 already been done to all of my 11 clients, and I assume to
6 Senator Jones, is affected, and it's only going to be
7 exacerbated.

8 I mean the threats that they're getting, the hate
9 mail that they're getting, the hate e-mails they're
10 getting here, Your Honor, for doing, in our view nothing
11 wrong. They are caught up in ambiguous circumstances,
12 which gives them the right under the Supreme Court
13 precedent to invoke their privileges.

14 THE COURT: We're not going to get into whether they
15 should be surprised or not that they have become the
16 subject of negative attention, based on the decisions
17 they've made, but I'm wondering. You have now tried to
18 put your arm around Mr. Dillon's client, who is in an
19 actively contested election. I am not aware of any of
20 your clients being in that position as well, but again, I
21 don't recognize all of their names.

22 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, Mr. Still, Mr. Sean
23 Still is a candidate for senate office, and in addition,
24 Mr. Schafer is the chairman of the GOP, and he is involved
25 in all of these, and many of these people are involved in

1 the electoral arm of the Georgia Republican Party for many
2 of these races, so while and I think the point is, Your
3 Honor, so while Mr. Jones is involved in his race, and Mr.
4 Still is involved in his race, a lot of these people are
5 involved in all of these races, and I think the point is,
6 Your Honor, AVA regulations with Georgia Professional
7 Responsibility Rules cite favorably with special
8 prosecutor rules.

9 They specifically say a target should not be put in a
10 Grand Jury unless they are immunized, and here you know
11 they can't be immunized because they're federal, and under
12 the statute you can't immunize against a federal, so here
13 the burden really should be on them to come forward with
14 some bucket, as you call it, that they can show we can't
15 invoke on it. If we can invoke on all of the buckets they
16 should not be dragged down here in front of the Grand
17 Jury, Your Honor.

18 THE COURT: Okay, do I need to check with Ms.
19 Debrorogh as well, or do you guys both have an agreement
20 that she will speak up if there's something she wants to
21 add?

22 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, you know Ms.
23 Deborrough. If she's got something to add she certainly
24 will, but I think I covered it.

25 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wakeford or Mr. Wade,
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1 talk to me a little bit about the last, second to last
2 point I heard from Ms. Pearson about an inability to
3 immunize because, of course, one ticket you can punch that
4 you may not want to punch for anyone, but you may for some
5 of the alternate electors whose sole connection or primary
6 connection to what you're investigating may be the
7 alternate elector situation, would be to let them know
8 that nothing you say during a Grand Jury can be used
9 against you.

10 If you put that in writing then you magically have
11 some compulsory powers, I do, that did not exist before,
12 but if there is not a way to provide sufficient protection
13 you may not have that, and I hadn't processed it the way
14 Ms. Pearson did. Anything you want to add on that? Mr.
15 Wade is shaking his head. As in you disagree or I don't
16 want to add to it?

17 ADA WADE: I vehemently disagree, and there was no
18 effort or attempt or even any indication that our position
19 would be to offer any type of immunity, if that is what
20 she's looking for.

21 THE COURT: I didn't hear Ms. Pearson looking for
22 anything. What I heard her say was that even if you
23 wanted to, and you're saying I don't want to, the scope of
24 the District Attorney's offices offer of immunity wouldn't
25 be sufficient in Ms. Pearson's mind to protect her clients

1 such that they could be compelled to testify, but we don't
2 need to work through that if that's nothing that the
3 District Attorney's office is looking at right now.

4 ADA WADE: Okay.

5 THE COURT: So then what do you see, and I guess, the
6 vision you have for moving forward with the Fifth
7 Amendment concerns, Mr. Wade, would be to have the kinds of
8 individualized discussions like we had yesterday, and like
9 you suggested you would have with counsel. I guess it
10 would be Ms. Pearson and Ms. Deborrough for theses 11,
11 Mr. Dillon and Ms. Clapp for Senator Jones to talk about
12 the buckets.

13 In no way would I be requiring that here are the 112
14 questions, here is a script, but it would be that these
15 are the categories that we want to explore, and then there
16 are the disagreements between your team and counsel for
17 the witness, then we might need to have a group
18 discussion.

19 ADA WADE: I think much like the process on last
20 evening, on the day of the witnesses testimony, have that
21 conversation. If we can agree upon the buckets, great.
22 If we can't, then Your Honor would be asked to get
23 involved. I don't think that having a conversation well
24 in advance of 11 people's testimony -- I don't think it's
25 fair. I think it puts the State at a disadvantage.

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1 THE COURT: No, I agree. I wasn't suggesting that
2 you had to map it out in a lot of detail or particularly,
3 far in advance, but more along the lines of what we talked
4 about yesterday.

5 ADA WADE: Yes, sir.

6 THE COURT: One more question for one or the two of
7 you. If target letter is not a reason to conclude that a
8 witness shouldn't appear in front of the Grand Jury, this
9 is a two-part question, is it not at least a reason for
10 that witness to have heightened concern, and if not, why
11 send it? What was the purpose of it?

12 If the purpose was to get them more concerned
13 shouldn't they be more concerned and say wait a minute?
14 I'm not going to answer these questions in front of a
15 Grand Jury. I might sit down with you and have a proffer
16 if it's protected, if it can be protected enough. I'm
17 trying to understand the thinking.

18 ADA WADE: Judge, to be transparent with the Court,
19 the discussions that took place with our side and Ms.
20 Pearson and Ms. Deborrough prior to a few of their clients
21 having voluntary interviews, the questions were what is
22 the status of my client at this point? We disclosed the
23 status of the client at that point - -

24 THE COURT: So it was responsive. It wasn't
25 proactive, it was reactive. You're asking - -

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1 ADA WADE: And we said to them at that time, if at
2 any point the status of your client were to change, we'll
3 disclose that as well, and we did that.

4 THE COURT: So that explains why, but then help me
5 think through what the consequences should be of that
6 elevation in status. I assume it wasn't a downgrade that
7 you've been downgraded from, we've actually already
8 indicted you and we've dismissed it, and now you're only
9 target. Why shouldn't there be the enhanced concern and
10 the beginning of the discussion that it may be that my
11 client is going to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment
12 rights here?

13 ADA WADE: And certainly this discussion, Judge, from
14 our perspective, is not an attempt to circumvent anyone's
15 rights in terms of a fifth amendment, so I think that what
16 comes up is exactly what we're doing.

17 THE COURT: Okay.

18 ADA WADE: It gives Ms. Pearson the right to stand
19 up and say this is not what we want, and it gives the
20 State the right to stand up and cite Lampl, they'll have
21 to come in and do that.

22 THE COURT: Lampl Bank of Nova Scotia. They need to
23 come in and assert it in front of the Grand Jury as
24 opposed to having a lawyer say or the witness, him or
25 herself, you know what? I'm thinking about it, I'm not

1 comfortable doing that. No matter what you ask me, I'm
2 going to invoke.

3 ADA WADE: Yes, sir.

4 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, may I respond briefly?

5 THE COURT: I was just about to ask you that, and
6 there you go.

7 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, that's not what Lampl
8 says, as you accurately pointed out. It says they can
9 subpoena people to a Grand Jury, and if that special Grand
10 Jury abuses its power, you'd better bring it up at the
11 time or there is nothing you can do about it later. We're
12 not going to suppress the evidence. We're not going to do
13 it, so it doesn't have anything to do with this Court's
14 authority, either under the quashal statute or the
15 supervisory ability of this Court to quash and otherwise
16 properly serve a subpoena.

17 We're not saying they can't subpoena us. We're
18 saying you could quash it, and we're asking you to. It's
19 clear, I don't think, Your Honor, that under these facts
20 it is sufficient to drag 11 people in here and then have
21 them figure out the buckets. I genuinely cannot think of
22 a single question or area of questioning that I would be
23 comfortable allowing them to ask my clients including
24 their names, under these circumstances, and they shouldn't
25 be dragged down here from far away places of the State

1 just to be told, you know, either by you or us coming to
2 you for 11 witnesses, however many times that they are not
3 going to answer the questions.

4 They should have to come forward with at least a
5 bucket list, so to speak, that Your Honor approves before
6 they are dragged down here. That is not too much to ask,
7 and if it can't be done before their appearances next
8 week, then you can quash them and we can revisit it, and
9 we can set them for a different time, but they should not
10 be dragged down here and put on public display for doing,
11 in our view, nothing wrong, but their own ambiguous
12 circumstances being forced to invoke their rights, and
13 it's just not appropriate under the Ethical Standards
14 under the Georgia Professional Standards - -

15 THE COURT: But if they did nothing wrong, why aren't
16 they talking to the Grand Jury?

17 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Because she's called them targets.
18 I mean, Your Honor, we've outlined in our motion why we
19 don't even think there's jurisdiction here, why the law
20 protects what they did, but as you know the Supreme Court
21 has made clear that the main purpose, one of the main
22 purposes of the Fifth Amendment is to protect innocent
23 people who can be bound up in ambiguous circumstances, and
24 I don't think but you're going to find, at least the cases
25 that I've never been in where ambiguous circumstances are

1 more ambiguous and politicized and fraught than this, and
2 so, you know, that is why - -

3 THE COURT: I don't know that politicized makes it
4 ambiguous, but you're using the word ambiguous, and I'll
5 let you use that word.

6 ATTORNEY PEARSON: We certainly have different views
7 of the facts in the law, Your Honor.

8 THE COURT: There are entirely different views of
9 certain facts and non facts, I hear you on that, but I
10 don't know if that makes it ambiguous, but I hear you, and
11 I am mindful of an inconvenience factor, if in the end the
12 product of the exercise is to have a witness say I assert
13 the Fifth, and that's it.

14 Hopefully, folks will exercise discretion, but I
15 don't think there is, other than some rules that apply
16 more in a Federal setting where the word target means
17 something different, not entirely different, not entirely
18 different. I wasn't able to find any legal precedent that
19 says it was improper that the Court should have barred the
20 investigating body from requiring someone to come in and
21 in their face saying I'm not answering any questions. I'm
22 not even going to tell you my name. That may actually be
23 something that the Grand Jury may want to know, that this
24 person won't even give her name under oath. That could be
25 instructive to what the Grand Jury is doing, but they

1 wouldn't know that if they never met the person.

2 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Well, given that they're not
3 supposed to draw any negative inference from an
4 invocation I wouldn't think that would be evidence, but
5 even if it were, I think the reason you can't find any
6 precedence is because in the Federal system, and then the
7 State system doesn't do Grand Jury work very often, and
8 then the Federal system they don't do this. .

9 They don't bring targets in and try to force them to
10 testify because they recognize it's unethical, as the AVA
11 has said and as the Georgia Professional Rules have
12 outlined, and we would ask that at a minimum, Your Honor,
13 that you ask them proffer the buckets to you or to us
14 before our people are brought in.

15 THE COURT: Fair request. I appreciate that.

16 ADA WAKEFORD: Your Honor, may I address one point?

17 THE COURT: Hold on. Mr. Dillon, if you're going to
18 talk more about disqualification, not yet. If it's the
19 Fifth Amendment you've been patient, so I'm happy to hear
20 from Senator Jones' perspective.

21 ATTORNEY DILLON: Keeping quiet my mouth quiet in
22 this whole disqualification thing - -

23 THE COURT: But go ahead.

24 ATTORNEY DILLON: Trust me. I call the Court's
25 attention to the Georgia Code, that's 15-12-100. It's a

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1 procedure for a special Grand Jury and hours of that Grand
2 Jury, and under Subparagraph C it says, "while conducting
3 any investigation authorized by this part, investigative
4 grand juries may compel evidence and subpoena witnesses."
5 It may inspect records, documents, correspondence, and
6 books, blah, blah, blah , and it specifically excludes
7 subpoena targets, Your Honor, and these are the rules --

8 THE COURT: You mean it says you may not do that or?

9 ATTORNEY DILLON: No, it doesn't, but because it is
10 not included in the list, we all know the cannons of
11 constructing statutes. If there is a list and it's not
12 included in the list, it's excluded from the list, and
13 this is the provision under which this Grand Jury was
14 impaneled.

15 THE COURT: It didn't say subpoena tall people or
16 short people, it says witnesses.

17 ATTORNEY DILLON: It says witnesses.

18 THE COURT: You're saying a target is not a witness?

19 ATTORNEY DILLON: A target is a different category
20 than a witness, and the case law in the state of Georgia
21 says that because targets are discussed differently in the
22 Lampl case, and that's a good case to cite on. A target
23 is different than a witness, and this doesn't say subpoena
24 targets. It says subpoena witnesses.

25 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Wakeford.

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ADA WAKEFORD: Your Honor, I'll read directly from Lampl.

THE COURT: Lampl is getting a lot of attention. Am I right? Is it a Clayton County - - It was some sort of city counsel - -

ADA WAKEFORD: I think so, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Green-Cross is now nodding her head. She would know. She's the appellate expert. All right. Continue.

ADA WAKEFORD: "One who has not been so charged, meaning formally charged, in a formal charging instrument --

THE COURT: Which would be every single recipient of a subpoena so far?

ADA WAKEFORD: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

ADA WAKEFORD: -- may be compelled to appear before a Grand Jury that he retains the option during his appearance of invoking his privilege against self-incrimination and refusing to testify regarding the incriminating matters, this is true even if the witness is a target of the grand jury's investigation."

THE COURT: So Mr. Dillon stood up first, and he's freshest from saying ha ha, take Lampl that way, State. So did he skip a sentence? That's a pretty powerful

1 sentence, Mr. Dillon.

2 ATTORNEY DILLON: A very powerful sentence, and with
3 regard to regular grand juries, I have no doubt that the
4 District Attorney might, but the statute under which the
5 subpoena is issued in this case properly is not that the
6 ordinary Grand Jury, nor the special grand jury, and it's
7 under this chapter in the Georgia code, and the rules are
8 different.

9 THE COURT: So your argument is that a regular Grand
10 Jury that could indict and would target -- Lampl says you
11 can call that person in front of a that Grand Jury who has
12 the ability to indict Lample, and they can invoke his
13 Fifth from which they need to draw no adverse inference,
14 but a special purpose Grand Jury which can indict no one
15 or anything, they can't subpoena a target because they use
16 the word witness instead of target?

17 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor.

18 THE COURT: Is the word target used in the
19 non-special purpose Grand Jury statute, or is the word
20 witness used?

21 ATTORNEY DILLON: Interesting question, Your Honor,
22 but I do note that the subpoena is - -

23 THE COURT: What's the answer?

24 ATTORNEY DILLON: I don't know, but I do note that
25 the statute under which the subpoenas were supposed to be

1 issued in this case is under Title 15, but the subpoena is
2 actually rolled out under the provision of the Georgia
3 code that is not under Title 15, and they were, in fact,
4 technically, improper subpoenas because they were issued
5 under the normal statute and not under this chapter.

6 THE COURT: So I guess we could republish them and
7 resign them if that is the - -

8 ATTORNEY DILLON: Exactly, and then recognize that
9 this rule applies, but not the Lampl rule that we're
10 citing here.

11 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, we would take a
12 slightly different differentiation of Lampl - -

13 THE COURT: A third reading.

14 ATTORNEY PEARSON: It's actually the same read, and
15 that is the sentence that he read is (unintelligible) What
16 the the Supreme Court is saying in Lampl, we have an
17 individual who didn't take his Fifth in the Grand Jury,
18 the special purpose grand jury, the special purpose Grand
19 Jury used its authority to have a conveyer who was later
20 indicted in an improper Grand Jury.

21 I'm not suggesting they were improper, but a
22 different regular Grand jury, and then he tried to get
23 evidence suppressed from the special Grand Jury. This is
24 not about whether they can compel people. We're not
25 disputing they can issue the subpoenas, everybody says

1 they can. That is the only thing Lample even arguably
2 says. The only issue then is you get to quash them if you
3 want to.

4 If you believe that you should, and there's nothing
5 that says your authority under the statute, or under
6 supervisory authority is in any way affected by Lampl at
7 all whatsoever, so you clearly have the authority to do
8 what you think is proper with this Grand Jury here, and
9 we're asking you, on behalf of our clients, not to have
10 them frogmarched in front of a cameras and in this
11 courtroom.

12 THE COURT: Okay.

13 ADA WAKEFORD: At this point I was going to address
14 the original point I was going to make, which is I believe
15 we've heard the phrase "frog marched" in front of the
16 cameras three times now.

17 THE COURT: All right.

18 ADA WAKEFORD: I do not want to talk about this, but
19 I have to at this point. Publicity is a hindrance to the
20 special purpose Grand Jury's work. I believe earlier
21 Ms. Pearson stated that there may have been a witness in
22 here yesterday, but she didn't know who it was or how they
23 appeared, or what they had talked about, which is an
24 indication that the witnesses can come before the special
25 purpose Grand Jury, and no one ever know anything about

1 it. If witnesses exercise their First Amendment right to
2 disclose after the fact or before the fact they were
3 called, then they are allowed to do that. That is the
4 source of publicity around this. It is, I think here we
5 are tired of hearing that there is publicity jammed up by
6 the District Attorney's Office in order to create a circus
7 around this when we have actually taken pains to try to
8 create an environment of circus around this, so there is
9 no frogmarching, and there are ways to come before the
10 special purpose Grand Jury without publicity being brought
11 into it. I just wanted to clarify it right after the
12 third time we heard that phrase.

13 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I appreciate much of what
14 you said. I think it's a little rich to suggest that any
15 particular side that has avoided the cameras. One need
16 look only at basically any major news outlet, and you will
17 see who is talking to the media, and it is not always the
18 lawyers for the witnesses, so I think everyone involved in
19 this has taken full advantage of media coverage.

20 That said, they're are some things that can be done,
21 I know, because I've been asked to be involved with it to
22 ensure that witnesses can enter into the building and
23 leave the building without much harassment from the media,
24 and we can get to do that.

25 I don't know that there are many of Ms. Pearson's
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1 clients that the media would even recognize when they
2 walked up the front steps of the courthouse if that's how
3 they came in, so I think the concern about putting people
4 on public display is a bit exaggerated for most of her
5 clients, but if there are clients who need special
6 accommodations and ingress and egress we can always
7 accommodate them, we've done it before and can do it
8 again. Anything more from the District Attorney's office
9 on the fifth Amendment concerns raised in Ms. Pearson and
10 Mr. Deborrough's motion as expanded by Mr. Dillon?

11 ADA WAKEFORD: No, your Honor. We have responded to
12 your questions, and we have proposed a method going
13 forward, and we have nothing else to add.

14 THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. Ms. Pearson or Ms.
15 Deborrough, anything else on behalf of your 11 clients in
16 connection with the quashal of the requests, in other
17 words the Fifth Amendment concerns?

18 ATTORNEY PEARSON: I think that's it, Your Honor.

19 THE COURT: Mr. Dillon, anything more on the Fifth
20 Amendment aspects?

21 ATTORNEY DILLON: No, Your Honor, we've got the
22 motion as communicated earlier.

23 THE COURT: Okay. Thank You. So I will not be
24 quashing any of the subpoenas, but I will be asking -- we
25 may need to change some of the timelines. How many of

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1 your 11 are coming all at once? Are all 11 supposed to
2 come out the same day or are they spread out, Ms. Pearson?

3 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, we have -- they are
4 all coming on the 26th, 27th, and the 28th, so that's 3,
5 4, 5. I allocated over the states maybe 9 exactly.

6 THE COURT: The process is going to take longer
7 because what will happen, I suspect it will become more
8 regularized and streamlined after the first few of your
9 witnesses, but what will need to happen is that your
10 witness, and you Ms. Pearson and Ms. Deborroughs, if she
11 clears quarantine she can be here too. She can appear
12 virtually, however we need to make it work, however we can
13 make it work.

14 We'll need to sit down, and it may just be lawyers at
15 first, so you can have your client wherever you want them
16 to be, as long as he or she is in the building, and
17 you're going to have that bucket conversation and see
18 where there is agreement or disagreement, and you've made
19 very clear that you can't think of anything, not even
20 astrological signs because somehow that would be tied to
21 something, or it would be irrelevant, but that
22 conversation needs to happen so that that we can, lawyers
23 and I can have a conversation about is it really a
24 complete impasse, of I may make the ruling, and you can
25 challenge it in whatever way you want, that the witnesses

1 will need to go in front of the Grand Jury to answer name,
2 rank, and serial number and then the rest will be Fifth
3 Amendment.

4 It helps the District Attorney's office has 12
5 because they know basically that they're going to ask one
6 question beyond name, rank, and serial number, if I get
7 folks passed that because there is not an area that can be
8 explored that I don't think is unprotected by the Fifth
9 Amendment.

10 ADA WADE: One thing I believe, Judge, from our side
11 that is noteworthy, is the very thing that the District
12 Attorney's office has fought so hard to do, was keep our
13 witnesses secret and out of the public eye. What Ms.
14 Pearson just did was, she gave the dates that her clients
15 were coming in here, that's the exact thing she's
16 complaining about. She gave - -

17 THE COURT: Well, before we draw more attention to
18 this, I did not hear Ms. Pearson say Steve Jones is coming
19 in on this day. She divided it over days and did not
20 identify people, and I mentioned, if there is a concern
21 about letting someone in the building discreetly, we can
22 address that and get someone in the building discreetly.

23 Most of these folks who walk, as long as they are
24 wearing normal clothes, they can walk right in the
25 courthouse, and those cameras that seem to be glued to our

1 courthouse steps right now wouldn't even pivot on that, so
2 I think the concern is greater than it needs to be, but we
3 can accommodate it. I'm not going to ask someone to be
4 more specifically about who is going to be here when, I
5 just need to know if it's going to take a while for these
6 witnesses because there will be the conference before the
7 witness testifies. .

8 Testimony may be greatly reduced because of the
9 outcome of the conference may be that testimony is going
10 to be just as long as the District Attorney's Office had
11 forecast, but there's still this lawyer-to-lawyer
12 conference in advance, but that's how we're going to work
13 through it, and as I said, we may develop some guidelines.

14 A ruling I make with Witness One, isn't going to
15 apply to Witness Two insofar as she is similarly
16 situated. I don't believe all are similarly situated.
17 There's still the overlap. They are all alternate
18 electors, so there are certain commonalities, and I assume
19 that is why they all want to have you and Ms. Deborrough.
20 Similarly, they are all situated in this same situation,
21 but they are not clones, and so there may be areas that
22 are explorable with Witness One that are not explorable
23 with Witness Two, so I'm going to let the parties develop
24 the framework they want to use as we go forward.

25 I am here to assist when you reach an impasse, but I
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1 don't think it's appropriate under the case law Lampl and
2 others to quash the subpoenas, but it may be that these
3 witnesses have very, very, brief appearances in front of
4 the Grand Jury.

5 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, just so that I
6 understand. We aren't going to elaborate on it ahead of
7 time. We will collaborate when the first witnesses come
8 here or in between each witness? I mean, we've got 11
9 people to get through, so I guess I need some clarity on
10 how that's going to work for each witness.

11 THE COURT: So I invite early collaboration, but I
12 also understand that if the District Attorney's Office is
13 reluctant to get too specific too far in advance, so they
14 may buckle under the pressure of how long that would take
15 as well, and there may be some basic frameworks that they
16 want to share with you in advance, but if you're now
17 getting into the nuts and bolts that I get to stay out of.

18 I will get in the mix should an impasse be reached.
19 If that impasse is reached tomorrow, because you're
20 talking about a witness who is coming on an undisclosed
21 date next week, at an undisclosed location, then I could
22 talk with you all tomorrow, but it may well be that the
23 default is let's talk when you're witness is here.

24 That may mean you won't get to everything next week.
25 That was - - the reason why I was asking is that if they

1 are spread out you four weeks you - - they're all coming
2 in next week. I could see it being that what had been
3 scheduled for Thursday ends up being what was scheduled
4 for Tuesday, because you only got through two people on
5 Tuesday because of the confirming that doesn't occur until
6 Tuesday, so I'm not forcing an answer to your question,
7 what you develop with the District Attorney's Office.

8 ATTORNEY PEARSON: In light of that, Your Honor,
9 would the Court at all be amenable to to moving our grand
10 jurors, not quashing them but moving them to later so that
11 we can work this process out in advance?

12 THE COURT: So another really good question for you
13 to explore with the District Attorney's office, they may
14 think that's wise and necessary as well, and it may well
15 be that 6 of the 11 go next week because everything is
16 taking a little bit longer because we are being careful
17 about the concerns raised in your motion, but I have made
18 clear that other than checking on the welfare of the Grand
19 Jury, in other words they are not in session from 8 a.m.
20 to 10:00 p.m.

21 I don't micromanage who gets called it or when, but
22 I'll let you know that the District Attorney's office has
23 been flexible at having to move things if obstacles come
24 up.

25 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Well, we had asked for that, Your
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1 Honor, and they refused, that's why I brought that up, but
2 we'll talk to them about it.

3 THE COURT: Well, things are a lot less streamlined
4 than they were before, so you work through that.

5 All right. Let's talk about disqualification and
6 this process has moved up to the driver's seat on the DA's
7 side, and I think since Mr. Dillon got in about three
8 quarters of his argument in answering my simple question
9 of do you think it's moot or not, I want to give the DA's
10 office a chance to share some of their perspective about
11 it.

12 I think the word partisan gets thrown around a lot in
13 this and why they think disqualification doesn't fit or
14 how to manage what I think are some valid concerns that
15 Senator Jones has raised through counsel, but at a minimum
16 pretty clear appearance of conflict, if it's developed not
17 before the investigation started but in the midst of it.

18 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Thank you, your Honor. I
19 think Your Honor has used the phrase appearance of
20 impropriety. There is Mr. Dillon's use of the phrase
21 appearance impropriety or appearance of conflict, and the
22 first place the State is going to direct your attention to
23 is on the law cited in the responsive brief that
24 appearance of conflict is enough.

25 Under Georgia law, the disqualification of a
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1 prosecuting attorney or entity requires an actual
2 conflict, not speculative, not conjecture, but an actual
3 personal interest, and in this case would be the
4 investigation of the special purpose Grand Jury or the
5 prosecution potentially of Senator Jones.

6 So I think that while optics in this case may be
7 more front and center than in some others, optics doesn't
8 carry the day, it's an actual conflict, and there's just
9 nothing at all that suggests that there is the actual
10 personal interest on the behalf of the District Attorney.
11 I'll note that insofar as the motion target, special
12 prosecutor Wade, there is --

13 THE COURT: Oh, thank you for that. Pause on that.
14 Mr. Dillon, do you agree -- originally we were going to
15 talk about just disqualification and Ms. Deborrough, and
16 Ms. Pearson arrived on the scene about the Fifth
17 Amendment. My first question was meant to be that, do you
18 agree, Mr. Dillon, that Mr. Wade's purported donations,
19 and I'm not attributing anything to him, but it looks like
20 from the records that Mr. Wade gave \$2,000 to Mr. Bailey
21 when Mr. Bailey was running for Attorney General.

22 No donations of record or any public insofar as the
23 donations is the public because records are made of it, no
24 public donations in support of Charlie Bailey by Nathan
25 Wade since Charlie Bailey switched races, and is instead

1 trying to be Lieutenant Governor instead of Attorney
2 General; do you agree with that?

3 ATTORNEY DILLON: I agree with that, Your Honor.

4 THE COURT: Okay.

5 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: That was my whole paragraph.

6 THE COURT: You don't need to cover that, because
7 that was very persuasive.

8 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Thank you.

9 THE COURT: If that fact is true, I am focused very
10 much on the appearance of the District Attorney. Using
11 that title District Attorney Fani Willis, invites you and
12 encourages you to come to this fundraiser for the
13 political opponent of the target of my investigation.
14 That's what we need to navigate here, and I guess the
15 question is, if there's an actual conflict, is
16 disqualification mandatory or discretionary, and if it's
17 mandatory then does that mean that the appearance of
18 conflict still give the judge the discretion to fashion
19 some form of relief?

20 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Let me start with the last
21 question. No.

22 THE COURT: No?

23 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I don't think the Court has
24 the discretion law. While I want to give the Court as
25 much discretion as you want to have - -

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THE COURT: Only what it should have.

ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Yes. I don't think the law allows the Court to elevate the standard, what the legal standard is an actual conflict. I don't believe that the Court's discretion is broad enough to force a remedy for an appearance of conflict.

THE COURT: And examples of actual conflict that I saw in your pleading were somehow the prosecutor was able to be like a defense attorney at the same -- I mean it was these things where like what were you thinking? Yes, it was kind of crazy. I represent one co defendant and as the defense attorney in a criminal proceeding become the DA and the prosecute the co defendant.

THE COURT: okay.

ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: That makes no sense, and that is not the situation we've got here, but that is the kind of extreme example of what the law recognizes as an actual conflict for a prosecuting attorney, at one time I represented the victim in a case that is now before me in a divorce preceding who is now before me in a case.

It's that kind of really striking in your face and routine political support for a political ally. It just doesn't make it there. It doesn't go that far.

THE COURT: The routine -- I would interpret as Mr. Wade strokes a check for the candidate he wants to

1 support. Using the title of your office and having a
2 social media that you as this political office holder are
3 holding a fundraiser for the opponent of someone that this
4 political office is investigating. I don't know that it's
5 an actual conflict, but I use that phrase, "what were you
6 thinking," where the prosecutor thought I could prosecute
7 the codefendant of someone I defended.

8 It's a what are you thinking moment? The optics are
9 horrific. If you are trying to have the public believe
10 that this is a non-partition driven by the facts, and I'm
11 not here to critique decisions. The decision was made,
12 but If we are trying to maintain confidence that this
13 investigation is pursuing facts in a non-partisan sense,
14 no matter who the District Attorney is, we follow the
15 evidence where it goes and ignore that fact that I hosted
16 a fundraiser for the political opponent of someone I just
17 named a target.

18 That strikes me as problematic. Maybe not from an
19 actual conflict level, but if we are at a cocktail party
20 and people are asking do you think that this is a fair and
21 balanced approach to things, I do. Well, how do you
22 explain this?

23 I mean, how does one explain? I mean, that is the
24 concern I'm working through is that it is not a lowercase
25 A appearance, it is a capital A with flashy lights

1 fundraiser District Attorney for the political opponent of
2 someone I've named a target of my investigation, while I'm
3 a legal adviser of the Grand Jury, and I'm on national
4 medial almost nightly talking about this investigation
5 and That's problematic.

6 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Okay. Not accepting the
7 entirety of the Court's characterization of the series of
8 events. I'm going to explain it in a couple of ways.
9 First, it's still not a legal conflict. It's still not
10 anything within the Court's discretion to remedy in the
11 way that Mr. Dillon has advocated on behalf of Senator
12 Jones. As a legal matter, everybody can talk at cocktail
13 parties all they want and watch the cable news station of
14 their choosing, but no matter what it still doesn't amount
15 to a legal conflict under Georgia law.

16 Second, I want to direct the Court's attention to the
17 absolute lack of any evidence to the case that any action
18 taken during the course of the investigation has been
19 politically motivated at all. As the Court made
20 reference, and maybe I'm paraphrasing, but it's the Grand
21 Jury's duty to Senator Jones, not the District Attorney's
22 office.

23 The District Attorney is the legal adviser of the
24 special purpose Grand Jury, and may well have an
25 investigation of their own, but Senator Jones is trying to

1 fight a subpoena to the special purpose Grand Jury, and it
2 was brought under their authority.

3 THE COURT: It was, and I think technically you are
4 correct. I wouldn't want anyone to be misled, that the
5 special purpose Grand Jury is the only -- meaning those
6 grand jurors are the only source of subpoenas that they
7 say to their legal adviser, where is what we'd like to see
8 next. That can happen, but what can also happen, and it
9 doesn't matter who it happened here because your point is
10 a good one, but I don't want people leaving here thinking
11 oh, it's only the special purpose Grand Jury that decides
12 to come in and. Equally so and perhaps most of the time
13 it's the District Attorney's team that says, here's who we
14 would like to have come before the special purpose Grand
15 Jury next. .

16 That subpoena comes through the Grand Jury maybe the
17 wrong statute under the subpoena, but it comes through the
18 Grand Jury, but the idea, motivation, and the decision is
19 from the District Attorney's office. I don't know how
20 Senator Jones' subpoena which channel from which it
21 flowed, I've got an inkling, but it doesn't matter. Your
22 point is a good one.

23 I don't know that it cures the concern about
24 political support for an opponent not having any bearing
25 on how focused or not the special purpose Grand Jury would

1 be on the person I'm supporting's political opponent before
2 November X, whenever the election is.

3 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I understand, and I didn't
4 mean to imply otherwise to the public in my report, but I
5 certainly understand the need to clarify that. The larger
6 point being though, I think in this posture is that,
7 Senator Jones is still in obligation to some action taken
8 during the investigation that is the Court's allegation of
9 a political motivation, and you just haven't seen it here.
10 The -- Yes, sir.

11 THE COURT: Mr. Dillon will get a chance to say more,
12 but part of his introductory remarks he emphasized a whole
13 lot then this target letter arise, like there was some
14 cause and effect. I am not familiar with the timeline and
15 you mentioned that my description of events may have
16 gotten some of the timeline, and I'm not anchored to any
17 particular timeline other than the correct one.

18 Hopefully, there is only one set of facts as to the
19 timeline. What was your reaction to the way Mr. Dillon
20 was painting -- it was almost a cause and effect timeline
21 that X happens and as a result of X support for Charlie
22 Bailey then Y happens, something that that in the public
23 eye would be negative to Senator Jones.

24 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I represent to the Court, and
25 I believe it's accurate that all of the target letters

1 went out at the same time.

2 THE COURT: Okay.

3 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: So it was not pegged to any
4 event that had any relevance of Lieutenant Governor's race
5 or any other political option was dictated by the terms
6 and the pace of that investigation.

7 THE COURT: So the 11 that Ms. Pearce and Ms.
8 Deborrough received were issued on the same day, and
9 effectively the same time as Senator Jones?

10 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Yes.

11 THE COURT: It is not Senator Jones got his on a
12 special day, and it was a broadcasted event, and then the
13 other 11 went out?

14 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: It was a routine issuance of
15 the change of status as Mr. Wade explained in an effort to
16 be transparent to everyone who had been working and
17 talking with the State.

18 The final point I think I kind of want to make is
19 that, as noted in the brief, we have partisan District
20 Attorneys and partisan elections for those offices, so it
21 should surprise exactly nobody elected District Attorney's
22 should have political affiliations with other individual
23 within the same political party, and I think the post case
24 -- I've got a copy for the Court if you are not familiar
25 with it and a copy for Mr. Dillon.

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THE COURT: Is there a cite?

ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: It is. 298 Georgia 241. It's a 2015 decision. It's post, P-O-S-T. I've got a copy that is highlighted. I'll hand Mr. Dillon the same copies that have been highlighted for the Court. May I approach, please?

THE COURT: Sure. Thank You.

ADA GREEN: On page 5 it is a reference. The case doesn't raise the issue of a prosecuting attorney who has been or sought disqualified by a defendant or target or a subject, or a witness in the case. It's an even higher stand to what a judicial recusal would be, and I think it's instructed as a lower standard -- I'm sorry, a lower burden and a higher standard for a recusal of Court, and in this case it was the situation where the District Attorney had been listed as a campaign official of a Superior Court judge's campaign at one time, and the Court in that case found -- well, that's beyond routine, it's beyond financial, it's beyond what we normally expect.

Although it even -- and so the Court concluded, You know what, when you got that allegation and the affidavit of recusal you should have sent that on. I'll note too though, that once it was sent on, the Court determined that that wasn't an actual (unintelligible), and it went right back, so I bring the language to the Court's

1 attention because it does draw a focus on these are the
2 things that happen when you have political affiliations
3 for elected offices. It's expected, it's normal, and
4 until or it shows some actual conflict then that is just
5 maybe the upside, maybe the downside, but that's a
6 consequence of the system that we have.

7 THE COURT: Okay.

8 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: One more final thing, and I
9 think this could streamline some of our other
10 conversations about remedy. The State is not interested
11 in any summer surprises. I couldn't source that October
12 deadline to anything. I'm unable to determine when that
13 is. I don't believe we have that here. It's especially
14 unlikely.

15 THE COURT: My understanding from speaking with the
16 Grand Jury directly. My supervisory role is that the
17 timeline is whatever the timeline is. There is no
18 deadline, they like to be done with this soon, but that is
19 only because they are giving much of their life to this
20 process, but they'll follow this process as it unfolds,
21 and as I intimated to Mr. Dillon and I'll make it clearer
22 when I wrap up the disqualification session that if the
23 work is completed such that it lands on or near the
24 election, it will state in the pleading and be in my
25 office until it gets disclosed after the election.

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1 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: You won't be hearing any
2 objection about that from the State.

3 THE COURT: I never I heard any requests to the
4 contrary. What I heard is we don't know when it will end.
5 When will it will be done, when we're done.

6 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I got a passed a note that's
7 going to clear up that timeline. The political event for
8 Mr. Bailey was June 14th, and the target letter was sent
9 to Senator Jones and the others in that July 5th, July 6th
10 timeline.

11 THE COURT: So three weeks later. All right. Mr.
12 Dillon or Ms. Clapp. I'm happy to hear what you want to
13 share. Don't repeat what you already said because I heard
14 that. I'd like you to start with Ms. Cross's focus, and
15 it is different. I'm very familiar with the judicial
16 requirements and the impact and affect of apparent
17 conflicts, and Ms. Cross's observation is the District
18 Attorney is not a judge.

19 This is true, but because of that the apparent
20 conflict may be an area of concern that we ought to talk
21 about, but that it would not require me to take any
22 remedial action, only if there were an actual conflict,
23 and even if it was an actual conflict, but I don't
24 disagree with you if you say there is an appearance of a
25 conflict. You don't need to try to convince me of that.

1 If that's not enough, legally, then we'll all agree
2 that there was an appearance of conflict, hopefully
3 something like that doesn't happen again between now and
4 the conclusion of this electoral cycle, but that is what I
5 need you to start with appearance verses actual and
6 anything else we need to cover that you already didn't.

7 ATTORNEY DILLON: Your Honor, if I may. My associate
8 has a power point, and we'd like to plug into the screen
9 if that is possible to the Court.

10 THE COURT: It is, Ms. Clapp is a part of this zoom
11 session, and you're able to share your screen. Is what
12 you're going to share something you shared with Ms. Cross
13 or is this brand new?

14 ATTORNEY DILLON: We have not shared this with Ms.
15 Cross.

16 THE COURT: It's not evidence?

17 ATTORNEY DILLON: It's not evidence, but we do have
18 some exhibits, Your Honor, we do have some evidence here
19 today.

20 THE COURT: Okay, if there is going to be evidence,
21 let's just make sure Ms. Cross gets a chance to see it
22 before we blast it on the screen.

23 ATTORNEY DILLON: Absolutely. oh, no. It won't be
24 blasted on the screen. It won't be published before --

25 THE COURT: Okay.

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1 ATTORNEY DILLON: As the initial point, Your Honor,
2 I'd like to point out that Senator Jones received his
3 Grand Jury subpoena in late May, and he was set for
4 testimony in late July.

5 We won't go into the date because we don't want to
6 create a bottle neck, but he was assured by the DA's
7 office that he was a witness in the case, and he was glad
8 to do his civic duty. We were trying to work out the
9 parameters for a voluntary interview to avoid the reptile
10 marching. I won't use that term. while I like it, I just
11 won't use it.

12 THE COURT: Simple, but what you are avoiding is
13 answering my question. My question was, appearance of
14 conflict verses actual conflict, what do you think the law
15 is, and where do you think this falls?

16 ATTORNEY DILLON: I think, based on my reading of the
17 law that controls in this area is that when there is a
18 public perception of a conflict, then there's an issue
19 that this Court has to look at, and the standard is the
20 standard that is layed out in the Young case, the Supreme
21 Court case that the DA cites in their response brief.

22 THE COURT: Young as in not old?

23 ATTORNEY DILLON: Young as in not old, and I don't
24 have the cite in front of me.

25 THE COURT: I'll get it.

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1 ATTORNEY DILLON: It's also in my brief.

2 THE COURT: Lampl.

3 ATTORNEY DILLON: Okay. The DA cites it for the
4 proposition that, "The standard of neutrality for
5 prosecutors is not necessarily astringent as those
6 applicable to judicial or quasi -- judicial offices," and
7 she is correct, direct quote from Young.

8 It is not astringent, and the Court goes on to say
9 that the different in treatment is relevant whether a
10 conflict is found, however, not to it's gravity once
11 identified. We may require a stronger showing for a
12 prosecutor that a judge in order to conclude that a
13 conflict of interest exists, but once we have drawn that
14 conclusion we have deemed the prosecutor subject to
15 influences that undermine confidence that a prosecution
16 can be conducted in a disinterested fashion.

17 If this is the case we can not have confidence that a
18 proceeding in which the officer plays the critical role of
19 preparing and presenting the case for the defendant's
20 guilt or hear the defendant's recommendation for a charge.

21 And so here is the Supreme Court saying that if the
22 confidence is undermined, if the Court is saying, what
23 were you thinking, then the decision is already made,
24 because if we have a what were you thinking factor that
25 even if they recommend discharge, and even if they died,

1 and if they go to trial, and even if they win the case,
2 which we submit will never happen, there it has occurred
3 in the Young case.

4 The bigger issue here is not whether or not they can
5 indict him for submitting a false document, they determine
6 the falsity of all the documents in this case. The issue
7 here is whether or not they can drag Senator Jones down by
8 literally releasing to the press that he's a target. This
9 guy get's \$32,000 dollars. This guy get's a publicly
10 disclose target letter.

11 THE COURT: You're going a little bit off the -- the
12 focus here is disqualification, and I'm not quite sure
13 what you are invoking from the press or who you think said
14 to the press that someone was a target, maybe other than
15 you or your client talking to the press, but that's not
16 what your motion was about. Your motion was about the
17 decision the District Attorney made to support someone in
18 her political party --

19 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor.

20 THE COURT: -- and how that may create, and it does
21 create the appearance of possible conflict, but is it an
22 actual conflict, and you are helping me process that maybe
23 an appearance would be enough, but that is what I need us
24 to focus on and not your theory that the District
25 Attorney's office is trying to affect someone's political

1 career as opposed to revelations about someones connection
2 to a series of events that are particularly controversial
3 in our society right now might prove problematic for that
4 political candidate. I can't help that part. Those were
5 choices that were made. That might elevate that candidate
6 in the eyes of some. They might not elevate that
7 candidate in the eyes of many.

8 ATTORNEY DILLON: It may, Your Honor, and with regard
9 to those facts, Senator Jones was willing to come in and
10 meet with the prosecutor and sit down and say these are
11 the facts of the case, under oath and maybe not under
12 oath, but then they received this carpet bombing of target
13 letters for everyone who signed the document, it is
14 suddenly 16 witnesses had the door slammed in their face
15 because they were told that they less friends of the
16 investigation or targets.

17 Can we go to the next slide? Mr. Jones received his
18 target letter on July 6th as the DA indicated. Contrary
19 to their motion where they indicated he was a potential
20 target, he was told he was What? Next slide. "You are
21 advised that you are "A target" of the Grand Jury." This
22 was on July 6th.

23 Next slide, please. On July the 12th, six days
24 after, I received this target letter, and I will say that
25 we consider this to be highly confidential, and the only

1 two people in the world that knew about the target letter
2 were me and the district Attorney's office. I get this
3 unsolicited e-mail from a reporter with --

4 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I'm sorry --

5 THE COURT: Stop.

6 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I'm sorry. This isn't a
7 document that I've seen before, so before we publish it,
8 Mr. Dillon can you --

9 THE COURT: Can you take that down, Ms. Clapp back to
10 the preceding page? And so, Mr. Dillon, you had assured
11 me that --

12 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, I did, Your Honor, and in my
13 zeal I got a little ahead of myself.

14 THE COURT: Well, be less zealous. Represent your
15 client, but let's not slap e-mails for which no foundation
16 has not been laid upon the screen. I thought you said, in
17 fact, I know you said don't worry, the actual exhibits I
18 won't put on the screen, they'll just be in my hands and
19 they won't be published.

20 ATTORNEY DILLON: I had a carefully drafted script,
21 and I lost it because we started in the middle of my
22 argument. May I approach and enter before the Court with
23 a copy.

24 THE COURT: You may.

25 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: If it's a copy of Defense
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1 Exhibit 2 then again, there's no foundation. I haven't
2 seen it before.

3 THE COURT: I'll take it. I won't necessarily make
4 it a part of the record --

5 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: That was a part of my request.

6 THE COURT: If we're going to have a discussion about
7 it, I need to be able to see it. Thank you.

8 ATTORNEY DILLON: It's an original and one.

9 THE COURT: All right. Any way. Your representation
10 is that you previously shared with me what happened in
11 your life, and in your life a reporter out of the blue
12 reached out to you and said hey, I heard that your client
13 is targeted in the District Attorney's investigation?

14 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor.

15 THE COURT: Well, the special Grand Jury's
16 investigation. Okay.

17 ATTORNEY DILLON: Three days later this same reporter
18 broke the story, and we won't publish that either. It's
19 not an exhibit, and it's on the internet, and we believe
20 the Court -- we'd love to publish the story.

21 THE COURT: You're free to do that, not through the
22 Court's zoom.

23 ATTORNEY DILLON: Okay. We'll hold off on that slide
24 for now, but I will represent to the Court three days
25 later this same reporter broke that everyone who signed on

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1 the alternate slate of electors and had received a target
2 letter including Senator Jones.

3 THE COURT: Assuming for a minute that is exactly how
4 that played out with you and Mr. Isokoff (sp.) where does
5 that get us actual conflict, apparent conflict -- I
6 understand where your client is very frustrated by that.
7 You suggest that, gosh, the only two people on the planet
8 who should know about it would be the District Attorney
9 and you.

10 Certainly, it's a whole lot more than that. We know
11 the District Attorney alone didn't, in fact, write all
12 these letters by herself. In fact, she didn't sign the
13 letters. It's on the screen right now. Mr. Wade did, so
14 the universe has just grown by 50%. It's three people.

15 ATTORNEY DILLON: Right.

16 THE COURT: So somehow -- let me finish. Somehow
17 word got out and the reporting universe knows about it
18 now, and it flows as an unwelcomed development for your
19 client. Actual conflict, appearance for conflict. I need
20 you to bend it back to what I need to work through, which
21 is should I take any remedial action to address an actual
22 conflict or the appearance of conflict, if I have the
23 authority, that's what we're working through and not the
24 trials and tribulations of Senator Jones because there was
25 a leak. Unless you've got proof that it was Charlie

1 Bailey who leaked it, and then now we have --
2 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor.
3 THE COURT: But we don't have that here.
4 ATTORNEY DILLON: I do not have that. No indication
5 that Mr. Bailey was involved. All I know is that this
6 organization knew and I knew, and of course my client
7 knew, and then six days later this internet reporter
8 knows, and then shortly after that there's an AJC story
9 about it. If we could I'd like to publish Exhibit 3,
10 which is a flyer for it.
11 THE COURT: That's in your pleading.
12 ATTORNEY DILLON: It is.
13 THE COURT: You may -- it's already public record.
14 Let me make sure the State can look at it, but if it's in
15 the pleading --
16 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: If it is what's in the
17 pleading then we don't have an objection to the
18 authenticity of it.
19 THE COURT: Okay.
20 ATTORNEY DILLON: May I approach, Your Honor.
21 THE COURT: I've got it on my screen. So we have
22 this fundraiser, and it's a blockbuster headlining Fani
23 Willis the District Attorney. In fine print you can see
24 where Mr. Bailey is, in fact, a candidate there, the font
25 is so small that I have to squint to see what it says.

1 This occurs about three weeks before the decision is made
2 to make my client target in this case.

3 The District Attorney, according to publicly
4 available records, which I have marked as Exhibit 4. This
5 particular document, Your Honor is from the public
6 campaign finance website here in Georgia, so this is
7 publicly available data. It shows during the day of and
8 during the day after this fundraiser \$32,000 made to the
9 office of Mr. Bailey. We submit is a direct result of
10 this fundraiser. I'm told that the custom is, often
11 people show up with a check or they give their regrets and
12 sent a check the next day. During this particular
13 month, Mr. Bailey raised over \$270,000 dollars.

14 THE COURT: So this was a particularly small
15 fundraiser for him?

16 ATTORNEY DILLON: This might have been a particularly
17 big one. This might have been the one that caused the
18 avalanche of checks to come in.

19 THE COURT: Could be for all those people who are
20 checking the ethics website to see what the cash flow
21 looking like for the first couple of weeks were, so I'll
22 put my money behind it.

23 ATTORNEY DILLON: This is the sort of headline
24 fundraiser that gets people to say, oh, we have a big
25 wheel. We have somebody who is on the nightly news, as

1 this Court knows, who is pulling for Charlie Bailey.

2 THE COURT: Okay.

3 ATTORNEY DILLON: One candidate in the Lieutenant
4 Governor's office or the Lieutenant Governor's race gets a
5 headliner, the other one, three weeks later gets a target
6 letter -- quietly get's a target letter. Now, there were
7 numerous news stories speculating about the existence of
8 target letters on or about the time of the Yahoo news
9 article, and there was a lot of buzz about that.

10 In fact, there was even an AJC story where DA Willis
11 was quoted as saying that numerous attorneys had received
12 target letters on their behalf. It didn't name Senator
13 Jones, fortunately. In fact, it wasn't publicly known
14 that Senator Jones received a target letter until the DA
15 filed their brief two days ago.

16 They were the first people to acknowledge he was a
17 target for this Grand Jury. We had never acknowledged
18 that. It was a mere speculation in the press, but it's
19 that sort of thing that gives the DA the the ability to
20 benefit their friends and harm somebody who is under
21 investigation, and that is really what we're talking
22 about.

23 The cases that the DA's point to in their motion from
24 1916 and 1936 are talking about transactions where the
25 financial transactions were \$150, and was that materially,

1 and while those are interesting cases, but once that \$150
2 was material in the depression, we were talking about
3 \$30,000 and we're talking about swaying an election, a
4 statewide election in Georgia, and that's a significant
5 thing.

6 This is not something that is being done by accident.
7 This is being done by design. This fundraiser was pointed
8 at benefiting Senator Jones --

9 THE COURT: Isn't that the purpose of the fundraiser.
10 I agree -- the point of -- the question is does the
11 District Attorney decision to support someone with whom
12 she is politically aligned, it surprises no one that they
13 are politically aligned. Does that rise to the level of
14 creating -- an appearance of -- , and I've opined on that
15 a little bit an actual conflict, and I understand because
16 you can't climb into someone's mind.

17 You have to do a little of this through the
18 shadowboxing of, okay -- there is a fundraiser and all of
19 this money came in, and then there was a target letter.
20 Do you have more of a connection of one who proceeded the
21 other?

22 ATTORNEY DILLON: As far as a direct connection?

23 THE COURT: Any connection.

24 ATTORNEY DILLON: What is out there in the press,
25 what is out there in the ether. A part of Senator Jones'

1 concern is that this report is going to come out in
2 October. I'm glad to hear there's no October surprise,
3 but there's been this whole series of drips, this whole
4 series of leaks out of the Fulton County DA's office that
5 have tilted benefit towards Mr. Bailey. It pointed to my
6 client as being a presumptive violator of the law, and
7 it's only because the DA has the authority to do that.

8 So if this Court were to determine that she has a
9 conflict, and this appearance is sufficient, and we go to
10 the Attorney General's office to appoint a new prosecutor
11 with regard to Senator Jones who could sit down with him
12 and say, Well, Senator Jones, we're interested in what
13 happened in December 2020, would you like to talk to us,
14 and just like we did on day one, with the DA's office?

15 Certainly, we would be glad to. Do we have a target
16 letter from your office? No, you do not, Senator Jones,
17 because we have useful information that would age your
18 investigation, because this is an investigation when it
19 was impaneled that was supposed to gather evidence to see
20 whether or not there was an effort to undermine democracy
21 in this country, and when Senator Jones said, I have a
22 subpoena here, I'm going to talk to these people we said,
23 fine. We prepared our rates, but then we've got this
24 target letter and then everything changed, just like it
25 did for these 11 clients.

1 So then where initially they indicated where they
2 wanted to gather evidence, now it appears that what they
3 really wanted to do is gather publicity, and they slammed
4 the door on all 16 witnesses who signed the document by
5 giving them target letters, and then they announced that
6 they're all bad people, and in essence they're going to
7 recommend their charges in this report, if and when it
8 comes to you desk.

9 THE COURT: So the DA's office doesn't write the
10 report, the Grand Jury does, just to repeat. You
11 mentioned something about the District Attorney's office
12 leaking this and leaking that. Supposition or evidence?

13 ATTORNEY DILLON: I certainly don't know that the
14 District Attorney's office talked to Yahoo News, but I
15 know that I was the only other person holding a copy of
16 that target letter on that day, and there are numerous
17 daily stories in the AJC, to quote learned sources from
18 inside the investigation are the people who are conducting
19 this special Grand Jury.

20 THE COURT: I'm focused on your client, and I'm
21 asking you to direct me to anything other than the
22 gentleman from Yahoo who said, I heard X about your client
23 being a target. has there been other outreach from the
24 media to you saying, I heard Y, I heard Z about Senator
25 Jones that you can source only to the District Attorney's

1 office as opposed to, hey, any witness who comes before
2 that Grand Jury is free to talk to the media afterwards if
3 he or she wants to.

4 ATTORNEY DILLON: That's absolutely correct, and as
5 you know, that's how the Grand Jury work.

6 THE COURT: Right.

7 ATTORNEY DILLON: You're supposed to operate in
8 secrecy, which is what was anticipated when this was
9 founded, but the witnesses are free to go talk, and some
10 of the witnesses probably do talk, but certainly Senator
11 Jones had an interest in the public not knowing that
12 Fulton County considered him a target, so he did not talk;
13 we know that.

14 The leak of the existence of this target letter and
15 subpoena actually, violate the the (unintelligible) of
16 ethics that the District Attorney operates under, and one
17 of the things that we have with regard to Exhibit 5 is the
18 ethics training that the DA's office gives from their
19 general counsel, Mr. Robert Smith, who is the general
20 counsel for the Prosecuting Attorney's Counsel of Georgia,
21 and with permission of the Court I'd like to mark this as
22 Exhibit 5.

23 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: No objection, Your Honor.

24 ATTORNEY DILLON: I think the District Attorney
25 offered me an affidavit from Mr. Smith earlier today, so I

1 think they rely on him as an expert in regard to ethics.

2 THE COURT: Okay.

3 ATTORNEY DILLON: And so at this time I would offer
4 Exhibit 5 into evidence and request to publish it.

5 THE COURT: Sure.

6 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Your Honor, I don't object to
7 the submission of the document -- I can't verify it's
8 authenticity. If Mr. Dillon is representing to the Court
9 the source of this information, where he got it, that it's
10 accurate, true, and complete, and that's probably going to
11 take care of my objection. I just can't look at it and
12 know that this is the presentation that Mr. Smith gave.

13 THE COURT: Right. It's too long for you to do that,
14 just in this setting. Any reason we should be concerned
15 that this has been altered in any way, or is anything
16 other than what Mr. Smith presented to this District
17 Attorney, but presumably all District Attorneys and their
18 processes?

19 ATTORNEY DILLON: My understanding is that this is
20 his presentation and he does it periodically and that he
21 would have done it during the time period that Ms. Willis
22 was the District Attorney here.

23 THE COURT: Okay.

24 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Can I ask for a representation
25 of where you obtained this copy?

1 ATTORNEY DILLON: This was pulled off of the
2 internet.

3 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Did you pull it from off of
4 the internet?

5 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, I did.

6 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Okay. Was it from the PAC
7 website?

8 ATTORNEY DILLON: You have to have access to the PAC
9 website to get it.

10 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: And I'm wondering how you got
11 it.

12 ATTORNEY DILLON: It's out there in the ethers.

13 THE COURT: He got it from Yahoo.

14 ATTORNEY DILLON: I got it from Yahoo.

15 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I want to kind of thank you
16 for your candor.

17 ATTORNEY DILLON: Would you like to present it to
18 your client? She would have attended this training, and
19 see if it's complete?

20 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I would like to preserve
21 publication of the document until I can ascertain whether
22 it is true, accurate, and complete, because I understand
23 that it has been sourced to the internet, and that is not
24 something that I can accept, this authentication.

25 THE COURT: Okay, so it's admitted. I'll take it,
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1 just don't put it on the screen. I want us to keep moving
2 forward.

3 ATTORNEY DILLON: Okay. We won't put it on the
4 screen, but it does quote the rules of professional
5 responsibility in Georgia, and so, I think those rules are
6 relevant here, and the fact that the District Attorney's
7 members and the District Attorney herself receives
8 training on this on and gets reminded on a periodic basis
9 of what their responsibilities are for the prosecutors is
10 relevant.

11 THE COURT: Okay. So are you going to be reminding
12 her now by reading it?

13 ATTORNEY DILLON: I would love to just read a few
14 snippets, if I may, Your Honor.

15 THE COURT: If they are truly snippets.

16 ATTORNEY DILLON: "The DA and Assistant DA's should
17 refrain from making extra judicial comments that have a
18 substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation
19 of the accused." That is rule 3.8.

20 THE COURT: This relates to your theory that there
21 was a leak that wasn't necessary -- one, we don't know
22 there was a leak. Two, the District Attorney herself who
23 is the focus of your concern because of the political
24 support she has from someone with whom she is politically
25 aligned, that she somehow has been behind the leak that, I

1 guess would have been behind the leak that your client is
2 a target, but there is no evidence of that.

3 ATTORNEY DILLON: There was no evidence that my
4 client was a client was a target until two days ago when
5 they said it in their reply brief, Your Honor.

6 THE COURT: Okay.

7 ATTORNEY DILLON: And that was not inadvertent. That
8 came directly from the mouth of the District Attorney's
9 office, and so we're not talking merely about this runoff.
10 We're talking about the fact that it is publicly confirmed
11 that Senator Jones is a target of this Grand Jury.

12 THE COURT: Okay.

13 ATTORNEY DILLON: Irrefutably.

14 THE COURT: So your focus is not on a theory that
15 would have got out but the confirmation, if you will, in
16 Ms. Cross's response to your response in your motion to
17 disqualify?

18 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor.

19 THE COURT: Okay. I'll let her talk about that.

20 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, I understand. That brings us
21 to the juncture that you pointed out where we began, which
22 is on one side, we have this headliner and they raised
23 \$32,000, and on the other side we have this target letter
24 that they publicly disclosed, and we have these series of
25 leaks to the press, and this is an effort to sway the

1 outcome of the election for Lieutenant Governor in this
2 case. It really has nothing to do with whether or not
3 they ultimately indict Senator Jones or the other group of
4 11, or anybody in this case, because once the publicity
5 machine has done it's business, the friends of the
6 District Attorney have won, and so that is really why
7 we're here, and so you ask, is there a real conflict here?
8 It couldn't be more.

9 THE COURT: Okay. Short of disqualification, what do
10 you view as a remedy? If I conclude that something needs
11 to be done, and I have the authority to do it, but I don't
12 think that it's practical or appropriate to say that the
13 entire District Attorney apparatus for Fulton County has
14 to unplug from any investigation, questioning of,
15 exploration of your client's connection to the
16 interference of the 2020 general election.

17 What do you see as an intermediate -- one would be
18 for me to say there is an apparent conflict, but I can't
19 do anything about that, because I can only handle actual
20 conflicts. Another would be to say either it's an actual
21 conflict, and I'm going to do something, or I'm going to
22 go out on a limb and do something even though it's only an
23 apparent conflict.

24 So if I'm going to do something, but it's not
25 disqualify the whole office, what is your second most

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preferable outcome?

ATTORNEY DILLON: Well, as the Court is aware, there are not numerous special Grand Juries of this magnitude to point to for precedent, so what we suggest in our brief is that the statutory provision that requires, once there's a conflict made apparent, that it be referred to Attorney General Carr's office and he find someone to conduct that portion of that here independent of this special Grand Jury, and it can be as simple as finding a District Attorney that doesn't have to find a good solid democratic District Attorney somewhere who doesn't have a conflict and give him the authority to pursue Senator Jones' issue in this, and we would be glad to sit down with him.

We would be glad to sit down with you. We would be glad to approach this with the same willingness to say let's get to the bottom of this issue and whether or not there was a conspiracy to undermine democracy in this country because that is an important issue, and let's put the media circus behind us. So let's answer the questions and forget it affecting this election for Lieutenant Governor, because there's no way she can keep a hand in it.

THE COURT: She being the District Attorney?

ATTORNEY DILLON: She being the District Attorney.
Forgive me, Your Honor, and not affect the outcome of this

1 election for Lieutenant Governor.

2 THE COURT: So if Attorney General Carr selected
3 fictional District Attorney X who had also given \$2,000 to
4 Charlie Bailey's campaign for Lieutenant Governor --

5 ATTORNEY DILLON: It would not be a problem at all.
6 It's an ordinary contribution, and it's exactly what
7 counsel points to. Now, if they had hosted a fundraiser
8 during the time period that they were investigating
9 Senator Jones, I might have to go to that judge and talk
10 about that fundraiser.

11 THE COURT: What if that District Attorney had
12 already hosted -- the District Attorney is not involved in
13 that investigation. She hosted a fundraiser two weeks
14 ago, \$50 grand or even more money than DA Willis, but it's
15 done. It's over and done with, and I'm not going to do
16 anymore fundraisers from here on out, because now I've
17 been tasked with seeing what connection, if any, Senator
18 Jones had to what was going on in November and December.

19 ATTORNEY DILLON: If every District Attorney in the
20 whole state had hosted a fundraiser for Mr. Bailey then
21 that issue might be apparent, but I suspect, giving the
22 list of good democratic District Attorneys in this state
23 that we can find somebody who doesn't have a conflict and
24 hasn't hosted a fundraiser for either one, because
25 certainly, if somebody that hosted a fundraiser for

1 Senator Jones, the Attorney General shouldn't nominate
2 that person either. Find somebody who doesn't have a dog
3 in the hunt. Fani Willis has a dog in this hunt.

4 THE COURT: Got it. Thank you, sir.

5 ATTORNEY DILLON: Thank you, Your Honor. Oh, can we
6 offer into evidence Exhibits now.

7 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Actually, I was going to ask
8 to leave it up.

9 THE COURT: Leave it up? Okay, don't take it down?
10 Too late. Thank you, Ms. Clapp.

11 ATTORNEY DILLON: Can we offer into evidence 1-5?

12 THE COURT: If there's no objection, 1-5. Was 5 the
13 one where the province was the internet?

14 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Yes. I was going to object to
15 the authenticity. I believe the foundation has been shown
16 for Exhibit NO. 5, we entered it into evidence so I didn't
17 object to the Court reviewing it, but I do object to it
18 being tendered and admitted.

19 THE COURT: Why don't we do this? I will take 1-5,
20 and then I will give Mr. Dillon to maybe shore up his
21 sourcing of it, and if, in fact, it is pretty clear that
22 Smith was the name of -- Mr. Smith's presentation then
23 I'll add to 5 the other 4. I'll hold on to it, but it
24 won't become part of the record until either Ms. Cross you
25 agree to talk to Mr. Dillon a little bit more and we see

1 the source, or we're substituting to you -- someone can
2 get it off the PACK site.

3 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I do want to raise objections
4 to some of the others, but if they're being tendered now
5 into evidence, Exhibit 1, the letter, I don't have any
6 objection to that.

7 THE COURT: Okay, 1 is admitted.

8 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Exhibit No. 2 is the e-mail
9 that I do have an objection to that being tendered and
10 accepted into evidence without any providence of it. I do
11 also object to the relevance of it. There's nothing in
12 this e-mail that sources any information to the District
13 Attorney's office insofar as this being offered to show
14 that the leaks are coming from this side of the table. I
15 object to the relevance of that, and I don't think it
16 shows that, and I object to the admission of it into
17 evidence.

18 THE COURT: Okay.

19 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: No. 3 is the fundraiser flyer
20 that is up on the screen now, and we don't have any
21 objection to that being tendered and admitted into
22 evidence. Exhibit No. 4. Again, I have an objection to
23 the relevance of this. I don't think it shows what, at
24 least what's been argued. It's been identified and
25 offered for the purpose of establishing how much money was

1 raised at the fundraiser, but what the actual document is
2 or appears to be, based on Mr. Dillon's representation,
3 and I don't have any reason to doubt it.

4 This is publicly available about how much money was
5 donated to Mr. Bailey campaign during a 2-day period in
6 this document to the fundraiser, and while I don't
7 think that is going, and because of that I don't think
8 that we have an objection to the ruling.

9 THE COURT: Okay, and then 5 is being conditionally
10 admitted, provisionally admitted. I'm assuming you can
11 clear up the source.

12 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Yes, sir.

13 THE COURT: All right. Anything you want to add, Mr.
14 Dillon?

15 ATTORNEY DILLON: No, Your Honor.

16 THE COURT: All right. I will admit Exhibits 1 and
17 3, and then 5 will be provisionally admitted. We'll see
18 if the loose ends can be tied up there. Last question,
19 Mr. Dillon, and I'll let you sit down. Beyond the Young
20 case, is there a case or are there cases you want me to
21 look at that stand for the proposition that the appearance
22 of a conflict could be sufficient for a Judge to take any
23 of the forms of remedial action that you are seeking?

24 ATTORNEY DILLON: Your Honor, I rely on the Davenport
25 case, and that is a Georgia case.

1 THE COURT: I don't see it in here. You're free to
2 rely on it. It didn't manage to make it's way into your
3 motion.

4 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: It was in mine. It's on page
5 4.

6 THE COURT: You guys share very well when it comes to
7 cases.

8 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: The Cite is 170 -- I'm' sorry,
9 it's 157 Georgia Appeals 704, if that's the case you're
10 referring to.

11 THE COURT: Okay. Do you agree, Ms. Cross, that that
12 discusses the Davenport actual vs. apparent conflicts.

13 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I didn't cite it for that
14 proposition, and that's not my recollection of discussion
15 in the case.

16 THE COURT: Okay. I'll look at it anyway.

17 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Yes, but don't -- yes.

18 ATTORNEY DILLON: Your Honor, I never did get clarity
19 on the basis for the objection to Exhibit 2, other than
20 she objected to it.

21 THE COURT: Relevance was one, and I think it was
22 foundation, although, the recipient, Mr. Dillon, I think
23 he could authenticate it as receiving it, but I'm not sure
24 the relevance you suppose that Mr. Isokoff(sp.) theorized
25 what he did because the District Attorney's office let him

1 know about it, as opposed to the witness from the Grand
2 Jury or the grand juror.

3 I don't know who's in the circle of discussing who is
4 going to be a target or not, but you've made your point.
5 I'm just not going to make it part of the record.

6 ATTORNEY DILLON: Okay, and with regard to Exhibit 4,
7 the financial fundraising report. We offer that as to Mr.
8 Bailey's take over the two days, the day of the fundraiser
9 and the day after, and we submit that it is relevant.

10 THE COURT: Okay. I thought it showed his take for
11 the whole month.

12 ATTORNEY DILLON: No, no, no, no. It's just a 2-day
13 period.

14 THE COURT: It is before and after the 14th?

15 ATTORNEY DILLON: It is the day of the 14th and the
16 day after.

17 THE COURT: And it is publicly available?

18 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, it is, Your Honor.

19 THE COURT: All right. I'll admit it.

20 ATTORNEY DILLON: That was Exhibit 4.

21 THE COURT: Yes.

22 ATTORNEY DILLON: May I offer a copy to the Court;
23 I'm not sure I did that, Your Honor.

24 THE COURT: What you want to make sure is that the
25 court reporter, ultimately, has them. I've got number 2

1 of -- here when we're done will do that. Just make sure
2 before you go that our court reporter has 1, 3, and 4, and
3 5 you're going to hold on to until you and Ms. Cross can
4 work out if you we're able to put more to the story to
5 that.

6 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor.

7 THE COURT: Ms. Cross, your closing thoughts about
8 disqualification.

9 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Very brief ones. Your Honor,
10 we're taking a look now at what has been admitted as Mr.
11 Jones, Exhibit 3. You'll notice that Mr. Jones is not Mr.
12 Bailey's opponent at this point in the Lieutenant
13 Governor's race.

14 If anybody's got a problem, or was the opponent of
15 Mr. Bailey at that time was Mr. Kwanzaa Hall because at
16 this point, Mr. Bailey was in a run off election, and he
17 was very clearly identified as District Attorney Willis
18 raising money for Mr. Bailey in the runoff fundraiser.

19 THE COURT: It's the largest font on the page. Even
20 larger than the District Attorney's name.

21 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I understand, insofar, as
22 we're talking about appearances. I think that shifts the
23 focus a little bit. The District Attorney isn't raising
24 money for the opponent of Senator Jones in giving this
25 fund raiser, this is prior to Mr. Bailey becoming the

1 actual Lieutenant Governor nominee for his party, so I
2 want to make that as clear as it can be.

3 THE COURT: When was the runoff election?

4 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Sometime after June.

5 THE COURT: Good.

6 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Someone with easier access to
7 google might be able to -- the last week of June.

8 THE COURT: Late June?

9 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Late June.

10 THE COURT: All right. Got it.

11 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Mr. Smith is going to be so
12 pleased, because he gets another mention. I shared with
13 Mr. Dillon an affidavit from Mr. Smith, who is actually
14 general counsel of the prosecuting of Georgia. May I
15 approach, Your Honor?

16 THE COURT: Yes.

17 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I've got an original for the
18 court reporter, but I'll hold onto that until it's been
19 tendered and amended. This is an affidavit, thank you,
20 that I shared with Mr. Dillon not long before the hearing
21 identifying that Mr. Smith is someone who deals with
22 conflict. He routinely advises District Attorney's as far
23 as general and other entities to the inquiry about the
24 legal requirements and that's the legal conflict for
25 individuals, prosecuting attorneys.

1 He's reviewed the motion, he's reviewed the response,
2 the motion of Senator Jones, including the runoff
3 fundraiser flyer that we're still looking at, and he
4 determined, in fact, in his opinion that it does not a
5 legal requirement.

6 I'm not suggesting that Mr. Smith's opinion
7 (undecipherable) the Court's, but insofar as the
8 individual who routinely advises district attorneys about
9 these matters, this is the individual who is saying that
10 there is not an actual conflict. There is also language
11 in their indicating, of course, that he does advise that
12 an actual conflict is required, as opposed to the
13 appearance of one, so we ask that State's Exhibit No. 1 be
14 admitted.

15 THE COURT: Any objection to State's 1 being
16 admitted, assuming Jones 5 ultimately get's admitted?

17 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor. I'm going to
18 object, subject to Jones 5 being admitted along with this.

19 THE COURT: Okay.

20 ATTORNEY DILLON: I have no reason to doubt the
21 authenticity of this, but Mr. Smith also trains them on an
22 ethical (unintelligible) and so we could be back here next
23 week with a motion for prosecutorial misconduct, which I
24 won't define, but the ethical rules also apply to the
25 District Attorney's office, and in the presentation that I

1 provided the Court, he lays out exactly the rules that DA
2 Willis' office has violated.

3 THE COURT: Okay. Sort out Exhibit 5 soon, so I can
4 put that alarm on it. I'm going to admit DA 1 or State's
5 1, but I'd love to see 5. It seems like it ought to come
6 in. I understand the State's concern.

7 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I think we can work that out.
8 There comes a time when the Court considers Senator Jones'
9 offer of Exhibit No. 5, Mr. Smith's presentation. I
10 believe at least the excerpt that Mr. Dillon read this
11 afternoon was a concern or admonishment, or flagging the
12 extra judicial statements of the District Attorney or
13 prosecuting entity.

14 You've heard no evidence this afternoon or to my
15 knowledge in the record anywhere that there has been any
16 extra judicial statement from the District Attorney's
17 office about Mr. Jones officer that has played a part in
18 this.

19 Insofar as the objection this afternoon came to the
20 identification, apparently, for the first time officially,
21 that Senator Jones has received a target letter, of course
22 that was in direct response in the motion to disqualify
23 that was file by Senator Jones on Friday. They raised in
24 that motion equal protection and due process claims. They
25 reference constitutional protections of the Federal and

1 State Constitution, and they are essentially saying, hey,
2 look what you're doing. You're investigating me, and
3 you're doing that only because I am a political opponent
4 of someone you like.

5 That is our whole point to you, that is the whole
6 thrust of this. Friends get rewarded and enemies get
7 punished. The fact of the matter is, and what the
8 District Attorneys represented in that was, no, You're
9 just like everybody else. You're treated exactly like
10 everybody else, similarly situated to you, received the
11 same treatment and you can't show otherwise, and for that
12 reason the legal standard hasn't been met, so I wanted to
13 clear that up too.

14 Otherwise, I'm happy to address any concern or
15 comment further from the Court that I think the motion --
16 the burden hasn't been satisfied. It is not a legal
17 conflict here and the motion should be denied after I
18 consult very briefly with my table.

19 THE COURT: Please consult. Can we take the screen
20 share down now?

21 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Yes, and apparently we can
22 withdraw our objection to Exhibit 5.

23 THE COURT: Great.

24 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: There's no need to go forward.

25 THE COURT: Great. So before you leave, Mr. Dillon,
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1 make sure a copy gets to our court reporter, but I'd like
2 a copy of 5 as well.

3 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I'm handing up the original of
4 the affidavit of Mr. Smith.

5 THE COURT: Thanks. Mr. Dillon?

6 ATTORNEY DILLON: Very briefly, Judge. Regarding to
7 the last point raised by the State.

8 THE COURT: Which was?

9 ATTORNEY DILLON: That it is perfectly okay to out
10 the target letter status of Senator Jones in their
11 pleading.

12 THE COURT: I didn't hear that it was perfectly
13 okay. It was an explanation for -- the hand was forced,
14 and because an argument was made or treated differently.
15 I didn't hear that it was perfectly okay. I heard that it
16 was a justification. You don't think it's justified
17 because?

18 ATTORNEY DILLON: I think they could have made that
19 argument under (unintelligible) and not further the
20 appearance that they're favoring Mr. Bailey in trying to
21 do what? Hold my client up to public ridicule and
22 increase his shame, and do the things that Mr. Smith's
23 presentation says they should never do.

24 THE COURT: Ms. Pearson, was there anything you
25 wanted to add. Your motion with Ms. Deborrough, the

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1 motion to quash and disqualify. I mean your focus was
2 quashal, and I get that, but you adopted Mr. Dillon and
3 Ms. Clapp's motion.

4 You've shared with me that Mr. Still is a political
5 candidate. I appreciate that Mr. Shaeffer is politically
6 prominent in the Republican party and you said that all of
7 your client's are active in one way or another. What's
8 the disqualification argument? They seem to be not in the
9 same category as Mr. Dillon's client.

10 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, I would agree that
11 Senator Jones has the most direct conflict. In our view
12 not to ask for more relief than the senator himself has
13 asked for, in our view that remedy is not sufficient to
14 address that conflict, and the conflict is exacerbated --
15 the evidence, by the politicization of our client's cases
16 and our client's processes.

17 THE COURT: Again, I'll have to have you explain what
18 you mean by politicization, given that it was your
19 client's were doing? What is politicization their
20 politicizing their activity, their political choices,
21 their connection to a political -- what's politicization
22 about it. other than talking about that which is
23 inherently political; I'm not following.

24 ATTORNEY PEARSON: I think it's a great distinction,
25 Your Honor. We're not talking about -- although we're

1 talking about political things, we're talking about
2 political motivation by one party against another party,
3 and to actions taken in one uniform direction against
4 republican candidates, prominent republican actors --

5 THE COURT: Was there a third group of alternate
6 democrat electors in case the democrat electors -- I'm not
7 aware that another group that the special purpose Grand
8 Jury should be investigating in connection with Republican
9 efforts to create republican alternate electors and to
10 challenge the outcome that, at that time, and continues to
11 show that a democrat won. I was going to press Ms. Cross,
12 but she didn't go there about partisan, because partisan
13 has lots of meanings.

14 I don't think that partisan, the case that she cited
15 was democrat and republican, it was I'm partisan because
16 I'm trying to get this guy prosecuted. I have a stake in
17 the outcome of this prosecution. That is not where her
18 argument went today, but everything about this is
19 inherently political, because two political parties
20 collided, someone appears who have won, and folks who
21 appear to have lost didn't like that outcome and said
22 appearances can be deceiving and took some steps, and the
23 question is where those steps legal, and that's the
24 purpose of this special purpose Grand Jury is
25 investigating, so it seems to me utterly unremarkable that

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1 your clients are all republicans. What would be
2 remarkable is if they weren't. What's the politicization
3 because I don't want to miss it if there's a reason to be
4 concerned, but you're not asking, I'd hope for, we have to
5 have a Republican District Attorney investigate this
6 because that's the only way it will be fair.

7 ATTORNEY PEARSON: No, not at all, Your Honor. I
8 think the process, well, I know Mr. Dillon's motion is
9 that the Attorney General would be allowed to designate
10 the replacement, and so we think that should be done,
11 because I think the appearance of impropriety with Senator
12 Jones taints the entirety as office of the entire
13 investigation, not just with regard to him as the remedy
14 for what I'm trying to say, but you are correct that our
15 focus was quashal, and that we are joining in that motion
16 as an add on.

17 I would also say, Your Honor, that just on behalf of
18 my clients, you asked if there is another slate that they
19 should be investigating, and I would argue under the
20 authorities that I put in our motion to the extent we were
21 contingent electors, and so were the democrats, because
22 there was a pending judicial challenge that made it joint.

23 And so, yes. The answer to your question is that
24 both electors were contingent about time contingent on the
25 judicial outcome which never came.

1 THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate that perspective, but
2 you did say you are seeking -- I'm paraphrasing you, more
3 relief or greater relief than Mr. Dillon was seeking, but
4 then I thought you ended it by saying we want what Mr.
5 Dillon recommended, which is push for his client, Senator
6 Jones situation to the Attorney General, and let the
7 Attorney General decide should I, the Attorney General,
8 find another District Attorney in her office to see if it
9 bares having a conversation with Senator Jones, or
10 investigating, or sending a letter, whatever they choose
11 to do. What's the difference between that and what you
12 think I ought to do in terms of disqualification and your
13 clients?

14 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, I think the
15 disqualification, if there is one, it is disqualification
16 to the entire investigation, and the disease cannot be
17 cabin to Senator Jones alone --

18 THE COURT: Okay.

19 ATTORNEY PEARSON: -- because it's still the special
20 Grand Jury being advised by this District Attorney, and
21 the report would still be advised by this District
22 Attorney, and so we don't believe that's a sufficient
23 cure, and that if there's a disqualification, it should be
24 from the entire investigation and not just from Senator
25 Jones.

1 THE COURT: I follow that, and I thank you so much.

2 ATTORNEY DILLON: Just as a suggestion, Judge, and my
3 learned counsel points to my own brief at page 6. The
4 Magloclin(sp.) case, Magloclin v. Payne indicates that
5 where the elected District Attorney is totally
6 disqualified from the case, everybody in the office is.
7 Here the special grand jury has two focuses.

8 One, the focus of the call between the president and
9 the Secretary of State's office, and perhaps other
10 officials that related to finding the votes. That's one
11 aspect of it, and then there's the other aspect of it that
12 could be carved off and sent to Mr. Carr's office to say,
13 let's find a new District Attorney who doesn't have a dog
14 in this hunt and do an investigation, do a proper
15 investigation.

16 They can still have this other aspect of it, but a
17 new District Attorney could come in and look at the
18 evidence.

19 THE COURT: So without agreeing that there are only
20 two aspects to what the special purpose Grand Jury is
21 investigating, your creative idea is if I determine that
22 there is going to be disqualification, it could be not as
23 to individuals, but as to subject matter, and so this
24 question of an alternate slate of electors, if that is
25 something that needs to be further investigated, create a

1 separate entity to do that, that's not supervised by this
2 District Attorney?

3 ATTORNEY DILLON: That's correct, Your Honor.

4 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. All right. I think
5 we've covered everything, but let me find out from Ms.
6 Cross, Mr. Wade, Mr. Wakeford. Anything else from the
7 District Attorney's office?

8 ADA WADE: Nothing, Judge. Thank you.

9 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Dillon or Ms. Clapp, anything
10 further from Senator Jone's legal team?

11 ATTORNEY DILLON: No, Your Honor.

12 THE COURT: Ms. Pearson, Ms. Deborrough, anything
13 else from your clients?

14 ATTORNEY PEARSON: No, Your Honor. Thank You.

15 THE COURT: All right. So we're clear, some things
16 I'll need to memorialize in writing. I am not quashing
17 the subpoenas. I'm repeating myself, but I will be
18 issuing an order, a written order on the question of
19 disqualification, and it will address, not just Mr.
20 Dillon's client, bur Ms. Pearson and Ms. Deboroughs'
21 clients as well.

22 I'll probably put in there a little bit about the
23 timing of the issuance of the report, but I want to make
24 it clear now in front of everyone what I've heard from the
25 District Attorney's office as well, there is no plan for a

1 date right now anyway. It's not available. If the way
2 the investigation flows, insofar as it stays with this
3 District Attorney's office and the special purpose Grand
4 Jury, that Grand Jury disgorges it's final report
5 somewhere near the election, it will not be published and
6 released until after the election.

7 I'll put that in writing as well, because from my
8 brief conversation with the grand jurors, just to check in
9 on their health and well being, they don't have that light
10 at the end of the tunnel, but things could change, and if
11 suddenly their work is done I will make sure that there is
12 a meaningful time buffer between release and election, and
13 it may well be that we need to publish the plan -- if it's
14 going to be released. If the report is going to be
15 released before the election we make sure when that
16 elected date is, so that if people have concerns or
17 objections we could file those and we could air that out
18 before the release.

19 I'd be shocked if there is a report before then. I'm
20 trying to prime interim report just for me from them on
21 how things are going. I don't know at all how they do
22 that, so we'll see how that goes. I appreciate everyone's
23 time, so with that you are all free to go.

24 (This matter has been adjourned.)

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Certificate

STATE OF GEORGIA)
COUNTY OF FULTON)

I, Hadassah J. David, official court reporter in and for the state of Georgia, do hereby certify that I did report and take down the foregoing pages on the 21th day of July 2022, that it is a true, accurate, and complete transcript of the proceedings transcribed herein to the best of my skill and ability. I further certify that the transcript is in conformity with the judicial counsel of georgia and the georgia board of court reporting. I hereby witness my hand and official seal this 15th day of August 2022.

/S/ HADASSAH J. DAVID, CCR

HADASSAH J. DAVID, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
#4857-8554-6837-1968
FULTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
HADASSAH J. DAVID, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

<p>ADA GREEN: [1] 51/7 ADA WADE: [15] 4/6 15/16 15/25 16/7 22/16 23/3 23/18 24/4 24/17 24/25 25/12 25/17 26/2 38/9 92/7 ADA WAKEFORD: [14] 12/4 12/9 13/18 14/19 15/2 29/15 30/25 31/5 31/9 31/14 31/16 34/12 34/17 36/10 ATTORNEY CLAPP: [1] 4/22 ATTORNEY DILLON: [93] 4/15 4/18 5/13 5/21 5/25 7/1 7/3 7/12 9/17 10/22 29/20 29/23 30/8 30/16 30/18 32/1 32/16 32/20 32/23 33/7 36/20 44/2 54/6 54/13 54/16 54/22 54/25 55/15 55/22 55/25 56/2 57/18 58/7 59/11 59/19 60/7 60/13 60/16 60/22 61/14 62/1 62/3 62/11 62/19 63/15 63/22 64/2 65/21 65/23 67/12 68/3 68/6 68/23 69/2 69/18 69/25 70/4 70/7 70/11 70/13 70/16 71/2 71/12 71/15 72/2 72/6 72/12 72/17 72/19 74/1 74/23 75/4 75/18 76/4 76/10 78/14 78/23 79/17 80/5 80/11 80/14 80/17 80/19 80/21 81/5 83/16 83/19 86/5 86/8 86/17 91/1 92/2 92/10 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: [53] 4/1 4/11 42/17 44/4 44/7 44/19 44/22 45/1 45/14 47/5 49/2 49/23 50/2 50/9 50/13 51/1 52/7 52/25 53/5 59/3 59/5</p>	<p>59/24 60/4 62/15 68/22 69/5 69/23 70/2 70/5 70/9 70/14 70/19 76/6 76/13 77/2 77/7 77/18 78/11 79/3 79/7 79/12 79/16 81/8 81/20 82/3 82/5 82/8 82/10 82/16 84/6 85/20 85/23 86/2 ATTORNEY PEARSON: [26] 5/4 5/7 17/21 18/7 18/12 18/24 20/21 21/21 26/3 26/6 27/16 28/5 29/1 33/10 33/13 36/17 37/2 40/4 41/7 41/24 87/9 87/23 89/6 90/13 90/18 92/13 THE COURT: [189] \$ \$150 [2] 64/25 65/1 \$2,000 [2] 43/20 75/3 \$270,000 [1] 63/13 \$30,000 [1] 65/3 \$32,000 [5] 9/23 10/5 57/9 63/8 72/23 \$50 [1] 75/14 / /S [1] 94/21 0 000024 [1] 2/3 00024 [2] 1/6 1/8 1 1-5 [3] 76/11 76/12 76/19 10 [1] 17/9 100 [1] 29/25 10:00 p.m [1] 41/20 11 [22] 2/11 4/25 11/21 13/5 13/20 14/15 18/5 18/13 20/5 23/10 23/24 26/20 27/2 36/15 37/1 37/1 40/8 41/15 50/7 50/13 66/25 73/4 112 [1] 23/13 12 [6] 14/16 14/17 15/12</p>	<p>15/16 16/7 38/4 12th [1] 58/23 14th [3] 53/8 80/14 80/15 15 [2] 33/1 33/3 15-12-100 [1] 29/25 157 [1] 79/9 15th [1] 94/16 16 [2] 58/14 67/4 170 [1] 79/8 1916 [1] 64/24 1936 [1] 64/24 1968 [2] 1/22 94/24 2 2-day [2] 78/5 80/12 2015 [1] 51/3 2020 [3] 15/15 66/13 73/16 2022 [3] 1/12 94/10 94/16 2022-Ex-000024 [1] 2/3 2022-EX-00024 [2] 1/6 1/8 21st of [1] 2/4 21th [1] 94/10 22 [8] 2/23 3/1 3/2 3/3 3/5 3/9 3/10 3/14 24 [2] 3/2 3/8 241 [1] 51/2 25 [1] 1/12 26th [1] 37/4 27th [1] 37/4 28th [1] 37/4 298 [1] 51/2 2:00 [1] 2/4 3 3.8 [1] 71/19 30303 [1] 1/12 4 4857 [1] 1/22 4857-8554-6837-1968 [1] 94/24 5 50 [2] 16/1 61/14 5th [1] 53/9</p>
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6th [3] 53/9 58/18 58/22	access [2] 70/8 82/6	77/7 77/21 78/10 78/10
7	accident [1] 65/6	78/17 81/10 83/14 83/16
704 [1] 79/9	accommodate [2] 36/7	83/16 83/18
8	39/3	admonishment [1] 84/11
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
Exhibit 12

Transcript of July 25, 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury Hearing before the Honorable Robert C.I. McBurney, Atlanta, Georgia, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA



IN RE:)
SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY)

) CASE NUMBER: 2022-EX-00024

2022-EX-00024

SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY MOTIONS TRANSCRIPT

Before the HONORABLE JUDGE ROBERT C.I MCBURNEY

on July 25, 2022, Atlanta, GA 30303

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE STATE: ADA NATHAN WADE

FOR THE STATE: ADA DONALD WAKEFORD

FOR THE STATE: ATTORNEY ANNA GREEN-CROSS

FOR SENATOR JONES: BILL DILLON & ANNA CLAPP

FOR THE JURORS: ATTORNEYS MS. PEARSON & MS. DEBORROUGH

HADASSAH J. DAVID, CVR, CCR

#4857 8554 6837 1968

CERTIFIED COURT REPORTER

SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

hadassah.david@fultoncountyga.gov

HADASSAH J. DAVID, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1 PROCEEDINGS

2 THE COURT: Good afternoon. Let's get on the record
3 in 2022-Ex-000024. This is a special purpose Grand Jury.
4 It is about 2:00 o'clock on the 21st of July, and we are
5 going to work through, this afternoon, a couple of motions
6 that have been filed. A motion filed on behalf of Senator
7 Jones seeking to disqualify the DA's office from handling
8 the case, the case that is Senator Jones and then a motion
9 to quash and disqualify, but to disqualify, I think, is
10 merely an adoption of Senator Jones' motion that was filed
11 on behalf of 11 of the -- for today we'll call them
12 alternate electors.

13 Those are the two motions I think we are covering.
14 The State has filed, the District Attorney's Office has
15 filed, an opposition to the motion to disqualify. I let
16 them know, because when I received the motion to quash
17 that they didn't need to file a written response motion
18 which is fine, and hopefully you will be able to address
19 it today. It's a lot of moving parts.

20 We've got a lot of lawyers here, so I want to make
21 sure we get on the record who is here and who will be
22 speaking for the different parties. Before we go any
23 further, though, Rule 22 wise. There were some media
24 outlets that only reached out today to get the green
25 light. If you were able to get equipment in here you are

1 free to use it, but I did not sign your Rule 22 today,
2 because the general Rule 22 is to be signed 24 hours in
3 advance, but you really only need the Rule 22 for purposes
4 of getting in the building with the big cameras, so if you
5 sought Rule 22 approval to record things while you're in
6 here and you've got a handheld device, you are welcome to
7 do that.

8 Going forward it's 24 hours in advance, and it would
9 really help if you could report back to your Rule 22
10 people, if you would designate more clearly on the Rule 22
11 forms what kind of equipment you want to bring in. I am
12 all for having a pool feed rather than four big cameras in
13 here. It gets a little crowded for you all, but I can't
14 tell because everyone who submits a Rule 22 checks
15 everything -- I want to bring in every kind of equipment
16 in. I'm bringing in a drone. I know you're not bringing
17 in a drone, but apparently for everyone bringing in the
18 big cameras we only need one, and like I said, I'm happy
19 to have a pool, but it's hard to tell.

20 With that, let's start with the State. Who will be
21 handling -- it can be more than one person, but I just
22 don't want to omit anyone if I'm looking to the District
23 Attorney's Office for answers or responses to concerns
24 raised by some of these witnesses. Who from the DA's
25 office or affiliated from the DA's office should I be

HADASSAH J. DAVID, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1 expected to hear from?

2 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Good afternoon, Your Honor,
3 I'm Anna Green-Cross. I'm here representing the District
4 Attorney's office on the motion to disqualify prosecutors.

5 THE COURT: So if I have questions about quashal or
6 assertion of Fifth Amendment rights?

7 ADA WADE: Good afternoon, Judge. I'm Nathan Wade,
8 special prosecutor from the District Attorney's office as
9 well as Donald Wakeford.

10 THE COURT: So Wade and Wakeford for Fifth Amendment
11 quashal and Green-Cross for the disqualification.

12 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Yes.

13 THE COURT: Okay, got it. Thank you. All right. If
14 we pivot over to potential witnesses and counsel, Mr.
15 Dillon, good morning. How are you?

16 ATTORNEY DILLON: Good afternoon. I'm fine, Judge.

17 THE COURT: You are representing Senator Jones. Is
18 there anyone else? I don't want to ignore anyone.

19 ATTORNEY DILLON: My associate Anna Clapp is also
20 here.

21 THE COURT: Great. Okay. Clapp as in applause or
22 Platt as in . . .

23 ATTORNEY CLAPP: Clapp as in applause, two P's.

24 THE COURT: Got it. Excellent, and then on behalf of
25 the 11 alternate electors, Ms. Pearson and Ms. Deborroughs

1 I see Ms. Deborroughs virtually. She is appearing in
2 Newnan or even further away, but we greenlighted that
3 virtual appearance. It's fine, and we've got Ms. Pearson
4 here.

5 ATTORNEY PEARSON: You do, Your Honor.

6 THE COURT: Okay. Anyone else on behalf of your
7 clients or just the two of you?

8 ATTORNEY PEARSON: No, Your Honor, just us.

9 THE COURT: All right. I want to start with a
10 question for either Mr. Dillon or Ms. Clapp, and that is
11 whether you are joining in the motion that Ms. Pearson
12 filed in which Fifth Amendment concerns are raised as
13 opposed to conflict issues?

14 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor. Insofar as Ms.
15 Pearson's motion, I believe at page 7. It raises the fact
16 that these witnesses who have received both subpoenas and
17 target letters should have their appearances waived. We
18 join in that portion of her motion.

19 THE COURT: What is the status of your client? I
20 know he's received the subpoena, that is the only part
21 that's been disclosed to me.

22 ATTORNEY DILLON: Well, in the government's response
23 to our motion, they actually point out that Senator Jones
24 received a target letter in this case.

25 THE COURT: Okay. Do you disagree with that or . . .

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1 ATTORNEY DILLON: No, I do not. It is an irrefutable
2 fact at this point. We publicly acknowledge that it is an
3 irrefutable fact.

4 THE COURT: Okay, so my thought is that we talk about
5 some of the Fifth Amendment concerns first because it may
6 make moot for practical purposes the conflict concerns
7 that you raise in your motion. Let me simplify my thought
8 process for you. If in the end I determine that Senator
9 Jones need not appear because of Fifth Amendment reasons,
10 I don't know we need to reach the question of
11 disqualification if that would be his only connection to
12 this grand jury.

13 This Grand Jury is not a Grand Jury that would be
14 voting on a bill of indictment. It is a Grand Jury that
15 has been tasked with generating a report that would
16 contain in it, ideally, a recommendation to the District
17 Attorney as to whether she should pursue charges or not
18 and what those charges might look like, and any other
19 things that that Grand Jury wants to put in there other
20 than a true bill.

21 So the way the Fifth Amendment analysis plays out is
22 that I conclude that Senator Jones doesn't need to appear,
23 if they state his name or something, and we can work
24 through those logistics probably in a smaller group
25 setting. Do you agree that we don't need to reach the

1 question of disqualification?

2 ATTORNEY DILLON: No, Your Honor. I do disagree.

3 THE COURT: Okay.

4 ATTORNEY DILLON: I think that the disqualification
5 issue is right, and I think that it has been exacerbated
6 by the media circus that's been generated out of the
7 Fulton County's DA's office in this case, and that the
8 harm to my client, Senator Jones, is that he's being drug
9 through the mud publicly as a subject of this special
10 Grand Jury.

11 THE COURT: Well, apparently as a target, not a
12 subject.

13 ATTORNEY DILLON: Well, I say a subject as someone
14 who has been affected by this special Grand Jury,
15 particularly as a target, but with the effort and focus
16 being that it's going to have an impact on the Lieutenant
17 Governor's race this fall. And so if the DA's office has
18 a hand in it and they issue a report that says, Well,
19 we're going to recommend an indictment of Senator Jones,
20 it will have a direct impact on the election in November,
21 and that's been reported in the media numerous times.

22 THE COURT: Okay. So I'll correct a couple of things
23 for you. One, and I may have misunderstood what you were
24 saying, but the District Attorney's Office is not offering
25 any report. That would come from the grand jurors as

1 supervised by me. I appreciate that the District Attorney
2 has fashioned herself as the legal adviser to the Grand
3 Jury, and that's an adaptation of the actual language of
4 the role that that office plays, but ultimately it's the
5 Grand Jury's report not the District Attorney's.

6 Second, and a concern we do need to cover today,
7 regardless of how we approach the disqualification piece
8 would be the timing of the release of the report. Now, I
9 think that's something that everyone ought to leave here
10 today with a better understanding of how that will be
11 managed.

12 That is within my purview, and it was helpful to have
13 it brought to my attention that timelines could collide,
14 that the Grand Jury might complete Its work in October,
15 and that might not be the best time for Its work product
16 to be shared publicly in the way that many investigative
17 agencies, that's what the Grand Jury is an effect here,
18 they hold off on taking certain steps until an election
19 has passed with a few exceptions, and we need to see
20 what's going on with that report, if it's even ready by
21 then.

22 The Grand Jury is authorized to continue its work
23 through May 1 of next year, so I don't know that it's
24 right yet to worry about that other than to get a general
25 understanding that I wouldn't be a big fan of an October

1 surprise, so if we talk about when reports would be
2 released and we work through a Fifth Amendment analysis,
3 if that Fifth Amendment analysis is, in light of a target
4 letter, et. cetera, Senator Jones probably doesn't need to
5 -- and it's not my analysis yet, but if the end result of
6 that is that Senator Jones does not need to appear before
7 the Grand Jury, that it strikes me that the
8 disqualification piece is moot.

9 I don't know from what the office would be
10 disqualified if Senator Jones isn't being asked to do
11 anything between now and the release of the report other
12 than the timing of the report, which doesn't necessarily
13 tie into who is investigating. If we were suddenly to
14 switch to the Lowndes County District Attorney's Office,
15 and they finished their work with the Grand Jury in
16 October, we'd be faced with that same chronological
17 challenge.

18 ATTORNEY DILLON: We would, Your Honor, with the
19 exception of the issue that has to do with the press, and
20 the issue that has to do with the public favoring of my
21 client's opponent for Lieutenant Governor, Charlie Bailey,
22 and the the District Attorney in this case has raised
23 \$32,000 for Charlie Bailey in the headliner that she
24 hosted for him in June. Shortly thereafter, she issued my
25 client a target letter and then shortly after that, in

1 fact, two days ago when they filed their brief, that was
2 the first time that it was publicly known that Senator
3 Jones was a target of this Grand Jury investigation, so on
4 one side we have a public target, and on the other side we
5 have a headliner fundraiser raising \$32,000, and we
6 contend that those two things create the appearance of
7 impropriety, that under the Rules of Ethics in the state
8 of Georgia this is prohibited conduct, and then with
9 regard to Senator Jones this investigation in Fulton
10 County should be complete at this point, that this
11 District Attorney's Office needs to be disqualified, and
12 perhaps some other district attorney can be appointed, and
13 in that case, Senator Jones would would be glad to
14 cooperate with that investigation, because he has
15 indicated and indicated early on that he was willing to
16 cooperate and give a statement and meet with their
17 investigators, and then two weeks later he gets a target
18 letter, and then six days after he gets that target
19 letter, and 'm getting ahead of myself.

20 THE COURT: Yes, you are. In fact, I'm going to cut
21 you off, because I simply wanted to know whether you
22 thought it was moot and you do not think it is.

23 ATTORNEY DILLON: I do not think it is, Your Honor.
24 I think it is right at this point.

25 THE COURT: Okay, and we may get to it. I was
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1 expecting a different answer, but I appreciate your
2 answer. I still think we need to start with the Fifth
3 Amendment concerns that were brought to a head in
4 Ms. Peterson's motion, but what I want to do is start with
5 the State on that because your perspective with the
6 District Attorney's Office on that, because your
7 perspective may help me better navigate what to do, and
8 for folks in the room here representatives of the District
9 Attorney's Office and a lawyer for another witness, that
10 witness and I have already had some basic discussions
11 about how we might work through the assertion of Fifth
12 Amendment privilege in certain context, and so we will
13 probably build on that.

14 So if I'm referring to what we talked about
15 yesterday, that is what I mean in connection with that
16 situation. Mr. Wade or Mr. Wakeford, what I would like to
17 hear from you on is is your overarching reaction to
18 Ms. Deborroughs and Ms. Pearson's motion as we discussed in
19 the past. I don't know that there is a blanket, I don't
20 have to answer any questions that would work here, but
21 insofar as their 11 client's sole connection to the
22 investigation is their participation in the alternate
23 electors scheme, and that was going to be the focus of
24 99 percent of your questions, if that is determined to be
25 in light of some of the target news that's been shared,

1 something that is protected that they don't need to
2 respond to. I'm not sure what the point would be in
3 bringing those folks in on a non-immunized status before
4 the Grand Jury, so help me work through that, please.

5 ADA WAKEFORD: Yes, Your Honor. I would begin by
6 pointing, Your Honor, to the case of State v. Lampl, that
7 is spelled L-A-M-P-L. Your Honor, may be aware of this
8 case.

9 THE COURT: Is that Clayton County -- yes?

10 ADA WAKEFORD: I believe, I'm not sure of the
11 jurisdiction that it began, but it speaks very poignantly
12 to this issue. Specifically what it says is, that "Under
13 Georgia law, the designation as a target without a formal
14 charge being leveled against an individual doesn't change
15 the ability to subpoena someone to appear before a special
16 purpose Grand Jury."

17 THE COURT: Fair point, and a footnote may have been
18 dropped somewhere with something that was provided, but
19 that was not my question. I don't think the word target
20 is as magical in State proceedings as it is in Federal
21 proceedings, but it certainly has caused the temperature
22 in the room to go up and antennas to go up everywhere, and
23 so whether you you call him target or you call him less of
24 a friend, we now have witnesses who are saying, "I'm not
25 comfortable answering those questions, I think I may be

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1 facing criminal liability."

2 In other words, I assert my Fifth Amendment privilege
3 or protection, whatever you want to call it, and that's
4 what Ms. Pearson and Ms. Deborrough have done on behalf of
5 their 11 clients, so my question isn't doesn't target mean
6 you can't go any further. You may want to think through
7 in the future labeling someone that and then hailing them
8 in because of how this is played out.

9 Let's just stick to the topics. If my sole
10 connection to the investigation that you are conducting
11 with this Grand Jury is that I was one of the people who
12 agreed or was nominated, or however it happened to be an
13 alternate elector, you're going to ask me about that, and
14 I have a good-faith basis to believe my decision to agree
15 to be an alternate elector exposes me to potential
16 criminal liability, why shouldn't I be able to say I'm not
17 answering any of those questions in the context of a Grand
18 Jury?

19 ADA WAKEFORD: I understand, Your Honor. Thank you
20 for the clarification. I would say that the 11
21 individuals identified in the motion are not all situated
22 in exactly the same place, so there may be commonality
23 between them, but there is going to need to be an
24 individual determination with regard to each of them. The
25 level of involvement is necessarily individual, so what I

1 think would work is for an individual assessment to be
2 made in each case, since we undoubtedly have the ability
3 under the law under Lampl to ask the witnesses to appear,
4 then there would be ahead of time a discussion between the
5 parties with Your Honor's involvement need be, to discuss
6 areas of inquiry that may lead to an identification of
7 Fifth Amendment rights.

8 If that is the case, I believe we would be able to
9 work out a procedure where there is not a badgering of a
10 witness, but simply an ability for the special purpose
11 Grand Jury to walk up to an area of inquiry and be told
12 this is going to be foreclosed by the Fifth Amendment and
13 move on if there are other areas to pursue, so each them
14 will require, I believe an individual assessment.

15 THE COURT: Are there any of the 11 - - I'm gonna
16 make it 12. I'm going to include Senator Jones in the
17 group, so any of those 12 where the only topic of interest
18 is that witness's participation in the alternate elector
19 scheme.

20 ADA WAKEFORD: The answer to that is no.

21 THE COURT: Every one of them - - it sounds like it's
22 a very diverse group, and one of the concerns Ms.
23 Deborrough and Ms. Pearson had brought up was that some of
24 them are remote, some of them have trouble with mobility,
25 but you are saying all of them have some other potential

1 connection to the investigation or area of interest to the
2 investigation.

3 ADA WAKEFORD: Standing in my place right now, Your
4 Honor, this is an investigative Grand Jury, so we're not
5 at the stage, you know approaching, say a trial, where I
6 can give a statement with the definiteness that you might
7 be seeking. What I can tell you is, right now, can I say
8 unless there's only one thing that we can connect one of
9 these people to, then no, Your Honor.

10 THE COURT: Okay, so just to flip it around to the
11 type of questions asked, you envision, or you and your
12 colleagues envision asking each of the 12, including
13 Senator Jones, questions beyond simply why did you decide
14 to be an alternate elector? Tell me more about that.
15 There are other aspects of the 2020 general election that
16 you would be asking each of the 12 about. Mr. Wade.

17 ADA WADE: Yes, sir, Judge. If I may, much like the
18 witness on yesterday, we have planned categories to touch,
19 and we understand per the Court's instruction, if we can
20 narrow down these buckets, ask the general question about
21 that particular bucket, let the witness assert, at that
22 point ask the witness if they plan to assert their Fifth
23 Amendment privilege to any question concerning that issue,
24 once they say yes, we move on.

25 THE COURT: Sure.

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1 ADA WADE: Not a barrage of like 50 questions where
2 they decide to assert, but just to be able to hit the
3 different buckets though and to answer the Court's
4 question directly, that, yes, sir, there are other areas
5 that we plan to attack.

6 THE COURT: There's more than one bucket for each of
7 the 12 - -

8 ADA WADE: Yes, sir.

9 THE COURT: -- Is what I'm hearing you say - - well,
10 then we would need to work through that. That helps, I
11 appreciate that, and I think there is ample case law,
12 state and federal, that authorizes witnesses who say up
13 front that I'm going to assert the Fifth Amendment to
14 still be called before the Grand Jury to then assert it.

15 Bank of Nova Scotia from the US Supreme Court is the
16 earliest one I found where you sometimes need to have
17 those people get in front of the Grand Jury to actually
18 invoke, because they might not when put in that situation,
19 and then the investigators are not forced to rely on a
20 claim that they will, or to your point, Mr. Wakeford and
21 Mr. Wade, there may be areas that come up that aren't
22 properly covered by that protection.

23 I know we've been bouncing around a lot, but I think
24 it makes sense for me to hear now from Ms. Pearson or Ms.
25 Deborrough about the approach you've taken, which is my

1 client shouldn't have to come in at all, and you may not
2 yet have been able to speak with Mr. Wade and his team to
3 know about these other buckets, to use his terms, but I
4 will just share with you in working with Mr. Wade and his
5 team yesterday and a different witness and lawyer, there
6 are other areas, they may be minor, but they're still
7 areas where even the lawyer agreed that my client doesn't
8 have the Fifth Amendment right not to say, this is my job.

9 I've had this job for 10 years, and then they move on
10 to what did you have to do with the electors scheme Fifth
11 Amendment, and then they stop. They don't go any further
12 with that topic, but to the District Attorney's offices
13 point it's a broad waterfront, and you have seized upon
14 maybe the big bright lighthouse, vis-a-vis your client's,
15 but there could be some (unintelligible) buildings at that
16 that lighthouse that it's appropriate for questions to be
17 asked and more importantly answered.

18 So tell me why you think that instead the answers
19 should be, and I mean you, go to the extreme, it's
20 quashed, they shouldn't even have to show up to give
21 (unintelligible)

22 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Correct, Your Honor. I think the
23 first place to start is, just to correct a few things or
24 to clarify a few things, from my understanding of what you
25 just said, all of my clients are identically situated from

1 a legal perspective. They were all witnesses, they were
2 all converted to targets, and there has been no
3 differentiation from the DA's office between that.

4 THE COURT: Let me interrupt you for a second. So,
5 you are saying all 11 of them have received target letters
6 or some communication from the District Attorney's Office
7 that uses the "T" word?

8 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Yes.

9 THE COURT: Whatever that may mean in the State
10 context, but just because two of your clients have, you
11 are saying they are similarly situated, it's just a matter
12 of time for the postman to get there.

13 ATTORNEY PEARSON: I have 11 target letters.

14 THE COURT: Okay. So in that way they are similarly
15 situated, but it sounds like they are, and you note it in
16 your own motion, they are also very differently situated.
17 You have, and I apologize if I have the title wrong, Mr.
18 Schaffer as the chair of the Republican Party in Georgia,
19 A very, very, different role in connection with the
20 affairs of election then. I don't remember who the
21 elderly individual difficulty with mobility and whatnot.
22 I've never heard of the person.

23 It is a differently situated individual once you get
24 outside of that lighthouse of, I was an alternate elector.

25 ATTORNEY PEARSON: That's true, Your Honor, but I
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1 don't know what situation you dealt with yesterday or what
2 that person's role was or who they were, but in my
3 client's situation I genuinely cannot think of a single
4 topic or question that they could be asked that would not
5 be either under the Fifth Amendment or a link in the
6 chain.

7 What's your name under these charges that they have
8 said they are going to do by signing your name, by saying
9 who you are, by putting your signature on something could
10 arguably be, as ridiculous as that sounds, an
11 incriminating fact, so I don't think my clients are
12 similarly situated to these other witnesses that you are
13 dealing with, anything they could be asked.

14 What's your name? That is incriminating. What's
15 your job? That could lead to other political links in the
16 chain, that could lead to e-mails where they talked about
17 various issues. It could lead to anything. I don't see
18 any topic that could actually be relevant to the Grand
19 Jury's inquiry, upon which my clients could not invoke
20 their federal, their state, or constitutional rights, and
21 their statutory rights, and I think absence of proffer
22 that there is such a subject that you would agree with
23 that is not incriminating.

24 Eleven people should not be essentially frogmarched
25 in front of the cameras and the Grand Jury to be forced to

1 invoke their rights, and I echo Mr. Dillon's concerns
2 about publicity, you know, we're not use to that. We are
3 federal prosecutors, there is Grand Jury secrecy. We
4 don't have that here, but the damage is being done and has
5 already been done to all of my 11 clients, and I assume to
6 Senator Jones, is affected, and it's only going to be
7 exacerbated.

8 I mean the threats that they're getting, the hate
9 mail that they're getting, the hate e-mails they're
10 getting here, Your Honor, for doing, in our view nothing
11 wrong. They are caught up in ambiguous circumstances,
12 which gives them the right under the Supreme Court
13 precedent to invoke their privileges.

14 THE COURT: We're not going to get into whether they
15 should be surprised or not that they have become the
16 subject of negative attention, based on the decisions
17 they've made, but I'm wondering. You have now tried to
18 put your arm around Mr. Dillon's client, who is in an
19 actively contested election. I am not aware of any of
20 your clients being in that position as well, but again, I
21 don't recognize all of their names.

22 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, Mr. Still, Mr. Sean
23 Still is a candidate for senate office, and in addition,
24 Mr. Schafer is the chairman of the GOP, and he is involved
25 in all of these, and many of these people are involved in

1 the electoral arm of the Georgia Republican Party for many
2 of these races, so while and I think the point is, Your
3 Honor, so while Mr. Jones is involved in his race, and Mr.
4 Still is involved in his race, a lot of these people are
5 involved in all of these races, and I think the point is,
6 Your Honor, AVA regulations with Georgia Professional
7 Responsibility Rules cite favorably with special
8 prosecutor rules.

9 They specifically say a target should not be put in a
10 Grand Jury unless they are immunized, and here you know
11 they can't be immunized because they're federal, and under
12 the statute you can't immunize against a federal, so here
13 the burden really should be on them to come forward with
14 some bucket, as you call it, that they can show we can't
15 invoke on it. If we can invoke on all of the buckets they
16 should not be dragged down here in front of the Grand
17 Jury, Your Honor.

18 THE COURT: Okay, do I need to check with Ms.
19 Debrorogh as well, or do you guys both have an agreement
20 that she will speak up if there's something she wants to
21 add?

22 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, you know Ms.
23 Deborrough. If she's got something to add she certainly
24 will, but I think I covered it.

25 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wakeford or Mr. Wade,
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1 talk to me a little bit about the last, second to last
2 point I heard from Ms. Pearson about an inability to
3 immunize because, of course, one ticket you can punch that
4 you may not want to punch for anyone, but you may for some
5 of the alternate electors whose sole connection or primary
6 connection to what you're investigating may be the
7 alternate elector situation, would be to let them know
8 that nothing you say during a Grand Jury can be used
9 against you.

10 If you put that in writing then you magically have
11 some compulsory powers, I do, that did not exist before,
12 but if there is not a way to provide sufficient protection
13 you may not have that, and I hadn't processed it the way
14 Ms. Pearson did. Anything you want to add on that? Mr.
15 Wade is shaking his head. As in you disagree or I don't
16 want to add to it?

17 ADA WADE: I vehemently disagree, and there was no
18 effort or attempt or even any indication that our position
19 would be to offer any type of immunity, if that is what
20 she's looking for.

21 THE COURT: I didn't hear Ms. Pearson looking for
22 anything. What I heard her say was that even if you
23 wanted to, and you're saying I don't want to, the scope of
24 the District Attorney's offices offer of immunity wouldn't
25 be sufficient in Ms. Pearson's mind to protect her clients

1 such that they could be compelled to testify, but we don't
2 need to work through that if that's nothing that the
3 District Attorney's office is looking at right now.

4 ADA WADE: Okay.

5 THE COURT: So then what do you see, and I guess, the
6 vision you have for moving forward with the Fifth
7 Amendment concerns, Mr. Wade, would be to have the kinds of
8 individualized discussions like we had yesterday, and like
9 you suggested you would have with counsel. I guess it
10 would be Ms. Pearson and Ms. Deborrough for theses 11,
11 Mr. Dillon and Ms. Clapp for Senator Jones to talk about
12 the buckets.

13 In no way would I be requiring that here are the 112
14 questions, here is a script, but it would be that these
15 are the categories that we want to explore, and then there
16 are the disagreements between your team and counsel for
17 the witness, then we might need to have a group
18 discussion.

19 ADA WADE: I think much like the process on last
20 evening, on the day of the witnesses testimony, have that
21 conversation. If we can agree upon the buckets, great.
22 If we can't, then Your Honor would be asked to get
23 involved. I don't think that having a conversation well
24 in advance of 11 people's testimony -- I don't think it's
25 fair. I think it puts the State at a disadvantage.

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1 THE COURT: No, I agree. I wasn't suggesting that
2 you had to map it out in a lot of detail or particularly,
3 far in advance, but more along the lines of what we talked
4 about yesterday.

5 ADA WADE: Yes, sir.

6 THE COURT: One more question for one or the two of
7 you. If target letter is not a reason to conclude that a
8 witness shouldn't appear in front of the Grand Jury, this
9 is a two-part question, is it not at least a reason for
10 that witness to have heightened concern, and if not, why
11 send it? What was the purpose of it?

12 If the purpose was to get them more concerned
13 shouldn't they be more concerned and say wait a minute?
14 I'm not going to answer these questions in front of a
15 Grand Jury. I might sit down with you and have a proffer
16 if it's protected, if it can be protected enough. I'm
17 trying to understand the thinking.

18 ADA WADE: Judge, to be transparent with the Court,
19 the discussions that took place with our side and Ms.
20 Pearson and Ms. Deborrough prior to a few of their clients
21 having voluntary interviews, the questions were what is
22 the status of my client at this point? We disclosed the
23 status of the client at that point - -

24 THE COURT: So it was responsive. It wasn't
25 proactive, it was reactive. You're asking - -

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1 ADA WADE: And we said to them at that time, if at
2 any point the status of your client were to change, we'll
3 disclose that as well, and we did that.

4 THE COURT: So that explains why, but then help me
5 think through what the consequences should be of that
6 elevation in status. I assume it wasn't a downgrade that
7 you've been downgraded from, we've actually already
8 indicted you and we've dismissed it, and now you're only
9 target. Why shouldn't there be the enhanced concern and
10 the beginning of the discussion that it may be that my
11 client is going to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment
12 rights here?

13 ADA WADE: And certainly this discussion, Judge, from
14 our perspective, is not an attempt to circumvent anyone's
15 rights in terms of a fifth amendment, so I think that what
16 comes up is exactly what we're doing.

17 THE COURT: Okay.

18 ADA WADE: It gives Ms. Pearson the right to stand
19 up and say this is not what we want, and it gives the
20 State the right to stand up and cite Lampl, they'll have
21 to come in and do that.

22 THE COURT: Lampl Bank of Nova Scotia. They need to
23 come in and assert it in front of the Grand Jury as
24 opposed to having a lawyer say or the witness, him or
25 herself, you know what? I'm thinking about it, I'm not

1 comfortable doing that. No matter what you ask me, I'm
2 going to invoke.

3 ADA WADE: Yes, sir.

4 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, may I respond briefly?

5 THE COURT: I was just about to ask you that, and
6 there you go.

7 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, that's not what Lampl
8 says, as you accurately pointed out. It says they can
9 subpoena people to a Grand Jury, and if that special Grand
10 Jury abuses its power, you'd better bring it up at the
11 time or there is nothing you can do about it later. We're
12 not going to suppress the evidence. We're not going to do
13 it, so it doesn't have anything to do with this Court's
14 authority, either under the quashal statute or the
15 supervisory ability of this Court to quash and otherwise
16 properly serve a subpoena.

17 We're not saying they can't subpoena us. We're
18 saying you could quash it, and we're asking you to. It's
19 clear, I don't think, Your Honor, that under these facts
20 it is sufficient to drag 11 people in here and then have
21 them figure out the buckets. I genuinely cannot think of
22 a single question or area of questioning that I would be
23 comfortable allowing them to ask my clients including
24 their names, under these circumstances, and they shouldn't
25 be dragged down here from far away places of the State

1 just to be told, you know, either by you or us coming to
2 you for 11 witnesses, however many times that they are not
3 going to answer the questions.

4 They should have to come forward with at least a
5 bucket list, so to speak, that Your Honor approves before
6 they are dragged down here. That is not too much to ask,
7 and if it can't be done before their appearances next
8 week, then you can quash them and we can revisit it, and
9 we can set them for a different time, but they should not
10 be dragged down here and put on public display for doing,
11 in our view, nothing wrong, but their own ambiguous
12 circumstances being forced to invoke their rights, and
13 it's just not appropriate under the Ethical Standards
14 under the Georgia Professional Standards - -

15 THE COURT: But if they did nothing wrong, why aren't
16 they talking to the Grand Jury?

17 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Because she's called them targets.
18 I mean, Your Honor, we've outlined in our motion why we
19 don't even think there's jurisdiction here, why the law
20 protects what they did, but as you know the Supreme Court
21 has made clear that the main purpose, one of the main
22 purposes of the Fifth Amendment is to protect innocent
23 people who can be bound up in ambiguous circumstances, and
24 I don't think but you're going to find, at least the cases
25 that I've never been in where ambiguous circumstances are

1 more ambiguous and politicized and fraught than this, and
2 so, you know, that is why - -

3 THE COURT: I don't know that politicized makes it
4 ambiguous, but you're using the word ambiguous, and I'll
5 let you use that word.

6 ATTORNEY PEARSON: We certainly have different views
7 of the facts in the law, Your Honor.

8 THE COURT: There are entirely different views of
9 certain facts and non facts, I hear you on that, but I
10 don't know if that makes it ambiguous, but I hear you, and
11 I am mindful of an inconvenience factor, if in the end the
12 product of the exercise is to have a witness say I assert
13 the Fifth, and that's it.

14 Hopefully, folks will exercise discretion, but I
15 don't think there is, other than some rules that apply
16 more in a Federal setting where the word target means
17 something different, not entirely different, not entirely
18 different. I wasn't able to find any legal precedent that
19 says it was improper that the Court should have barred the
20 investigating body from requiring someone to come in and
21 in their face saying I'm not answering any questions. I'm
22 not even going to tell you my name. That may actually be
23 something that the Grand Jury may want to know, that this
24 person won't even give her name under oath. That could be
25 instructive to what the Grand Jury is doing, but they

1 wouldn't know that if they never met the person.

2 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Well, given that they're not
3 supposed to draw any negative inference from an
4 invocation I wouldn't think that would be evidence, but
5 even if it were, I think the reason you can't find any
6 precedence is because in the Federal system, and then the
7 State system doesn't do Grand Jury work very often, and
8 then the Federal system they don't do this. .

9 They don't bring targets in and try to force them to
10 testify because they recognize it's unethical, as the AVA
11 has said and as the Georgia Professional Rules have
12 outlined, and we would ask that at a minimum, Your Honor,
13 that you ask them proffer the buckets to you or to us
14 before our people are brought in.

15 THE COURT: Fair request. I appreciate that.

16 ADA WAKEFORD: Your Honor, may I address one point?

17 THE COURT: Hold on. Mr. Dillon, if you're going to
18 talk more about disqualification, not yet. If it's the
19 Fifth Amendment you've been patient, so I'm happy to hear
20 from Senator Jones' perspective.

21 ATTORNEY DILLON: Keeping quiet my mouth quiet in
22 this whole disqualification thing - -

23 THE COURT: But go ahead.

24 ATTORNEY DILLON: Trust me. I call the Court's
25 attention to the Georgia Code, that's 15-12-100. It's a

1 procedure for a special Grand Jury and hours of that Grand
2 Jury, and under Subparagraph C it says, "while conducting
3 any investigation authorized by this part, investigative
4 grand juries may compel evidence and subpoena witnesses."
5 It may inspect records, documents, correspondence, and
6 books, blah, blah, blah , and it specifically excludes
7 subpoena targets, Your Honor, and these are the rules --

8 THE COURT: You mean it says you may not do that or?

9 ATTORNEY DILLON: No, it doesn't, but because it is
10 not included in the list, we all know the cannons of
11 constructing statutes. If there is a list and it's not
12 included in the list, it's excluded from the list, and
13 this is the provision under which this Grand Jury was
14 impaneled.

15 THE COURT: It didn't say subpoena tall people or
16 short people, it says witnesses.

17 ATTORNEY DILLON: It says witnesses.

18 THE COURT: You're saying a target is not a witness?

19 ATTORNEY DILLON: A target is a different category
20 than a witness, and the case law in the state of Georgia
21 says that because targets are discussed differently in the
22 Lampl case, and that's a good case to cite on. A target
23 is different than a witness, and this doesn't say subpoena
24 targets. It says subpoena witnesses.

25 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Wakeford.

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1 ADA WAKEFORD: Your Honor, I'll read directly from
2 Lampl.

3 THE COURT: Lampl is getting a lot of attention. Am
4 I right? Is it a Clayton County - - It was some sort of
5 city counsel - -

6 ADA WAKEFORD: I think so, Your Honor.

7 THE COURT: Ms. Green-Cross is now nodding her head.
8 She would know. She's the appellate expert. All right.
9 Continue.

10 ADA WAKEFORD: "One who has not been so charged,
11 meaning formally charged, in a formal charging instrument
12 --

13 THE COURT: Which would be every single recipient of
14 a subpoena so far?

15 ADA WAKEFORD: Yes.

16 THE COURT: All right.

17 ADA WAKEFORD: -- may be compelled to appear before a
18 Grand Jury that he retains the option during his
19 appearance of invoking his privilege against
20 self-incrimination and refusing to testify regarding the
21 incriminating matters, this is true even if the witness is
22 a target of the grand jury's investigation."

23 THE COURT: So Mr. Dillon stood up first, and he's
24 freshest from saying ha ha, take Lampl that way, State.
25 So did he skip a sentence? That's a pretty powerful

1 sentence, Mr. Dillon.

2 ATTORNEY DILLON: A very powerful sentence, and with
3 regard to regular grand juries, I have no doubt that the
4 District Attorney might, but the statute under which the
5 subpoena is issued in this case properly is not that the
6 ordinary Grand Jury, nor the special grand jury, and it's
7 under this chapter in the Georgia code, and the rules are
8 different.

9 THE COURT: So your argument is that a regular Grand
10 Jury that could indict and would target -- Lampl says you
11 can call that person in front of a that Grand Jury who has
12 the ability to indict Lample, and they can invoke his
13 Fifth from which they need to draw no adverse inference,
14 but a special purpose Grand Jury which can indict no one
15 or anything, they can't subpoena a target because they use
16 the word witness instead of target?

17 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor.

18 THE COURT: Is the word target used in the
19 non-special purpose Grand Jury statute, or is the word
20 witness used?

21 ATTORNEY DILLON: Interesting question, Your Honor,
22 but I do note that the subpoena is - -

23 THE COURT: What's the answer?

24 ATTORNEY DILLON: I don't know, but I do note that
25 the statute under which the subpoenas were supposed to be

1 issued in this case is under Title 15, but the subpoena is
2 actually rolled out under the provision of the Georgia
3 code that is not under Title 15, and they were, in fact,
4 technically, improper subpoenas because they were issued
5 under the normal statute and not under this chapter.

6 THE COURT: So I guess we could republish them and
7 resign them if that is the - -

8 ATTORNEY DILLON: Exactly, and then recognize that
9 this rule applies, but not the Lampl rule that we're
10 citing here.

11 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, we would take a
12 slightly different differentiation of Lampl - -

13 THE COURT: A third reading.

14 ATTORNEY PEARSON: It's actually the same read, and
15 that is the sentence that he read is (unintelligible) What
16 the the Supreme Court is saying in Lampl, we have an
17 individual who didn't take his Fifth in the Grand Jury,
18 the special purpose grand jury, the special purpose Grand
19 Jury used its authority to have a conveyer who was later
20 indicted in an improper Grand Jury.

21 I'm not suggesting they were improper, but a
22 different regular Grand jury, and then he tried to get
23 evidence suppressed from the special Grand Jury. This is
24 not about whether they can compel people. We're not
25 disputing they can issue the subpoenas, everybody says

1 they can. That is the only thing Lample even arguably
2 says. The only issue then is you get to quash them if you
3 want to.

4 If you believe that you should, and there's nothing
5 that says your authority under the statute, or under
6 supervisory authority is in any way affected by Lampl at
7 all whatsoever, so you clearly have the authority to do
8 what you think is proper with this Grand Jury here, and
9 we're asking you, on behalf of our clients, not to have
10 them frogmarched in front of a cameras and in this
11 courtroom.

12 THE COURT: Okay.

13 ADA WAKEFORD: At this point I was going to address
14 the original point I was going to make, which is I believe
15 we've heard the phrase "frog marched" in front of the
16 cameras three times now.

17 THE COURT: All right.

18 ADA WAKEFORD: I do not want to talk about this, but
19 I have to at this point. Publicity is a hindrance to the
20 special purpose Grand Jury's work. I believe earlier
21 Ms. Pearson stated that there may have been a witness in
22 here yesterday, but she didn't know who it was or how they
23 appeared, or what they had talked about, which is an
24 indication that the witnesses can come before the special
25 purpose Grand Jury, and no one ever know anything about

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1 it. If witnesses exercise their First Amendment right to
2 disclose after the fact or before the fact they were
3 called, then they are allowed to do that. That is the
4 source of publicity around this. It is, I think here we
5 are tired of hearing that there is publicity jammed up by
6 the District Attorney's Office in order to create a circus
7 around this when we have actually taken pains to try to
8 create an environment of circus around this, so there is
9 no frogmarching, and there are ways to come before the
10 special purpose Grand Jury without publicity being brought
11 into it. I just wanted to clarify it right after the
12 third time we heard that phrase.

13 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I appreciate much of what
14 you said. I think it's a little rich to suggest that any
15 particular side that has avoided the cameras. One need
16 look only at basically any major news outlet, and you will
17 see who is talking to the media, and it is not always the
18 lawyers for the witnesses, so I think everyone involved in
19 this has taken full advantage of media coverage.

20 That said, they're are some things that can be done,
21 I know, because I've been asked to be involved with it to
22 ensure that witnesses can enter into the building and
23 leave the building without much harassment from the media,
24 and we can get to do that.

25 I don't know that there are many of Ms. Pearson's
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1 clients that the media would even recognize when they
2 walked up the front steps of the courthouse if that's how
3 they came in, so I think the concern about putting people
4 on public display is a bit exaggerated for most of her
5 clients, but if there are clients who need special
6 accommodations and ingress and egress we can always
7 accommodate them, we've done it before and can do it
8 again. Anything more from the District Attorney's office
9 on the fifth Amendment concerns raised in Ms. Pearson and
10 Mr. Deborrough's motion as expanded by Mr. Dillon?

11 ADA WAKEFORD: No, your Honor. We have responded to
12 your questions, and we have proposed a method going
13 forward, and we have nothing else to add.

14 THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. Ms. Pearson or Ms.
15 Deborrough, anything else on behalf of your 11 clients in
16 connection with the quashal of the requests, in other
17 words the Fifth Amendment concerns?

18 ATTORNEY PEARSON: I think that's it, Your Honor.

19 THE COURT: Mr. Dillon, anything more on the Fifth
20 Amendment aspects?

21 ATTORNEY DILLON: No, Your Honor, we've got the
22 motion as communicated earlier.

23 THE COURT: Okay. Thank You. So I will not be
24 quashing any of the subpoenas, but I will be asking -- we
25 may need to change some of the timelines. How many of

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1 your 11 are coming all at once? Are all 11 supposed to
2 come out the same day or are they spread out, Ms. Pearson?

3 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, we have -- they are
4 all coming on the 26th, 27th, and the 28th, so that's 3,
5 4, 5. I allocated over the states maybe 9 exactly.

6 THE COURT: The process is going to take longer
7 because what will happen, I suspect it will become more
8 regularized and streamlined after the first few of your
9 witnesses, but what will need to happen is that your
10 witness, and you Ms. Pearson and Ms. Deborroughs, if she
11 clears quarantine she can be here too. She can appear
12 virtually, however we need to make it work, however we can
13 make it work.

14 We'll need to sit down, and it may just be lawyers at
15 first, so you can have your client wherever you want them
16 to be, as long as he or she is in the building, and
17 you're going to have that bucket conversation and see
18 where there is agreement or disagreement, and you've made
19 very clear that you can't think of anything, not even
20 astrological signs because somehow that would be tied to
21 something, or it would be irrelevant, but that
22 conversation needs to happen so that that we can, lawyers
23 and I can have a conversation about is it really a
24 complete impasse, of I may make the ruling, and you can
25 challenge it in whatever way you want, that the witnesses

1 will need to go in front of the Grand Jury to answer name,
2 rank, and serial number and then the rest will be Fifth
3 Amendment.

4 It helps the District Attorney's office has 12
5 because they know basically that they're going to ask one
6 question beyond name, rank, and serial number, if I get
7 folks passed that because there is not an area that can be
8 explored that I don't think is unprotected by the Fifth
9 Amendment.

10 ADA WADE: One thing I believe, Judge, from our side
11 that is noteworthy, is the very thing that the District
12 Attorney's office has fought so hard to do, was keep our
13 witnesses secret and out of the public eye. What Ms.
14 Pearson just did was, she gave the dates that her clients
15 were coming in here, that's the exact thing she's
16 complaining about. She gave - -

17 THE COURT: Well, before we draw more attention to
18 this, I did not hear Ms. Pearson say Steve Jones is coming
19 in on this day. She divided it over days and did not
20 identify people, and I mentioned, if there is a concern
21 about letting someone in the building discreetly, we can
22 address that and get someone in the building discreetly.

23 Most of these folks who walk, as long as they are
24 wearing normal clothes, they can walk right in the
25 courthouse, and those cameras that seem to be glued to our

1 courthouse steps right now wouldn't even pivot on that, so
2 I think the concern is greater than it needs to be, but we
3 can accommodate it. I'm not going to ask someone to be
4 more specifically about who is going to be here when, I
5 just need to know if it's going to take a while for these
6 witnesses because there will be the conference before the
7 witness testifies. .

8 Testimony may be greatly reduced because of the
9 outcome of the conference may be that testimony is going
10 to be just as long as the District Attorney's Office had
11 forecast, but there's still this lawyer-to-lawyer
12 conference in advance, but that's how we're going to work
13 through it, and as I said, we may develop some guidelines.

14 A ruling I make with Witness One, isn't going to
15 apply to Witness Two insofar as she is similarly
16 situated. I don't believe all are similarly situated.
17 There's still the overlap. They are all alternate
18 electors, so there are certain commonalities, and I assume
19 that is why they all want to have you and Ms. Deborrough.
20 Similarly, they are all situated in this same situation,
21 but they are not clones, and so there may be areas that
22 are explorable with Witness One that are not explorable
23 with Witness Two, so I'm going to let the parties develop
24 the framework they want to use as we go forward.

25 I am here to assist when you reach an impasse, but I
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1 don't think it's appropriate under the case law Lampl and
2 others to quash the subpoenas, but it may be that these
3 witnesses have very, very, brief appearances in front of
4 the Grand Jury.

5 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, just so that I
6 understand. We aren't going to elaborate on it ahead of
7 time. We will collaborate when the first witnesses come
8 here or in between each witness? I mean, we've got 11
9 people to get through, so I guess I need some clarity on
10 how that's going to work for each witness.

11 THE COURT: So I invite early collaboration, but I
12 also understand that if the District Attorney's Office is
13 reluctant to get too specific too far in advance, so they
14 may buckle under the pressure of how long that would take
15 as well, and there may be some basic frameworks that they
16 want to share with you in advance, but if you're now
17 getting into the nuts and bolts that I get to stay out of.

18 I will get in the mix should an impasse be reached.
19 If that impasse is reached tomorrow, because you're
20 talking about a witness who is coming on an undisclosed
21 date next week, at an undisclosed location, then I could
22 talk with you all tomorrow, but it may well be that the
23 default is let's talk when you're witness is here.

24 That may mean you won't get to everything next week.
25 That was - - the reason why I was asking is that if they

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1 are spread out you four weeks you - - they're all coming
2 in next week. I could see it being that what had been
3 scheduled for Thursday ends up being what was scheduled
4 for Tuesday, because you only got through two people on
5 Tuesday because of the confirming that doesn't occur until
6 Tuesday, so I'm not forcing an answer to your question,
7 what you develop with the District Attorney's Office.

8 ATTORNEY PEARSON: In light of that, Your Honor,
9 would the Court at all be amenable to to moving our grand
10 jurors, not quashing them but moving them to later so that
11 we can work this process out in advance?

12 THE COURT: So another really good question for you
13 to explore with the District Attorney's office, they may
14 think that's wise and necessary as well, and it may well
15 be that 6 of the 11 go next week because everything is
16 taking a little bit longer because we are being careful
17 about the concerns raised in your motion, but I have made
18 clear that other than checking on the welfare of the Grand
19 Jury, in other words they are not in session from 8 a.m.
20 to 10:00 p.m.

21 I don't micromanage who gets called it or when, but
22 I'll let you know that the District Attorney's office has
23 been flexible at having to move things if obstacles come
24 up.

25 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Well, we had asked for that, Your
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1 Honor, and they refused, that's why I brought that up, but
2 we'll talk to them about it.

3 THE COURT: Well, things are a lot less streamlined
4 than they were before, so you work through that.

5 All right. Let's talk about disqualification and
6 this process has moved up to the driver's seat on the DA's
7 side, and I think since Mr. Dillon got in about three
8 quarters of his argument in answering my simple question
9 of do you think it's moot or not, I want to give the DA's
10 office a chance to share some of their perspective about
11 it.

12 I think the word partisan gets thrown around a lot in
13 this and why they think disqualification doesn't fit or
14 how to manage what I think are some valid concerns that
15 Senator Jones has raised through counsel, but at a minimum
16 pretty clear appearance of conflict, if it's developed not
17 before the investigation started but in the midst of it.

18 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Thank you, your Honor. I
19 think Your Honor has used the phrase appearance of
20 impropriety. There is Mr. Dillon's use of the phrase
21 appearance impropriety or appearance of conflict, and the
22 first place the State is going to direct your attention to
23 is on the law cited in the responsive brief that
24 appearance of conflict is enough.

25 Under Georgia law, the disqualification of a
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1 prosecuting attorney or entity requires an actual
2 conflict, not speculative, not conjecture, but an actual
3 personal interest, and in this case would be the
4 investigation of the special purpose Grand Jury or the
5 prosecution potentially of Senator Jones.

6 So I think that while optics in this case may be
7 more front and center than in some others, optics doesn't
8 carry the day, it's an actual conflict, and there's just
9 nothing at all that suggests that there is the actual
10 personal interest on the behalf of the District Attorney.
11 I'll note that insofar as the motion target, special
12 prosecutor Wade, there is --

13 THE COURT: Oh, thank you for that. Pause on that.
14 Mr. Dillon, do you agree -- originally we were going to
15 talk about just disqualification and Ms. Deborrough, and
16 Ms. Pearson arrived on the scene about the Fifth
17 Amendment. My first question was meant to be that, do you
18 agree, Mr. Dillon, that Mr. Wade's purported donations,
19 and I'm not attributing anything to him, but it looks like
20 from the records that Mr. Wade gave \$2,000 to Mr. Bailey
21 when Mr. Bailey was running for Attorney General.

22 No donations of record or any public insofar as the
23 donations is the public because records are made of it, no
24 public donations in support of Charlie Bailey by Nathan
25 Wade since Charlie Bailey switched races, and is instead

1 trying to be Lieutenant Governor instead of Attorney
2 General; do you agree with that?

3 ATTORNEY DILLON: I agree with that, Your Honor.

4 THE COURT: Okay.

5 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: That was my whole paragraph.

6 THE COURT: You don't need to cover that, because
7 that was very persuasive.

8 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Thank you.

9 THE COURT: If that fact is true, I am focused very
10 much on the appearance of the District Attorney. Using
11 that title District Attorney Fani Willis, invites you and
12 encourages you to come to this fundraiser for the
13 political opponent of the target of my investigation.
14 That's what we need to navigate here, and I guess the
15 question is, if there's an actual conflict, is
16 disqualification mandatory or discretionary, and if it's
17 mandatory then does that mean that the appearance of
18 conflict still give the judge the discretion to fashion
19 some form of relief?

20 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Let me start with the last
21 question. No.

22 THE COURT: No?

23 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I don't think the Court has
24 the discretion law. While I want to give the Court as
25 much discretion as you want to have - -

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THE COURT: Only what it should have.

ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Yes. I don't think the law allows the Court to elevate the standard, what the legal standard is an actual conflict. I don't believe that the Court's discretion is broad enough to force a remedy for an appearance of conflict.

THE COURT: And examples of actual conflict that I saw in your pleading were somehow the prosecutor was able to be like a defense attorney at the same -- I mean it was these things where like what were you thinking? Yes, it was kind of crazy. I represent one co defendant and as the defense attorney in a criminal proceeding become the DA and the prosecute the co defendant.

THE COURT: okay.

ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: That makes no sense, and that is not the situation we've got here, but that is the kind of extreme example of what the law recognizes as an actual conflict for a prosecuting attorney, at one time I represented the victim in a case that is now before me in a divorce preceding who is now before me in a case.

It's that kind of really striking in your face and routine political support for a political ally. It just doesn't make it there. It doesn't go that far.

THE COURT: The routine -- I would interpret as Mr. Wade strokes a check for the candidate he wants to

1 support. Using the title of your office and having a
2 social media that you as this political office holder are
3 holding a fundraiser for the opponent of someone that this
4 political office is investigating. I don't know that it's
5 an actual conflict, but I use that phrase, "what were you
6 thinking," where the prosecutor thought I could prosecute
7 the codefendant of someone I defended.

8 It's a what are you thinking moment? The optics are
9 horrific. If you are trying to have the public believe
10 that this is a non-partition driven by the facts, and I'm
11 not here to critique decisions. The decision was made,
12 but If we are trying to maintain confidence that this
13 investigation is pursuing facts in a non-partisan sense,
14 no matter who the District Attorney is, we follow the
15 evidence where it goes and ignore that fact that I hosted
16 a fundraiser for the political opponent of someone I just
17 named a target.

18 That strikes me as problematic. Maybe not from an
19 actual conflict level, but if we are at a cocktail party
20 and people are asking do you think that this is a fair and
21 balanced approach to things, I do. Well, how do you
22 explain this?

23 I mean, how does one explain? I mean, that is the
24 concern I'm working through is that it is not a lowercase
25 A appearance, it is a capital A with flashy lights

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1 fundraiser District Attorney for the political opponent of
2 someone I've named a target of my investigation, while I'm
3 a legal adviser of the Grand Jury, and I'm on national
4 medial almost nightly talking about this investigation
5 and That's problematic.

6 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Okay. Not accepting the
7 entirety of the Court's characterization of the series of
8 events. I'm going to explain it in a couple of ways.
9 First, it's still not a legal conflict. It's still not
10 anything within the Court's discretion to remedy in the
11 way that Mr. Dillon has advocated on behalf of Senator
12 Jones. As a legal matter, everybody can talk at cocktail
13 parties all they want and watch the cable news station of
14 their choosing, but no matter what it still doesn't amount
15 to a legal conflict under Georgia law.

16 Second, I want to direct the Court's attention to the
17 absolute lack of any evidence to the case that any action
18 taken during the course of the investigation has been
19 politically motivated at all. As the Court made
20 reference, and maybe I'm paraphrasing, but it's the Grand
21 Jury's duty to Senator Jones, not the District Attorney's
22 office.

23 The District Attorney is the legal adviser of the
24 special purpose Grand Jury, and may well have an
25 investigation of their own, but Senator Jones is trying to

1 fight a subpoena to the special purpose Grand Jury, and it
2 was brought under their authority.

3 THE COURT: It was, and I think technically you are
4 correct. I wouldn't want anyone to be misled, that the
5 special purpose Grand Jury is the only -- meaning those
6 grand jurors are the only source of subpoenas that they
7 say to their legal adviser, where is what we'd like to see
8 next. That can happen, but what can also happen, and it
9 doesn't matter who it happened here because your point is
10 a good one, but I don't want people leaving here thinking
11 oh, it's only the special purpose Grand Jury that decides
12 to come in and. Equally so and perhaps most of the time
13 it's the District Attorney's team that says, here's who we
14 would like to have come before the special purpose Grand
15 Jury next. .

16 That subpoena comes through the Grand Jury maybe the
17 wrong statute under the subpoena, but it comes through the
18 Grand Jury, but the idea, motivation, and the decision is
19 from the District Attorney's office. I don't know how
20 Senator Jones' subpoena which channel from which it
21 flowed, I've got an inkling, but it doesn't matter. Your
22 point is a good one.

23 I don't know that it cures the concern about
24 political support for an opponent not having any bearing
25 on how focused or not the special purpose Grand Jury would

1 be on the person I'm supporting's political opponent before
2 November X, whenever the election is.

3 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I understand, and I didn't
4 mean to imply otherwise to the public in my report, but I
5 certainly understand the need to clarify that. The larger
6 point being though, I think in this posture is that,
7 Senator Jones is still in obligation to some action taken
8 during the investigation that is the Court's allegation of
9 a political motivation, and you just haven't seen it here.
10 The -- Yes, sir.

11 THE COURT: Mr. Dillon will get a chance to say more,
12 but part of his introductory remarks he emphasized a whole
13 lot then this target letter arise, like there was some
14 cause and effect. I am not familiar with the timeline and
15 you mentioned that my description of events may have
16 gotten some of the timeline, and I'm not anchored to any
17 particular timeline other than the correct one.

18 Hopefully, there is only one set of facts as to the
19 timeline. What was your reaction to the way Mr. Dillon
20 was painting -- it was almost a cause and effect timeline
21 that X happens and as a result of X support for Charlie
22 Bailey then Y happens, something that that in the public
23 eye would be negative to Senator Jones.

24 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I represent to the Court, and
25 I believe it's accurate that all of the target letters

1 went out at the same time.

2 THE COURT: Okay.

3 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: So it was not pegged to any
4 event that had any relevance of Lieutenant Governor's race
5 or any other political option was dictated by the terms
6 and the pace of that investigation.

7 THE COURT: So the 11 that Ms. Pearce and Ms.
8 Deborrough received were issued on the same day, and
9 effectively the same time as Senator Jones?

10 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Yes.

11 THE COURT: It is not Senator Jones got his on a
12 special day, and it was a broadcasted event, and then the
13 other 11 went out?

14 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: It was a routine issuance of
15 the change of status as Mr. Wade explained in an effort to
16 be transparent to everyone who had been working and
17 talking with the State.

18 The final point I think I kind of want to make is
19 that, as noted in the brief, we have partisan District
20 Attorneys and partisan elections for those offices, so it
21 should surprise exactly nobody elected District Attorney's
22 should have political affiliations with other individual
23 within the same political party, and I think the post case
24 -- I've got a copy for the Court if you are not familiar
25 with it and a copy for Mr. Dillon.

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1 THE COURT: Is there a cite?

2 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: It is. 298 Georgia 241. It's
3 a 2015 decision. It's post, P-O-S-T. I've got a copy
4 that is highlighted. I'll hand Mr. Dillon the same copies
5 that have been highlighted for the Court. May I approach,
6 please?

7 THE COURT: Sure. Thank You.

8 ADA GREEN: On page 5 it is a reference. The case
9 doesn't raise the issue of a prosecuting attorney who has
10 been or sought disqualified by a defendant or target or a
11 subject, or a witness in the case. It's an even higher
12 stand to what a judicial recusal would be, and I think
13 it's instructed as a lower standard -- I'm sorry, a lower
14 burden and a higher standard for a recusal of Court, and
15 in this case it was the situation where the District
16 Attorney had been listed as a campaign official of a
17 Superior Court judge's campaign at one time, and the Court
18 in that case found -- well, that's beyond routine, it's
19 beyond financial, it's beyond what we normally expect.

20 Although it even -- and so the Court concluded, You
21 know what, when you got that allegation and the affidavit
22 of recusal you should have sent that on. I'll note too
23 though, that once it was sent on, the Court determined
24 that that wasn't an actual (unintelligible), and it went
25 right back, so I bring the language to the Court's

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1 attention because it does draw a focus on these are the
2 things that happen when you have political affiliations
3 for elected offices. It's expected, it's normal, and
4 until or it shows some actual conflict then that is just
5 maybe the upside, maybe the downside, but that's a
6 consequence of the system that we have.

7 THE COURT: Okay.

8 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: One more final thing, and I
9 think this could streamline some of our other
10 conversations about remedy. The State is not interested
11 in any summer surprises. I couldn't source that October
12 deadline to anything. I'm unable to determine when that
13 is. I don't believe we have that here. It's especially
14 unlikely.

15 THE COURT: My understanding from speaking with the
16 Grand Jury directly. My supervisory role is that the
17 timeline is whatever the timeline is. There is no
18 deadline, they like to be done with this soon, but that is
19 only because they are giving much of their life to this
20 process, but they'll follow this process as it unfolds,
21 and as I intimated to Mr. Dillon and I'll make it clearer
22 when I wrap up the disqualification session that if the
23 work is completed such that it lands on or near the
24 election, it will state in the pleading and be in my
25 office until it gets disclosed after the election.

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1 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: You won't be hearing any
2 objection about that from the State.

3 THE COURT: I never I heard any requests to the
4 contrary. What I heard is we don't know when it will end.
5 When will it will be done, when we're done.

6 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I got a passed a note that's
7 going to clear up that timeline. The political event for
8 Mr. Bailey was June 14th, and the target letter was sent
9 to Senator Jones and the others in that July 5th, July 6th
10 timeline.

11 THE COURT: So three weeks later. All right. Mr.
12 Dillon or Ms. Clapp. I'm happy to hear what you want to
13 share. Don't repeat what you already said because I heard
14 that. I'd like you to start with Ms. Cross's focus, and
15 it is different. I'm very familiar with the judicial
16 requirements and the impact and affect of apparent
17 conflicts, and Ms. Cross's observation is the District
18 Attorney is not a judge.

19 This is true, but because of that the apparent
20 conflict may be an area of concern that we ought to talk
21 about, but that it would not require me to take any
22 remedial action, only if there were an actual conflict,
23 and even if it was an actual conflict, but I don't
24 disagree with you if you say there is an appearance of a
25 conflict. You don't need to try to convince me of that.

1 If that's not enough, legally, then we'll all agree
2 that there was an appearance of conflict, hopefully
3 something like that doesn't happen again between now and
4 the conclusion of this electoral cycle, but that is what I
5 need you to start with appearance verses actual and
6 anything else we need to cover that you already didn't.

7 ATTORNEY DILLON: Your Honor, if I may. My associate
8 has a power point, and we'd like to plug into the screen
9 if that is possible to the Court.

10 THE COURT: It is, Ms. Clapp is a part of this zoom
11 session, and you're able to share your screen. Is what
12 you're going to share something you shared with Ms. Cross
13 or is this brand new?

14 ATTORNEY DILLON: We have not shared this with Ms.
15 Cross.

16 THE COURT: It's not evidence?

17 ATTORNEY DILLON: It's not evidence, but we do have
18 some exhibits, Your Honor, we do have some evidence here
19 today.

20 THE COURT: Okay, if there is going to be evidence,
21 let's just make sure Ms. Cross gets a chance to see it
22 before we blast it on the screen.

23 ATTORNEY DILLON: Absolutely. oh, no. It won't be
24 blasted on the screen. It won't be published before --

25 THE COURT: Okay.

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1 ATTORNEY DILLON: As the initial point, Your Honor,
2 I'd like to point out that Senator Jones received his
3 Grand Jury subpoena in late May, and he was set for
4 testimony in late July.

5 We won't go into the date because we don't want to
6 create a bottle neck, but he was assured by the DA's
7 office that he was a witness in the case, and he was glad
8 to do his civic duty. We were trying to work out the
9 parameters for a voluntary interview to avoid the reptile
10 marching. I won't use that term. while I like it, I just
11 won't use it.

12 THE COURT: Simple, but what you are avoiding is
13 answering my question. My question was, appearance of
14 conflict verses actual conflict, what do you think the law
15 is, and where do you think this falls?

16 ATTORNEY DILLON: I think, based on my reading of the
17 law that controls in this area is that when there is a
18 public perception of a conflict, then there's an issue
19 that this Court has to look at, and the standard is the
20 standard that is layed out in the Young case, the Supreme
21 Court case that the DA cites in their response brief.

22 THE COURT: Young as in not old?

23 ATTORNEY DILLON: Young as in not old, and I don't
24 have the cite in front of me.

25 THE COURT: I'll get it.

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1 ATTORNEY DILLON: It's also in my brief.

2 THE COURT: Lampl.

3 ATTORNEY DILLON: Okay. The DA cites it for the
4 proposition that, "The standard of neutrality for
5 prosecutors is not necessarily astringent as those
6 applicable to judicial or quasi -- judicial offices," and
7 she is correct, direct quote from Young.

8 It is not astringent, and the Court goes on to say
9 that the different in treatment is relevant whether a
10 conflict is found, however, not to it's gravity once
11 identified. We may require a stronger showing for a
12 prosecutor that a judge in order to conclude that a
13 conflict of interest exists, but once we have drawn that
14 conclusion we have deemed the prosecutor subject to
15 influences that undermine confidence that a prosecution
16 can be conducted in a disinterested fashion.

17 If this is the case we can not have confidence that a
18 proceeding in which the officer plays the critical role of
19 preparing and presenting the case for the defendant's
20 guilt or hear the defendant's recommendation for a charge.

21 And so here is the Supreme Court saying that if the
22 confidence is undermined, if the Court is saying, what
23 were you thinking, then the decision is already made,
24 because if we have a what were you thinking factor that
25 even if they recommend discharge, and even if they died,

1 and if they go to trial, and even if they win the case,
2 which we submit will never happen, there it has occurred
3 in the Young case.

4 The bigger issue here is not whether or not they can
5 indict him for submitting a false document, they determine
6 the falsity of all the documents in this case. The issue
7 here is whether or not they can drag Senator Jones down by
8 literally releasing to the press that he's a target. This
9 guy get's \$32,000 dollars. This guy get's a publicly
10 disclose target letter.

11 THE COURT: You're going a little bit off the -- the
12 focus here is disqualification, and I'm not quite sure
13 what you are invoking from the press or who you think said
14 to the press that someone was a target, maybe other than
15 you or your client talking to the press, but that's not
16 what your motion was about. Your motion was about the
17 decision the District Attorney made to support someone in
18 her political party --

19 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor.

20 THE COURT: -- and how that may create, and it does
21 create the appearance of possible conflict, but is it an
22 actual conflict, and you are helping me process that maybe
23 an appearance would be enough, but that is what I need us
24 to focus on and not your theory that the District
25 Attorney's office is trying to affect someone's political

1 career as opposed to revelations about someones connection
2 to a series of events that are particularly controversial
3 in our society right now might prove problematic for that
4 political candidate. I can't help that part. Those were
5 choices that were made. That might elevate that candidate
6 in the eyes of some. They might not elevate that
7 candidate in the eyes of many.

8 ATTORNEY DILLON: It may, Your Honor, and with regard
9 to those facts, Senator Jones was willing to come in and
10 meet with the prosecutor and sit down and say these are
11 the facts of the case, under oath and maybe not under
12 oath, but then they received this carpet bombing of target
13 letters for everyone who signed the document, it is
14 suddenly 16 witnesses had the door slammed in their face
15 because they were told that they less friends of the
16 investigation or targets.

17 Can we go to the next slide? Mr. Jones received his
18 target letter on July 6th as the DA indicated. Contrary
19 to their motion where they indicated he was a potential
20 target, he was told he was What? Next slide. "You are
21 advised that you are "A target" of the Grand Jury." This
22 was on July 6th.

23 Next slide, please. On July the 12th, six days
24 after, I received this target letter, and I will say that
25 we consider this to be highly confidential, and the only

1 two people in the world that knew about the target letter
2 were me and the district Attorney's office. I get this
3 unsolicited e-mail from a reporter with --
4 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I'm sorry --
5 THE COURT: Stop.
6 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I'm sorry. This isn't a
7 document that I've seen before, so before we publish it,
8 Mr. Dillon can you --
9 THE COURT: Can you take that down, Ms. Clapp back to
10 the preceding page? And so, Mr. Dillon, you had assured
11 me that --
12 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, I did, Your Honor, and in my
13 zeal I got a little ahead of myself.
14 THE COURT: Well, be less zealous. Represent your
15 client, but let's not slap e-mails for which no foundation
16 has not been laid upon the screen. I thought you said, in
17 fact, I know you said don't worry, the actual exhibits I
18 won't put on the screen, they'll just be in my hands and
19 they won't be published.
20 ATTORNEY DILLON: I had a carefully drafted script,
21 and I lost it because we started in the middle of my
22 argument. May I approach and enter before the Court with
23 a copy.
24 THE COURT: You may.
25 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: If it's a copy of Defense
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1 Exhibit 2 then again, there's no foundation. I haven't
2 seen it before.

3 THE COURT: I'll take it. I won't necessarily make
4 it a part of the record --

5 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: That was a part of my request.

6 THE COURT: If we're going to have a discussion about
7 it, I need to be able to see it. Thank you.

8 ATTORNEY DILLON: It's an original and one.

9 THE COURT: All right. Any way. Your representation
10 is that you previously shared with me what happened in
11 your life, and in your life a reporter out of the blue
12 reached out to you and said hey, I heard that your client
13 is targeted in the District Attorney's investigation?

14 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor.

15 THE COURT: Well, the special Grand Jury's
16 investigation. Okay.

17 ATTORNEY DILLON: Three days later this same reporter
18 broke the story, and we won't publish that either. It's
19 not an exhibit, and it's on the internet, and we believe
20 the Court -- we'd love to publish the story.

21 THE COURT: You're free to do that, not through the
22 Court's zoom.

23 ATTORNEY DILLON: Okay. We'll hold off on that slide
24 for now, but I will represent to the Court three days
25 later this same reporter broke that everyone who signed on
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1 the alternate slate of electors and had received a target
2 letter including Senator Jones.

3 THE COURT: Assuming for a minute that is exactly how
4 that played out with you and Mr. Isokoff (sp.) where does
5 that get us actual conflict, apparent conflict -- I
6 understand where your client is very frustrated by that.
7 You suggest that, gosh, the only two people on the planet
8 who should know about it would be the District Attorney
9 and you.

10 Certainly, it's a whole lot more than that. We know
11 the District Attorney alone didn't, in fact, write all
12 these letters by herself. In fact, she didn't sign the
13 letters. It's on the screen right now. Mr. Wade did, so
14 the universe has just grown by 50%. It's three people.

15 ATTORNEY DILLON: Right.

16 THE COURT: So somehow -- let me finish. Somehow
17 word got out and the reporting universe knows about it
18 now, and it flows as an unwelcomed development for your
19 client. Actual conflict, appearance for conflict. I need
20 you to bend it back to what I need to work through, which
21 is should I take any remedial action to address an actual
22 conflict or the appearance of conflict, if I have the
23 authority, that's what we're working through and not the
24 trials and tribulations of Senator Jones because there was
25 a leak. Unless you've got proof that it was Charlie

1 Bailey who leaked it, and then now we have --

2 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor.

3 THE COURT: But we don't have that here.

4 ATTORNEY DILLON: I do not have that. No indication
5 that Mr. Bailey was involved. All I know is that this
6 organization knew and I knew, and of course my client
7 knew, and then six days later this internet reporter
8 knows, and then shortly after that there's an AJC story
9 about it. If we could I'd like to publish Exhibit 3,
10 which is a flyer for it.

11 THE COURT: That's in your pleading.

12 ATTORNEY DILLON: It is.

13 THE COURT: You may -- it's already public record.
14 Let me make sure the State can look at it, but if it's in
15 the pleading --

16 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: If it is what's in the
17 pleading then we don't have an objection to the
18 authenticity of it.

19 THE COURT: Okay.

20 ATTORNEY DILLON: May I approach, Your Honor.

21 THE COURT: I've got it on my screen. So we have
22 this fundraiser, and it's a blockbuster headlining Fani
23 Willis the District Attorney. In fine print you can see
24 where Mr. Bailey is, in fact, a candidate there, the font
25 is so small that I have to squint to see what it says.

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1 This occurs about three weeks before the decision is made
2 to make my client target in this case.

3 The District Attorney, according to publicly
4 available records, which I have marked as Exhibit 4. This
5 particular document, Your Honor is from the public
6 campaign finance website here in Georgia, so this is
7 publicly available data. It shows during the day of and
8 during the day after this fundraiser \$32,000 made to the
9 office of Mr. Bailey. We submit is a direct result of
10 this fundraiser. I'm told that the custom is, often
11 people show up with a check or they give their regrets and
12 sent a check the next day. During this particular
13 month, Mr. Bailey raised over \$270,000 dollars.

14 THE COURT: So this was a particularly small
15 fundraiser for him?

16 ATTORNEY DILLON: This might have been a particularly
17 big one. This might have been the one that caused the
18 avalanche of checks to come in.

19 THE COURT: Could be for all those people who are
20 checking the ethics website to see what the cash flow
21 looking like for the first couple of weeks were, so I'll
22 put my money behind it.

23 ATTORNEY DILLON: This is the sort of headline
24 fundraiser that gets people to say, oh, we have a big
25 wheel. We have somebody who is on the nightly news, as

1 this Court knows, who is pulling for Charlie Bailey.

2 THE COURT: Okay.

3 ATTORNEY DILLON: One candidate in the Lieutenant
4 Governor's office or the Lieutenant Governor's race gets a
5 headliner, the other one, three weeks later gets a target
6 letter -- quietly get's a target letter. Now, there were
7 numerous news stories speculating about the existence of
8 target letters on or about the time of the Yahoo news
9 article, and there was a lot of buzz about that.

10 In fact, there was even an AJC story where DA Willis
11 was quoted as saying that numerous attorneys had received
12 target letters on their behalf. It didn't name Senator
13 Jones, fortunately. In fact, it wasn't publicly known
14 that Senator Jones received a target letter until the DA
15 filed their brief two days ago.

16 They were the first people to acknowledge he was a
17 target for this Grand Jury. We had never acknowledged
18 that. It was a mere speculation in the press, but it's
19 that sort of thing that gives the DA the the ability to
20 benefit their friends and harm somebody who is under
21 investigation, and that is really what we're talking
22 about.

23 The cases that the DA's point to in their motion from
24 1916 and 1936 are talking about transactions where the
25 financial transactions were \$150, and was that materially,

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1 and while those are interesting cases, but once that \$150
2 was material in the depression, we were talking about
3 \$30,000 and we're talking about swaying an election, a
4 statewide election in Georgia, and that's a significant
5 thing.

6 This is not something that is being done by accident.
7 This is being done by design. This fundraiser was pointed
8 at benefiting Senator Jones --

9 THE COURT: Isn't that the purpose of the fundraiser.
10 I agree -- the point of -- the question is does the
11 District Attorney decision to support someone with whom
12 she is politically aligned, it surprises no one that they
13 are politically aligned. Does that rise to the level of
14 creating -- an appearance of -- , and I've opined on that
15 a little bit an actual conflict, and I understand because
16 you can't climb into someone's mind.

17 You have to do a little of this through the
18 shadowboxing of, okay -- there is a fundraiser and all of
19 this money came in, and then there was a target letter.
20 Do you have more of a connection of one who proceeded the
21 other?

22 ATTORNEY DILLON: As far as a direct connection?

23 THE COURT: Any connection.

24 ATTORNEY DILLON: What is out there in the press,
25 what is out there in the ether. A part of Senator Jones'

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1 concern is that this report is going to come out in
2 October. I'm glad to hear there's no October surprise,
3 but there's been this whole series of drips, this whole
4 series of leaks out of the Fulton County DA's office that
5 have tilted benefit towards Mr. Bailey. It pointed to my
6 client as being a presumptive violator of the law, and
7 it's only because the DA has the authority to do that.

8 So if this Court were to determine that she has a
9 conflict, and this appearance is sufficient, and we go to
10 the Attorney General's office to appoint a new prosecutor
11 with regard to Senator Jones who could sit down with him
12 and say, Well, Senator Jones, we're interested in what
13 happened in December 2020, would you like to talk to us,
14 and just like we did on day one, with the DA's office?

15 Certainly, we would be glad to. Do we have a target
16 letter from your office? No, you do not, Senator Jones,
17 because we have useful information that would age your
18 investigation, because this is an investigation when it
19 was impaneled that was supposed to gather evidence to see
20 whether or not there was an effort to undermine democracy
21 in this country, and when Senator Jones said, I have a
22 subpoena here, I'm going to talk to these people we said,
23 fine. We prepared our rates, but then we've got this
24 target letter and then everything changed, just like it
25 did for these 11 clients.

1 So then where initially they indicated where they
2 wanted to gather evidence, now it appears that what they
3 really wanted to do is gather publicity, and they slammed
4 the door on all 16 witnesses who signed the document by
5 giving them target letters, and then they announced that
6 they're all bad people, and in essence they're going to
7 recommend their charges in this report, if and when it
8 comes to you desk.

9 THE COURT: So the DA's office doesn't write the
10 report, the Grand Jury does, just to repeat. You
11 mentioned something about the District Attorney's office
12 leaking this and leaking that. Supposition or evidence?

13 ATTORNEY DILLON: I certainly don't know that the
14 District Attorney's office talked to Yahoo News, but I
15 know that I was the only other person holding a copy of
16 that target letter on that day, and there are numerous
17 daily stories in the AJC, to quote learned sources from
18 inside the investigation are the people who are conducting
19 this special Grand Jury.

20 THE COURT: I'm focused on your client, and I'm
21 asking you to direct me to anything other than the
22 gentleman from Yahoo who said, I heard X about your client
23 being a target. has there been other outreach from the
24 media to you saying, I heard Y, I heard Z about Senator
25 Jones that you can source only to the District Attorney's

1 office as opposed to, hey, any witness who comes before
2 that Grand Jury is free to talk to the media afterwards if
3 he or she wants to.

4 ATTORNEY DILLON: That's absolutely correct, and as
5 you know, that's how the Grand Jury work.

6 THE COURT: Right.

7 ATTORNEY DILLON: You're supposed to operate in
8 secrecy, which is what was anticipated when this was
9 founded, but the witnesses are free to go talk, and some
10 of the witnesses probably do talk, but certainly Senator
11 Jones had an interest in the public not knowing that
12 Fulton County considered him a target, so he did not talk;
13 we know that.

14 The leak of the existence of this target letter and
15 subpoena actually, violate the the (unintelligible) of
16 ethics that the District Attorney operates under, and one
17 of the things that we have with regard to Exhibit 5 is the
18 ethics training that the DA's office gives from their
19 general counsel, Mr. Robert Smith, who is the general
20 counsel for the Prosecuting Attorney's Counsel of Georgia,
21 and with permission of the Court I'd like to mark this as
22 Exhibit 5.

23 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: No objection, Your Honor.

24 ATTORNEY DILLON: I think the District Attorney
25 offered me an affidavit from Mr. Smith earlier today, so I

1 think they rely on him as an expert in regard to ethics.

2 THE COURT: Okay.

3 ATTORNEY DILLON: And so at this time I would offer
4 Exhibit 5 into evidence and request to publish it.

5 THE COURT: Sure.

6 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Your Honor, I don't object to
7 the submission of the document -- I can't verify it's
8 authenticity. If Mr. Dillon is representing to the Court
9 the source of this information, where he got it, that it's
10 accurate, true, and complete, and that's probably going to
11 take care of my objection. I just can't look at it and
12 know that this is the presentation that Mr. Smith gave.

13 THE COURT: Right. It's too long for you to do that,
14 just in this setting. Any reason we should be concerned
15 that this has been altered in any way, or is anything
16 other than what Mr. Smith presented to this District
17 Attorney, but presumably all District Attorneys and their
18 processes?

19 ATTORNEY DILLON: My understanding is that this is
20 his presentation and he does it periodically and that he
21 would have done it during the time period that Ms. Willis
22 was the District Attorney here.

23 THE COURT: Okay.

24 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Can I ask for a representation
25 of where you obtained this copy?

1 ATTORNEY DILLON: This was pulled off of the
2 internet.

3 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Did you pull it from off of
4 the internet?

5 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, I did.

6 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Okay. Was it from the PAC
7 website?

8 ATTORNEY DILLON: You have to have access to the PAC
9 website to get it.

10 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: And I'm wondering how you got
11 it.

12 ATTORNEY DILLON: It's out there in the ethers.

13 THE COURT: He got it from Yahoo.

14 ATTORNEY DILLON: I got it from Yahoo.

15 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I want to kind of thank you
16 for your candor.

17 ATTORNEY DILLON: Would you like to present it to
18 your client? She would have attended this training, and
19 see if it's complete?

20 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I would like to preserve
21 publication of the document until I can ascertain whether
22 it is true, accurate, and complete, because I understand
23 that it has been sourced to the internet, and that is not
24 something that I can accept, this authentication.

25 THE COURT: Okay, so it's admitted. I'll take it,
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1 just don't put it on the screen. I want us to keep moving
2 forward.

3 ATTORNEY DILLON: Okay. We won't put it on the
4 screen, but it does quote the rules of professional
5 responsibility in Georgia, and so, I think those rules are
6 relevant here, and the fact that the District Attorney's
7 members and the District Attorney herself receives
8 training on this on and gets reminded on a periodic basis
9 of what their responsibilities are for the prosecutors is
10 relevant.

11 THE COURT: Okay. So are you going to be reminding
12 her now by reading it?

13 ATTORNEY DILLON: I would love to just read a few
14 snippets, if I may, Your Honor.

15 THE COURT: If they are truly snippets.

16 ATTORNEY DILLON: "The DA and Assistant DA's should
17 refrain from making extra judicial comments that have a
18 substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation
19 of the accused." That is rule 3.8.

20 THE COURT: This relates to your theory that there
21 was a leak that wasn't necessary -- one, we don't know
22 there was a leak. Two, the District Attorney herself who
23 is the focus of your concern because of the political
24 support she has from someone with whom she is politically
25 aligned, that she somehow has been behind the leak that, I

1 guess would have been behind the leak that your client is
2 a target, but there is no evidence of that.

3 ATTORNEY DILLON: There was no evidence that my
4 client was a client was a target until two days ago when
5 they said it in their reply brief, Your Honor.

6 THE COURT: Okay.

7 ATTORNEY DILLON: And that was not inadvertent. That
8 came directly from the mouth of the District Attorney's
9 office, and so we're not talking merely about this runoff.
10 We're talking about the fact that it is publicly confirmed
11 that Senator Jones is a target of this Grand Jury.

12 THE COURT: Okay.

13 ATTORNEY DILLON: Irrefutably.

14 THE COURT: So your focus is not on a theory that
15 would have got out but the confirmation, if you will, in
16 Ms. Cross's response to your response in your motion to
17 disqualify?

18 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor.

19 THE COURT: Okay. I'll let her talk about that.

20 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, I understand. That brings us
21 to the juncture that you pointed out where we began, which
22 is on one side, we have this headliner and they raised
23 \$32,000, and on the other side we have this target letter
24 that they publicly disclosed, and we have these series of
25 leaks to the press, and this is an effort to sway the

1 outcome of the election for Lieutenant Governor in this
2 case. It really has nothing to do with whether or not
3 they ultimately indict Senator Jones or the other group of
4 11, or anybody in this case, because once the publicity
5 machine has done it's business, the friends of the
6 District Attorney have won, and so that is really why
7 we're here, and so you ask, is there a real conflict here?
8 It couldn't be more.

9 THE COURT: Okay. Short of disqualification, what do
10 you view as a remedy? If I conclude that something needs
11 to be done, and I have the authority to do it, but I don't
12 think that it's practical or appropriate to say that the
13 entire District Attorney apparatus for Fulton County has
14 to unplug from any investigation, questioning of,
15 exploration of your client's connection to the
16 interference of the 2020 general election.

17 What do you see as an intermediate -- one would be
18 for me to say there is an apparent conflict, but I can't
19 do anything about that, because I can only handle actual
20 conflicts. Another would be to say either it's an actual
21 conflict, and I'm going to do something, or I'm going to
22 go out on a limb and do something even though it's only an
23 apparent conflict.

24 So if I'm going to do something, but it's not
25 disqualify the whole office, what is your second most

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preferable outcome?

ATTORNEY DILLON: Well, as the Court is aware, there are not numerous special Grand Juries of this magnitude to point to for precedent, so what we suggest in our brief is that the statutory provision that requires, once there's a conflict made apparent, that it be referred to Attorney General Carr's office and he find someone to conduct that portion of that here independent of this special Grand Jury, and it can be as simple as finding a District Attorney that doesn't have to find a good solid democratic District Attorney somewhere who doesn't have a conflict and give him the authority to pursue Senator Jones' issue in this, and we would be glad to sit down with him.

We would be glad to sit down with you. We would be glad to approach this with the same willingness to say let's get to the bottom of this issue and whether or not there was a conspiracy to undermine democracy in this country because that is an important issue, and let's put the media circus behind us. So let's answer the questions and forget it affecting this election for Lieutenant Governor, because there's no way she can keep a hand in it.

THE COURT: She being the District Attorney?

ATTORNEY DILLON: She being the District Attorney. Forgive me, Your Honor, and not affect the outcome of this

1 election for Lieutenant Governor.

2 THE COURT: So if Attorney General Carr selected
3 fictional District Attorney X who had also given \$2,000 to
4 Charlie Bailey's campaign for Lieutenant Governor --

5 ATTORNEY DILLON: It would not be a problem at all.
6 It's an ordinary contribution, and it's exactly what
7 counsel points to. Now, if they had hosted a fundraiser
8 during the time period that they were investigating
9 Senator Jones, I might have to go to that judge and talk
10 about that fundraiser.

11 THE COURT: What if that District Attorney had
12 already hosted -- the District Attorney is not involved in
13 that investigation. She hosted a fundraiser two weeks
14 ago, \$50 grand or even more money than DA Willis, but it's
15 done. It's over and done with, and I'm not going to do
16 anymore fundraisers from here on out, because now I've
17 been tasked with seeing what connection, if any, Senator
18 Jones had to what was going on in November and December.

19 ATTORNEY DILLON: If every District Attorney in the
20 whole state had hosted a fundraiser for Mr. Bailey then
21 that issue might be apparent, but I suspect, giving the
22 list of good democratic District Attorneys in this state
23 that we can find somebody who doesn't have a conflict and
24 hasn't hosted a fundraiser for either one, because
25 certainly, if somebody that hosted a fundraiser for

1 Senator Jones, the Attorney General shouldn't nominate
2 that person either. Find somebody who doesn't have a dog
3 in the hunt. Fani Willis has a dog in this hunt.

4 THE COURT: Got it. Thank you, sir.

5 ATTORNEY DILLON: Thank you, Your Honor. Oh, can we
6 offer into evidence Exhibits now.

7 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Actually, I was going to ask
8 to leave it up.

9 THE COURT: Leave it up? Okay, don't take it down?
10 Too late. Thank you, Ms. Clapp.

11 ATTORNEY DILLON: Can we offer into evidence 1-5?

12 THE COURT: If there's no objection, 1-5. Was 5 the
13 one where the province was the internet?

14 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Yes. I was going to object to
15 the authenticity. I believe the foundation has been shown
16 for Exhibit NO. 5, we entered it into evidence so I didn't
17 object to the Court reviewing it, but I do object to it
18 being tendered and admitted.

19 THE COURT: Why don't we do this? I will take 1-5,
20 and then I will give Mr. Dillon to maybe shore up his
21 sourcing of it, and if, in fact, it is pretty clear that
22 Smith was the name of -- Mr. Smith's presentation then
23 I'll add to 5 the other 4. I'll hold on to it, but it
24 won't become part of the record until either Ms. Cross you
25 agree to talk to Mr. Dillon a little bit more and we see

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1 the source, or we're substituting to you -- someone can
2 get it off the PACK site.

3 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I do want to raise objections
4 to some of the others, but if they're being tendered now
5 into evidence, Exhibit 1, the letter, I don't have any
6 objection to that.

7 THE COURT: Okay, 1 is admitted.

8 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Exhibit No. 2 is the e-mail
9 that I do have an objection to that being tendered and
10 accepted into evidence without any providence of it. I do
11 also object to the relevance of it. There's nothing in
12 this e-mail that sources any information to the District
13 Attorney's office insofar as this being offered to show
14 that the leaks are coming from this side of the table. I
15 object to the relevance of that, and I don't think it
16 shows that, and I object to the admission of it into
17 evidence.

18 THE COURT: Okay.

19 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: No. 3 is the fundraiser flyer
20 that is up on the screen now, and we don't have any
21 objection to that being tendered and admitted into
22 evidence. Exhibit No. 4. Again, I have an objection to
23 the relevance of this. I don't think it shows what, at
24 least what's been argued. It's been identified and
25 offered for the purpose of establishing how much money was

1 raised at the fundraiser, but what the actual document is
2 or appears to be, based on Mr. Dillon's representation,
3 and I don't have any reason to doubt it.

4 This is publicly available about how much money was
5 donated to mr. Bailey campaign during a 2-day period in
6 this document to the fundraiser, and while w I don't
7 think that is going, and because of that I don't think
8 that we have an objection to the ruling.

9 THE COURT: Okay, and then 5 is being conditionally
10 admitted, provisionally admitted. I'm assuming you can
11 clear up the source.

12 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Yes, sir.

13 THE COURT: All right. Anything you want to add, Mr.
14 Dillon?

15 ATTORNEY DILLON: No, Your Honor.

16 THE COURT: All right. I will admit Exhibits 1 and
17 3, and then 5 will be provisionally admitted. We'll see
18 if the loose ends can be tied up there. Last question,
19 Mr. Dillon, and I'll let you sit down. Beyond the Young
20 case, is there a case or are there cases you want me to
21 look at that stand for the proposition that the appearance
22 of a conflict could be sufficient for a Judge to take any
23 of the forms of remedial action that you are seeking?

24 ATTORNEY DILLON: Your Honor, I rely on the Davenport
25 case, and that is a Georgia case.

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THE COURT: I don't see it in here. You're free to rely on it. It didn't manage to make it's way into your motion.

ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: It was in mine. It's on page 4.

THE COURT: You guys share very well when it comes to cases.

ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: The Cite is 170 -- I'm' sorry, it's 157 Georgia Appeals 704, if that's the case you're referring to.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you agree, Ms. Cross, that that discusses the Davenport actual vs. apparent conflicts.

ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I didn't cite it for that proposition, and that's not my recollection of discussion in the case.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll look at it anyway.

ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Yes, but don't -- yes.

ATTORNEY DILLON: Your Honor, I never did get clarity on the basis for the objection to Exhibit 2, other than she objected to it.

THE COURT: Relevance was one, and I think it was foundation, although, the recipient, Mr. Dillon, I think he could authenticate it as receiving it, but I'm not sure the relevance you suppose that Mr. Isokoff(sp.) theorized what he did because the District Attorney's office let him

1 know about it, as opposed to the witness from the Grand
2 Jury or the grand juror.

3 I don't know who's in the circle of discussing who is
4 going to be a target or not, but you've made your point.
5 I'm just not going to make it part of the record.

6 ATTORNEY DILLON: Okay, and with regard to Exhibit 4,
7 the financial fundraising report. We offer that as to Mr.
8 Bailey's take over the two days, the day of the fundraiser
9 and the day after, and we submit that it is relevant.

10 THE COURT: Okay. I thought it showed his take for
11 the whole month.

12 ATTORNEY DILLON: No, no, no, no. It's just a 2-day
13 period.

14 THE COURT: It is before and after the 14th?

15 ATTORNEY DILLON: It is the day of the 14th and the
16 day after.

17 THE COURT: And it is publicly available?

18 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, it is, Your Honor.

19 THE COURT: All right. I'll admit it.

20 ATTORNEY DILLON: That was Exhibit 4.

21 THE COURT: Yes.

22 ATTORNEY DILLON: May I offer a copy to the Court;
23 I'm not sure I did that, Your Honor.

24 THE COURT: What you want to make sure is that the
25 court reporter, ultimately, has them. I've got number 2

1 of -- here when we're done will do that. Just make sure
2 before you go that our court reporter has 1, 3, and 4, and
3 5 you're going to hold on to until you and Ms. Cross can
4 work out if you we're able to put more to the story to
5 that.

6 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor.

7 THE COURT: Ms. Cross, your closing thoughts about
8 disqualification.

9 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Very brief ones. Your Honor,
10 we're taking a look now at what has been admitted as Mr.
11 Jones, Exhibit 3. You'll notice that Mr. Jones is not Mr.
12 Bailey's opponent at this point in the Lieutenant
13 Governor's race.

14 If anybody's got a problem, or was the opponent of
15 Mr. Bailey at that time was Mr. Kwanzaa Hall because at
16 this point, Mr. Bailey was in a run off election, and he
17 was very clearly identified as District Attorney Willis
18 raising money for Mr. Bailey in the runoff fundraiser.

19 THE COURT: It's the largest font on the page. Even
20 larger than the District Attorney's name.

21 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I understand, insofar, as
22 we're talking about appearances. I think that shifts the
23 focus a little bit. The District Attorney isn't raising
24 money for the opponent of Senator Jones in giving this
25 fund raiser, this is prior to Mr. Bailey becoming the

1 actual Lieutenant Governor nominee for his party, so I
2 want to make that as clear as it can be.

3 THE COURT: When was the runoff election?

4 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Sometime after June.

5 THE COURT: Good.

6 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Someone with easier access to
7 google might be able to -- the last week of June.

8 THE COURT: Late June?

9 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Late June.

10 THE COURT: All right. Got it.

11 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Mr. Smith is going to be so
12 pleased, because he gets another mention. I shared with
13 Mr. Dillon an affidavit from Mr. Smith, who is actually
14 general counsel of the prosecuting of Georgia. May I
15 approach, Your Honor?

16 THE COURT: Yes.

17 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I've got an original for the
18 court reporter, but I'll hold onto that until it's been
19 tendered and amended. This is an affidavit, thank you,
20 that I shred with Mr. Dillon not long before the hearing
21 identifying that Mr. Smith is someone who deals with
22 conflict. He routinely advises District Attorney's as far
23 as general and other entities to the inquiry about the
24 legal requirements and that's the legal conflict for
25 individuals, prosecuting attorneys.

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1 He's reviewed the motion, he's reviewed the response,
2 the motion of Senator Jones, including the runoff
3 fundraiser flyer that we're still looking at, and he
4 determined, in fact, in his opinion that it does not a
5 legal requirement.

6 I'm not suggesting that Mr. Smith's opinion
7 (undecipherable) the Court's, but insofar as the
8 individual who routinely advises district attorneys about
9 these matters, this is the individual who is saying that
10 there is not an actual conflict. There is also language
11 in their indicating, of course, that he does advise that
12 an actual conflict is required, as opposed to the
13 appearance of one, so we ask that State's Exhibit No. 1 be
14 admitted.

15 THE COURT: Any objection to State's 1 being
16 admitted, assuming Jones 5 ultimately get's admitted?

17 ATTORNEY DILLON: Yes, Your Honor. I'm going to
18 object, subject to Jones 5 being admitted along with this.

19 THE COURT: Okay.

20 ATTORNEY DILLON: I have no reason to doubt the
21 authenticity of this, but Mr. Smith also trains them on an
22 ethical (unintelligible) and so we could be back here next
23 week with a motion for prosecutorial misconduct, which I
24 won't define, but the ethical rules also apply to the
25 District Attorney's office, and in the presentation that I

1 provided the Court, he lays out exactly the rules that DA
2 Willis' office has violated.

3 THE COURT: Okay. Sort out Exhibit 5 soon, so I can
4 put that alarm on it. I'm going to admit DA 1 or State's
5 1, but I'd love to see 5. It seems like it ought to come
6 in. I understand the State's concern.

7 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I think we can work that out.
8 There comes a time when the Court considers Senator Jones'
9 offer of Exhibit No. 5, Mr. Smith's presentation. I
10 believe at least the excerpt that Mr. Dillon read this
11 afternoon was a concern or admonishment, or flagging the
12 extra judicial statements of the District Attorney or
13 prosecuting entity.

14 You've heard no evidence this afternoon or to my
15 knowledge in the record anywhere that there has been any
16 extra judicial statement from the District Attorney's
17 office about Mr. Jones officer that has played a part in
18 this.

19 Insofar as the objection this afternoon came to the
20 identification, apparently, for the first time officially,
21 that Senator Jones has received a target letter, of course
22 that was in direct response in the motion to disqualify
23 that was file by Senator Jones on Friday. They raised in
24 that motion equal protection and due process claims. They
25 reference constitutional protections of the Federal and

1 State Constitution, and they are essentially saying, hey,
2 look what you're doing. You're investigating me, and
3 you're doing that only because I am a political opponent
4 of someone you like.

5 That is our whole point to you, that is the whole
6 thrust of this. Friends get rewarded and enemies get
7 punished. The fact of the matter is, and what the
8 District Attorneys represented in that was, no, You're
9 just like everybody else. You're treated exactly like
10 everybody else, similarly situated to you, received the
11 same treatment and you can't show otherwise, and for that
12 reason the legal standard hasn't been met, so I wanted to
13 clear that up too.

14 Otherwise, I'm happy to address any concern or
15 comment further from the Court that I think the motion --
16 the burden hasn't been satisfied. It is not a legal
17 conflict here and the motion should be denied after I
18 consult very briefly with my table.

19 THE COURT: Please consult. Can we take the screen
20 share down now?

21 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: Yes, and apparently we can
22 withdraw our objection to Exhibit 5.

23 THE COURT: Great.

24 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: There's no need to go forward.

25 THE COURT: Great. So before you leave, Mr. Dillon,
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1 make sure a copy gets to our court reporter, but I'd like
2 a copy of 5 as well.

3 ATTORNEY GREEN-CROSS: I'm handing up the original of
4 the affidavit of Mr. Smith.

5 THE COURT: Thanks. Mr. Dillon?

6 ATTORNEY DILLON: Very briefly, Judge. Regarding to
7 the last point raised by the State.

8 THE COURT: Which was?

9 ATTORNEY DILLON: That it is perfectly okay to out
10 the target letter status of Senator Jones in their
11 pleading.

12 THE COURT: I didn't hear that it was perfectly
13 okay. It was an explanation for -- the hand was forced,
14 and because an argument was made or treated differently.
15 I didn't hear that it was perfectly okay. I heard that it
16 was a justification. You don't think it's justified
17 because?

18 ATTORNEY DILLON: I think they could have made that
19 argument under (unintelligible) and not further the
20 appearance that they're favoring Mr. Bailey in trying to
21 do what? Hold my client up to public ridicule and
22 increase his shame, and do the things that Mr. Smith's
23 presentation says they should never do.

24 THE COURT: Ms. Pearson, was there anything you
25 wanted to add. Your motion with Ms. Deborrough, the

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1 motion to quash and disqualify. I mean your focus was
2 quashal, and I get that, but you adopted Mr. Dillon and
3 Ms. Clapp's motion.

4 You've shared with me that Mr. Still is a political
5 candidate. I appreciate that Mr. Shaeffer is politically
6 prominent in the Republican party and you said that all of
7 your client's are active in one way or another. What's
8 the disqualification argument? They seem to be not in the
9 same category as Mr. Dillon's client.

10 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, I would agree that
11 Senator Jones has the most direct conflict. In our view
12 not to ask for more relief than the senator himself has
13 asked for, in our view that remedy is not sufficient to
14 address that conflict, and the conflict is exacerbated --
15 the evidence, by the politicization of our client's cases
16 and our client's processes.

17 THE COURT: Again, I'll have to have you explain what
18 you mean by politicization, given that it was your
19 client's were doing? What is politicization their
20 politicizing their activity, their political choices,
21 their connection to a political -- what's politicization
22 about it. other than talking about that which is
23 inherently political; I'm not following.

24 ATTORNEY PEARSON: I think it's a great distinction,
25 Your Honor. We're not talking about -- although we're

1 talking about political things, we're talking about
2 political motivation by one party against another party,
3 and to actions taken in one uniform direction against
4 republican candidates, prominent republican actors --

5 THE COURT: Was there a third group of alternate
6 democrat electors in case the democrat electors -- I'm not
7 aware that another group that the special purpose Grand
8 Jury should be investigating in connection with Republican
9 efforts to create republican alternate electors and to
10 challenge the outcome that, at that time, and continues to
11 show that a democrat won. I was going to press Ms. Cross,
12 but she didn't go there about partisan, because partisan
13 has lots of meanings.

14 I don't think that partisan, the case that she cited
15 was democrat and republican, it was I'm partisan because
16 I'm trying to get this guy prosecuted. I have a stake in
17 the outcome of this prosecution. That is not where her
18 argument went today, but everything about this is
19 inherently political, because two political parties
20 collided, someone appears who have won, and folks who
21 appear to have lost didn't like that outcome and said
22 appearances can be deceiving and took some steps, and the
23 question is where those steps legal, and that's the
24 purpose of this special purpose Grand Jury is
25 investigating, so it seems to me utterly unremarkable that

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1 your clients are all republicans. What would be
2 remarkable is if they weren't. What's the politicization
3 because I don't want to miss it if there's a reason to be
4 concerned, but you're not asking, I'd hope for, we have to
5 have a Republican District Attorney investigate this
6 because that's the only way it will be fair.

7 ATTORNEY PEARSON: No, not at all, Your Honor. I
8 think the process, well, I know Mr. Dillon's motion is
9 that the Attorney General would be allowed to designate
10 the replacement, and so we think that should be done,
11 because I think the appearance of impropriety with Senator
12 Jones taints the entirety as office of the entire
13 investigation, not just with regard to him as the remedy
14 for what I'm trying to say, but you are correct that our
15 focus was quashal, and that we are joining in that motion
16 as an add on.

17 I would also say, Your Honor, that just on behalf of
18 my clients, you asked if there is another slate that they
19 should be investigating, and I would argue under the
20 authorities that I put in our motion to the extent we were
21 contingent electors, and so were the democrats, because
22 there was a pending judicial challenge that made it joint.

23 And so, yes. The answer to your question is that
24 both electors were contingent about time contingent on the
25 judicial outcome which never came.

1 THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate that perspective, but
2 you did say you are seeking -- I'm paraphrasing you, more
3 relief or greater relief than Mr. Dillon was seeking, but
4 then I thought you ended it by saying we want what Mr.
5 Dillon recommended, which is push for his client, Senator
6 Jones situation to the Attorney General, and let the
7 Attorney General decide should I, the Attorney General,
8 find another District Attorney in her office to see if it
9 bares having a conversation with Senator Jones, or
10 investigating, or sending a letter, whatever they choose
11 to do. What's the difference between that and what you
12 think I ought to do in terms of disqualification and your
13 clients?

14 ATTORNEY PEARSON: Your Honor, I think the
15 disqualification, if there is one, it is disqualification
16 to the entire investigation, and the disease cannot be
17 cabin to Senator Jones alone --

18 THE COURT: Okay.

19 ATTORNEY PEARSON: -- because it's still the special
20 Grand Jury being advised by this District Attorney, and
21 the report would still be advised by this District
22 Attorney, and so we don't believe that's a sufficient
23 cure, and that if there's a disqualification, it should be
24 from the entire investigation and not just from Senator
25 Jones.

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THE COURT: I follow that, and I thank you so much.

ATTORNEY DILLON: Just as a suggestion, Judge, and my learned counsel points to my own brief at page 6. The Magloclin(sp.) case, Magloclin v. Payne indicates that where the elected District Attorney is totally disqualified from the case, everybody in the office is. Here the special grand jury has two focuses.

One, the focus of the call between the president and the Secretary of State's office, and perhaps other officials that related to finding the votes. That's one aspect of it, and then there's the other aspect of it that could be carved off and sent to Mr. Carr's office to say, let's find a new District Attorney who doesn't have a dog in this hunt and do an investigation, do a proper investigation.

They can still have this other aspect of it, but a new District Attorney could come in and look at the evidence.

THE COURT: So without agreeing that there are only two aspects to what the special purpose Grand Jury is investigating, your creative idea is if I determine that there is going to be disqualification, it could be not as to individuals, but as to subject matter, and so this question of an alternate slate of electors, if that is something that needs to be further investigated, create a

1 separate entity to do that, that's not supervised by this
2 District Attorney?

3 ATTORNEY DILLON: That's correct, Your Honor.

4 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. All right. I think
5 we've covered everything, but let me find out from Ms.
6 Cross, Mr. Wade, Mr. Wakeford. Anything else from the
7 District Attorney's office?

8 ADA WADE: Nothing, Judge. Thank you.

9 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Dillon or Ms. Clapp, anything
10 further from Senator Jone's legal team?

11 ATTORNEY DILLON: No, Your Honor.

12 THE COURT: Ms. Pearson, Ms. Deborrough, anything
13 else from your clients?

14 ATTORNEY PEARSON: No, Your Honor. Thank You.

15 THE COURT: All right. So we're clear, some things
16 I'll need to memorialize in writing. I am not quashing
17 the subpoenas. I'm repeating myself, but I will be
18 issuing an order, a written order on the question of
19 disqualification, and it will address, not just Mr.
20 Dillon's client, bur Ms. Pearson and Ms. Deboroughs'
21 clients as well.

22 I'll probably put in there a little bit about the
23 timing of the issuance of the report, but I want to make
24 it clear now in front of everyone what I've heard from the
25 District Attorney's office as well, there is no plan for a

1 date right now anyway. It's not available. If the way
2 the investigation flows, insofar as it stays with this
3 District Attorney's office and the special purpose Grand
4 Jury, that Grand Jury disgorges it's final report
5 somewhere near the election, it will not be published and
6 released until after the election.

7 I'll put that in writing as well, because from my
8 brief conversation with the grand jurors, just to check in
9 on their health and well being, they don't have that light
10 at the end of the tunnel, but things could change, and if
11 suddenly their work is done I will make sure that there is
12 a meaningful time buffer between release and election, and
13 it may well be that we need to publish the plan -- if it's
14 going to be released. If the report is going to be
15 released before the election we make sure when that
16 elected date is, so that if people have concerns or
17 objections we could file those and we could air that out
18 before the release.

19 I'd be shocked if there is a report before then. I'm
20 trying to prime interim report just for me from them on
21 how things are going. I don't know at all how they do
22 that, so we'll see how that goes. I appreciate everyone's
23 time, so with that you are all free to go.

24 (This matter has been adjourned.)

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Certificate

STATE OF GEORGIA)
COUNTY OF FULTON)

I, Hadassah J. David, official court reporter in and for the state of Georgia, do hereby certify that I did report and take down the foregoing pages on the 21th day of July 2022, that it is a true, accurate, and complete transcript of the proceedings transcribed herein to the best of my skill and ability. I further certify that the transcript is in conformity with the judicial counsel of georgia and the georgia board of court reporting. I hereby witness my hand and official seal this 15th day of August 2022.

/S/ HADASSAH J. DAVID, CCR

HADASSAH J. DAVID, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
#4857-8554-6837-1968
FULTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
HADASSAH J. DAVID, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

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
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Exhibit 13

August 25, 2022 Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Disqualification Request, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA



IN RE 2 MAY 2022 SPECIAL PURPOSE
GRAND JURY

2022-EX-000024

**ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DISQUALIFICATION REQUEST**

On 25 July 2022, the undersigned entered an Order disqualifying the District Attorney of Fulton County and her Office from investigating State Senator Burt Jones as part of the special purpose grand jury's investigation into possible criminal interference in the November 2020 general election in Georgia. The Court disqualified the District Attorney and her Office from investigating Senator Jones for good reason: her obvious and irreconcilable conflict of interest created by her decision to "pledge[] her name, likeness, and office" in support of Senator Jones's opponent in the upcoming election for Lieutenant Governor. Order of 25 July 2022 at 3.

In that same Order, the Court denied the motion to disqualify the District Attorney and her Office from investigating eleven other "alternate" electors who, like Senator Jones, had offered themselves up as potential electoral college votes for former President Trump even after he lost the Georgia popular tally by over 10,000 votes. These eleven, despite their disparate backgrounds, divergent roles in post-election activities, and fundamentally different postures in the District Attorney's investigation, remain a legal bloc represented by the same attorneys. Those attorneys, in a 16 August 2022 filing, are asking the Court to reconsider its ruling denying their motion to disqualify. Having

reviewed the record as well as the eleven alternate electors' recent motion, the Court reaffirms its position and DENIES the motion to reconsider.¹

The eleven alternate electors, despite their assertions to the contrary, are not similarly situated with Senator Jones. None is locked in a high-profile statewide political campaign against someone whom the District Attorney has personally and professionally endorsed.² Indeed, these alternate electors have provided no evidence that the District Attorney (or any member of her staff) has done anything that suggests a possible political motivation for investigating *them* -- beyond the banal observation that they are active Republicans and the District Attorney is not.³ Plainly that is not enough. Nor is it sufficient to point out that these alternate electors have all donated to Senator Jones's campaign for Lieutenant Governor (and the District Attorney has not). Their legal campaign donations are no more disqualifying than the District Attorney's. *See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.*, 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009) ("Not every campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that requires ... recusal."); *Gude v. State*, 289 Ga. 46, 50 (2011) (same) (both cases involve judicial recusals, where disqualification rules are more stringent).

¹ The Court also declines to provide a certificate of immediate review.

² Alternate elector Shawn Still is running for a State Senate seat. His contest is local and relatively low profile. More important, unlike Senator Jones, candidate Still offers no evidence that the District Attorney has supported his opponent in any manner (other than the bald claim that the District Attorney's pursuit of the election interference investigation is designed to harm him and aid his opponent). Thus, apart from the different political affiliations of the District Attorney and candidate Still, there is nothing to suggest any political link to the District Attorney's investigation into Still's activities as an alternate elector.

³ Remarkably, counsel for the eleven alternate electors cites as proof of the District Attorney's bias "her targeting of only Republicans." Mot. at 10. It eludes the undersigned how an investigation into allegations of *Republican* interference in the 2020 general election in Georgia would have any other list of targets than Republicans.

Contrary to the alternate electors' unavailing analogizing, this is not a basketball game or a closed military tribunal. It is a public investigation into possible electoral wrongdoing. The process is inherently "political" in the simple and unremarkable sense that politicians and leaders of a specific political party are alleged to have undertaken efforts to defeat the will of the Georgia electorate. A prosecutor who pursues such a case is not automatically biased and partisan -- and subject to disqualification -- because of the common political affiliations of the subjects (and targets) of the investigation. And most certainly it is not a legal, ethical, or even sensical requirement that the prosecutor share that political affiliation.

Until the eleven alternate electors can do more than parrot back language from the Court's Order addressing the profound conflict that the District Attorney faced with investigating Senator Jones as if it applies to their readily distinguishable situations, they should refrain from further petitions for disqualification.

SO ORDERED this 24th day of August 2022.




Judge Robert C.I. McBurney
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Exhibit 14

July 11, 2022 Certificate of Material Witness
Pursuant to the Uniform Act to Secure the
Attendance of Witnesses from Without the
State, Codified in the State of Georgia as
O.C.G.A. § 24-13-90 et seq. (Lindsey
Graham), In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose
Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024
(Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA



IN RE:)
SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY)
)
)
)

2022-EX-000024

Judge Robert C. I. McBurney

CERTIFICATE OF MATERIAL WITNESS
PURSUANT TO UNIFORM ACT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE
OF WITNESSES FROM WITHOUT THE STATE,
CODIFIED IN THE STATE OF GEORGIA AS
O.C.G.A. § 24-13-90 ET SEQ.

Upon the petition of Fani T. Willis, District Attorney, Atlanta Judicial Circuit, pursuant to the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State, codified at O.C.G.A. § 24-13-90 et seq., the Court issues the following Certificate under seal of this Court, and further says as follows:

1. A Special Purpose Grand Jury investigation commenced in Fulton County, Georgia, by order of this Court on May 2, 2022. *See* Order Impaneling Special Purpose Grand Jury Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100, et seq., “**Exhibit A**”. The Special Purpose Grand Jury is authorized to investigate any and all facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to possible attempts to disrupt the lawful administration of the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia. *See* Letter Requesting Special Purpose Grand Jury, “**Exhibit B**”.
2. Based on the representations made by the State in the attached “Petition for Certification of Need for Testimony Before Special Purpose Grand Jury Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-13-90 et seq.”, the Court finds that Lindsey Olin Graham, born July 9,

1955, (hereinafter, "the Witness") is a necessary and material witness to the Special Purpose Grand Jury investigation. The Court further finds that the Witness currently resides at 414 SOUTH CAPITOL ST SE WASHINGTON DC 20003.

3. Based on the representations made by the State in the attached "Petition for Certification of Need for Testimony Before Special Purpose Grand Jury Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-13-90 et seq.", the Court finds that the Witness made at least two telephone calls to Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger and members of his staff in the weeks following the November 2020 election in Georgia. During the telephone calls, the Witness questioned Secretary Raffensperger and his staff about reexamining certain absentee ballots cast in Georgia in order to explore the possibility of a more favorable outcome for former President Donald Trump. The Witness also made reference to allegations of widespread voter fraud in the November 2020 election in Georgia, consistent with public statements made by known affiliates of the Trump Campaign.
4. Based on the representations made by the State in the attached "Petition for Certification of Need for Testimony Before Special Purpose Grand Jury Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-13-90 et seq.", the Court finds that the Witness, based on the substance and timing of the telephone calls he personally made to Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, is a necessary and material witness in this investigation. The Witness possesses unique knowledge concerning the substance of the telephone calls, the circumstances surrounding his decision to make the telephone calls, the logistics of setting up the telephone calls, and any communications between himself, others involved in the planning and execution of the telephone calls, the Trump

Campaign, and other known and unknown individuals involved in the multi-state, coordinated efforts to influence the results of the November 2020 election in Georgia and elsewhere. Finally, the Witness's anticipated testimony is essential in that it is likely to reveal additional sources of information regarding the subject of this investigation.

5. The testimony of the Witness will not be cumulative of any other evidence in this matter.
6. The Witness will be required to be in attendance and testify before the Special Purpose Grand Jury on August 2, 2022, and continuing through and until the conclusion of the Witness's testimony on or before August 31, 2022, at the Superior Court of Fulton County, Fulton County Courthouse, 136 Pryor Street, 3rd Floor, Atlanta, Georgia 30303.
7. The Office of the Fulton County District Attorney, in and for the State of Georgia, will pay all reasonable and necessary travel expenses and witness fees required to secure the Witness's attendance and testimony, in accordance with O.C.G.A. §24-13-90 et seq.
8. The Witness shall be given protection from arrest and from service of civil or criminal process, both within this State and in any other state through which the Witness may be required to pass in the ordinary course of travel, for any matters which arose before the Witness's entrance into this State and other states, while traveling to and from this Court for the purpose of testifying for this case.

9. The State of Georgia is a participant in a reciprocal program providing for the securing of witnesses to testify in foreign jurisdictions which likewise provide for such methods of securing witnesses to testify in their courts.
10. This Certificate is made for the purpose of being presented to a judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia by the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia or his duly authorized representative, who is proceeding at the request and on behalf of the Office of the Fulton County District Attorney to compel the Witness to be in attendance and testify before the Special Purpose Grand Jury on August 2, 2022, and continuing through and until the conclusion of the Witness's testimony on or before August 31, 2022, at the Superior Court of Fulton County, Fulton County Courthouse, 136 Pryor Street, 3rd Floor, Atlanta, Georgia 30303.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL as a judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County,
Georgia,

This the 27 day of July, 2022.




Hon. Robert C. I. McBurney
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
State of Georgia

Exhibit A

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
STATE OF GEORGIA

IN RE: REQUEST FOR
SPECIAL PURPOSE
GRAND JURY



ORDER APPROVING REQUEST FOR SPECIAL PURPOSE
GRAND JURY PURSUANT TO O.C.G.A. §15-12-100, et seq.

The District Attorney for the Atlanta Judicial Circuit submitted to the judges of the Superior Court of Fulton County a request to impanel a special purpose jury for the purposes set forth in that request. This request was considered and approved by a majority of the total number of the judges of this Court, as required by O.C.G.A. §15-12-100(b).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that a special purpose grand jury be drawn and impaneled to serve as provided in O.C.G.A. § 15-12-62.1, 15-12-67, and 15-12-100, to commence on May 2, 2022, and continuing for a period not to exceed 12 months. Such period shall not include any time periods when the supervising judge determines that the special purpose grand jury cannot meet for safety or other reasons, or any time periods when normal court operations are suspended by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the Chief Judge of the Superior Court. The special purpose grand jury shall be authorized to investigate any and all facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to alleged violations of the laws of the State of Georgia, as set forth in the request of the District Attorney referenced herein above.

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101(a), the Honorable Robert C. I. McBurney is hereby assigned to supervise and assist the special purpose grand jury, and shall charge said special purpose grand jury and receive its reports as provided by law.

This authorization shall include the investigation of any overt acts or predicate acts relating to the subject of the special purpose grand jury's investigative purpose. The special purpose grand jury, when making its presentments and reports, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-71 and 15-12-101, may make recommendations concerning criminal prosecution as it shall see fit. Furthermore, the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-83 shall apply.

This Court also notes that the appointment of a special purpose grand jury will permit the time, efforts, and attention of the regular grand jury(ies) impaneled in this Circuit to continue to be devoted to the consideration of the backlog of criminal matters that has accumulated as a result of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of Fulton County.

SO ORDERED, THIS 24 DAY OF January, 2022.



CHRISTOPHER S. BRASHER, CHIEF JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Exhibit B

OFFICE OF THE FULTON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
136 PRYOR STREET SW, 3RD FLOOR
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303


TELEPHONE 404-612-4639

Fani T. Mills
District Attorney



The Honorable Christopher S. Brasher
Chief Judge, Fulton County Superior Court
Fulton County Courthouse
185 Central Avenue SW, Suite T-8905
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

2022-EX-000017



January 20, 2022

Dear Chief Judge Brasher:

I hope this letter finds you well and in good spirits. Please be advised that the District Attorney's Office has received information indicating a reasonable probability that the State of Georgia's administration of elections in 2020, including the State's election of the President of the United States, was subject to possible criminal disruptions. Our office has also learned that individuals associated with these disruptions have contacted other agencies empowered to investigate this matter, including the Georgia Secretary of State, the Georgia Attorney General, and the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Georgia, leaving this office as the sole agency with jurisdiction that is not a potential witness to conduct related to the matter. As a result, our office has opened an investigation into any coordinated attempts to unlawfully alter the outcome of the 2020 elections in this state.

We have made efforts to interview multiple witnesses and gather evidence, and a significant number of witnesses and prospective witnesses have refused to cooperate with the investigation absent a subpoena requiring their testimony. By way of example, Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, an essential witness to the investigation, has indicated that he will not participate in an interview or otherwise offer evidence until he is presented with a subpoena by my office. Please see Exhibit A, attached to this letter.


Therefore, I am hereby requesting, as the elected District Attorney for Fulton County, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 et. seq., that a special purpose grand jury be impaneled for the purpose of investigating the facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to possible attempts to disrupt the lawful administration of the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia. Specifically, a special purpose grand jury, which will not have the authority to return an indictment but may make recommendations concerning criminal prosecution as it shall see fit, is needed for three reasons: first, a special purpose grand jury can be impaneled by the Court for any time period required in order to accomplish its investigation, which will likely exceed a normal grand jury

term; second, the special purpose grand jury would be empowered to review this matter and this matter only, with an investigatory focus appropriate to the complexity of the facts and circumstances involved; and third, the sitting grand jury would not be required to attempt to address this matter in addition to their normal duties.

Additionally, I am requesting that, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101, a Fulton County Superior Court Judge be assigned to assist and supervise the special purpose grand jury in carrying out its investigation and duties.

I have attached a proposed order impaneling the special purpose grand jury for the consideration of the Court.

Respectfully,



Fani T. Willis
District Attorney, Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Exhibit A: Transcript of October 31, 2021 episode of *Meet the Press* on NBC News at 26:04
(video archived at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B71cBRPgt9k>)
Exhibit B: Proposed Order

cc:


- The Honorable Kimberly M. Esmond Adams
- The Honorable Jane C. Barwick
- The Honorable Rachelle Carnesdale
- The Honorable Thomas A. Cox, Jr.
- The Honorable Eric Dunaway
- The Honorable Charles M. Eaton, Jr.
- The Honorable Belinda E. Edwards
- The Honorable Kelly Lee Ellerbe
- The Honorable Kevin M. Farmer
- The Honorable Ural Glanville
- The Honorable Shakura L. Ingram
- The Honorable Rachel R. Krause
- The Honorable Melynee Leftridge
- The Honorable Robert C.I. McBurney
- The Honorable Henry M. Newkirk
- The Honorable Emily K. Richardson
- The Honorable Craig L. Schwall, Sr.
- The Honorable Paige Reese Whitaker
- The Honorable Shermela J. Williams
- Fulton County Clerk of Superior Court Cathelene "Tina" Robinson

Exhibit 15

August 25, 2022 Certificate of Material Witness Pursuant to the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State, Codified in the State of Georgia as O.C.G.A. § 24-13-90 et seq. (Mark Meadows), In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA



IN RE:)
SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY)
)
Witness:)
Mark Randall Meadows)

2022-EX-000024

Judge Robert C. I. McBurney

**PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION OF NEED FOR TESTIMONY BEFORE
SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY PURSUANT TO THE UNIFORM ACT TO
SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FROM WITHOUT THE STATE,
CODIFIED IN THE STATE OF GEORGIA AS O.C.G.A. § 24-13-90 ET SEQ.**

COMES NOW the State of Georgia, by and through Fani T. Willis, District Attorney, Atlanta Judicial Circuit, Fulton County, Georgia, and petitions this Honorable Court for a Certificate of Need for Testimony Before Special Purpose Grand Jury, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-13-92 et seq., and in support thereof says as follows:

1. A Special Purpose Grand Jury investigation commenced in Fulton County, Georgia, by order of this court on May 2, 2022. *See* Order Impaneling Special Purpose Grand Jury Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100, Et Seq, "Exhibit A". The Special Purpose Grand Jury is authorized to investigate any and all facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to possible attempts to disrupt the lawful administration of the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia. *See* Letter Requesting Special Purpose Grand Jury, "Exhibit B".
2. While Georgia law authorizes special purpose grand juries to conduct both civil and criminal investigations, the Special Purpose Grand Jury's investigation is criminal in nature in that it was requested for the purpose of investigating criminal disruptions

authorized to make recommendations concerning criminal prosecution. Further, the authority for a special purpose grand jury to conduct a criminal investigation has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Georgia. *See State v. Lampl*, 296 Ga. 892 (2015).

Accordingly, the provisions of the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State apply pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-13-92 et seq.

3. Based on the representations made by the State in the attached "Petition for Certification of Need for Testimony Before Special Purpose Grand Jury" the Court finds that Mark Randall Meadows, born July 28, 1959, (hereinafter, "the Witness") is a necessary and material witness to the Special Purpose Grand Jury's investigation. The Court further finds that the Witness currently resides in Sunset, Pickens County, South Carolina.
4. Based on the representations made by the State in the attached "Petition for Certification of Need for Testimony Before Special Purpose Grand Jury" the Court finds that the Witness is known to be affiliated with both former President Donald Trump and the Trump Campaign.
5. Based on the representations made by the State in the attached "Petition for Certification of Need for Testimony Before Special Purpose Grand Jury" the Court finds that from March 31, 2020, to January 20, 2021, the Witness served as Chief of Staff to former President Donald Trump and was in constant contact with former President Trump in the weeks following the November 2020 election.
6. Based on the representations made by the State in the attached "Petition for Certification of Need for Testimony Before Special Purpose Grand Jury" the Court finds that on December 21, 2020, the Witness attended a meeting at the White House

with former President Trump, members of Congress, and others to discuss allegations of voter fraud and the certification of electoral college votes from Georgia and other states. The Witness confirmed this meeting in a Tweet on December 21, 2020, when he stated, "Several members of Congress just finished a meeting in the Oval Office with President @realDonaldTrump, preparing to fight back against mounting evidence of voter fraud. Stay tuned."

7. Based on the representations made by the State in the attached "Petition for Certification of Need for Testimony Before Special Purpose Grand Jury" the Court finds that on December 22, 2020, the Witness made a surprise visit to the Cobb County Civic Center in Marietta, Georgia, where the Georgia Secretary of State's Office and the Georgia Bureau of Investigation were conducting an absentee ballot signature match audit. Officials conducting the audit were unaware of the Witness's trip to Georgia until shortly before he arrived at the Civic Center. The Witness requested to personally observe the audit process but was prevented from doing so because the audit was not open to the public.
8. Based on the representations made by the State in the attached "Petition for Certification of Need for Testimony Before Special Purpose Grand Jury" the Court finds that between at least December 30, 2020, and January 1, 2021, the Witness sent e-mails to United States Department of Justice officials, including Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen, making various allegations of voter fraud in Georgia and elsewhere and requesting that the Department of Justice conduct investigations into these allegations. The e-mails were obtained by the United States Senate Judiciary Committee and were released publicly.

9. Based on the representations made by the State in the attached "Petition for Certification of Need for Testimony Before Special Purpose Grand Jury" the Court finds that on January 2, 2021, former President Donald Trump and members of his team, including the Witness, participated in a lengthy telephone call with Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger and others to discuss allegations of voter fraud in Georgia. An audio recording of the telephone call was widely broadcast. During the telephone call, former President Trump stated to Secretary Raffensperger, "I just want to find 11,780 votes." The Witness actively participated in and spoke on the call, and the Special Purpose Grand Jury's investigation has revealed that the Witness was involved in setting up the call.

10. Based on the representations made by the State in the attached "Petition for Certification of Need for Testimony Before Special Purpose Grand Jury" the Court finds that the Witness is a necessary and material witness. The Witness possesses unique knowledge concerning the logistics, planning, and subject matter of the meeting at the White House on December 21, 2020. The Witnesses possess unique knowledge concerning the logistics, planning, and execution of his visit to the Cobb County Civic Center on December 22, 2020. The Witness possesses unique knowledge concerning the logistics, planning, and subject matter of his e-mails to United States Department of Justice officials. The Witnesses possesses unique knowledge concerning the logistics, planning, execution, and subject matter of the January 2, 2021, phone call with Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger. The Witness possesses unique knowledge concerning relevant communications between the Witness, former President Donald Trump, the Trump Campaign, and other known


and unknown individuals involved in the multi-state, coordinated efforts to influence the results of the November 2020 elections in Georgia and elsewhere. Finally, the Witness's anticipated testimony is essential in that it is likely to reveal additional sources of information regarding the subject of this investigation.

11. The testimony of the Witness will not be cumulative of any other evidence in this matter.
12. The Witness will be required to be in attendance and testify before the Special Purpose Grand Jury on Tuesday, September 27, 2022, at 9:00 a.m., at the Superior Court of Fulton County, Fulton County Courthouse, 136 Pryor Street, 3rd Floor, Atlanta, Georgia 30303. The Court notes that the District Attorney anticipates that the Witness's testimony will not exceed one day.
13. The Office of the Fulton County District Attorney, in and for the State of Georgia, will pay all reasonable and necessary travel expenses and witness fees required to secure the Witness's attendance and testimony, in accordance with O.C.G.A. §24-13-90 et seq.
14. The Witness shall be given protection from arrest and from service of civil or criminal process, both within this State and in any other state through which the Witness may be required to pass in the ordinary course of travel, for any matters which arose before the Witness's entrance into this State and other states, while traveling to and from this Court for the purpose of testifying for this case.
15. The State of Georgia is a participant in a reciprocal program providing for the securing of witnesses to testify in foreign jurisdictions which likewise provide for such methods of securing witnesses to testify in their courts.

16. This Certificate is made for the purpose of being presented to a judge of the Court of General Sessions of Pickens County, South Carolina, by the Office of the Solicitor, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, or his duly authorized representative, who is proceeding at the request and on behalf of the Office of the Fulton County District Attorney.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL as a judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County,
Georgia,

This the 22nd day of August, 2022.




Hon. Robert C. I. McBurney
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
State of Georgia

Exhibit A

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
STATE OF GEORGIA

IN RE: REQUEST FOR
SPECIAL PURPOSE
GRAND JURY



ORDER APPROVING REQUEST FOR SPECIAL PURPOSE
GRAND JURY PURSUANT TO O.C.G.A. §15-12-100, et seq.

The District Attorney for the Atlanta Judicial Circuit submitted to the judges of the Superior Court of Fulton County a request to impanel a special purpose jury for the purposes set forth in that request. This request was considered and approved by a majority of the total number of the judges of this Court, as required by O.C.G.A. §15-12-100(b).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that a special purpose grand jury be drawn and impaneled to serve as provided in O.C.G.A. § 15-12-62.1, 15-12-67, and 15-12-100, to commence on May 2, 2022, and continuing for a period not to exceed 12 months. Such period shall not include any time periods when the supervising judge determines that the special purpose grand jury cannot meet for safety or other reasons, or any time periods when normal court operations are suspended by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the Chief Judge of the Superior Court. The special purpose grand jury shall be authorized to investigate any and all facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to alleged violations of the laws of the State of Georgia, as set forth in the request of the District Attorney referenced herein above.

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101(a), the Honorable Robert C. I. McBurney is hereby assigned to supervise and assist the special purpose grand jury, and shall charge said special purpose grand jury and receive its reports as provided by law.

This authorization shall include the investigation of any overt acts or predicate acts relating to the subject of the special purpose grand jury's investigative purpose. The special purpose grand jury, when making its presentments and reports, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-71 and 15-12-101, may make recommendations concerning criminal prosecution as it shall see fit. Furthermore, the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-83 shall apply.

This Court also notes that the appointment of a special purpose grand jury will permit the time, efforts, and attention of the regular grand jury(ies) impaneled in this Circuit to continue to be devoted to the consideration of the backlog of criminal matters that has accumulated as a result of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of Fulton County.

SO ORDERED; THIS 24 DAY OF January, 2022.



CHRISTOPHER S. BRASHER, CHIEF JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Exhibit B


OFFICE OF THE FULTON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
136 PRYOR STREET SW, 3RD FLOOR
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Fani T. Mills
District Attorney



TELEPHONE 404-612-4639

The Honorable Christopher S. Brasher
Chief Judge, Fulton County Superior Court
Fulton County Courthouse
185 Central Avenue SW, Suite T-8905
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



January 20, 2022

Dear Chief Judge Brasher:

I hope this letter finds you well and in good spirits. Please be advised that the District Attorney's Office has received information indicating a reasonable probability that the State of Georgia's administration of elections in 2020, including the State's election of the President of the United States, was subject to possible criminal disruptions. Our office has also learned that individuals associated with these disruptions have contacted other agencies empowered to investigate this matter, including the Georgia Secretary of State, the Georgia Attorney General, and the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Georgia, leaving this office as the sole agency with jurisdiction that is not a potential witness to conduct related to the matter. As a result, our office has opened an investigation into any coordinated attempts to unlawfully alter the outcome of the 2020 elections in this state.

We have made efforts to interview multiple witnesses and gather evidence, and a significant number of witnesses and prospective witnesses have refused to cooperate with the investigation absent a subpoena requiring their testimony. By way of example, Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, an essential witness to the investigation, has indicated that he will not participate in an interview or otherwise offer evidence until he is presented with a subpoena by my office. Please see Exhibit A, attached to this letter.


Therefore, I am hereby requesting, as the elected District Attorney for Fulton County, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 et. seq., that a special purpose grand jury be impaneled for the purpose of investigating the facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to possible attempts to disrupt the lawful administration of the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia. Specifically, a special purpose grand jury, which will not have the authority to return an indictment but may make recommendations concerning criminal prosecution as it shall see fit, is needed for three reasons: first, a special purpose grand jury can be impaneled by the Court for any time period required in order to accomplish its investigation, which will likely exceed a normal grand jury

term; second, the special purpose grand jury would be empowered to review this matter and this matter only, with an investigatory focus appropriate to the complexity of the facts and circumstances involved; and third, the sitting grand jury would not be required to attempt to address this matter in addition to their normal duties.

Additionally, I am requesting that, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101, a Fulton County Superior Court Judge be assigned to assist and supervise the special purpose grand jury in carrying out its investigation and duties.

I have attached a proposed order impaneling the special purpose grand jury for the consideration of the Court.

Respectfully,



Fani T. Willis

District Attorney, Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Exhibit A: Transcript of October 31, 2021 episode of *Meet the Press* on NBC News at 26:04
(video archived at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B71cBRPgt9k>)

Exhibit B: Proposed Order


cc:

The Honorable Kimberly M. Esmond Adams
The Honorable Jane C. Barwick
The Honorable Rachelle Carnesdale
The Honorable Thomas A. Cox, Jr.
The Honorable Eric Dunaway
The Honorable Charles M. Eaton, Jr.
The Honorable Belinda E. Edwards
The Honorable Kelly Lee Ellerbe
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The Honorable Ural Glanville
The Honorable Shakura L. Ingram
The Honorable Rachel R. Krause
The Honorable Melynee Leftridge
The Honorable Robert C.I. McBurney
The Honorable Henry M. Newkirk
The Honorable Emily K. Richardson
The Honorable Craig L. Schwall, Sr.
The Honorable Paige Reese Whitaker
The Honorable Shermela J. Williams
Fulton County Clerk of Superior Court Cathelene "Tina" Robinson

Exhibit 16

January 16, 2023 Order Entering Portions of
Special Purpose Grand Jury's Final report
into Court Record, in re 2 May 2022 Special
Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-
000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA




IN RE 2 MAY 2022 SPECIAL PURPOSE
GRAND JURY

2022-EX-000024

**ORDER ENTERING PORTIONS OF SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY'S
FINAL REPORT INTO COURT RECORD**

On 13 February 2023, the undersigned entered an Order directing the publication, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 and consistent with the holding in *Thompson v. Macon-Bibb Cnty. Hosp. Auth.*, 246 Ga. 777 (1980), of certain portions of the Special Purpose Grand Jury's final report that sets forth its findings and recommendations to the District Attorney of Fulton County concerning its investigation into possible criminal interference in the 2020 general election in Georgia. Those three portions are attached to this Order as Exhibits A – C. The Clerk is directed to make this Order and its attachments available to the public.

SO ORDERED this 16th day of February 2023.



Judge Robert C.I. McBurney
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

EXHIBIT A
to Order of 16 February 2023
2022-EX-000024

1 **SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY REPORT**

2
3 This Special Purpose Grand Jury (herein referred to as "the Grand Jury") was
4 impaneled pursuant to an Order dated January 24, 2022 by Christopher S. Brasher,
5 Chief Judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County, Atlanta Judicial Circuit. The
6 Grand Jury consisted of twenty-six Fulton County residents, three of whom were
7 alternates. On any day testimony was received or deliberations were had, the number
8 of jurors present ranged between sixteen and twenty-four as availability allowed.
9 Pursuant to statute, if we had our needed quorum of sixteen jurors present, we could
10 do business with that.

11 The Grand Jury was impaneled to investigate a specific issue: the facts and
12 circumstances relating directly or indirectly to possible attempts to disrupt the lawful
13 administration of the 2020 presidential elections in the State of Georgia.

14 This Grand Jury was selected on May 2nd, 2022 and first heard evidence on
15 June 1st, 2022. We continued to hear evidence and receive information into
16 December 2022. The Grand Jury received evidence from or involving 75 witnesses
17 during the course of this investigation, the overwhelming majority of which
18 information was delivered in person under oath. The Grand Jury also received
19 information in the form of investigator testimony and various forms of digital and
20 physical media. Pursuant to Georgia law, a team of assistant district attorneys
21 provided the Grand Jury with applicable statutes and procedures. Any
22 recommendation set out herein is the sole conclusion of the Grand Jury based on
23 testimony presented, facts received, and our deliberations.

24 Following is the final report of the Special Purpose Grand Jury. We set forth
25 for the Court our recommendations on indictments and relevant statutes, including
26 the votes by the Grand Jurors. This includes the votes respective to each topic,
27 indicated in a "Yea/Nay/Abstain" format throughout. The total number of
28 Grand Jurors who placed a vote on each topic has been indicated in each section.
29 Footnotes have been added in certain places where a juror requested the opportunity
30 to clarify their vote for any reason. Each applicable statute is referenced by citation

1 number. Attached to this document as Appendix A is a complete set of Georgia
2 statutes referenced below.

3 The Grand Jury heard extensive testimony on the subject of alleged election
4 fraud from poll workers, investigators, technical experts, and State of Georgia
5 employees and officials, as well as from persons still claiming that such fraud took
6 place. We find by a unanimous vote that no widespread fraud took place in the
7 Georgia 2020 presidential election that could result in overturning that election.

8

EXHIBIT B
to Order of 16 February 2023
2022-EX-000024

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VIII.

A majority of the Grand Jury believes that perjury may have been committed by one or more witnesses testifying before it. The Grand Jury recommends that the District Attorney seek appropriate indictments for such crimes where the evidence is compelling.

CONCLUSION

The Grand Jury wishes to acknowledge the hardworking attorneys and staff of the Fulton County District Attorney's office. Any legal errors contained in this report should not be laid at their feet, however, because that Office had nothing to do with the recommendations contained herein.

If this report fails to include any potential violations of referenced statutes that were shown in the investigation, we acknowledge the discretion of the District Attorney to seek indictments where she finds sufficient cause. Furthermore, this Grand Jury contained no election law experts or criminal lawyers. The majority of this Grand Jury used their collective best efforts, however, to attend every session, listen to every witness, and attempt to understand the facts as presented and the laws as explained.

1 If the Court finds this report to have satisfied the purpose of the Special
2 Purpose Grand Jury as impaneled, we request that we be formally discharged from
3 our service.

4
5

6 This 15th day of December, 2022

7

8

_____/s/ [REDACTED]_____

9

Foreperson [REDACTED]

10

11

_____/s/ [REDACTED]_____

12

Deputy Foreperson [REDACTED]

13

EXHIBIT C

to Order of 16 February 2023

2022-EX-000024

Addendum to Special Purpose Grand Jury Final Report

The undersigned Special Purpose Grand Jury Foreperson and Deputy Foreperson hereby make this Addendum to the Special Purpose Grand Jury Final Report to clarify two matters:

1. Before its dissolution, the Special Purpose Grand Jury voted to recommend that the Special Purpose Grand Jury Final Report be published. The Special Purpose Grand Jury did not recommend a manner or time for such publication.
2. At no time were 24 or more jurors present when evidence was received. 24 jurors, including alternates, were present only at an introductory meeting at the Fulton County Courthouse on May 12, 2022.



Foreperson




Deputy Foreperson

Exhibit 2

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA



IN RE:
SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY

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)
)

2022-EX-000024

Judge Robert C. I. McBurney

STATE'S RESPONSE TO MOTIONS

On March 20, 2023, former President Donald J. Trump filed a Motion in this matter seeking several forms of relief. Presenting a variety of arguments, the Motion¹ ultimately requested that the final report of the Fulton County Special Purpose Grand Jury² be “quashed and expunged from the record”; that all of the evidence “derived from” the SPGJ be suppressed in any future proceedings; and that the Fulton County District Attorney’s Office³ be disqualified from “any further investigation and/or prosecution of this matter or any related matter derived from their use of the SPGJ.” Mtn. at 51. On April 28, 2023, Cathleen A. Latham filed a Motion adopting or joining the original Motion. Mrs. Latham’s own Motion added a request for an injunction which would quash “the SPGJ actions” in their entirety, enjoin any State entity from “presenting or

¹ While two Movants have submitted Motions in this matter, this response will refer to the first, Mr. Trump’s, as “the Motion” throughout. Citations to the Motion will read as “Mtn. at [page]” or “Mtn., Exhibit [number].” The second, filed by Mrs. Cathleen A. Latham, will be referred to as the “Latham Motion” where applicable. Citations to the Latham Motion will read as “Latham Mtn. at [page].” This response will refer to the two parties who have brought these Motions as “Movants” or “the Movants” throughout. Where it is necessary to distinguish between the two Movants, this response will refer to them by their names.

² This response will refer to the Special Purpose Grand Jury as “SPGJ” or “the SPGJ” throughout.

³ This response will refer to the Fulton County District Attorney’s Office as “FCDAO” or “the FCDAO” throughout. Where it is necessary to discuss the District Attorney as an individual, this response will refer to her as “the District Attorney.”

utilizing any evidence or testimony derived by the SPGJ,” and disqualify the FCDAO from any further involvement in the matter. Latham Mtn. at 5-6. Both Motions requested a hearing, and also that this matter be reassigned or transferred to another judge for their consideration. This Court thereafter provided an order outlining a schedule for the State’s response and asked that the FCDAO specifically address whether the matter should be heard by another judge, as well as whether a hearing should be held.

The State now responds that the Motions should be dismissed or denied as appropriate. The Movants advance constitutional arguments for which they have no standing and which fail to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of pertinent statutes. They request that the FCDAO be disqualified on grounds which fail to meet the exacting standards for prosecutorial disqualification under Georgia law, and also by repeating prior unsuccessful arguments or adopting standards which do not apply. They refer vaguely to violations of their own due process rights arising from a “tainted” grand jury process without making a showing demonstrating the existence of either. Overall, the Motions are procedurally flawed and advance arguments that lack merit, and the State respectfully requests that this Court retain supervision of this matter and dismiss or deny the Motions as appropriate without a hearing.

I. Because the Movants do not provide any standard or basis for the transfer of this matter to another judge, this Court should retain supervision of this matter and deny the Motions without a hearing.

As an initial matter, the Movants request that their Motions not be heard by this Court, instead preferring that they be heard by either the Chief Judge or another Fulton County Superior Court judge. The Movants do not clarify a standard for assessing the request for a transfer to another judge, citing neither the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Superior Court Rules, nor any statute or other provision. The Motion states only that this Court’s “nexus to certain aspects of the SPGJ and the subsequent drafting of the report, in combination with his prior rulings” require a

transfer. Mtn. at 10. The grounds for this request appear to be twofold. First, the Movants disagree with this Court's "improper application of the law," specifically its rulings regarding the criminal nature of the SPGJ and the disqualification of the FCDAO. Second, the Movants argue that certain comments made by the Court during oral argument in 2022 were improper. Because these arguments lack merit, and neither establishes an appropriate basis for the transfer of this matter to a different judge, the District Attorney respectfully asserts that there are no grounds for another judge to hear these Motions.⁴

The first basis for transfer offered by the Movants is without merit because disagreement or criticism of a judge's prior rulings does not furnish a litigant with a basis for having subsequent motions heard by a different judge. The second basis provided by the Movants concerns comments made by this Court during oral arguments made during 2022 (Mtn. at 48-50), but it is not clear what impact, if any, the comments could have had upon the Movants. Certainly, these comments, which appear to relate to witnesses' possible assertion of Fifth Amendment rights before the SPGJ, have nothing at all to do with Mr. Trump, as they were not made about him or any aspect of SPGJ administration that involved him. Mrs. Latham joins and adopts Mr. Trump's Motion but does not clarify how any comments concerning the possible assertion of Fifth Amendment rights before the SPGJ actually affected her. The Movants argue only that this Court's comments could have possibly affected the grand jurors' understanding of certain witnesses' assertion of their Fifth Amendment rights and that, as a result, non-witnesses were also negatively affected. Mtn. at 50.

⁴ The Motion also criticizes this Court's denial of certificates of immediate review in two instances. Mtn. at 10; 19 n.13; 24. Such decisions are subject to a judge's "unfettered discretion" and "carte blanche authority." *Duke v. State*, 306 Ga. 171, 178-79 (3)(a) (2019). The Motion clarifies that the Movants disagreed with this Court's decisions in those instances, both substantively and procedurally, but it does not articulate how the denials amount to judicial impropriety or why they might support the transfer of this matter to another judge.

Movants refer generally to the Court's comments "violating the rights of" witnesses as well as "all parties impacted by the investigation, including [Movants]." *Id.* The Motion then combines this Court's comments with other arguments they make regarding the application of the Fifth Amendment within the SPGJ (addressed herein in Part IV) and asserts that together these demonstrate a "flawed process" requiring the quashal of any evidence obtained by the SPGJ "in violation of the rights of witnesses and non-parties alike." *Id.* The Movants argue the SPGJ was a "constitutionally unsound investigation" whose impartiality cannot be trusted by the public and whose report "will negatively impact the due process rights of the named individuals." Mtn. at 48.

This Court should deny the Movants' request on these grounds for quashal of evidence obtained by the SPGJ. The Movants' vague and sweeping assertions of due process violations lack a basis in law or in fact. They provide no authority demonstrating how such comments could be fundamentally unfair to them. This Court's comments, made in the midst of extensive oral argument, are too isolated and too far removed from any possible impact upon the Movants' rights. It cannot suffice to assert that the comments might have been heard by the grand jurors, who as a result might have altered their understanding of the Fifth Amendment, which might in turn have affected their evaluation of certain witnesses, and which thus might have altered or "tainted" the report, which in turn might somehow negatively affect the Movants.

Because these arguments are far too attenuated to support any claim of a due process violation for either Movant, this Court should deny the Movants' request for quashal as presented in Part VI of the Motion. As a result, this Court should also deny the Movants' request that their Motions be heard by another judge, particularly because they do not articulate any sort of standard for this Court's evaluation of their request. Finally, this Court should also deny the Movants' request for a hearing. The Movants' arguments are purely legal and do not raise any factual dispute

requiring resolution in a hearing. The original Motion attaches hundreds of pages of exhibits containing statements, transcripts, and prior orders of this Court, and there is no factual matter that will be further developed by a hearing. As will be shown below, most of the Movants' arguments are barred by lack of standing, untimeliness, and other procedural flaws, and any remaining arguments are without merit. There are simply no matters requiring resolution by this Court that require or warrant a hearing. As a result, in compliance with the instructions of this Court, the District Attorney respectfully requests that this Court deny the Movants' request for a hearing and rule upon these Motions on the basis of the papers.

II. The statutes concerning special purpose grand juries are not unconstitutional.

The Movants argue that the statutory scheme defining and governing special purpose grand juries is unconstitutional.⁵ They assert that the statutes are both unconstitutionally vague (Mtn. at 15-21) and unconstitutional as applied in this matter (Mtn. at 21-31). Because the Movants fail to demonstrate a cognizable, individualized injury and therefore lack standing, their constitutional challenges should be dismissed. To the extent that the Court evaluates the substance of their challenges, the Movants' arguments fail to demonstrate either vagueness or as-applied constitutional concerns, and their Motions should be denied.

A. Standing

The Georgia Supreme Court recently engaged in close examination of the nature of standing under the Georgia Constitution. In so doing, the Court reaffirmed a basic and longstanding tenet of jurisprudence: in order to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, a citizen must demonstrate an "individualized injury" or "injury-in-fact." "We have long held that Georgia courts may not decide the constitutionality of statutes absent an individualized

⁵ These statutes include O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-100, 15-12-101, and 15-12-102.

injury to the plaintiff...This kind of individualized injury seems similar to the injury-in-fact required federally...nothing in this opinion should be understood to undermine in any way our longstanding case law articulating this requirement.” *Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Bd. Of Comm’rs*, 315 Ga. 39, 54 n.13 (2022) (collecting cases). “Standing to challenge a statute on constitutional grounds in Georgia depends on a showing that the plaintiff was injured in some way by the operation of the statute or that the statute has had an adverse impact on the plaintiff’s rights.” *Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.*, 283 Ga. 271, 273 (1) (2008) (citations omitted). Even in the possibly more permissive context of First Amendment challenges (which the Movants do not make here), litigants cannot “make facial attacks upon entire statutory schemes and provisions by which they were not harmed ‘as applied’ or harmed by ‘running afoul’ of the provision.” *Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Roswell*, 283 Ga. 417, 421 (1) (2008).

Neither of the Movants can satisfy the standing requirements articulated by the Georgia Supreme Court. Their arguments reveal no individualized injury or injury-in-fact. Instead, the Movants submit arguments that, if anything, argue that certain *other parties* may have standing to challenge the special purpose grand jury statutes. The Movants only arrive at an injury to themselves through a daisy chain of cause and effect: if other parties could articulate individualized injuries to themselves, this could affect the administration of the grand jury or the creation of its final report. If the final report is affected, it is possible that individuals named in the report could be affected. If the Movants are among the individuals named in the report, then their due process rights could possibly be injured. The individualized injury requirement prevents exactly this kind of attenuation.

The Movants’ explanations for their own standing are disconnected from the actual arguments they provide in support of a finding of unconstitutionality. Mr. Trump asserts that he

has been “inextricably intertwined with this investigation since its inception” in early 2021, also observing that he participated in the event which precipitated the investigation, a phone call in January of 2021. Mtn. at 11. However, as he acknowledges, he was never a witness before the SPGJ. Mrs. Latham suggests that she has standing because she was identified as a “target” of the investigation.⁶ Latham Mtn. at 2. She, too, never testified. Despite this, nearly all of the grounds identified by the Movants for challenging the constitutionality of the statutes involve their application to, and effects upon, the rights of actual witnesses. *See* Mtn. at Part III.A.i, Part III.B, Part III.C. The only remaining grounds identified by the Movants address vagueness as to the administration of the SPGJ and the issuance of its final report. *See* Mtn. at Part III.A.ii. Even if a party is named in a SPGJ final report, that does not mean the party is injured by the statute describing the report’s creation. If the statutes were vague in the regards suggested, the parties suffering actual injury would be the supervising judge and the grand jurors, who would be left without guidance as to how they should govern themselves in discharging their duties under the law. Because the Movants’ arguments do not demonstrate individualized injuries or injuries-in-fact rather than injuries-in-conjecture, they lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of the pertinent statutes.

B. Vagueness

The Movants argue that the statutes governing special purpose grand juries are unconstitutionally vague in two ways: because they do not specify whether the nature of SPGJs is civil, criminal, or both; and because the statutes are vague about the “contents and release” of the SPGJ’s final report. Neither argument is persuasive.

⁶ As discussed below, being named as a “target” does not alter one’s rights before a special purpose grand jury, particularly when one does not testify before such a grand jury.

Beginning with the “nature” of SPGJs, O.C.G.A § 15-12-100(a) is clear that, similarly to “regular” grand juries, SPGJs are authorized to investigate “any alleged violation of the laws of this state or any other matter subject to investigation by grand juries as provided by law.” The authorization is clearly broad, but just because a statute is *broad* does not mean that it is *vague*. It follows, naturally, that if regular grand juries are authorized to investigate both civil and criminal matters, then a SPGJ is as well. In *State v. Lampl*, 296 Ga. 892, 895-96 (1) (2015), the Supreme Court acknowledged that SPGJs can investigate criminal matters. *Lampl* also established that a SPGJ is bound by the law and by the scope of its authority described in its impaneling order; the order in that case authorized a criminal investigation. *Id.* As this Court has previously found, the SPGJ in this case was requested by the District Attorney, impaneled specifically to investigate criminal activity, and authorized to provide recommendations for criminal charges. All of this comported with the clear language of the statute authorizing investigations into any alleged violation of Georgia law.

In response, the Movants cite only the arguments of prospective SPGJ witnesses who moved to quash their SPGJ subpoenas. They cite to *In re Jacki L. Pick*, WR-94, 066-01 (Tex. App. 2022), involving witness Jacki Pick’s motion to quash her out-of-state subpoena in Texas, as well as efforts by Governor Brian Kemp and Senator Lindsey Graham to have their subpoenas quashed on grounds of sovereign immunity. Not one of these efforts produced a decision on the merits declaring that SPGJs are necessarily civil rather than criminal. Ms. Pick’s subpoena was quashed on procedural grounds, and the concurring opinions attached to the decision in her case likely say more about the application of the law in Texas than they do in Georgia. This is because *In re Pick* was the *only* case where any judge expressed opinions that Georgia’s SPGJ investigations might only be civil rather than criminal in nature. Every other court, in multiple states, which opined

upon the nature of the SPGJ determined that it was conducting a criminal investigation and authorized to summons witnesses under the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State. *See* O.C.G.A. § 24-13-90 et seq. Such unanimity indicates clarity rather than unconstitutional vagueness of some kind. Additionally, neither Governor Kemp nor Senator Graham were successful in their attempts to persuade courts that the SPGJ was civil; this Court determined the investigation was clearly criminal, and the Northern District of Georgia dismissed Senator Graham's arguments as "unpersuasive and unavailing." *See In re Jury*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146741, *20-21. To the extent that any conclusion can be drawn from the litigation arising from this matter, it is not that the statutes are too vague in determining whether a SPGJ can be of a criminal nature.

The Movants also assert that the statutes are impermissibly vague regarding the creation, contents, and release of the SPGJ's final report. However, the statutes articulate requirements for the final report which negate any suggestion of impermissible vagueness or possible violations of due process. A SPGJ's final report must indicate that it has completed the investigation authorized in its impaneling order, and it must do so to the satisfaction of the supervising judge and a majority of the jurisdiction's Superior Court bench. *See* O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101(b). Again, this means that a SPGJ's authority to craft the report is *broad*, but it does not follow that it is unconstitutionally *vague*, and the requirement that not one but several judges must approve the dissolution of a SPGJ ensures that fundamental fairness is maintained. While the statute is flexible (a necessity, given the broad mandate afforded to grand juries), it does not contain an "insufficient objective standards and guidelines to meet the requirements of due process." *Jekyll Island State Park Civic Auth. V. Jekyll Island Citizens Ass'n.*, 266 Ga. 152, 153 (1996).

C. As Applied

Finally, the Movants argue that the statutes governing SPGJs are unconstitutional as applied in this case. These arguments all involve the rights of *witnesses* who might come before the SPGJ, so again, the Movants lack standing to challenge the statutes on such a basis. In any event, the application of the statutes in this matter does not demonstrate a constitutional deficiency of any kind.

In making this argument, the Movants first turn again to their insistence that the SPGJ can only be civil in nature. They cite *Kenerly v. State*, 311 Ga. App. 190 (2011) and *State v. Bartel*, 223 Ga. App. 696 (1996) and attempt to demonstrate that this Court's prior rulings distinguishing *Kenerly* and *Bartel* from the present matter were made in error. Mtn. at 22-23. The problem for their argument remains that *Kenerly* mischaracterizes the holding in *Bartel* and that nowhere does *Bartel* indicate that SPGJs can conduct only civil investigations. This is precisely what this Court previously found. *See* Mtn. Exhibit 10 at 3-4. To hold otherwise would be to determine that SPGJs are empowered to conduct investigations of alleged crimes, but only as civil bodies. Such an interpretation makes no sense.

Movants additionally argue that the statutes are unconstitutional as applied because, in finding that the SPGJ was a criminal body, this Court authorized it to subpoena out-of-state witnesses. This argument is unavailing because the SPGJ was clearly criminal in nature, but also because there can be no due process concerns whatsoever. Witnesses subpoenaed from out of state had their subpoenas reviewed by two separate courts, including one in their home jurisdiction. If summoned, they were then able to invoke the Fifth Amendment or consult with an attorney at any time. Where the various requirements of the Uniform Act were followed (and Movant does not contend otherwise), there can be no due process violation to any out-of-state witness, much less to non-witnesses such as the Movants.

Finally, the Movants argue that the statutes were unconstitutional as applied because some individuals were named as “targets” of the SPGJ investigation and because witnesses’ Fifth Amendment rights were insufficiently protected. These arguments are unpersuasive because the term “target” has no constitutional significance in Georgia. The Supreme Court has held that a “target” can be summoned to a SPGJ so long as they are afforded the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment as any witness would. *Lampl*, 296 Ga. at 298-99. The Movants’ arguments as to the status of “targets” thus cannot demonstrate a constitutional problem. Regarding the application of the Fifth Amendment in the SGPJ, the Movants provide only suppositions, as is discussed below, and certainly nothing demonstrating an injury to either of them.

The Movants provide a litany of arguments but cannot connect them to an actual injury, actual vagueness, or actual as-applied constitutional issues. As a result, their arguments must fail, and this Court should dismiss or deny their Motions as appropriate.

III. The Movants fail to demonstrate that the District Attorney’s Office should be disqualified because they either repeat prior unsuccessful arguments, submit inadequate grounds for disqualification under Georgia law, or ask this Court to adopt inapplicable standards.

The Movants next argue that the FCDAO “must be recused, disqualified, and prevented from any further investigation or prosecution of this matter.” Mtn. at 31. This severe remedy is required, Movants insist, for three reasons: the Supervising Judge should have disqualified the FCDAO in July of 2022; the District Attorney has committed “forensic misconduct” by making public comments related to the investigation; and three of the District Attorney’s social media posts on Twitter have created an “appearance of impropriety” severe enough to require disqualification. The Movants’ arguments are untimely, improperly brought, and without merit, and they should be dismissed or denied as appropriate.

To begin with the untimeliness of the Movants' arguments, the Motion cites to hearings, statements, and social media posts made months or even years ago, in some instances referencing comments made before the SPGJ had even been impaneled. *See* Mtn. at 38 fn.24. And yet, as noted above, Mr. Trump asserts that he has been "inextricably intertwined with this investigation since its inception" in early 2021, also observing that he participated in the event which precipitated the investigation, a phone call in January of 2021. Mtn. at 11. By his own estimation, Mr. Trump has been at the center of an investigation which has progressed for over two years, but only now is he moving for the prosecutor's disqualification. To the extent that Mrs. Latham's arguments regarding disqualification are not barred by *res judicata* (discussed below), her remaining arguments are untimely as well.

If any of the elements put forward by Mr. Trump in his Motion (the disqualification of the FCDAO regarding Burt Jones in July of 2022, the District Attorney's statements to the media in 2021 and 2022, or the "appearance of impropriety" created by Twitter posts in July of 2022) were the egregious grounds for disqualification which he asserts they are, he had a duty to raise them to the Court's attention as soon as he learned of them. "Although we have not considered when a motion to disqualify a prosecutor based on an alleged conflict of interest should be asserted, we have held, in other contexts, that such challenges must be raised promptly after the defendant learns of a potentially disqualifying matter." *Reed v. State*, 314 Ga. 534, 546 (4) (2022). The objection must be raised "without delay, at the first opportunity after the accused learns of the grounds for disqualification." *Id.* (quoting *Hudson v. State*, 250 Ga. 479, 481 (1) (1983)).

Far from raising this issue promptly, Mr. Trump has waited years, until after the conclusion of an entire SPGJ investigation, when the FCDAO's own investigation has moved into its latter stages. Mr. Trump could have pursued the disqualification of the FCDAO in February of 2021,

after the District Attorney made certain comments to which he now objects (Mtn. at 38 fn.24), but he did not. He also did not do so when the District Attorney requested the impanelment of the SPGJ, or when the order creating the SPGJ was issued. He might have sought disqualification as the SPGJ pursued its investigation with the assistance of the FCDAO, but he did not then either. Mr. Trump did not argue for disqualification when Burt Jones did in the summer of 2022, nor did he do so when a group of alternate electors (including Mrs. Latham) requested reconsideration of the denial of their own disqualification motion shortly afterward. Mr. Trump remained silent on this matter when the Supervising Judge announced the dissolution of the SPGJ, and he chose not to even attempt to participate in the litigation surrounding the possible publication of the SPGJ's final report. Mr. Trump elected to pursue the disqualification of this office only after the FCDAO announced an investigation in early 2021, pursued it for months, requested the SPGJ in early 2022, impaneled and advised the SPGJ for the remainder of the year, received its report in early 2023, and began to litigate the possibility of the report's release. At this latter stage, and after all of these events occurred without action by Mr. Trump, he now seeks to prevent the FCDAO from "any further investigation or prosecution of this matter." His request for disqualification should therefore be dismissed as untimely.

Mrs. Latham, having adopted Mr. Trump's Motion, is now attempting, for a third time, to disqualify the FCDAO from investigating her. Along with several other alternate electors, she joined Burt Jones's motion for disqualification in July 2022, which was denied as to her (*see* Mtn., Exhibit 4), and she then filed a motion for reconsideration in August of 2022, which was also denied (*see* Mtn., Exhibit 13). To the extent that Mrs. Latham, having adopted Mr. Trump's arguments regarding disqualification, relies upon facts which should have been known to her prior to the filing of her motion for reconsideration in August of 2022, her arguments are untimely. To

the extent that, in adopting Mr. Trump's Motion, she merely restates her prior arguments, she is barred from raising them again by the doctrine of res judicata.⁷

If any purported grounds for disqualification remain after dismissing those which are untimely or barred by res judicata, the Movant's arguments concerning them lack sufficient merit. The Movants first insist that this Court erred when, even as it disqualified the FCDAO from investigating or otherwise prosecuting Burt Jones in 2022, it did not also disqualify the FCDAO from the *entire investigation*. In its July 2022 Order, this Court explained the focused and specific analysis required under Georgia law when evaluating motions for disqualification; such motions can be based only upon a conflict of interest or "forensic misconduct" relating to public statements, either of which must have a direct relationship to a specific individual. *See Williams v. State*, 258 Ga. 305, 314 (2)(B) (1988). In arguing that disqualification should extend instead to an entire matter or investigation, the Movants rely extensively upon a single Supreme Court case, *Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fil S.A. et al*, 481 U.S. 787 (1987). This case, however, is inapposite. *Young* involved a contempt case stemming from private litigation between two parties. The trial court in *Young* appointed the attorneys for the plaintiff to act as special prosecutors for a criminal contempt action against the defendants for activities arising directly from the private litigation. *Id.* at 791-92. These "special prosecutors" had an obvious and pervasive conflict of interest from the very inception of the contempt case, which led the Supreme Court to hold that "counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed as prosecutor in a contempt action alleging a violation of that order." *Id.* at 809.

⁷ *See* O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40: "A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set aside."

Obviously, such circumstances are not present in this case. Any reliance upon *Young* for the contention that disqualification applies to entire matters or investigations rather than individual defendants is misplaced. When this Court entered its order disqualifying the FCDAO from investigating Burt Jones, its analysis turned on the nature of the District Attorney's relationship to Mr. Jones specifically and explicitly rejected any claims that the District Attorney had a broader conflict of interest that might have applied to Mrs. Latham (and by extension, Mr. Trump or others). In *Young*, the special prosecutors had an inarguable conflict of interest that necessarily pervaded the entire case, including the facts giving rise to the actual criminal charges at issue. As it stands, nothing in *Young* indicates that Georgia's existing framework for the disqualification of prosecutors is inadequate or was incorrectly applied by this Court previously. The facts have not changed, and they still do not support the attribution of a finding of conflict of interest as to one individual to every other individual with some relation to the events surrounding the 2020 elections. Because the Movants rely solely upon *Young*, their arguments that this Court erred in its initial rulings on disqualification must fail.

The Movants also assert that the District Attorney has engaged in "forensic misconduct" by making statements to the media about the investigation. As noted above, forensic misconduct is one of the two generally recognized grounds for the disqualification of prosecutors. The only described example of forensic misconduct is "the improper expression by the prosecuting attorney of his personal belief in the defendant's guilt." *Williams*, 258 Ga. at 315. It is an exceedingly rare claim; *Williams* appears to be the only Georgia case discussing forensic misconduct in any depth. In *Williams*, the Georgia Supreme Court adopted a stringent and specific standard for evaluating claims of forensic misconduct: "[i]n determining whether an improper statement of the prosecutor as to the defendant's guilt requires his disqualification, the courts have taken into consideration

whether such remarks were part of a calculated plan evincing a design to prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jurors, or whether such remarks were inadvertent, albeit improper, utterances.”

Id.

Two obstacles to the Movants’ claims are immediately apparent under this standard: the statements to which they cite do not concern the Movants’ guilt, and no jury exists in this case. Nearly every one of the statements contained in Exhibit 5 of the Motion are conditional, vague, comments regarding “allegations,” or general statements about the investigation and the reason for its pursuit. The one statement which does directly address the District Attorney’s opinion of Mr. Trump’s culpability indicates the direct opposite of forensic misconduct: “FCDA said she has yet to make up her mind about whether the former president or his advocates broke the law and reiterates that she will treat President Trump like anyone else who crosses her desk.” *See Mtn.*, Exhibit 5 at no. 23.

Even if this Court were to determine that there were some statement from the District Attorney that could be considered improper, which was timely objected to and not subject to res judicata, the Movants have not (and cannot) show the sort of pervasive misconduct required for disqualification. The examples provided in *Williams* indicate the sort of egregious conduct required for such a showing. The opinion refers to a Vermont case where a prosecutor was disqualified for publicly pledging during a reelection campaign to secure a conviction against a defendant. *See id.* at 315 n.4; *Vermont v. Hohman*, 420 A2d 852 (Vt. 1980). In *Williams*, the prosecutor flatly stated his opinion of the defendant’s guilt, making a series of comments that culminated with, “In my opinion, therefore, there is substantial reason to believe Mr. Williams is guilty of the offense charged.” 258 Ga. at 310. Even then, the Supreme Court held that it was “quite clear” that the prosecutor’s comments were “not of such egregious nature as to require

disqualification.” *Id.* at 315.⁸ Disqualification for forensic misconduct in Georgia is only warranted by remarks which speak directly to the *prosecutor’s opinion* of a *defendant’s guilt* and which are part of a *calculated plan* designed to *prejudice a jury* against that defendant, and such remarks must be *egregious*. Even if a jury existed in this case, there is absolutely no indication of any such comments, or any such plan, in the present matter.

The Movants’ final argument regarding disqualification moves past the standard for disqualification under Georgia law and asks that this Court create a new one. The Movants point to three of the District Attorney’s social media posts on Twitter, all made in July of 2022, and argue that these posts, in combination with their prior arguments, create an “appearance of impropriety.” Mtn. at 41. That appearance of impropriety in turn “creates a conflict.” Mtn. at 43.

The Movants’ arguments on this last point fail for at least three reasons. First, their reasoning is backward. The “appearance of impropriety” does not create conflict; conflict creates the appearance of impropriety. “[A]ppointment of *an interested prosecutor* creates an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general.” *Young*, 481 U.S. at 811 (emphasis added). Second, the Movants’ argument seeks to import the “appearance of impropriety” standard for judicial recusal into the possible disqualification of prosecutors. *See* Rule 1.2, Code of Judicial Conduct (Judges must avoid “impropriety and the appearance of impropriety”). However, the standards for prosecutors and judges cannot be conflated, and courts have intentionally avoided doing so.

[B]ecause of their differing roles and responsibilities, the neutrality required of a judge is necessarily of a higher degree than that required of a prosecutor. While the

⁸ As an example of the sort of “egregious” behavior or plan contemplated by the term “forensic misconduct,” the *Williams* opinion then cites to *Pierce v. United States*, 86 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1936), a case that involved repeated improper comments before a trial jury in “what appears to have been a studied effort to inject into the case irrelevant and prejudicial matter for the purpose of influencing the verdict, and its continued repetition after adverse rulings.” *Id.* at 953.

prosecuting officer should see that no unfair advantage is taken of the accused, yet he is not a judicial officer. Those who are required to exercise judicial functions in the case are the judge and jury. The public prosecutor is necessarily a partisan in the case. If he were compelled to proceed with the same circumspection as the judge and jury, there would be an end to the conviction of criminals.

Whitworth v. State, 275 Ga. App. 790, 793 (2005) (citations omitted). See also *Young*, 481 U.S. at 810-11 (“It is true that we have indicated that the standards of neutrality for prosecutors are not necessarily as stringent as those applicable to judicial or quasi-judicial officers,” and such standards apply to “*whether* a conflict is found” in the first place) (emphasis in original). Finally, the social media activity specified by the Movants is simply not disqualifying behavior, a reality which the Movants themselves acknowledge. See Mtn. at 42 (the posts “if standing alone, might not be sufficient for disqualification”). The Twitter activity consisted of one retweet of a political cartoon (which involved neither Movant) and two tweets thanking an individual for two tweets of his own, each of which called for more Twitter users to follow the District Attorney. The Movants acknowledge that these facts are so innocuous that they must be considered “in combination” with, again, this Court’s ruling regarding Burt Jones. This argument, then, is an extension of the Movants’ prior argument: that the Court’s ruling regarding Mr. Jones should be applied to the entire investigation, as well as the social media activity of the District Attorney.

In light of the foregoing, the FCDAO respectfully ask that this Court dismiss or deny the Movants’ Motion for disqualification of the FCDAO. The arguments are largely untimely or barred by res judicata, and any that survive dismissal fail to demonstrate adequate grounds for disqualification of prosecutors under Georgia law.

IV. The Movants fail to demonstrate how the SPGJ was “tainted” or how they have suffered any injury to their due process rights as a result.

The Movants next claim that public comments made by several former grand jurors demonstrate that the SPGJ was “tainted” by “improper influences,” “inaccurate instructions,” and

“unconstitutional inferences.” Mtn. at 43. These apparent improprieties thus demand that this Court “suppress” the SPGJ’s report because otherwise, “named individuals” will suffer violation of their due process rights. These arguments are also without merit or a basis in the law.

The Motion does not clarify how “improper outside sources” could have tainted the SPGJ process, perhaps because it is not clear what “improper outside sources” could mean in the grand jury context. It is a basic tenet of grand jury jurisprudence that “the grand jury generally is entitled to act upon its own information, however acquired.” *Isaacs v. State*, 259 Ga. 717, 719 (2) (1989) (citing *Groves v. State*, 73 Ga. 205 (1884)). Grand jurors are empowered to undertake investigations on their own initiative and have a statutory duty to “examine or make presentments of such offenses as may or shall come to their knowledge” either before or after they are sworn. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-74; *see Brown v. State*, 295 Ga. 240, 241-242 (2014). This would be impossible if grand jurors could somehow be “tainted” by information which originated outside the grand jury room. The Movants argue that the grand jurors were aware of “extraneous” information which was “beyond their purview,” but they do not indicate how or why this is so. The Movants thus demonstrate only that the grand jurors were aware of “outside” information, not that such sources of information were somehow “improper.”

As to the Movants’ arguments regarding the Fifth Amendment, the Movants do not show or even argue that the grand jury was not instructed on the importance of a witness’s right against self-incrimination. The Movants also do not show how either of them have standing to raise any challenge related to the Fifth Amendment rights of witnesses before the SPGJ. They merely argue that, based on a smattering of comments from the former grand jurors, any instruction must have been inadequate. The Movants acknowledge that, in an interview after the discharge of the grand jury, a grand juror indicated that prosecutors “repeatedly” told the grand jury that a witness’s

invocation of his or her Fifth Amendment rights could not be seen “as an admission of guilt.” Mtn. at 46. The grand juror went on to state that prosecutors “were very passionate about saying: ‘I need you to understand that.’” *See* Mtn., Exhibit 8 no. 11.

The Movants insist that these comments demonstrate that any instruction regarding the Fifth Amendment must have been “inadequate on its face.” Relying exclusively on *Barnes v. State*, 335 Ga. App. 709 (2016), they argue that the SPGJ was tainted by misunderstanding and that they should have been instructed that they could not draw “any inference” from a witness’s silence, rather than merely an inference of guilt. Mtn. at 46-47. This attempt to split hairs fails, not least of all because it misapplies the holding in *Barnes*. That case involved a trial court’s failure to instruct a trial jury that it could not “consider in any way” a defendant’s decision not to take the stand in his own trial. Notably, the Court of Appeals in *Barnes* approved of the pre-trial instruction that “the defendant had the absolute right to remain silent and the jury was not permitted to draw any inference of *guilt* from his exercise of that right,” but said that the trial court erred because “those instructions did not specifically address the issue of Barnes’s testimony at trial.” *Id.* at 712 (emphasis added). In the present investigation, there is no defendant, no trial, no trial jury, and no scenario where a defendant opts not to testify. Instead, there are grand jurors whom the Movants acknowledge were instructed “repeatedly” not to infer guilt from a witness’s assertion of rights. On their own terms, the Movants’ arguments fail to demonstrate any inadequacies, much less any that irrevocably “tainted” the SPGJ.

The Movants cannot show that the grand jury was “tainted” by “improper” outside information or inadequate instructions regarding the Fifth Amendment. They do not indicate how outside information can be improper for a grand jury to perceive. They do not indicate how they have standing to address the Fifth Amendment rights of others, how the statements contained in

their own motion indicate some inadequacy, or how the *Barnes* case is applicable in this context. Finally, aside from general references to “fundamental fairness,” they do not clarify how the handling of witnesses’ Fifth Amendment concerns actually gives rise to a violation of their own due process rights. For all these reasons, their arguments are without merit.

V. The Movants are not entitled to injunctive relief.

Mrs. Latham’s Motion also prays that this Court grant her injunctive relief. She requests that the SPGJ’s report be quashed and that the FCDAO be disqualified, mirroring Mr. Trump’s Motion, but her added request for an injunction is more expansive. Mrs. Latham insists that such an injunction should reach far beyond the FCDAO, the SPGJ, or the report; the injunction should prohibit the FCDAO “or any other prosecuting arm of the State” from using “any evidence *presented to* the SPGJ in any future grand jury or legal proceeding.” Latham Mtn. at 2 (emphasis added). The injunction would require that “any and every state entity be enjoined from presenting or utilizing any evidence or testimony derived by the SPGJ.” Latham Mtn. at 5. In sum, Mrs. Latham asks this Court to eliminate the report, disqualify the FCDAO, and prevent any other representative of the people of this State from using any evidence even *presented to* the SPGJ, in perpetuity.

This Court must dismiss Mrs. Latham’s request for relief because it is plainly without the power to grant it. O.C.G.A. § 9-5-2 states that “Equity will take no part in the administration of the criminal law. It will neither aid criminal courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction, nor will it restrain or obstruct them.” Injunctions of criminal investigations are simply not allowed. This prohibition is explicit, and yet O.C.G.A. § 9-5-2 is not mentioned anywhere in Mrs. Latham’s Motion. Because her requested relief is not legal and entirely without merit, this Court must dismiss it.

While Mrs. Latham's Motion is entirely without a basis in the law, it is at least explicit in what it actually seeks. Mrs. Latham asks that this Court "restrain or obstruct" not one criminal investigation, but *any* criminal investigation. She requests that not one prosecutor be enjoined, but *all* prosecutors. In so doing, she notes that her requested relief is identical to that requested by Mr. Trump in his own Motion: "Both motions seek to enjoin the publication or use of the of the SPGJ Report and to preclude any State prosecuting agency from presenting or utilizing any evidence or testimony derived by the SPGJ." Latham Mtn. at 1. While Mr. Trump's Motion avoids use of the words "enjoin" or "injunction," its procedural awkwardness is belied by the succession of standing and timeliness issues it presents. Functionally, it seeks a single, sweeping remedy, which is the elimination of the SPGJ's report and any investigation tied to the SPGJ's operation, explicitly or implicitly. In Mrs. Latham's own estimation, what Mr. Trump's Motion seeks is an injunction.

The Movants cannot succeed because their requested remedies have no basis in the law and in fact fly in the face of the orderly administration of the laws of the State of Georgia. If an investigation results in actual criminal charges against the Movants, the justice system ensures they will have no shortage of available remedies to pursue. The general rule set out in O.C.G.A. § 9-5-2 that equity will "take no part in" the operation of criminal law

is based upon the principle that equity is intended to supplement, and not usurp, the functions of courts of law, and that to sustain a bill in equity to restrain or relieve against proceedings for the punishment of offenses would constitute an invasion of the courts of law; and on the fact that the party has an adequate remedy at law by establishing as a defense to the prosecution that he did not commit the act charged, or that the statute on which the prosecution is based is invalid, and, in case of conviction, by taking an appeal.


Hodges v. State Revenue Com., 183 Ga. 832, 833 (1) (1937). The Movants are not content to follow the ordinary course of the law. They seek to "restrain" a criminal investigation before any charges are filed or even sought; they ask that the judicial system place them above and apart from the common administration of the criminal law; and they do so by raising arguments for which they


have no standing, or which they failed to timely join, or which they have already failed, or which have no basis in law at all.

The FCDAO respectfully requests that, for all these reasons, the Motions presented by Mr. Trump and Mrs. Latham be denied or dismissed as appropriate.

WHEREFORE, the State of Georgia, by and through Fani T. Willis, District Attorney, Atlanta Judicial Circuit, Fulton County, Georgia, prays that this Honorable Court dismiss or deny the instant Motions on the basis of the papers.


Respectfully submitted this the 15th day of May, 2023,


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Certificate of Service


I hereby certify that on this 15th day of May 2023, a true copy of this Response was delivered to the following persons by electronic mail: Drew Findling, Jennifer L. Little, and Kieran J. Shanahan, attorneys for the movants.



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Eani T. Willis", is written over a horizontal line.

EANI T. WILLIS
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Ga. Bar No. 223955
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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Exhibit 3



IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

_____)
IN RE 2 MAY 2022 SPECIAL PURPOSE) No. 2022-EX-000024
GRAND JURY)
_____)

**BRIEF OF MEDIA INTERVENORS IN SUPPORT OF
THE PUBLIC FILING OF THE GRAND JURY REPORT**

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution; American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.; The Associated Press; Bloomberg L.P.; Cable News Network, Inc.; CMG Media Corporation and its television station WSB-TV; Dow Jones & Company, publisher of The Wall Street Journal; Gannett Co., Inc. and its newspapers USA Today, the Athens Banner-Herald, The Augusta Chronicle, and the Savannah Morning News; Gray Media Group, Inc. and its television station WANF; The New York Times Company; Tegna Inc. and its television station WXIA-TV; and Yahoo Inc. and its news publication Yahoo News (collectively, “Media Intervenors”) respectfully file this brief in support of the public release of the special purpose grand jury’s final report (the “Report”).

INTRODUCTION

On the morning of Wednesday, November 4, 2020 – the day after Georgia citizens had finished casting their votes in the 2020 Presidential Election – the focus of the nation turned to Georgia. As poll workers continued to tabulate votes, it became clear that, by the narrowest margins, the voting results in Georgia and a small group of other states would determine the outcome of the Presidential election.

In the days and weeks that followed, enormous controversy and confusion descended on the State. Without credible evidence, an array of public officials, paid advocates, and private citizens spread allegations that voting fraud had been rampant in Georgia. The claims of fraud

were aimed with particular force at Fulton County where, for example, routine video of vote counting at a tabulating center was mischaracterized as illegal ballot stuffing using a “suitcase” of fake ballots. As pressure mounted in the weeks that followed, then-sitting President Donald J. Trump made a recorded telephone call to Georgia’s Secretary of State asking for the assistance of the Secretary’s Office to “find” more than 11,000 votes.

These and many other events from the post-election time-period have raised serious questions about whether the State’s election system was subjected to a premeditated attempt to distort the results of the Presidential election. This question has been one of enormous public interest not just to Georgians, but also to citizens throughout the United States. The scale and scope of news organizations filing this brief reflect the profound public interest in this issue.¹

In January 2022, at the request of District County Attorney Fani Willis, the Judges of the Fulton County Superior Court voted to convene an investigative mechanism that has existed in Georgia for decades – a special purpose grand jury. Like numerous other states, Georgia law authorizes “special” grand juries to conduct detailed and patient examinations of public controversies by giving them authority to investigate “any alleged violation of the laws of this state or any other matter subject to investigation by grand juries as provided by law.” O.C.G.A § 15-12-100(a).

In a January 24, 2022 Order approving District Attorney Willis’ request, then-Chief Judge Christopher Brasher stated that the authorization given the special purpose grand jury would encompass the making of “presentments and reports.” He wrote:

¹ In Exhibit A to this Brief, Media Intervenors have submitted a listing of links to examples of news reports published and/or broadcast by them on the newsworthy issues relating to the special purpose grand jury’s investigation reflecting the extensive public interest in this matter.

This authorization shall include the investigation of any overt acts or predicate acts relating to the subject of the special purpose grand jury's investigative purpose. The special purpose grand jury, when making presentments and reports, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-71 and 15-12-101, may make recommendations concerning criminal prosecution as it shall see fit.

Armed with this authorization, the special purpose grand jury subpoenaed evidence and witness testimony from a wide array of individuals, public officials, and government entities for approximately seven months. Although the proceedings of the grand jury remained confidential, efforts by certain subpoenaed witnesses to avoid providing testimony or evidence – including legal efforts by some of the most senior officials in State and federal government – played out publicly in courtrooms in this State and elsewhere around the nation.

By its Order issued on January 9, 2023 (the “Order”), the Court informed the public and press that the special purpose grand jury had “issued its final report pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101(a).” Based upon the completion of the report and with the approval of a majority of the Fulton County Superior Court bench, the Court dissolved the special purpose grand jury and thanked the grand jurors for their service.

In the Order, the Court observed that the only remaining question concerned the “publication” of the Report. The Court explained that the special purpose grand jury “certified that it voted to recommend that [the Report] be published pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80.”² The Court noted that this “publication” statute “appears to apply to the work of special purpose grand juries” by virtue of the incorporation provision set forth at O.C.G.A. § 15-12-102, but also

² O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 provides as follows: “Grand juries are authorized to recommend to the court the publication of the whole or any part of their general presentments and to prescribe the manner of publication. When the recommendation is made, the judge shall order the publication as recommended. Reasonable charges therefor shall be paid out of the county treasury, upon the certificate of the judge, as other court expenses are paid.”

observed that it remained “unresolved” whether “the special purpose grand jury’s final report constitutes a presentment.”

In its Order, the Court invited argument on this issue by the District Attorney’s Office and any consolidated media intervenors. In advance of providing argument on January 24, 2023, the Media Intervenors offer this brief in support of their position that the Report is a court record subject to a presumption of openness under Uniform Superior Court Rule 21, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 1, Paragraph 5 of the Georgia State Constitution. Media Intervenors respectfully submit the presumption of openness that applies to the Report cannot be overcome in this matter. The public interest in the Report is extraordinary, and there are no countervailing interests sufficient to overcome the presumption. The Court should file the Report in the public docket and publish it pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 as the special purpose grand jurors have requested.

ARGUMENT

I. GRAND JURY REPORTS, INCLUDING THE REPORT IN THIS MATTER, ARE COURT RECORDS SUBJECT TO A PRESUMPTION OF OPENNESS.

A. Georgia Law Has Evolved to Strongly Favor Public Access to Court Documents, Including the Indictments, Presentments and Reports Returned by Grand Juries.

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that public access to the judicial system is not only deeply ingrained in the history of our system but also is an “indispensable” attribute of our judicial system protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. *Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia*, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980). The Court recognized in *Richmond Newspapers* that public scrutiny of the court system is essential to its institutional well-being for numerous reasons, including because it is vital to obtaining the

public's trust. "People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing." 448 U.S. at 572.

In conjunction with the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition of the protections afforded by the First Amendment, the Georgia Supreme Court has held that the Georgia Constitution independently requires our judicial system to operate in an open and public manner.

This court has sought to open the doors of Georgia's courtrooms to the public and to attract public interest in all courtroom proceedings because it is believed that open courtrooms are a *sine qua non* of an effective and respected judicial system which, in turn, is one of the principal cornerstones of a free society.

R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 576(1), 292 S.E.2d 815, 817(1) (1982). Indeed, *Page* makes clear that in the criminal context Georgia law is "more protective of the concept of open courtrooms than federal law." 249 Ga. at 578.

Side by side with preserving open court proceedings, the Georgia Supreme Court has embraced the importance of keeping court records available and accessible to the public. The United States Supreme Court recognized constitutional rights of access to court records in a series of decisions in the late 1970's and 1980s. *See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court*, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) ("*Press-Enterprise II*"); *Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court*, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) ("*Press-Enterprise I*"); *Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.*, 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978) ("It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents"); *In re Application of CBS, Inc.*, 828 F.2d 958, 959 (2d Cir. 1987) (characterizing existence of right of public access to criminal court records as "beyond dispute") (citation omitted).

Contemporaneously with the United States Supreme Court's decisions, the Georgia Supreme Court embraced the importance of keeping court records accessible to public inspection by enacting Uniform Superior Court Rule 21, which creates a presumptive right to inspect all

court records, and by infusing the Rule with substance in a series of forceful decisions rejecting efforts to seal court files. Most notably, in *Atlanta Journal & Atlanta Constitution v. Long*, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed a trial court order sealing a civil case file after the settlement of a lawsuit claiming sexual abuse by the Catholic Diocese of Savannah. The Court found that “the privacy interests of the appellees in the pre-judgment records of this civil suit do not clearly outweigh the public interest in open access to those records.” 258 Ga. 410, 411, 369 S.E.2d 755, 760 (1988); *see also In re The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, 271 Ga. 436, 438, 519 S.E.2d 909, 912 (1999) (“[J]ustice faces its greatest threat when courts dispense it secretly.” (quoting *Long*, 258 Ga. at 411)).

Of course, with respect to grand jury proceedings, the Georgia Supreme Court has always acknowledged the calculation about access to court records must be approached with special care. The Court has frequently noted that secrecy plays a very important role in connection with the investigations conducted by these judicial bodies. *See, e.g., In re Gwinnett County Grand Jury*, 284 Ga. 510, 512, 668 S.E.2d 682, 684 (2008) (“There is no doubt that the preservation of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings is . . . a well-recognized principle in Georgia.” (quoting *In re Hall County Grand Jury Proceedings*, 175 Ga. App. 349, 333 S.E.2d 389 (1985))). However, decisions from the Georgia appellate courts have consistently emphasized that the *outcome* of grand jury proceedings must be shared with the public to protect against public distrust of “star chamber court proceedings.”

In commenting on the importance of the indictment being returned in open court, the Court of Appeals explained:

The judge is the court for the reception of indictments only when he is presiding in open court. There must be a judge presiding, the clerk must be present, and the place of the reception of the indictment must be one where the court is being held open to the public. *Cadle v. State*, 101 Ga. App. 175, 180, 113 S.E.2d 180 (1960).

“It is a fundamental part of our judicial system that the general public be permitted to witness court proceedings sufficiently to guarantee that there may never be practiced in this State secret or star-chamber court proceedings, the deliberations of the juries alone excepted.” *Zugar v. State*, 194 Ga. 285, 289-290, 21 S.E.2d 647 (1942). “It is not enough to know that in this State there is hardly a chance that bogus indictments for personal spite will be filed in our courts. The preservation of the honor and purity of the courts, the confidence and respect of the public in those courts, and the good name of the citizens must not be left to chance. . . .” *Zugar, supra* at 291.

State v. Byrd, 197 Ga. App. 661, 399 S.E.2d 267, 268-69 (1990); *see also Zugar v. State*, 194 Ga. 285, 289-290, 21 S.E.2d 647 (1942) (requiring openness in return of indictment by grand jury: “public officials are made conscious of the duty to faithfully perform official acts when they are acting in the presence of the general public; and this fact causes the public to have confidence in the officials, and hence confidence in the governmental departments where such officials serve”).

More recently, in *Olsen v. State*, 302 Ga. 288, 806 S.E.2d 556 (2017), the Georgia Supreme Court noted that the secrecy afforded to Georgia grand juries has been curtailed at times by the General Assembly and now is focused most specifically on “the deliberations” of grand juries and less on its evidentiary phase. The Court remarked that “[n]otably, the oath of secrecy no longer extends to the State’s attorney, and even the grand jurors’ oath encompasses only deliberations and not all things occurring in the grand jury room.” *Id.* at 290-91. The Court explained that they presumed this was the intent of the General Assembly and therefore “decline[d] to extend the requirement of secrecy applicable to grand jury proceedings in Georgia beyond that which is currently imposed by statute.” *Id.* at 291.

It is in this legal context that Georgia’s precedent on grand jury presentments and reports must be considered. When examined in light of the evolution of Georgia law on public access to court records, the precedent demonstrates the Report is subject to a presumption of public access under Uniform Superior Court Rule 21.

B. Georgia's Precedent on Grand Jury Reports and Presentments Compels a Finding that the Report is a Court Record and, therefore, Presumptively Public under Rule 21.

Investigative grand juries have played an important role in Georgia's judicial history. As our Supreme Court has observed since their roots in colonial times, "[t]hrough presentments and other customary reports, the American grand jury in effect [has] enjoyed a roving commission to ferret out official malfeasance or self-dealing of any sort." *In re Gwinnett County Grand Jury*, 284 Ga. at 512 (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, *The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction* 85 (1998)). "There is a consensus among courts and commentators that, historically, common law grand juries performed a public reporting function by identifying official misconduct without initiating prosecutions." Barry J. Stern, *Revealing Misconduct by Public Officials Through Grand Jury Reports*, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 73, 76 (1987) (https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol136/iss1/3). As commentators have observed, "the reporting function can be viewed as a device that forces government to police itself. Public confidence in the accountability of government is then furthered by requiring government to identify its own misconduct." *Id.* at 92.

While acknowledging that the public reporting function of investigative grand juries provides a powerful tool to expose wrongdoing, Georgia's appellate courts have recognized that investigative grand juries should be supervised to prevent grand juries from exceeding the scope of their legal authorization. As the Court of Appeals explained in *In re Floyd County Grand Jury Presentments for May Term 1996*, 225 Ga. App. 705, 484 S.E.2d 769 (1997), the responsibility of a supervising judge is to make sure the grand jury stays within the scope of its statutory authority.

Since the grand jury proceedings are secret, OCGA § 15-12-73, it is possible that a grand jury as a group of lay-persons can exceed the scope of their authority and, because of their membership, become involved in politics and in local feuds. It is for this reason that a superior court judge supervises the grand jury and has the duty to scrutinize, receive, and order filed the presentment of the grand jury.

Id. at 707 (citations omitted).³

While empowering judges to supervise grand juries to avoid their involvement in “politics and local feuds,” the Court of Appeals has also emphasized that the supervising judge has no authority to expunge or redact a grand jury’s report so long as the grand jury is acting within its mandate. In 2004, the Court of Appeals clarified the limited role of a supervising court that was asked to expunge a grand jury presentment regarding Vernon Jones, the CEO of DeKalb County. In *In re July-August, 2003 DeKalb County Grand Jury*, 265 Ga. App. 870, 595 S.E.2d 674 (2004), the Court of Appeals conducted a detailed review of the history of appellate decisions addressing grand jury reports over more than 40 years and emphasized that the role of the supervising courts was confined to expunging statements based on “*ultra vires* acts of the grand jury.” *Id.* at 873. The Court of Appeals rejected Jones’ attempts to read Georgia precedent more broadly.

There is nothing in [Georgia precedent on grand juries] that mandates the expungement of an entire presentment after the trial judge appropriately redacts all *ultra vires* criticism. *Kelley v. Tanksley* [] and *In re Hensley* [] allowed the presentments to be filed and published after the *ultra vires* matters were expunged.⁴

³ In the legal authority the Court of Appeals cited to support the above-referenced statement about the filing of presentments, the Court first cited O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80, the statute that requires the supervising judge to file and “publish” a presentment when requested by a grand jury. *Id.* Immediately, thereafter, the Court cited the statutes that authorize and empower special purpose grand juries, specifically O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-100 and 15-12-101. *Id.* The sequence of these citations supports the interpretation that the publication requirement applies to special purpose grand juries through the incorporation clause contained in O.C.G.A. § 15-12-102.

⁴ *Id.* The Court cited decisions in *Thompson v. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth.*, 246 Ga. 777, 273 S.E.2d 19 (1980); *In re Floyd County Grand Jury Presentments*, 225 Ga. App. at 707; *In re*

Based on its detailed review of Georgia precedent, and after the limited redaction of certain *ultra vires* content, the Court of Appeals affirmed the supervising court's decision to file a grand jury's report that addressed the conduct of Jones in his official capacity.

Georgia's history of decisions requiring the public filing and publication of grand jury reports was significantly reinforced by the Georgia Supreme Court's 2008 decision in *In re Gwinnett County Grand Jury*, 284 Ga. at 512. In *Gwinnett County Grand Jury*, the Georgia Supreme Court had its first opportunity to address the issue of grand jury records and reports in the aftermath of the United States' Supreme Court's series of decisions recognizing the public's constitutional right to court records under the First Amendment.⁵ The decision also followed the Georgia Supreme Court's own precedent emphasizing its perspective that public court records "protect[] litigants both present and future" because "[o]ur system abhors star chamber proceedings with good reason."⁶

Not surprisingly, rather than looking to dated precedent, the Supreme Court's decision in *Gwinnett County Grand Jury* squarely addressed the issue of access to grand jury records and reports under the modern constitutional standards that inform Uniform Superior Court Rule 21. In determining whether Gwinnett County could obtain the records of a grand jury that examined the dissolution of the County's Office of Internal Audits, the Court explained,

Hensley, 184 Ga. App. 625, 362 S.E.2d 432 (1987); *In re Gwinnett County Grand Jury Proceedings*, 180 Ga. App. 241, 348 S.E.2d 757 (1986); *Harris v. Edmonds*, 119 Ga. App. 305, 166 S.E.2d 909 (1969); *Kelley v. Tanksley*, 105 Ga. App. 65, 123 S.E.2d 462 (1961); and 1996 Op. Atty. Gen. No. U96-15.

⁵ See generally *supra* at p. 4-5 (citing *Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court*, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) ("*Press-Enterprise I*"); *Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court*, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) ("*Press-Enterprise II*"); *Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.*, 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978)).

[Uniform Superior Court Rule 21], adopted by this Court and the Council of Superior Court Judges, states that “[a]ll court records are public and are to be available for public inspection unless public access is limited by law or by the procedure set forth below.” The rule embodies the right of access to court records which the public and press in Georgia have traditionally enjoyed.

Id. at 511. The Court found that the presumption of openness applies to judicial records to which the public and press have traditionally enjoyed access “when a judicial document is filed.” *Id.* (quoting *Long*, 258 Ga. 410). The Court noted it had extended this rule even to “an official court reporter’s tape of remarks made by a judge in open court.” *Id.* (citing *Green v. Drinnon, Inc.*, 262 Ga. 264, 417 S.E.2d 11 (1992)).⁷

Guided by this standard, the Court ultimately determined that “evidence and testimony presented to a grand jury” as part of its investigation were not court records to which the public had a “presumptive right of access” because “the press and public have not traditionally enjoyed access to such material due to the preservation of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.” *Id.* at 513 (citation omitted). In contrast, however, the Court held the presentment made by a grand jury “is a court record under Uniform Superior Court Rule 21 that is available for public inspection unless public access is otherwise limited by law or by [Rule 21].” *Id.* at 513-14.

The *Gwinnett County Grand Jury* decision demonstrates the Report should be presumptively public. It has been filed with the Court by virtue of its delivery to the supervising judge. It is a judicial record that memorializes the determinations of a properly convened special

⁶ See generally *supra* at p. 5-6 (citing *Atlanta Journal & Atlanta Constitution v. Long*, 258 Ga. 410, 411 (1988)).

⁷ The Court subsequently elaborated on the presumption of public access to all judicial documents filed with the court in *Undisclosed LLC v. State*, 302 Ga. 418, 431, 807 S.E.2d 393, 403 (2017) (“Materials admitted into evidence, that call for court action, or play a central role in the adjudicative process are part of the judicial record, so long such materials are on file with the court.”).

purpose grand jury with a broad mandate. There is no basis to contend the special purpose grand jury acted in an *ultra vires* manner. Under such circumstances, grand jury reports are not just the type of judicial record that are “traditionally” available to the public; they are the type of judicial record that is “published” at County expense pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80.⁸

Just as with the presentment in *Gwinnett County Grand Jury*, the Report should be made public.⁹

⁸ An example of a Superior Court Order directing a county clerk to publish a Special Purpose Grand Jury Final Report under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 can be found at Exhibit B. The exhibit is an Order issued by DeKalb Superior Court Judge Gregory Adams requiring the publication of the “Final Report” of a Special Purpose Grand Jury impaneled on January 20, 2012, in connection with controversies relating to the DeKalb County Department of Watershed Management. Pursuant to the Order, the final report was published in DeKalb County’s legal organ, *The Champion Newspaper* and remains online: <http://thechampionnewspaper.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/000SpecialPurposeGrandJuryFinalReport.pdf>. A true and correct copy of the final report is attached as Exhibit C. CEO Burrell Ellis was subsequently prosecuted after the publication of the final report, but no challenge to the publication of the final report was raised in his appeal. *See Ellis v. State*, 300 Ga. 371, 794 S.E.2d 601 (2016).

⁹ The presumption in Georgia law that grand jury reports will be made public is consistent with the law of other states. *See generally Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Marko*, 352 So.2d 518, 523 (Fla. 1977) (affirming release of grand jury report and noting “[t]he benefits to be derived from this extraordinary exercise in citizen participation would be severely limited if the fruits of that activity were not available to the public on whose behalf it is undertaken.”); *In re Final Report of the 29th Statewide Grand Jury*, 343 So.3d 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022) (ordering release of all but two paragraphs of grand jury report following Marjory Stoneman Douglas school shooting), *reh’ring denied*, 343 So.3d 600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022), *review denied sub nom. D.K. v. Final Report of 20th Statewide Grand Jury*, No. SC22-983, 2022 WL 3573084 (Fla. Aug. 19, 2022, and *review denied sub nom. Murray v. Final Report of 20th Statewide Grand Jury*, No. SC22-1108, 2022 9801736 (Fla. Oct. 17, 2022); *Matter of Report of Washoe Cnty. Grand Jury*, 95 Nev. 121, 128, 590 P.2d 622 (1979) (“[T]he report was generally issued in the legitimate community interest, and [the interested target], with one exception, has not demonstrated that justice requires further expungement.”) *People v. Super. Ct.*, 13 Cal.3d 430, 434, 531 P.2d 761 (1975) (holding that courts may only seal portions of grand jury reports that “extend beyond the legal boundaries of the grand jury’s broad reportorial power”).

C. Our Courts and the General Assembly Have Not Attempted to Distinguish “Presentments” from Grand Jury “Reports,” so Construing O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 as Applicable to the Report is Appropriate and Required by the Federal and State Constitution.

In its Order, the Court noted it was “unresolved” whether the “special purpose grand jury’s final report constitutes a presentment” subject to the publication requirements of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80. Order at 2. However, the term “presentment” and “report” have been used interchangeably for decades by the Georgia judiciary, the General Assembly, and courts in other jurisdictions. There is no basis to find that the Report is outside the scope of the mandatory “publication” requirement of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80.

In the historical development of grand juries, a presentment was a criminal charge initiated by the grand jury based on its own knowledge, not at the request of prosecutors. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *298. Today, the use of a grand jury “presentment” to initiate a criminal prosecution is obsolete in Georgia and in most other jurisdictions. Instead, Georgia employs the term “special presentment” to identify a charging instrument initiated by the grand jury that effectively functions as an indictment. See O.C.G.A. § 15-12-74(b). “In this state the difference between an indictment and a special presentment has been abolished, with respect to the requirements of law in regard to trials under them, a mere technical distinction remaining that in an indictment the accusation is presented by a prosecutor, and in a special presentment it is preferred by the grand jury without a prosecutor.” *Carmichael v. State*, 228 Ga. 834, 837, 188 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1972) (citation omitted).

Based on this development, the modern legal practice is to refer interchangeably to the written account of an investigation delivered by a grand jury as either a “report” or “presentment” or “general presentment” when it is not for the purpose of initiating criminal

proceedings. Regardless of the legal vernacular used, each term refers to a document that is in substance a report. This is true in Georgia. *See, e.g., In re Presentments of Lowndes County Grand Jury*, 166 Ga. App. 258, 304 S.E.2d 423 (1983) (referring interchangeably to “presentments” against members of a city police department as “reports”); *Kelley*, 105 Ga. App. at 66 (“The report of the grand jury sought to be expunged from the records in the instant case was not a special presentment or true bill of indictment charging any individual with the violation of the penal laws of this State. It was in the nature of a general presentment or recommendation in which the grand jury took note of an unsolved theft involving county funds which occurred on county property”). The equivalence of the words “general presentment,” “presentment” and “report” has also been noted in other jurisdictions. *See, e.g., In re: Final Report of the 20th Statewide Grand Jury*, 343 So.3d at 588 (“We will refer to the statewide grand jury’s report interchangeably as either a report or presentment in this opinion.”).¹⁰

Because there is no legally meaningful distinction between a “general presentment” and a “report” when issued by the grand jury, there is no basis to contend that the publication requirement contained in O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 is not applicable to special purpose grand juries.

¹⁰ The Georgia General Assembly amended O.C.G.A. § 15-12-71 in 2016 to permit local grand juries to examine controversies relating to law enforcement’s use of deadly force. In amending the law, the General Assembly also referred to “presentments” and “reports” interchangeably as documents that could be issued by the grand jury while bringing charges and stated that both would be subject to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80. *See Georgia Laws 2016, Act 350, § 1, (eff. July 1, 2016)* (adding subsection (e)(1) to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-71: “If the grand jury conducts a review [in connection with a peace officer’s use of deadly force], and the grand jury does not request that the district attorney create a bill of indictment or special presentment, the grand jury shall prepare a report or issue a general presentment based upon its inspection, and any such report or presentment shall be subject to publication as provided for in Code Section 15-12-80”).

The Court correctly observed in its Order that O.C.G.A. § 15-12-102¹¹ incorporates the statutory procedures of regular grand juries into the operation of special purpose grand juries unless the procedures of the special grand jury are “otherwise provided” for in the authorizing statute. There is no conflicting provision that “otherwise” speaks to the publication or secrecy of special purpose grand jury reports. Accordingly, O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 applies to the Report.¹²

This result is particularly clear in the aftermath of the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in *Olsen v. State*, 302 Ga. 288 (2017). In *Olsen*, the Georgia Supreme Court emphasized it would not “extend the requirement of secrecy applicable to grand jury proceedings in Georgia” unless there was a clear mandate “imposed by statute.” *Id.* The General Assembly could easily have required by statute that the reports of a special purpose grand jury be maintained by the supervising court in secret, but they imposed no such rule in the enabling legislation.

Various courts have recognized that the right of access to court records is grounded not just in the common law, but also in constitutional principles protecting the public’s right of access to information about government. *See, e.g., In re Providence Journal Co.*, 293 F.3d 1, 10-13 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Apart from the prerogatives attendant to the common-law right of access to judicial records, the public and the press enjoy a constitutional right of access to criminal proceedings under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”); *Phoenix Newspapers v. U.S. Dist. Court*, 156 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1998); *United States v. Antar*, 38 F.3d 1348, 1359-60 (3d Cir.

¹¹ O.C.G.A. § 15-12-102 states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this part [governing special purpose grand juries], Part 1 [governing regular grand juries] of this article shall apply to the grand juries authorized by this part.”

¹² *See also* Exhibit B (Order of DeKalb County Superior Court Chief Judge requiring publication of a special purpose grand jury’s “Final Report” under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80).

1994); *Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski*, 868 F.2d 497, 505 (1st Cir. 1989); *In re Search Warrant*, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988). An interpretation of the mandatory publication requirement set forth in O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 that allowed supervising courts to set the requirement aside without a constitutionally meaningful showing of harm would violate not just the common law, but also the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 1, Paragraph 5 of the Georgia State Constitution (protecting the right of “every person” to “publish sentiments on all subjects”).

The Report is subject to publication under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80.

II. NEITHER THE STATE NOR ANY OTHER PARTY CAN MAKE A COMPELLING CASE THAT EXPUNGEMENT OR SEALING IS WARRANTED HERE.

The presumption of openness that applies to the Report cannot be overcome. Georgia law provides two paths through which the State or an interested party may seek to restrict all or portions of the Report in extraordinary circumstances: (1) through expungement of *ultra vires* content contained in the Report; (2) through a motion to seal pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 21. Neither have merit here.

A. There is No Basis to Expunge Any Portion of the Report.

As set forth above, under Georgia law courts have historically expunged portions of a report or presentment deemed “*ultra vires*,” i.e., containing “statements” that arise from investigative activity outside the scope of the grand jury’s mandate. In this case, the special purpose grand jury’s mandate was extraordinarily broad. The special purpose grand jury was authorized to investigate “facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to possible attempts to disrupt the lawful administration of the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia.”

January 20, 2022 Letter of District Attorney Fani Willis to Chief Judge Christopher Brasher; *see*

also January 24, 2022 Order Approving Request for Special Purpose Grand Jury Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100, et seq. (“The special purpose grand jury shall be authorized to investigate any and all facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to alleged violations of the laws of the State of Georgia, as set forth in the request of the District Attorney referenced herein above.”).

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101(a), the special purpose grand jury has been “supervise[d] and “assist[ed]” throughout its investigation. Various motions relating to the proper scope of testimony and evidence have been heard. There is simply no indication that anything in the Report exceeded the scope of the special purpose grand jury’s authority in a manner that would be appropriate for expungement.

B. There is No Basis to Seal Any Portion of the Report Pursuant to Rule 21.

In addition, as noted above, the Report is a court record, so it is subject to sealing only under the demanding standards of Uniform Superior Court Rule 21. *See generally In re Gwinnett County Grand Jury*, 284 Ga. at 513-14.

The Georgia Supreme Court has articulated the standard for sealing as requiring a finding that the movants’ privacy *clearly outweighs* the public interest in disclosure. *Long*, 258 Ga. at 413. The burden of demonstrating that court records should be sealed is on the party seeking the sealing, and the Court must make factual findings on the record supporting the sealing order. *Id.*; *see also In re Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, 271 Ga. at 438 (“[I]t is not sufficient for the trial court to forego making findings of fact and simply state that the public’s interest in access to court records is clearly outweighed by potential harm to the parties’ privacy”). The burden is intended to require public access in all cases except those involving a “clear necessity.” *Long*, 258 Ga. at 413, 369 S.E.2d at 758; *see also Merchant Law Firm, P.C. v. Emerson*, 301 Ga. 609,

613, 800 S.E.2d 557 (2017); *see also Long*, 258 Ga. at 413 (“In designing USCR 21, this court and the council of superior court judges . . . incorporated the presumption that the public will have access to all court records.”).

This standard is and is intended to be a difficult one to satisfy. Indeed, in enforcing the State’s commitment to open courtrooms and court records, Georgia courts have consistently emphasized, for example, that embarrassment and reputational harm are not sufficient interests to justify sealing. *See, e.g., In re Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, 271 Ga. at 438 (reversing trial court order sealing probate case involving claim by illegitimate child seeking portion of the estate of former owner of The Atlanta Falcons: “[C]ivil lawsuits quite often cause litigants to experience an invasion of privacy and resulting embarrassment, yet that fact alone does not permit trial courts to routinely seal court records”); *Long*, 258 Ga. at 413 (reversing trial court order sealing case file and holding that the privacy interests of Catholic Diocese of Savannah “do not clearly outweigh the public interest in open access to those records”).

There is no basis for sealing here. This investigation has been a matter of profound public interest that goes to the heart of the nation’s democratic forms of government. Much of the matters before the special purpose grand jury are already public knowledge through related federal and state court proceedings and Congressional hearings. There is quite simply no “clear and convincing proof” that sealing, either in whole or in part, is warranted.

CONCLUSION


The Georgia Supreme Court has explicitly stated that it would “decline to extend the requirement of secrecy applicable to grand jury proceedings beyond that which is currently imposed by statute.” *Olsen*, 302 Ga. at 291. There is no basis to do so here. The Media

Intervenors respectfully request that the Report be publicly filed and published as the special purpose grand jurors have requested.

Dated this the 23rd day of January, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX

Date	Headline	Link
11/6/2021	Georgia Grand Jury Looms in Trump Inquiry	https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/06/us/politics/trump-election-interference-investigation.html
1/20/2022	DA for Atlanta area requests special grand jury to probe Trump's election interference	https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/20/politics/georgia-trump-grand-jury/index.html
1/24/2022	Grand Jury Approved to Examine Trump's Efforts to Overturn Georgia's 2020 Election Results	https://www.wsj.com/articles/judges-approve-grand-jury-for-trump-election-probe-in-georgia-11643065455
1/24/2022	Fulton judges greenlight special grand jury for Trump probe	https://www.ajc.com/news/atlanta-news/breaking-fulton-judges-greenlight-special-grand-jury-for-trump-probe
4/29/2022	Special grand jury to convene Monday to determine if Trump broke law with infamous phone call	https://www.wsbradio.com/county-shut-down-streets-around-fulton-county-courthouse-trump-grand-jury-gets-underway
4/29/2022	Fulton County Sheriff says deputies are ready for Trump special grand jury	https://www.wsbtv.com/video/local-video/fulton-county-sheriff-says-deputies-are-ready-trump-special-grand-jury
4/29/2022	Fulton County to shut streets down around courthouse as Trump grand jury gets underway Monday	https://www.wsbtv.com/video/local-video/fulton-county-shut-streets-down-around-courthouse-trump-grand-jury-gets-underway-monday
5/2/2022	Trump grand jury hearings set to start in Fulton County on Monday	https://www.wsbtv.com/video/local-video/trump-grand-jury-hearings-set-start-fulton-county-monday
5/2/2022	Georgia Jury to Consider Whether Trump Illegally Interfered in 2020 Election	https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/02/us/trump-election-georgia-grand-jury.html
5/2/2022	Trump election probe special grand jury selection in Atlanta	https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-donald-trump-georgia-presidential-
5/2/2022	Trump probe: How would the Fulton County special grand jury work?	https://www.ajc.com/politics/trump-probe-how-would-the-fulton-county-special-grand-jury-work/YSS5HO2XGZHTXMC67J4VB4B54Q/
5/2/2022	Preps in place at Fulton County courthouse ahead of Trump investigation grand jury	https://www.wsbtv.com/preps-place-fulton-county-courthouse-ahead-grand-jury-investigation-former-pres-trump
5/6/2022	Georgia Elections Chief Rebuffs Trump-Backed Opponent on Fraud Claims	https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-06/georgia-elections-chief-rebuffs-trump-backed-foe-on-fraud-claims
6/1/2022	These people have been subpoenaed in Trump election interference probe	https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/fulton-county-special-grand-jury-trump-election-probe/
7/5/2022	Fulton grand jury subpoenas Giuliani, Graham, Trump campaign lawyers	https://www.ajc.com/politics/fulton-grand-jury-subpoenas-giuliani-graham-trump-confidantes/POUNSTTUXZDGD3D5LKA7TIQOM/
7/6/2022	Sen. Graham to fight Georgia election subpoena, lawyers say	https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-donald-trump-georgia-presidential-new-york
7/15/2022	Fulton County DA says she's considering asking Trump to testify to special grand jury	https://www.ajc.com/news/fulton-county-da-says-shes-considering-asking-trump-to-testify-to-special-grand-jury
7/15/2022	Exclusive: Fulton County DA sends 'target' letters to Trump allies in Georgia investigation	https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-fulton-county-da-sends-target-letters-to-trump-allies-in-georgia-investigation-152517469.html
7/19/2022	Georgia prosecutors say all 16 fake Trump electors are targets in criminal probe	https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/19/politics/georgia-grand-jury-trump-electors/index.html
7/27/2022	Federal judge denies Athens-area U.S. Rep. Hice's bid to quash subpoena in Trump probe	https://www.onlineathens.com/federal-judge-denies-us-rep-jody-hices-bid-quash-subpoena-trump-probe
8/11/2022	Prominent Atlanta defense law to represent former President Trump to special grand jury	https://www.wsbtv.com/prominent-atlanta-defense-lawyer-represent-former-president-trump-front-special-grand-jury

Date	Headline	Link
8/15/2022	Lindsey Graham ordered to testify in Fulton probe of bid to overturn Georgia election	https://www.onlineathens.com/story/news/2022/08/15/lindsey-graham-must-testify-georgia-grand-jury-probe-election
8/15/2022	Rudy Giuliani told by prosecutors he is a target in Georgia 2020 presidential election probe	https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/15/politics/rudy-giuliani-georgia-presidential-election-probe/index.html
8/16/2022	Trump legal adviser ordered to testify in Ga. election probe	https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-colorado-donald-trump-georgia-atlanta
8/17/2022	Rudy Giuliani testifies before Fulton grand jury on alleged 2020 election tampering	https://www.atlantaneewsfirst.com/2022/08/17/rudy-giuliani-appearing-before-fulton-grand-jury-alleged-2020-election-tampering/
8/19/2022	Graham Ordered to Appear Before Atlanta Grand Jury Investigating Trump	https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/19/us/lindsey-graham-atlanta-grand-jury-trump.html
8/29/2022	Georgia's Kemp Must Testify in Trump Election Probe, Judge Says	https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-29/georgia-s-kemp-must-testify-in-trump-election-probe-judge-says
9/29/2022	Trump attorney and adviser testified before Georgia grand jury investigating election interference	https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/29/politics/boris-epshteyn-testimony-georgia-grand-jury-election-interference-trump/index.html
10/4/2022	Georgia GOP bankrolls lawyers for 'fake' Trump electors in Fulton County DA probe	https://news.yahoo.com/georgia-da-gop-bankrolling-lawyers-for-fake-trump-electors-rife-with-serious-ethical-problems-191434263.html
10/27/2022	Mark Meadows ordered by court to testify in Georgia 2020 election meddling probe	https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/26/politics/mark-meadows-georgia-election-grand-jury/index.html
11/1/2022	Supreme Court rejects Lindsey Graham's request to block Georgia grand jury subpoena	https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/01/politics/lindsey-graham-supreme-court/index.html
11/1/2022	US Supreme Court Allows Election Grand Jury Questioning of Lindsey Graham	https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-01/us-supreme-court-allows-election-grand-jury-questioning-of-lindsey-graham
11/9/2022	Judge orders Gingrich to testify in Georgia election probe	https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-georgia-atlanta
11/15/2022	Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp appears before grand jury on 2020 election interference	https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/15/politics/brian-kemp-georgia-grand-jury-2020-election/index.html
11/15/2022	Michael Flynn ordered to testify in Atlanta grand jury probe into Trump's election subversion	https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/15/politics/michael-flynn-grand-jury/index.html
11/15/2022	Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp appears before Atlanta jury in election probe	https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2022/11/15/georgia-governor-brian-kemp-testifies-grand-jury
11/16/2022	Former White House aid Cassidy Hutchinson testifies before Georgia grand jury	https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/16/politics/cassidy-hutchinson-testifies-georgia-grand-jury/index.html
11/16/2022	Georgia DA floats immunity deals for fake electors as investigation into Trump hits roadblock	https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/16/politics/fulton-county-da-georgia-fake-electors-investigation-fake-electors-roadblock-immunity/index.html
11/22/2022	Lindsey Graham testifies before Georgia grand jury investigating 2020 election aftermath	https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/22/politics/lindsey-graham-fulton-county-grand-jury-2020-election/index.html
11/29/2022	Mark Meadows Ordered to Testify on Trump by South Carolina's Top Court	https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-29/meadows-ordered-to-testify-on-trump-by-south-carolina-top-court
12/6/2022	Florida appeals court: No delay for Michael Flynn in Fulton County Trump grand jury testimony	https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/michael-flynn-fulton-county-trump-grand-jury/
12/12/2022	Trump Special Counsel Subpoenas Official Asked to Find Votes (1)	https://news.bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-and-criminal-law/trump-special-counsel-subpoenas-official-asked-to-find-votes-1

Date	Headline	Link
12/17/2022	Georgia grand jury investigating Trump election interference is winding down and has begun writing final report	https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/17/politics/georgia-grand-jury-trump-2020-election/index.html
12/24/2022	Georgia special grand jury wraps up probe of Trump, allies	https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2022/12/24/trump-special-grand-jury-georgia-charges-investigation
12/27/2022	Georgia special grand jury wraps up probe of Trump, allies	https://www.atlantaneewsfirst.com/2022/12/27/georgia-special-grand-jury-wraps-up-probe-trump-allies/
1/9/2023	Fulton special grand jury completes Trump investigation	https://www.ajc.com/politics/breaking-fulton-special-grand-jury-completes-trump-investigation
1/9/2023	Georgia grand jury investigating Trump and 2020 election aftermath completes its work	https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/fulton-county-grand-jury-trump-election/index.html
1/9/2023	Fulton County grand jury submits final report on Trump's alleged interference in 2020 election	https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/fulton-county-grand-jury-submits-final-report-donald/story
1/9/2023	Special Grand Jury in Georgia Trump Inquiry Concludes Its Investigation	https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/09/us/trump-georgia-election-grand-jury.html
1/9/2023	Fulton County grand jury submits final report on Trump's alleged interference in 2020 election	https://news.yahoo.com/fulton-county-grand-jury-submits-153810676.html
1/9/2023	Fulton County grand jury submits final report on Donald Trump's alleged interference in 2020 election	https://www.wsj.com/fulton-county-grand-jury-submits-final-report-on-donald-trumps-alleged-interference-in-2020-election/
1/9/2023	Fulton County special grand jury ends its Trump investigation. What happens next?	https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/fulton-county-grand-jury-ends-trump-investigation
1/9/2023	Georgia grand jury wraps up Trump 2020 election probe	https://news.yahoo.com/georgia-grand-jury-wraps-trump
1/9/2023	Georgia grand jury completes report on Trump election interference probe	https://news.yahoo.com/georgia-grand-jury-completes-report
1/9/2023	Special Grand Jury in Georgia Trump Inquiry Concludes Its Investigation	https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/09/us/trump-georgia-election-grand-jury.html
1/9/2023	Georgia grand jury ends probe of Trump, 2020 decision	https://www.atlantaneewsfirst.com/2023/01/09/special-grand-jury-probing-trump-allies-georgia-finishes-work/
1/9/2023	Fulton County grand jury wraps up its investigation into Donald Trump	https://www.atlantaneewsfirst.com/2023/01/09/fulton-county-grand-jury-wraps-up-its-work-donald-trump/
1/9/2023	Georgia Special Grand Jury Completes Trump Investigation	https://www.wsj.com/articles/georgia-special-grand-jury-completes-donald-trump-investigation
1/9/2023	Georgia grand jury investigating Trump and 2020 election aftermath completes its work	https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/fulton-county-grand-jury-trump-election/index.html
1/9/2023	Georgia Grand Jury Investigating Trump Submits Recommendations, Disbands	https://www.bloomberg.com/georgia-grand-jury-investigating-trump-submits-recommendations-and-disbands
1/9/2023	All eyes on Georgia after grand jury wraps work on Donald Trump investigation	https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/01/09/trump-georgia-grand-jury-whats-next
1/9/2023	Georgia grand jury completes work in Donald Trump probe tied to 2020 election	https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/01/09/georgia-grand-jury-donald-trump-probe
1/9/2023	Charging decision on Trump now loom large in Georgia after grand jury completes its work	https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/01/09/donald-trump-grand-jury-georgia-decisions-loom

Date	Headline	Link
1/9/2023	Grand jury in Georgia delivers report on Trump, charges could come in next few months	https://news.yahoo.com/grand-jury-in-georgia-delivers-report-on-trump-charges-could-come-in-next-few-months-173112072.html
1/10/2023	Georgia grand jury completes Trump election investigation; what happens now?	https://news.yahoo.com/georgia-grand-jury-completes-trump
1/18/2023	Fulton County Trump probe: Prosecutors have final report as court hearing nears	https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/fulton-county-trump-probe-final-report-with-prosecutors-hearing-nears
1/20/2023	Fulton County prosecutors finalize report in Trump probe	https://www.atlantaneewsfirst.com/2023/01/20/fulton-county-prosecutors-finalize-report-trump-probe/

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

IN RE SPECIAL PURPOSE
GRAND JURY

)
)
) ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13CV1024
)
)

A Special Purpose Grand Jury was impaneled on January 20, 2012 pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the bidding, awarding and management of contracts, as well as the policies and procedures of, and any payments made under and for any contracts by, the DeKalb County Department of Watershed Management during the period of January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2010.

On August 15, 2013, Presiding Judge Mark Anthony Scott delivered a copy of the Special Purpose Grand Jury's Final Report to Chief Judge Gregory A. Adams. The Final Report is dated January 18, 2013.


As required by O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101(b), Chief Judge Gregory A. Adams convened a meeting of the Superior Court Judges on August 19, 2013 and reported to them the Presiding Judge's recommendation that the Grand Jury be dissolved. A majority of the Superior Court Judges at the meeting voted to accept the Final Report, file the Final Report and dissolve the Special Purpose Grand Jury.

Accordingly, the Special Grand Jury is hereby dissolved instant.

The Final Report, having been presented, it is hereby ordered that the same be filed with the Clerk of this Court and spread among the minutes thereof.

It is also ordered that the Final Report be published pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80 as legal notice in the official legal organ of the county, *The Champion Newspaper*, at least once with the costs to be paid from the general funds of DeKalb County.

SO ORDERED this 21st day of August, 2013.



Chief Judge Gregory A. Adams
Superior Court of DeKalb County
Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit

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Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit

PRESENTMENT OF THE SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY

2012-2013

CIVIL CASE # 12CV1000

**HONORABLE MARK ANTHONY SCOTT,
PRESIDING JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT**

**HONORABLE ROBERT D. JAMES
DISTRICT ATTORNEY**

DEKALB COUNTY SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY PRESENTMENT
JANUARY 2012 – JANUARY 2013 TERM

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES:

COURTNEY L. JOHNSON
ASHA JACKSON
CLARENCE F. SEELIGER
GREGORY A. ADAMS
CYNTHIA J. BECKER
GAIL C. FLAKE
DANIEL M. COURSEY, JR.
LINDA W. HUNTER
MARK ANTHONY SCOTT
TANGELA BARRIE

of the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia, Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit.
This Special Purpose Grand Jury, sworn in by the Honorable Mark Anthony Scott
in the DeKalb County Superior Court on January 20, 2012, respectively submits
the following presentment.

REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to O.C.G.A § 15-2-80, we the presently constituted 2012 Special Grand
Jury of DeKalb County, recommend to the Honorable Mark Anthony Scott that this
presentment be published in whole in the County Legal Organ.

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INTRODUCTION

History and Scope of this Investigative Grand Jury

Grand Jury's formation

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 et seq., on September 7, 2011, the District Attorney requested that a Special Purpose Grand Jury be impaneled. Superior Court Judges voted to approve the request on November 17, 2011, and entered an Order on January 11, 2012, mandating such. Accordingly, this Special Purpose Grand Jury was impaneled, sworn, and charged on January 20, 2012.

We, as common and ordinary citizens of DeKalb County, impaneled as the Special Purpose Grand Jury, recognize that we are privileged to serve our fellow citizens of DeKalb County. We recognize that we represent the common and ordinary citizens of DeKalb County and that we have a special charge to represent them in ensuring that their elected officials and hired personnel perform in a manner that is consistent with the laws and codes of the United States, the State of Georgia, and the County of DeKalb, Georgia.

We heard testimonial evidence and reviewed documentary evidence almost weekly since January 20, 2012. Additionally, we toured the Snapfinger Creek Advanced Wastewater Treatment Plant and interviewed its employees. We have followed the order and charge which impaneled the Special Purpose Grand Jury and inquired, in part, into procurement practices of DeKalb County related to Department of Watershed Management (also known as DWM) contracts; the

structure of the Department of Watershed Management over time; and, the companies with which the Department of Watershed Management does business.

In that regard, pursuant to our statutory authority, we

- compelled evidence;
- subpoenaed witnesses;
- inspected records, documents, correspondence, and books of the various departments of DeKalb County government; and,
- required the production of records, documents, correspondence, and books of persons, firms, and corporations which related directly and indirectly to the subject of this investigation.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury initially focused on reports of incompetence, patronage, fraud and cronyism within the Department of Watershed Management that emerged during the Vernon Jones administration and the lasting impact of same on the services provided to citizens and any increased expense passed on to citizens. Over time, this body became very concerned with reports of ongoing fraud and incompetence, most specifically those that impact areas of vendor selection, contract issuance and contract administration within the Department of Watershed Management and (as we learned eventually) in other County departments as well.

The evidence reviewed by this Special Purpose Grand Jury calls into question the efficiency, transparency and the fairness of the procurement process to be utilized to facilitate the approximately \$1.35 billion (\$1,350,000,000.00) Capital Improvement Plan ("CIP") that is currently in its infancy stage, as well as other County operations for which outside vendors are to be utilized.

DeKalb County's Consent Decree

The CIP, consisting of eighty (80) plus construction or rehabilitation projects for the County's water collection system, includes projects mandated by the Consent Decree between the County, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Georgia Environmental Protection Division. The Consent Decree arose out of a Complaint filed by the EPA and EPD alleging that DeKalb County violated the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, also known as the Clean Water Act, and the Georgia Water Quality Control Act, and the associated regulations. The State of Georgia joined as a plaintiff in this action. The County, without admitting liability to the EPA or the EPD arising out of the transactions or occurrences alleged in the Complaint, entered a Consent Decree that calls for improvement projects for the County's old and aging water collection system over a specified period of time.

The projects included in the CIP total approximately 1.35 Billion dollars (\$1,350,000,000.00), of which approximately Seven Hundred Million dollars (\$700,000,000.00) relate directly to the improvement projects mandated by the Consent Decree. The Special Purpose Grand Jury does not believe that the fair and efficient facilitation of the projects mandated by the Consent Decree and those included in the larger CIP can be accomplished through the current procurement practices of the County, particularly in light of the ongoing and improper influence of CEO Burrell Ellis and others on those practices.

THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION AND SPECIFIC FINDINGS

A. General

DeKalb County has approximately 5,000 miles of water and sewer lines servicing its citizens. The mission of the DeKalb County Department of Watershed Management is to protect the public health, safety and welfare through the provision of safe drinking water and quality wastewater treatment.

The DeKalb County Department of Water and Sewer was established in 1942. In 1985, the department became a division of a larger Public Works Department. In addition to the estimated 5,000 miles of pipe in the distribution and collection systems, major facilities operated and maintained by the Department include the Scott Candler Water Filter Plant, the PoleBridge Advanced Wastewater Treatment Plant, the Snapfinger Advanced Wastewater Treatment Plant, and the DeKalb County Raw Water Pumping Station. The management of these fixed assets, totaling over a billion dollars, requires planning, operation, maintenance, and monitoring of the activities of DeKalb's Department of Watershed Management, its employees, and its construction activities.

The Department of Watershed Management has approximately 670 employees working within five internal divisions: Administrative Services, Construction & Maintenance, Filtration & Treatment, GIS/GPS Mapping & System Inventory, and Technical & Production Services.

For the past ten years, the Department of Watershed Management has been building a countywide water and sanitary sewer GIS (Geographic Information System) as a tool for updating, mapping, and analyzing the water and sewer

distribution and collection network. The Department of Watershed Management GIS is a computer-based system used for geographic data creation, maintenance, storage, analysis and mapping. The system is being implemented by the GIS / GPS / Data Management Department.

In December 2010, DeKalb County reached a Clean Water Act settlement in the form of a consent decree with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (EPD) that formalizes implementation of certain sanitary sewer system programs and improvements, many of which the County is already implementing. These programs and improvements, which focus on the collection and transmission components of the County's sewers, are supposed to ensure long-term protection of public health and the environment, particularly with respect to the rivers and streams in the County. The programs and improvements will also ensure compliance with the federal Clean Water Act and the Georgia Water Quality Control Act, and will improve the viability of the County's sewers for generations to come.

The consent decree provides a road map for working cooperatively with the EPA and EPD. All of the programs contained in the consent decree are included in the County's Department of Watershed Management Capital Improvement Program (CIP). The approximate cost of the CIP is \$1.35 billion dollars and includes eighty (80) plus specified construction and rehabilitation projects.

B. History of bribery, fraud and other criminal activity within DeKalb County

1. Bribery by Department of Watershed Management Employees

The Grand Jury heard testimony pertaining to the November 2010

indictment of a DeKalb County Department of Watershed Management employee, Dameco Moss, who worked as a "Fats, Oil & Grease ("FOG") Inspector," on charges of Bribery and Theft by Taking. The defendant entered a guilty plea in May 2011. After the entry of the plea, the then Deputy Director of the Department of Watershed Management, Jo Ann Macrina, approached the District Attorney's Office and indicated that the corruption within the Department of Watershed Management was much more far reaching than this employee and the FOG program.

The Deputy Director revealed that an investigation into allegations regarding invoice padding, contract fraud, and bid rigging within the Department of Watershed Management during the Jones administration had been initiated by Detective Jamie Payton of the DeKalb County Police Department in August 2009. This investigation centered on the Champion Tree Service easement contracts but was now being hindered by the administration within the DeKalb County Police Department.

2. Champion Tree Service

As a result of the meeting and subsequent interview of Deputy Director Macrina, the District Attorney's Office contacted the DeKalb County Police Department to inquire as to the status of the Department of Watershed Management investigation. The District Attorney's Office learned the DeKalb County Police Department had initiated a criminal investigation pertaining to two contracts between DeKalb County and Champion Tree Service. The investigation centered on allegations of overbilling by Champion Tree Service which was owned and operated by Paul Champion. The investigation quickly expanded to

allegations that Mr. Champion had internal assistance in the overbilling scheme by former Deputy Director Nadine Maghsoudlou's brother-in-law, Hadi Haeri, a contract employee with the County, and other county employees to include former Deputy Director John Walker.

Champion Tree Service was awarded its first easement clearing contract with DeKalb County on June 24, 2003. The contract, administered by the Department of Watershed Management, lasted until early 2006. Champion Tree Service was paid approximately \$8,800,000.00 under the contract.

In 2003, prior to the issuance of the DeKalb contract to Champion Tree Service, Mr. Champion was approached by Mr. Don Tyler, the principal at Video Industrial Service, Inc., located in Decatur, Alabama, to bid on tree and easement clearing contracts in DeKalb County. Mr. Tyler had met Mr. Champion through a mutual friend in Birmingham, AL, where Mr. Champion resided. At the time, Mr. Champion's small tree service business made approximately \$50,000.00 per year. His company had no ties to Georgia, much less DeKalb County, and had no experience with municipal contracts for ongoing easement clearing services.

In exchange for assisting Mr. Champion in obtaining the lucrative DeKalb contract, Mr. Tyler was to receive eleven percent (11%) of the gross earnings of Mr. Champion on the contract as a "finder's fee". Mr. Tyler shared an unknown portion of the "finder's fee" with Mr. Hadi Haeri. According to a grand jury witness, Mr. Tyler introduced Mr. Champion to Mr. Haeri, but did not disclose that Mr. Tyler and Mr. Haeri had an agreement to share the aforementioned "finder's fee". It should be noted, contingency fee contracts such as this are expressly prohibited by the 2002 procurement rules.

As noted, Paul Champion began providing easement clearing services to the

County in September 2003. Several months passed and Mr. Champion was not paid by DeKalb County. At the time, Mr. Hadi Haeri was working in an unknown capacity at the Department of Watershed Management under the supervision of Deputy Director John Walker.¹ Mr. Champion went to Mr. Haeri in order to gain assistance in getting DeKalb County to remit payment for his services. Mr. Haeri took Mr. Champion to Deputy Director John Walker, who called DeKalb County Finance and had a hold removed that allowed Mr. Champion to get paid.

The grand Jury heard evidence that Deputy Director John Walker, a Jones appointee, was known to be longtime close friends with former DeKalb County CEO Vernon Jones. Furthermore, Mr. Walker's twin brother, Jeff Walker, and his sister, Joy Walker, are also known to be longtime close friends of CEO Jones. Vernon Jones appointed Joy Walker as the Chief Judge of the DeKalb County Recorder's Court. She later resigned from this office in 2010 after an investigation into criminal activity within Recorders Court was initiated by the District Attorney's Office.

Mr. Paul Champion later entered into an agreement to pay Mr. Hadi Haeri ten percent (10%) of his revenues derived from his (first) DeKalb contract. In early 2005, Mr. Champion ceased paying Mr. Don Tyler. Mr. Tyler threatened civil action, but Mr. Champion and Mr. Tyler reached an "Accord and Satisfaction" settlement agreement in April 2006. The agreement was that Mr. Champion would pay Mr. Tyler the sum of \$100,000.00. The agreement also involved Mr. Haeri. The agreement indicates Mr. Tyler and Mr. Haeri had a signed agreement for the

¹Mr. John Walker was hired by DeKalb County as an Assistant Compliance Manager in the Water and Sewer Department in December 2001, and was promoted to Deputy Director on or about July 18, 2005. He died October 20, 2007.

payment of a finder's fee that was dated May 12, 2003. This 2006 agreement released Mr. Tyler from his 2003 agreement with Mr. Haeri.

As part of his new agreement, Mr. Haeri was tasked with creating and submitting invoices to DeKalb County on behalf of Champion Tree Services. A witness stated that Mr. Paul Champion also entered into this agreement with Mr. Hadi Haeri because Mr. Haeri had known connections with John Walker and other officials in CEO Jones's administration. It should be noted that Mr. Haeri was, at times during the term of his agreement with Mr. Champion, still employed as a contract employee within the Department of Watershed Management and reported daily to an office space within the department. Also during this time, Hadi Haeri's sister-in-law, Nadine Maghsoudlou, was hired into the department and, after the death of John Walker in 2007, was promoted to Deputy Director.

Multiple Department of Watershed Management inspectors that were tasked with oversight of Mr. Champion's work complained to Mr. John Walker about issues with Mr. Champion's work. Mr. Walker, however, dismissed these complaints. Some of these complaints included allegations of made-up or exaggerated work. These complaints could easily have been verified by simple observation of areas claimed to have been cleared by Champion per submitted invoices.

As part of the probe into this activity, the Special Purpose Grand Jury heard testimony that on February 16, 2010, a link analysis chart developed by Detective Jamie Payton of the DeKalb County Police Department was provided to the senior officials within the DeKalb County Police Department. The chart linked numerous vendors and subcontractors to high ranking Department of Watershed Management officials, including John Walker, who also had known close

relationships to former CEO Vernon Jones.

According to testimony heard by the Special Purpose Grand Jury, the link analysis chart was given to DeKalb County Police Department Assistant Chief Annette Lane-Woodard. On or about February 18, 2010, the DeKalb County Police Department investigation was abruptly halted by Public Safety Director William (Wiz) Miller. Detectives were instructed to cease the investigation without explanation. In addition, the detectives who worked on the case were separated ..

In accord with the January 20, 2012, Order's provision, Judge Scott's written charge to this Special Purpose Grand Jury, and our statutory authority to look into related matters, this body also inquired into actions of Public Safety Director William Miller. It was apparent that his actions were related to stopping an ongoing, active criminal investigation into the Department of Watershed Management when it became obvious that the investigation would involve current county officials. Accordingly, we heard testimony from Director Miller and Deputy Chief Lane-Woodard. We were deeply disturbed by the conflicting testimony of Director Miller and Deputy Chief Lane-Woodard on the simple issue of whether information concerning possible corruption was even given to the FBI for their review. Based on their testimony, we are forced to conclude that Director Miller and Deputy Chief Lane-Woodard either perjured themselves or are abjectly incompetent.

As DeKalb County's Public Safety Director and a sworn law enforcement officer, Director Miller had an obligation to ensure appropriate crime control and prevention strategies. We believe that with respect to the DeKalb County Police Department's investigation of the Department of Watershed

Management, Director Miller failed in that duty. A law enforcement officer can fail to do his duty for many reasons: incompetence, ignorance, or perhaps criminal collusiveness. The Special Purpose Grand Jury finds that Director Miller's behavior was not the result of incompetence. Rather, the Special Purpose Grand Jury finds that, with complete awareness that an active investigation involved current county employees, Director Miller interfered with the investigation and failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the apparent and obvious criminal behavior was stopped or thoroughly investigated.

According to witness testimony, Department of Watershed Management Deputy Director, Charles Lambert, had been cooperating with the investigation and had been providing DeKalb County Police Department detectives with information pertaining to the aforementioned issues. Mr. Lambert had conducted an internal review of the Champion Tree Service invoices in question. This internal review found unequivocal evidence that multiple Champion Tree Services invoices had been inflated, and that Champion charged the County for services that it had not even provided. The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard evidence that Mr. Lambert met with Director Miller and Assistant Chief Lane-Woodard near the time period when the DeKalb County Police Department detectives provided the link analysis chart to their supervisors. At that meeting, Mr. Lambert provided details of his internal findings. Within weeks Mr. Lambert could not get any of the DeKalb County Police Department detectives that he had been working with to return his calls.

During the same time period, the District Attorney's Office learned of an ongoing civil lawsuit involving Champion Tree Service and DeKalb County. Paul

Champion had filed a lawsuit against the County claiming he was owed money for unpaid invoices stemming from his 2006 easement clearing contract. The District Attorney's Office, after much effort, obtained files and transcripts from the County Attorney's Office. The documents, which included emails of former Department of Watershed Director Roy Barnes², and former Deputy Director Nadine Maghsoudlou, appeared to reveal an alleged fraudulent scheme involving current and former employees of the Department of Watershed Management and other DeKalb County government departments, public/elected officials, and outside contractors during the time period of 2000 - present.

The Department of Watershed Management's own internal procedures were not enough to stop the Champion scheme. An Inspector with the Department of Watershed Management objected to the manner and billing of Paul Champion. That inspector testified to the Grand Jury that he reported to his superiors that Champion Tree Service was grossly overestimating the tree count and the linear feet cleared. Former Deputy Director John Walker and Nadine Maghsoudlou, however, told the inspector to sign the work orders and the invoices despite his concerns.

3. Ace Environmental

As noted above, Champion Tree Service was awarded two easement clearing contracts with DeKalb County in 2003 and 2007. The events that

² Mr. Barnes was the Associate Director of the DeKalb County Water and Sewer Department. Mr. Barnes was appointed to this position by CEO Vernon Jones on or about June 3, 2003. Mr. Barnes had been hired as an engineer. The promotion from engineer to Associate Director effectively meant Mr. Barnes jumped multiple ranks in the organization to head the entire department. The DA's Office investigation revealed Mr. Barnes to be a close friend of CEO Jones and both John and Jeff Walker.

occurred between the expiration of the 2003 contract (in 2006) and the award of the 2007 contract to Champion Tree Service greatly concern the Special Purpose Grand Jury. Witness testimony indicated that Deputy Director John Walker told Mr. Champion (in the presence of Hadi Haeri) that he needed a "black face" on this contract. In response to this, Paul Champion asked his childhood friend, Christian Vann, an African-American then employed by the Cartoon Network, to help him secure or re-secure the contract that Mr. Champion previously had with DeKalb County. Mr. Champion wanted Mr. Vann to sign off on the bid documents for the easement clearing contract – and then submit it to DeKalb County. Mr. Vann and Mr. Champion came to an agreement that in the event Mr. Vann won the bid, then Mr. Champion would come in as a subcontractor and do all the required work issued under the contract.

Mr. Vann then registered a fictitious company with the Georgia Secretary of State named ACE Environmental. Mr. Champion completed the Invitation to Bid for easement clearing services by handwriting in the line item figures for various clearing services and the names of references (including that of Deputy Director John Walker, whom Mr. Vann had never met). Mr. Vann signed the bid document. No one from the County tried to verify that Mr. Vann was a responsive and responsible bidder and that he and his "company" were qualified to do the work. Ironically, Mr. Vann did not even own a chainsaw at this point in time. Mr. Vann, per the directive of Mr. Champion, subsequently attended a mandatory pre-bid meeting at the County offices.

Despite not having any actual qualifications, ACE Environmental won the bid for the easement clearing contract. The amount of the contract was from two million two hundred thousand dollars (\$2,200,000.00) to two million five hundred

thousand dollars (\$2,500,000.00). After a dispute with Mr. Champion over fees to be paid to Mr. Vann under the contract (for his role in securing the County contract through his fictitious company), Mr. Vann, now facing complaints from the County regarding non-performance, attempted to enter into an agreement with Mr. David Gallemore. Mr. Gallemore has registered tens of companies with the Georgia Secretary of State, many of which have held contracts with DeKalb County (particularly in the area of IT). Gallemore's company, Arbor People, bought the name "ACE Environmental" from Mr. Vann. The contract issued to ACE Environmental was canceled by the County shortly thereafter for non-performance. It should be noted that Mr. Gallemore's employment company employed Mr. Hadi Haeri and placed him at DeKalb's Department of Watershed Management as a contracted or supplemental employee.

The realization that a fictitious company with no assets, no equipment, no employees and no experience in the relevant area of work can win a multi-million dollar services contract with the County is of great concern to the Special Purpose Grand Jury. Several employees from the Purchasing and Contracting Department testified to the Grand Jury and none were able to provide concrete answers as to how this situation could have occurred and, perhaps more importantly, what checks and balances are now in place to prevent a repeat of the situation.

4. G4 Technologies (David Gallemore)

A November 2007 DeKalb County internal audit report revealed that DeKalb County paid fourteen (14) consultants and technology service providers millions of dollars through various, individual contracts or purchase orders capped at the amount of \$50,000.00 each (Note: one of the fourteen companies had a

contract in excess of \$50,000.00, but was still paid in excess of a million dollars of their contracted amount.) The audit further revealed the payments made to the aforementioned contractors were done through the "splitting" of Purchase Orders. The "splitting" was done to circumvent the Board of Commissioner's approval and to avoid putting the contracts out for competitive bid (requirements made necessary for contracts of certain monetary thresholds). The DeKalb County internal auditors discovered that Mr. Richard Stogner, Executive Assistant to CEO Vernon Jones, directed employees to split the Purchase Orders in violation of County policy. Testimony heard by the Special Purpose Grand Jury indicated that Mr. Stogner knowingly violated these policies despite his own approval in 2004 of the very policies at issue.

G4 Enterprises was one of the fourteen (14) contractors referenced in the 2007 internal audit report. G4 Enterprises had a single contract in the amount of \$50,000.00; however, G4 Enterprises was paid a total of \$2,616,884.00 from June 30, 2004 - September 20, 2007. G4 Enterprises was also paid approximately \$20,000.00 in 2008, but their services were later terminated.

The internal audit report was sent to CEO Vernon Jones on November 14, 2007. Dr. Michael Bell and the Board of Commissioners commissioned an external audit through KPMG. This audit confirmed and expanded on the findings of the internal audit.

On November 15, 2007, CEO Vernon Jones ordered Internal Auditor Eugene O'Mard to issue an addendum to his audit report to include the roles of various departments in the contract payment deficiencies. Mr. O'Mard issued the addendum to his report on November 21, 2007, finding no connection to the finance department and the deficiencies. CEO Jones commissioned another

external audit through a company known as NashHill, which confirmed the findings of the internal audit. This third audit report commissioned by CEO Jones, in the opinion of the Special Purpose Grand Jury, was self-serving, unnecessary and a waste of tax payer money.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard testimony and saw evidence that between October 2006 and October 17, 2007, David Gallemore, operating under the business name of G4 Enterprises, Inc., sent threatening emails to Director Roy Barnes and Deputy Director John Walker. During this time, Mr. Gallemore had fallen out of favor with the Walkers and, therefore, with DeKalb County. The emails threatened to expose Barnes', Walker's and CEO Jones' involvement in corrupt activities, that included the Champion Tree Service contract and Christian Vann's contract, threats received by vendors from CEO Jones, reports of kickbacks in the form of trips, and bid and contract manipulation. The emails also claimed that as a form of retribution, Mr. Gallemore's company was no longer receiving work under his County contract and was not receiving timely payment from the County.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard testimony that Mr. Roy Barnes, as Associate Director of the Department of Watershed Management, investigated the emails and possibly sent the emails to someone in the law department. Mr. Barnes, however, did not investigate the allegations in the aforementioned emails. It should be noted that Mr. Barnes, during his time of employment as an Associate Director and a Deputy Director in the Department of Watershed Management, received thousands of dollars from John Walker for unknown purposes.

5. MM&E

Mr. Barry Bennett is the owner of Metals and Materials Engineers, LLC.

MM&E was started in 2001 with Mr. Bennett as the principal owner. Mr. Bennett wanted to get his company into the public sector arena and sought certification with DeKalb County as a Local Small Business Enterprise and a Minority Business Enterprise.

MM&E was awarded several Department of Watershed Management contracts between 2002 to present. Its initial success with the County was short-lived. Several contracts awarded to MM&E, which were under the control of Ms. Nadine Maghsoudlou, were drastically reduced in scope upon award or subsequently no work was issued to MM&E under the contract. Also, MM&E experienced issues with receiving timely payment on other Department of Watershed Management contracts. There is also some question as to whether a bid for a later contract was purposefully rigged to select another vendor when MM&E was actually the lowest bidder. MM&E representatives believe these actions on various contracts were forms of retribution for Mr. Bennett having fired Jeffrey Walker. Testimony provided to the Special Purpose Grand Jury indicated that Mr. Bennett had hired Mr. Jeffrey Walker as a business development consultant at a rate of \$8,000 per month in 2005. That agreement was terminated by Mr. Bennett after five months.

6. Universal Business Development (Hadi Haeri) and Brown & Caldwell

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard testimony about Hadi Haeri who provided services on the County's mapping project regarding DeKalb's effort to locate and determine the GPS coordinates of its approximately 75,000 manholes. The contract was worth approximately twenty million dollars (\$20,000,000.00). Mr.

Haeri ostensibly worked as a "business consultant" through his company Universal Business Development. In that capacity, according to Mr. Haeri, he worked to put together a team of subcontractors to work under a prime contractor, Brown & Caldwell, to pursue the mapping contract.

Mr. Haeri testified that he had no influence on bids/offers. However, the Special Purpose Grand Jury notes that Mr. Haeri's sister-in-law, Nadine Maghsoudlou at the time Deputy Director in the Department of Watershed Management, did have influence on bids/offers pertaining to the Department of Watershed Management. Ms. Maghsoudlou was a participant on various selection committees that reviewed and evaluated Request For Proposals (RFPs) vying for County contracts, including the lucrative mapping contract. In fact, one subcontractor involved in Brown & Caldwell's RFP for the mapping project testified that Mr. Haeri told the RFP group that they had nothing to worry about because Nadine would be on the selection committee for the contract award.

One of the subcontractors set up by Mr. Haeri to be included on the Brown and Caldwell bid for the mapping project, DMD Engineering, had no experience in the area of manhole inspections — the very scope of work DMD and Brown & Caldwell represented that DMD would perform under the contract. Despite this, Brown & Caldwell won the mapping contract with DMD still listed as the subcontractor on the project responsible for the manhole inspection portion of the work. As stated above, the ability for County contracts to be issued to unqualified vendors, especially those included on contracts as a Local Small Business Enterprise, is very troubling to the Special Purpose Grand Jury.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury reviewed the RFP submittal by Brown & Caldwell for the mapping contract. It included a detailed section about the quality

control services to be provided by Brown & Caldwell employees on the mapping project. The RFP listed three Brown & Caldwell employees that would oversee the quality control aspect of the project, one of whom had a Ph.D. Despite this impressive and qualified oversight group, just some weeks after the County issued the mapping project contract to Brown & Caldwell, Brown & Caldwell entered into an agreement to pay Hadi Haeri for the very same services.

Witnesses testified that Deputy Directors John Walker and Nadine Maghsoudlou directed Brown & Caldwell to hire Mr. Haeri under the Brown & Caldwell contract. In response to this directive, Brown & Caldwell sent two letters to Ms. Maghsoudlou to memorialize her directive. One of those letters stated in part:

In accordance with your request, we propose to add to our team, Mr. Hadi Haeri, who will be responsible for assisting DeKalb County Public Works Water and Sewer Department (DCWS), with project administration, as required. We understand that he will be based mainly at your offices and will report to you and other personnel at DCWS for project assignments and direction.

As instructed, we shall subcontract the services of Mr. Hadi Haeri with effect from January 1, 2007, under the above project. We propose to bill his services as a Junior Engineer at the rate of \$100 per hour, in accordance with the hourly rates given in the above Contract.

An acknowledgement attached to the letter goes on to state:

"It is understood and acknowledged by DeKalb County that Brown and Caldwell shall not scope, direct or review the work performed by Mr. Hadi Haeri for DeKalb County, and that Mr. Hadi Haeri shall not be under the direction or control of Brown and Caldwell at any time."

Ms. Maghsoudlou signed the acknowledgement to the first letter. The acknowledgement to the second version of the letter, which changed Mr. Haeri's title and significantly increased his hourly fee, was signed by Associate Director Barnes.

Mr. Haeri was paid over seven hundred thousand dollars for his services under the Brown & Caldwell contract — services that were already accounted for by Brown & Caldwell under its RFP submittal. As such, Mr. Haeri's and Brown & Caldwell's assertions that Mr. Haeri was added to the Brown & Caldwell prime contract under its "Additional Services" clause lack credibility.

With full knowledge of Mr. Haeri's created role under the Brown & Caldwell contract, Ms. Maghsoudlou approved Brown & Caldwell invoices which covered the expenses associated with Mr. Haeri. Additionally, both Ms. Maghsoudlou and Associate Director Roy Barnes approved various time sheets for invoices by Mr. Haeri under the mapping project during an eight month period in 2009 in which work on the mapping project had been halted due to a delay of the approval of the budget by the County Commissioners.

Hadi Haeri was fired by Brown & Caldwell on or about the time that Nadine Maghsoudlou was placed on administrative leave by DeKalb County in 2010.

7. Universal Business Development (Hadi Haeri) and DMD Engineering

The Special Purpose Grand Jury also learned through testimony that Mr. Haeri was also being paid by DMD Engineering, another subcontractor to Brown & Caldwell, during the course of the mapping project. DMD paid Mr. Haeri over five-hundred thousand dollars. The exact services, if any, provided by Mr. Haeri on the mapping project for or through DMD is unknown as the former principal of DMD is now deceased.

8. Global Business Development (Jeffrey Walker) and Brown & Caldwell

Per testimony provided to the Special Purpose Grand Jury, Brown & Caldwell hired Jeff Walker as a political or "business development" consultant in order to gain further favor with DeKalb County. Brown & Caldwell paid Jeff Walker, through his company Global Business Development, approximately \$106,000.00 from February 2008 through May 2010.

The Grand Jury reviewed invoices and reimbursement forms that were submitted to Brown & Caldwell by Jeff Walker. These documents show that Jeff Walker was meeting with and entertaining:

- CEO Jones' Chief of Staff, Ann Kimbrough,
- Debra Brewer (Deputy Director of DeKalb County Purchasing and Contracting),
- Rudy Chen (Deputy Director of DeKalb County Department of Watershed Management),
- Roy Barnes (Assistant/Deputy Director of DeKalb County Department of Watershed Management),
- Richard Calhoun (DeKalb County Department of Watershed Management),
- Kelvin Walton (Director of DeKalb County Purchasing and Contracting).

The documentation produced by Brown & Caldwell indicates a pattern of Mr. Jeff Walker meeting with the aforementioned individuals, in addition to other DeKalb County officials and employees, over a period of time from December

2007 to December 2009. Of the twenty-five Jeffrey Walker invoices produced by Brown & Caldwell, twenty reference his meetings with DeKalb officials including the department heads for DeKalb Watershed Management and Contracting and Procurement.

It should be noted that Mr. Walker, prior to the creation of his business development company in 2002, had no experience in engineering, construction or public policy. His only qualification for his role as a business developer for Brown & Caldwell and the below listed companies appears to be his connections with his twin brother, Deputy Director John Walker, his sister, former Chief Judge of Recorders Court Joy Walker, the Walker's longtime and close friendship with CEO Vernon Jones, and his friendship with Associate Director of Watershed Roy Barnes.

9. Global Business Development (Jeffrey Walker) and MM&E

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard testimony and saw evidence that Metals, Materials Engineers, LLC (MM&E) entered into an agreement to pay Global Business Development a monthly sum of \$8,000.00 in December 2005 for "advice". MM&E terminated the agreement after five (5) months.

10. Global Business Development (Jeffrey Walker) and Desmear Systems

Additionally, the Grand Jury heard testimony and saw evidence that a company known as Desmear Systems paid Jeff Walker, through his company, Global Business Development, \$8,000.00 in 2008. Desmear Systems was paid approximately \$2,254,000.00 by DeKalb County from November 2007 - November 2009. In addition, Desmear Systems has provided work space for Mr. Walker in

their Northlake area offices since at least 2011. This particular company gained the interest of the Grand Jury because of the following press release published May 22, 2012.

MAY 22, 2012 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The First ONE DeKalb Works Sewer Contract Awarded

DECATUR – DeKalb County Chief Executive Officer Burrell Ellis announces that DeKalb County awarded the first contract in the \$1.35 billion water and sewer system upgrades using bond funds that will be taking place over the next eight years.

“This is a historic day in DeKalb County as we begin these critical upgrades for future generations, and start putting people back to work under the ONE DeKalb Works jobs initiative,” said CEO Ellis.

The winning bidder, Desmear Systems, Inc., in Tucker, begins work in June. The \$7.6 million project prepares the Snapfinger Wastewater Treatment Facilities Expansion for later construction which includes clearing, grubbing, rock and soil excavation, and construction of a retaining wall.

There is a 20 percent Local and Small Business Enterprise participation required, as well as a good faith effort to hire at least 50 percent of DeKalb County residents for new jobs created as a result of this contract. Also, contractors are encouraged to have 25% or more of their labor force consisting of preferred employees from labor organizations selected from the First Source Registry and trained by a U.S. Department of Labor registered apprenticeship program.

“One of the key components of the American Jobs Act is targeted to rebuilding our nation’s crumbling infrastructure,” said CEO Ellis. “We are investing \$1.35 billion to upgrade and repair of our aging water and sewer system, but we have the opportunity to implement our own local stimulus program that will create jobs now and help citizens grow businesses now.”

ONE DeKalb Works is a public service, jobs initiative that will leverage the completion of water and sewer infrastructure improvements and other construction projects to cultivate a skilled workforce and promote local businesses. According to a recent study by the Carl Vinson Institute of Government at the University of Georgia, up to 4,700 jobs will be created at the programs peak.

For more information on ONE DeKalb Works, visit www.DeKalbcountyga.gov.

11. Global Business Development (Jeffrey Walker) and Parsons Water Infrastructure, Inc.

DeKalb County advertised and initiated the RFP process for design work for the Polebridge-Snappinger Wastewater Plant Expansion project (hereinafter "Polebridge Project") (worth approximately thirty million dollars) on three consecutive occasions starting in 2005. Parsons Water Infrastructure, Inc. (hereinafter "Parsons") submitted offers on these RFPs for the aforementioned project. After not being shortlisted on the first two occasions, Parsons teamed up with Jeffrey Walker in preparing for the third attempt for the lucrative contract. Mr. Walker met the Parson's general manager overseeing the Parson's efforts for the Polebridge Project RFP, Mr. Tony Taylor, through Barry Bennett of MM&E.

According to testimony provided to the Special Purpose Grand Jury, Parsons entered into a consulting agreement with Mr. Walker in 2006. Under the agreement Mr. Walker provided "technical writing and proofreading services" on the Parsons RFP notebook to be submitted to DeKalb County. The agreement was for a term of six (6) months and provided for fees to Mr. Walker in the amount of eight thousand dollars (\$8,000) a month for a total amount in fees of forty-eight thousand dollars (\$48,000). Parsons executed two amendments to the agreement which extended the term of Mr. Walker's agreement and increased his fees an additional forty thousand, nine hundred dollars (\$40,900). Under the consulting agreement, Parsons paid Jeffrey Walker a total amount of eighty-eight thousand, nine hundred dollars (\$88,900) for six months of technical writing and proofreading services. Parsons won the Polebridge Project contract award.

After winning the contract on the third RFP issued by the County for the

Polebridge Project, Parsons then hired Jeffrey Walker as an employee for a short time in 2008/2009. Documents produced by Parsons and reviewed by the Special Purpose Grand Jury indicate that Mr. Walker, as an employee of Parsons, engaged in numerous breakfast, lunch and dinner meetings from March of 2008 to June of 2009 with Parsons' Tony Taylor and various high level DeKalb County employees and officials. These employees and officials included former CEO Vernon Jones, former Chief of Staff Ann Kimbrough, Associate Director of Watershed Management, Roy Barnes, DeKalb County Director of Contracting and Procurement, Kelvin Walton and other lower level Department of Watershed Management employees.

During part of the period of time that Mr. Jeffrey Walker was employed full-time by Parsons to perform "marketing and business development" services, he was also a paid consultant for Brown & Caldwell providing the very same services. Both companies held and were seeking lucrative DeKalb County Department of Watershed Management projects with the County during this period of time.

The activities of Mr. Walker and his many consulting agreements with contractors and subcontractors (particularly small companies serving as subcontractors to larger prime contractors in order for the larger prime contractors to meet their Local Small Business Enterprise ("LSBE") requirement, and thus receive extra points during an RFP or bid assessment) is very troubling to the Special Purpose Grand Jury. Additional concern over these agreements arose upon learning that Mr. Walker's sister, former Records Court Chief Judge Joy Walker, provided ongoing assistance in drafting and preparing these consulting agreements for Mr. Walker. According to a 2005 email reviewed by the Special

Purpose Grand Jury, Ms. Walker conferred with a county attorney serving then as the Assistant Director of Purchasing and Contracting, Terry Phillips, to develop the contingency fee language used in many of Mr. Walker's contracts with DeKalb vendors. It should be noted that this very type of language regarding contingency fee agreements with consultants seeking work in DeKalb is expressly prohibited by Section 7, subsection 7, of the county's Purchasing Manual entitled "Ethics in Public Purchasing for DeKalb County". The manual, issued in 2002, specifically indicates that it was submitted to "Mr. Terry Phillips, Assistant Director Purchasing and Contracting". The Special Purpose Grand Jury finds the actions of Ms. Walker and Mr. Phillips to be unacceptable, in violation of the established purchasing policies, and contrary to the best interests of the County.

12. Inland Waters and Superior Pipeline (Dion Allen)

Dion Allen owned and operated Superior Pipeline. The company primarily performed pipe bursting services and CCTV inspection services related to water systems. Superior Pipeline sought and received certification from DeKalb County as a Local Small Business Enterprise. After that, Mr. Allen began teaming up with larger companies to bid on County contracts out of the Department of Watershed Management. In 2008 or 2009, Mr. Allen (Superior Pipeline) was approached by Inland Waters ("Inland") wanting to team up with Mr. Allen to pursue DeKalb projects (CCTV and pipe bursting). Inland, at that time, had no contracts with the County and was looking to get a foot in the door.

Superior Pipeline did not have the financial resources to pursue larger contracts out of the Department of Watershed Management as a prime contractor. Mr. Allen did own four CCTV trucks and other equipment needed to

perform services under a CCTV contract and a pipe bursting contract. Inland and Mr. Allen reached an agreement to pursue the aforementioned projects. Under the subcontractor agreement, Mr. Allen/Superior was to perform 100% of the work on the CCTV contract and 20% of the work on the pipe bursting contract. Inland, with Superior as its subcontractor, won both contracts in 2010.

According to testimony heard by the Special Purpose Grand Jury, Mr. Allen was contacted by the Inland project manager (Randy Hebert) only months into starting work on the CCTV contract. Mr. Hebert indicated that Inland now wanted to bring in another subcontractor on the contract who had some political connections to DeKalb's new administration (referring to CEO Burrell Ellis' administration). Mr. Allen's work would now be reduced from 100% to a much lower percentage (despite his original agreement with Inland when preparing the bid on the contract). Mr. Allen was told that he either play ball or risk losing the (sub)contract all together. Mr. Hebert indicated that Inland had a new lobbyist, Kevin Ross, and that the sudden change in subcontractors on the project was coming down from him. Mr. Ross is the former campaign manager to Burrell Ellis. Mr. Allen fought Inland on the matter. He subsequently was removed from the contract as Inland's subcontractor. Mr. Allen plans to file a civil suit over the matter this year.

C. Improper Activities within the CEO's office

As a result of this Grand Jury's efforts, numerous people have testified and voluminous documents have been reviewed. The investigation has yielded evidence that current Chief Executive Officer Burrell Ellis (hereinafter CEO Ellis) is involved in a scheme that entails the following: 1) soliciting campaign contributions

under the color of his title as CEO with vendors that have a just-approved or pending contract with DeKalb County; 2)canceling or attempting to cancel contracts in order to create an "emergency situation" for which an emergency contract can then be issued to another vendor without a competitive process; 3) directing the cancellation of contracts or the non-issuance of work to vendors for punitive and political reasons; 4) dictating which individuals should be placed on selection committees for RFPs for which major campaign donors will be submitting offers; 5) interfering in the evaluation process for RFPs by discussing secret selection committee information with committee members during the active evaluation period; 6) communicating with a submitting vendor and/or vendor representative during an active evaluation period for the related RFP about matters directly related to the pending RFP and subsequent contract award; and 7) interfering with and/or altering a selection committee's final recommendation (prior to submission to the Board of Commissioners) in favor of vendors represented by Kevin Ross or for vendors with a history of paying significant campaign contributions/raising significant campaign contributions for Mr. Ellis.

The Grand Jury has received information that, on a routine basis, CEO Ellis demands and receives an updated list of vendors that have been recently approved for contracts by the DeKalb County Board of Commissioners. CEO Ellis then utilizes the information provided in the vendor lists, specifically the name and phone number of the successful company representative who signed the ITB or RFP document, to contact the vendors to solicit campaign contributions. In some instances, if the vendors refuse or are not initially receptive or "responsive", CEO Ellis will make repeated calls to the vendor for the purpose of soliciting campaign contributions. These calls often are made prior to an issued contract to the vendor

being finalized or just after a contract is finalized and the vendor is in its initial phase of the contract.

1. CEO Soliciting Campaign Contributions from Vendors with Pending or new contracts with the County

a) Jeffrey Walker-"Things to Know"

During its investigation, the Grand Jury received a memorandum that is titled "Things to Know" which contains allegations against CEO Ellis. More than one witness testified that Mr. Jeff Walker authored the memorandum.

The aforementioned "Things to Know" memorandum indicates CEO Ellis is involved in a scheme to withhold his signature on contracts until receiving a campaign contribution from the vendor, specifically in regards to Desmear Systems.

b) Desmear Systems

The Grand Jury heard testimony that Desmear Systems was awarded a contract for sidewalk repair and landscaping in August of 2011. Systems did not receive a notice to proceed (to begin the work) until after a call from CEO Burrell Ellis on February 8, 2012, in which CEO Ellis asked for a \$2,500.00 campaign contribution. The company's principal agreed to make the contribution and the following day, Purchasing and Contracting told Desmear that DeKalb County was ready to proceed with its contract. On May 22, 2012, CEO Ellis' office issued the news release included above regarding a subsequent contract award for Desmear Systems.

c) Power and Energy Services

The Grand Jury also received evidence about a contract between DeKalb

County and Power and Energy Services. In April 2012, Power and Energy Services was awarded a DeKalb County contract (to service generators). Another company was also awarded the same contract (a split award). A review of the bid abstract indicates that Power and Energy Services significantly underbid the other vendor, Prime, on the majority of the line items included in the Invitation to Bid.

On June 4, 2012, CEO Ellis contacted Mr. Brandon Cummings, the co-owner of Power and Energy, via telephone and requested Mr. Cummings contribute \$2,500.00 through his company (Power and Energy Services) to CEO Ellis' campaign. Mr. Cummings advised CEO Ellis that Mr. Cummings was not sure if he would be able to make a campaign contribution, but that Mr. Cummings would check and advise CEO Ellis. Mr. Cummings talked with his wife, Danice Cummings, and the two decided they would not contribute to CEO Ellis' campaign. Mr. Cummings advised his administrative staff about CEO Ellis' request and that no contribution would be made.

On the following day, CEO Ellis again contacted Power and Energy Services and spoke to Ms. Eneida Robles, an employee. Ms. Robles advised CEO Ellis that Mr. Cummings was not available and CEO Ellis asked if Ms. Robles could take a message. CEO Ellis called back and again asked to speak to Mr. Cummings. Ms. Robles advised CEO Ellis that Power and Energy Services would not be able to help with CEO Ellis' solicitation for a campaign contribution. CEO Ellis' demeanor changed, and he became upset. CEO Ellis stated something to the effect of "Oh, so you are not interested in doing work in DeKalb County".

Within a few minutes after the call from CEO Ellis to Ms. Robles, a DeKalb County employee contacted Power and Energy Services and spoke to Ms. Danice Cummings, the other co-owner of Power and Energy Services. The DeKalb County

employee advised Ms. Cummings that CEO Ellis needed to speak to Mr. Cummings. Ms. Cummings advised the employee that Mr. Cummings was unavailable at the time. The employee then asked something to the effect of why Mr. Cummings would not be willing to speak to "the person that signs their contract". Ms. Cummings stated that she was able to get the employee to acknowledge that CEO Ellis was calling for the purpose of soliciting a campaign contribution.

The Grand Jury heard a recording of yet another phone call between Mr. Cummings and CEO Ellis. CEO Ellis came on the line and thanked "Brandon" for calling back. CEO Ellis stated that he was in a friend's office and that CEO Ellis normally gives out his (Ellis') cell phone, 404-625-7086, for these type calls.

CEO Ellis stated he had campaigned for CEO and that it takes approximately \$1 million dollars to run for the office. The CEO had raised approximately three fourths (¾) of the amount. CEO Ellis advised Mr. Cummings that CEO Ellis was holding a fundraiser on October 11, 2012, and asked Mr. Cummings to contribute the "maximum level" of \$2,500.00.

CEO Ellis advised Mr. Cummings that CEO Ellis had been trying to reach Mr. Cummings for some time. CEO Ellis stated that he had spoken to Mr. Cummings on June 4, 2012, and made attempts to call Mr. Cummings back on June 5, 2012, June 7, 2012, and June 11, 2012. CEO Ellis stated that he also called on June 25, 2012, and was advised by a person CEO Ellis described as Aneida (CEO Ellis spelled the name on the recording) and was told "he is not interested in your services".

Mr. Cummings stated that there may have been some confusion on the previous calls and that Mr. Cummings had received a call from a DeKalb County

Director of Purchasing and Contracting about the CEO's calls. CEO Ellis stated that he did not know why the employee had called, and that CEO Ellis would have to check his notes. CEO Ellis then stated that he recalled that he had been told by someone at Power and Energy Services that the company was not interested in his (Ellis') services. CEO Ellis stated that he was taken aback by this, but someone from Power and Energy Services had since called and apologized and CEO Ellis wanted to move forward.

CEO Ellis again inquired about financial support for the upcoming fundraiser on October 11, 2012. Mr. Cummings stated that he did not typically donate to campaigns and that Mr. Cummings was not a resident of DeKalb County.

CEO Ellis, his tone now becoming more firm and reprimanding, replied that he was not asking why Mr. Cummings should support DeKalb County Government, but why Mr. Cummings should support CEO Ellis with a campaign contribution. Mr. Cummings stated he did not know CEO Ellis' platform, and he is only a vendor that is based in Cobb County.

CEO Ellis stated that Power and Energy Services does business with DeKalb County and "If I got to sit down and explain to you why you would want to support this County government..." Mr. Cummings then replied, that Mr. Cummings was not asking about the County government.

d) National Property Institute

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard recorded conversations involving CEO Ellis related to his efforts to solicit a campaign contribution from the owners of National Property Institute (hereinafter "NPI"), Greg and Trina Shealey. The recordings and related testimony on the topic indicate that CEO Ellis called Trina

Shealey, who signed the RFP form submitted on behalf of NPI to DeKalb County for a contract related to a neighborhood stabilization project, seven times. The phone calls were made in the summer months of 2012. The Shealeys were awarded their contract in April of 2012.

Ms. Shealey spoke to CEO Ellis on two occasions. In response to CEO Ellis' request for a campaign contribution in the amount of \$2,500.00, Ms. Shealey indicated that she needed to speak to her husband about the request. Nothing related to the Shealey's contract, their scope of work and/or their performance under the County contract was discussed during these short calls.

The CEO, in response to Ms. Shealey's failure to call him back regarding his solicitation for a campaign contribution, directed the staff member who oversees the Shealey's one million dollar (\$1,000,000) contract to coordinate a meeting with the Shealeys in his County office. After several meetings between the CEO and the Shealeys over the course of a few weeks, the decision was made by the Shealeys to make a contribution to Mr. Ellis' campaign in the amount of \$2,500 (the maximum level for a campaign contribution). The Shealeys made the campaign contribution because they were afraid that their contract with the county would be terminated if they did not.

e) Reeves and Associates Consulting and Training, Inc.

On October 10, 2012, Mr. Michael Reeves, Vice President of Reeves and Associates Consulting and Training, Inc., received a call from CEO Ellis. Mr. Reeves had a subcontract with E2 Assure on a DeKalb County contract at the time of the phone call. During this call, CEO Ellis advised Mr. Reeves that Mr. Reeves was going to serve on the host committee for a fundraiser for the CEO on October 11, 2012, and that Mr. Reeves would be responsible for making a \$2,500.00

campaign contribution. CEO Ellis referenced the specific amounts that Mr. Reeves had contributed, as if CEO Ellis was "watching every penny" and stated that Mr. Reeves still needed to raise more money. CEO Ellis stated that Mr. Reeves had benefitted from doing work for DeKalb County.

Mr. Reeves never asked to be on the host committee. Mr. Reeves felt a great deal of pressure to contribute to CEO Ellis' campaign, and that he might lose his contract with the County if he did not contribute. Mr. Reeves did not feel that his company was in a financial position to make the contribution requested by CEO Ellis.

Mr. Reeves advised CEO Ellis that Mr. Reeves was struggling financially, and CEO Ellis brokered a deal that a company by the name of E2 Assure would cover the balance of the \$2,500.00 that Mr. Reeves could not pay. Mr. Reeves is currently a subcontractor of E2 Assure, which has an active contract with DeKalb County.

f) Merrell Brothers, Inc.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard testimony that on October 4, 2012, Purchasing and Contracting employees Yolanda Broome and Felton Williams participated in a conference call with Mr. Terry Merrell of Merrell Brothers, Inc. Merrell Brothers, Inc. had recently been awarded a DeKalb County Department of Watershed Management contract worth approximately four million dollars (\$4,000,000). Prior to the conference call, Mr. Merrell wrote an email to Ms. Broome indicating that an event had just occurred that now made him want to withdraw from his contract award with DeKalb County. During the conference call, Mr. Merrell stated Mr. Merrell had received a call from CEO Burrell Ellis and that CEO Ellis had requested a \$25,000.00 campaign contribution. Mr. Merrell twice

mentioned the amount requested was \$25,000.00. Mr. Merrell stated that he wished to withdraw from his contract if Merrell Brothers, Inc. was required to make a contribution, because that is not the way he does business.

In the call between Mr. Ellis and Mr. Merrell, CEO Ellis identified himself as the CEO of DeKalb County and stated that he (Ellis) had just been re-elected to the position of CEO. CEO Ellis went on to say that it takes approximately \$1,000,000.00 to run for his office and that he had already raised approximately \$800,000.00. CEO Ellis stated that he was attempting to retire his campaign debt and was holding a fundraiser on October 11, 2012. CEO Ellis then stated that he saw that Mr. Merrell's company had recently been awarded a \$4,000,000.00 contract with DeKalb County, and CEO Ellis wanted to know if he could count on Mr. Merrell to come to the fundraiser and bring a \$25,000.00 contribution.

Mr. Merrell stated that after CEO Ellis made the request, Mr. Merrell advised him that he was not yet a DeKalb vendor, because Mr. Merrell was still trying to work through an issue with his LSBE prior to finalizing the contract. CEO Ellis replied that he had a feeling that it would get worked out, and he asked Mr. Merrell if he wanted CEO Ellis to make a phone call on behalf of Mr. Merrell on the LSBE issue. Mr. Merrell told CEO Ellis "no". CEO Ellis then replied that he knew what Mr. Merrell meant and that CEO Ellis would contact Mr. Merrell back in approximately one month.

2. CEO Ellis canceling or attempting to cancel contracts In order to create an "emergency situation" for which an emergency contract can be then be issued to another vendor without a competitive process

a) CEO Ellis' two attempts to cancel the contract with Judicial Correction Services related to probation services in Recorders Court

As a result of the "Things to Know" memorandum and the testimony of numerous witnesses, the Special Purpose Grand Jury also examined the relationship between CEO Ellis and Mr. Kevin Ross. Our research revealed an August 5, 2010, Atlanta Journal-Constitution (AJC) article which states CEO Ellis had canceled three contracts since he took office. Two of the canceled contracts were associated with Mr. Kevin Ross. The contracts canceled by CEO Ellis were the DeKalb County Recorder's Court Probation Services contract with Judicial Correction Services (JCS) and the Care Ambulance contract. The third contract was not named in the AJC article.

The AJC article quoted Mr. Ross as being "a friend and an advisor to the CEO". The article states that Mr. Ross recommended to CEO Ellis the cancellation of the JCS contract. The article also indicated Mr. Ross was a consultant for Sentinel, which is a competitor of JCS. The article quoted Mr. Ross as stating "I did tell CEO Ellis to look into the procurement and he consider exercising the termination of the contract for convenience and to put it out to bid. I advocated and appealed to the County discretion to look at a procurement that is flawed". In the article, CEO Ellis acknowledged being contacted by Mr. Ross, but denied Mr. Ross having influence on CEO Ellis' decision to cancel the contract. It should be noted the "flawed" procurement related to the issuance of the contract to JCS took place

in 2008.

The Grand Jury heard testimony about the DeKalb County Recorder's Court Probation Services contract. According to that testimony, Judge Nelly Withers, Chief Judge of DeKalb County Recorder's Court, received a great deal of pressure from CEO Ellis and CEO Ellis' staff to terminate the current probation contract that is held by JCS. Purchasing and Contracting sent a letter to JCS without notifying Judge Withers that Purchasing and Contracting was terminating the JCS contract. Purchasing and Contracting, however, had no legal authority to terminate the contract, because that authority rests with the Court.

Judge Withers wrote a letter to CEO Ellis advising CEO Ellis that Purchasing and Contracting had no authority to terminate the JCS contract and that the actions of Purchasing and Contracting were illegal. After Judge Withers hand delivered the letter, the Director of Public Safety William "Wiz" Miller called her and screamed at her about the letter. Director Miller directed Judge Withers to stop accusing CEO Ellis of any illegal acts pertaining to the JCS contract. It should be noted, Director Miller has no statutory or administrative authority over Judge Withers.

The Grand Jury heard testimony that Judge Withers also contacted the DeKalb County Law Department in reference to the matter; however, no one had consulted with the Law Department on the termination of the JCS contract. The Law Department ultimately backed Judge Withers' legal opinion that only the Court had the legal authority to terminate the probation services contract. It should be noted that testimony from more than one witness associated with the Recorders Court indicated that there are no performance issues on the part of JCS to warrant contract termination.

After the aforementioned phone call with Director Miller, Judge Withers was called into a meeting with CEO Ellis, Chief Communications Officer Sheila Edwards, Chief of Staff Keith Barker, and other staff. Judge Withers provided a copy of the statute that supported Judge Withers' findings on the issue. CEO Ellis stated that CEO Ellis would "give it" to the Law Department. CEO Ellis advised Judge Withers the law had been changed regarding Judge Withers' appointment and that Judge Withers could be fired for any or no reason (which is incorrect). Within a few weeks, Purchasing and Contracting rescinded the decision to terminate the JCS contract.

At a subsequent meeting on or about December 2011, CEO Ellis approached Judge Withers to ask "a personal favor". CEO Ellis asked that Judge Withers allow the probation services contract to go back out for bid.

b) Cancellation of CARE Ambulance contract and issuance of emergency contract to Rural Metro

The Grand Jury discovered that Mr. Ross is also employed as a consultant with Rural Metro Ambulance, which was awarded an "emergency" contract in July 2010, after CEO Ellis terminated the contract with the previous vendor, Care Ambulance. Testimony heard by the Special Purpose Grand Jury indicates the decision to cancel the CARE Ambulance contract was not supported by the user the department, the Fire Department. Additionally, the issuance of the emergency ambulance services contract to Mr. Ross' client, Rural Metro, was contrary to the recommended vendor selected by the user department. The user department, after due diligence efforts, completed the Procurement and Contract Departments "Emergency Services" form necessary to request the issuance of an emergency contract and indicated its choice for the contract to be American Medical Response

("AMR"). The choice of AMR was communicated to the Public Safety Director, Wiz Miller and was also communicated to the Procurement and Contracts Department by the submittal of the "Emergency Services" form. Within just a couple of days, and with no notification to the Fire Department, the CEO's Office issued a press release indicating that it had entered into an emergency contract with Rural Metro for ambulance services and that Rural Metro would begin providing said services in six (6) days. The emergency contract issued to Rural Metro was for a term of one (1) year. The original understanding by the user department was that the emergency contract for ambulance services would be only for a term of six (6) months — just long enough to have an RFP issued and permanent contract awarded for ambulance services.

In the article, Mr. Ross acknowledged being a consultant with Rural Metro Ambulance, but denied involvement in the termination of Care Ambulance. The article also reported that CEO Ellis toured Rural Metro's Arizona headquarters two months before canceling the ambulance service contract.

3. CEO Ellis directing the cancellation of contracts for punitive and political reasons.

a) Cancellation of the Cornelius Group's contract.

The Grand Jury also heard testimony about a marketing contract issued to The Cornelius Group in 2011. The contract was associated with a project out of the Department of Watershed Management and Public Works Department. The Cornelius Group's contract was canceled at the direction of CEO Ellis in March 2012.

According to that testimony, Ms. Cornelius supported CEO Ellis the first

time that he ran for DeKalb CEO. Ms. Cornelius subsequently served on CEO Ellis' transition team. During the time on the transition team, Ms. Cornelius grew to believe that CEO Ellis was not trustworthy and stopped supporting CEO Ellis. Ms. Cornelius did not like the way CEO Ellis treated certain people and she was very concerned that CEO Ellis would never make a decision without getting approval from his campaign manager, Mr. Kevin Ross. Additional testimony indicated that Mr. Ross had a close personal relationship with CEO Ellis' Chief Communications Officer, Shelia Edwards. (Note: witness testimony indicated that Ms. Edwards was very involved in the decision to terminate the CARE Ambulance contract and the awarding of the emergency contract to Rural Metro discussed above).

Ms. Cornelius made her lack of support of CEO Ellis public in late January or early February 2012 to Joel Alvarado, (a member of the CEO executive staff). Mr. Alvarado told Ms. Cornelius that he was going to report this to CEO Ellis. When Mr. Alvarado told CEO Ellis, CEO Ellis became angry. He cursed at Chief of Staff Jabari Simama when CEO Ellis found out Ms. Cornelius had a contract with DeKalb County. CEO Ellis then directed a County employee to cancel Ms. Cornelius' contract. The directive came with no discussion of the performance of the Cornelius Group under its contract.

The CEO provided false testimony to the Special Purpose Grand Jury regarding whether he had ever directed the cancellation of a vendor's contract due to the vendor's lack of political support for the CEO and/or its support of a political opponent to the CEO.

b) Cancellation of the Collaborative Firm's contract.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard testimony that CEO Ellis canceled a contract with the Collaborative Firm, which is owned by Mr. Michael Hightower.

The testimony indicated the contract was likely canceled due to Mr. Hightower's association and political support of Ms. Barnes Sutton, a DeKalb County Commissioner who is sometimes at odds with CEO Ellis.

When he asked about the cancellation of his contract, Mr. Hightower was told his contract was canceled because of lack of funding. Mr. Hightower felt the cancellation was likely political in nature, because it is his experience that contracts are not awarded without funding already being available. Due to this, Mr. Hightower contacted CEO Ellis directly. In this conversation, CEO Ellis re-iterated the contract was canceled due to funding not being in place, but CEO Ellis also commented that CEO Ellis was not pleased that Mr. Hightower was supporting one of CEO Ellis political foes, Sharon Barnes Sutton.

The CEO provided false testimony to the Special Purpose Grand Jury regarding whether he had ever directed the cancellation of a vendor's contract due to the vendor's lack of political support for the CEO and/or its support of a political opponent to the CEO.

c) Cancellation directive for the NPI Contract

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard testimony from witnesses that CEO Ellis, in response to the Shealeys failing to be "responsive" to CEO Ellis' calls requesting campaign contributions, directed an employee of the Contracts and Procurement Department to effectively cancel the NPI contract. Recordings indicate that CEO Ellis gave the directive to "just dry them up," meaning to not issue any additional work to NPI under its contract.

The CEO provided false testimony to the Special Purpose Grand Jury regarding whether he had ever directed the non-issuance of work to a vendor due to the vendor's failure to return his calls for campaign contributions and/or failure to

proffer a contribution.

d) Cancellation directive for the Power and Energy Services contract.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard witness testimony and recordings of CEO Ellis related to his directive to a Purchasing and Contracting employee to let the Power and Energy contract expire. This directive was given after the CEO became very upset after the owner of Power and Energy Services questioned why he should make a contribution to the CEO's political campaign. A subsequent conversation with the same employee reveals that the CEO directed that employee to relay to Department of Watershed Management Director Joe Basista that Power and Energy Services should not be utilized anymore under their new contract, because they are "not responsive". The CEO further directed the employee to place a note in Power and Energy's vendor file that were "not responsive" in the event the company tried to ever bid on future work with the Department of Watershed Management.

The Grand Jury notes that Power and Energy Services' pricing is significantly lower than that of the other company, Prime Power, who is under contract with DeKalb County to provide the same services. Thus the directive to no longer utilize Power and Energy Services comes at a financial detriment to DeKalb County.

The CEO provided false testimony to the Special Purpose Grand Jury regarding whether he had ever directed the non-issuance of work to a vendor due to the vendor's failure to return his calls for campaign contributions and/or failure to proffer a contribution.

4. CEO Ellis dictating which individuals should be placed on selection committees for RFPs for which major campaign donors and/or clients of Kevin Ross will be submitting offers.

a) RFP for Consent Decree Program Management Services

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard witness testimony and recordings of CEO Ellis that indicated that CEO directed an employee to place a certain individual on the selection committee for the Consent Decree Program Management Services RFP. CEO Ellis also directed this employee to submit all names to be on the committee to his Chief of Staff, Dr. Jabari Simama and to "check with Jabari" as to other specific individuals to be on the selection committee. After following the CEO's directive to this end, the employee then came back to the CEO for final approval of the members to be on the selection committee. Testimony provided to the Special Purpose Grand Jury indicated that a vendor submitting on the Consent Decree RFP was Montgomery Watson, a client of Kevin Ross'. Additionally, the Special Purpose Grand Jury heard testimony and recordings of individuals that represented that Mr. Ross and/or Sheila Edwards were actual subcontractors to Montgomery Watson for the project.

It should be noted that the CEO denied to the Special Purpose Grand Jury having ever directed the placement of an individual on an RFP selection committee.

5. CEO Ellis interfering in the evaluation process for RFPs by discussing secret selection committee information with committee members during the active evaluation period;

a) Ambulance Services RFP

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard testimony from more than one witness and recordings of the CEO that indicate that the CEO held at least two meetings with the chairman of the selection committee for the then pending RFP for Ambulance Services. The discussions in these meetings centered wholly on the status of the RFP submittal of Rural Metro, exceptions requested by Rural Metro to the RFP and contract requirements, and whether or not the County could break from its normal practice and enter into contract negotiations with the winning offeror after the award of the contract. As stated above, Kevin Ross is a consultant to Rural Metro. Additional recordings indicate that CEO Ellis, around the same time of his meetings with the selection committee chairman, was having ongoing discussions with Kevin Ross about the RFP issues related to Rural Metro (this aspect is discussed in further detail below).

The CEO provided false testimony to the Special Purpose Grand Jury as to the issue of whether he has ever met with a selection committee member to discuss issues related to a pending RFP for which an active evaluation was ongoing.

6. CEO Ellis communicating with a submitting vendor and/or vendor representative during an active evaluation period for the related RFP about matters directly related to the pending RFP and subsequent contract award.

a) Rural Metro (Kevin Ross)-Ambulance Services RFP

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard testimony and recordings regarding the CEO's early investment and interest in the Ambulance Services RFP. While the RFP was being advertised, prior to the county's acceptance of submittals by offerors, CEO Ellis requested a copy of the Ambulance Services RFP from an employee within the Contracting and Procurement Department. He also requested that a copy of the RFP be provided to his Chief of Staff, Hakim Hilliard. This was the first time known to this employee that the CEO wanted to receive and review an RFP issued by the county. Both the CEO and the Chief of Staff received copies of the RFP per the request.

Additional recordings and testimony revealed conversations between CEO Ellis and Kevin Ross pertaining to Rural Metro's RFP submittal for the Ambulance Services contract. CEO Ellis counseled Kevin Ross as to Rural Metro's options regarding whether to withdraw its exceptions that were submitted with its RFP submittal. CEO Ellis, after disclosing that the other submitting vendors on the RFP either had not included any exceptions or already withdrawn their submitted exceptions, directed Kevin Ross to have Rural Metro withdraw all their exceptions. This is significant because if Rural Metro did not withdraw their exceptions, it would have been subsequently dropped from the ongoing RFP evaluation process and would not been in contention for consideration for the contract award. As these discussions were ongoing, Rural Metro received three extensions to the time in which they were to declare its intentions with regards to its exceptions. These extensions delayed the evaluation process and the issuance of the contract to the successful offeror — which is alarming especially considering the importance of the Ambulance Services contract to the citizens of the County.

After directing Rural Metro to withdraw its exceptions, CEO Ellis then began to have conversations with Kevin Ross, staff and the selection committee chairman about possibly deviating from the normal RFP/Contracting process and allowing the winning vendor to "negotiate" its contracts terms after the award of the contract. The normal process is to have the winning offeror sign the contract template that was included in the RFP issued and advertised by the County.

**b) Massey Bowers (Lewis Massey)-State Lobbying Services
RFP**

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard testimony from more than one witness that leads to the reasonable conclusion that CEO Ellis was engaged in communications with Lewis Massey, partner of the lobbying firm Massey Bowers, regarding the pending RFP for State Lobbying Services during the evaluation period for the RFP. Recordings of former staff for CEO Ellis indicate that "the plan" was to have Lewis Massey continue with its services despite its previous contract's expiration. This same recording indicates that CEO Ellis received over ten thousand dollars (\$10,000) in campaign contributions from the members of the Massey Bowers firm and that the firm was responsible for raising even more money for the CEO through others contacts.

The CEO provided false testimony to the Special Purpose Grand Jury as to the issue of whether he has ever discussed issues related to a pending RFP for which an active evaluation was ongoing with a submitting vendor or vendor representative.

7. CEO interfering with and/or altering a selection committee's final recommendation (prior to submission to the Board of Commissioners) in favor of vendors represented by Kevin Ross or for vendors with a history of significant campaign contributions/raising significant campaign contributions for Mr. Ellis.

a) Ambulance Services RFP

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard recordings of the CEO and heard testimony from witnesses that yield information as to CEO's intentions to interfere and possibly alter the selection committee's recommendation of AMR for the Ambulance Services Contract. One recording indicates that the CEO is waiting to receive materials from Kevin Ross related to ambulance response times so as to refute the representation by AMR in its RFP submittal that it can meet the required response time indicated in the RFP issued by the County. Additionally, over the objections of the Director of Contracting and Purchasing and the Chief of Staff, the CEO attempted to manufacture reasons for the termination of the entire RFP process "based on technical deficiencies". Witness testimony indicated that had Rural Metro received the recommendation, the CEO would not be involved in these conversations and would certainly not be calling for the entire process to be thrown out.

b) State Lobbying Services RFP

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard recordings of the CEO and others and heard testimony from witnesses to indicate that the CEO, upon learning that Massey Bowers did not receive the recommendation for contract award for the state lobbying services work, was questioning the criteria used included in the County's RFP and the validity of the recommendation. Witness testimony

indicated that had Lewis Massey received the recommendation, the CEO would not be involved in these conversations and would certainly not be calling for the entire process to be thrown out. If the entire process is thrown out, recordings and witness testimony indicate that the plan was then to issue an emergency contract to Massey Bowers for the work. Since the execution of search warrants by the District Attorney's Office, this plan has been abandoned by the CEO.

DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 2012 SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY

After the conclusion of twelve months of testimony and receiving evidence, including recordings, the 2012 Special Purpose Grand Jury makes the following recommendations::

A. Recommended Indictments

The 2012 Special Purpose Grand Jury strongly recommends the indictment of the following person:

1. Burrell Ellis

Lying to the Special Purpose Grand Jury pertaining to the following matters:

- directing the cancellation of contracts or the non-issuance of work to vendors for punitive and political reasons
- dictating which individuals should be placed on selection committees for RFPs for which major campaign donors will be submitting offers
- interfering in the evaluation process for RFPs by discussing secret selection committee information with committee members during the active evaluation period
- communicating with a submitting vendor and/or vendor representative during an active evaluation period for the related RFP about matters directly related to the pending RFP and subsequent contract award

- interfering with and/or altering a selection committee's final recommendation (prior to submission to the Board of Commissioners) in favor of vendors represented by Kevin Ross or for vendors with a history of paying significant campaign contributions/raising significant campaign contributions for Mr. Ellis.

B. Recommended further Criminal Investigation

The 2012 Special Purpose Grand Jury strongly recommends that the District Attorney criminally investigate the following individuals for possible indictment as to the listed topics:

1. Burrell Ellis

- soliciting campaign contributions under the color of his title as CEO with vendors that have a just approved or pending contract with DeKalb County;
- canceling or attempting to cancel contracts in order to create an "emergency situation" for which an emergency contract can then be issued to another vendor without a competitive process;
- directing the cancellation of contracts or the non-issuance of work to vendors for punitive and political reasons;
- dictating which individuals should be placed on selection committees for RFPs for which major campaign donors will be submitting offers;
- interfering in the evaluation process for RFPs by discussing

secret selection committee information with committee members during the active evaluation period;

- communicating with a submitting vendor and/or vendor representative during an active evaluation period for the related RFP about matters directly related to the pending RFP and subsequent contract award;
- interfering with and/or altering a selection committee's final recommendation (prior to submission to the Board of Commissioners) in favor of vendors represented by Kevin Ross or for vendors with a history of paying significant campaign contributions/raising significant campaign contributions for Mr. Ellis.

2. William "Wiz" Miller

- Obstructing a criminal investigation

3. Jabari Simama

- Manipulation of selection committee process
- Perjury
- Bid Rigging

4. Roy Barnes

- Bid Rigging
- Kickbacks
- Perjury

5. Hadi Haeri

- Theft
- False writings
- Perjury
- Bid Rigging

6. Nadine Maghsoudlou

- Theft
- False writings
- Perjury
- Bid Rigging

7. Vernon Jones

- Bid Rigging
- Theft

8. Paul Champion

- Manipulation of the ITB process
- False writings
- Theft
- Perjury

9. Kevin Ross

- Interference with government operations
- Manipulation of the RFP/ITB process
- Bid Rigging

10. Jeffrey Walker

- Theft
- Bid Rigging
- Perjury

11. Christian Vann

- False writings

12. John Willis and, possibly, other individuals with Brown & Caldwell

- Theft
- Bid Rigging
- Perjury

C. Reorganization of County Government

The Special Purpose Grand Jury recommends that the fundamental structure of DeKalb County government be changed. The current system of an elected Chief Executive Officer and seven part-time district commissioners does not provide adequate representation to the citizens of the County. The current system, with its over-reliance on County staff and departments who ultimately report to an elected official, provides too many opportunities for fraudulent influences and fosters a culture that is overly politicized and in which inappropriate business relationships are created. Inept policies and procedures and an attitude of non-compliance with same has been a strong thread throughout our investigation.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury strongly urges and requests that the DeKalb Delegation, per Section 23 of the DeKalb County Organizational Act, take immediate steps to initiate a process to revise the Organizational Act and/or take other appropriate measures in pursuit of the below recommendations:

The Special Purpose Grand Jury strongly recommends the immediate removal of Burrell Ellis as CEO of DeKalb County and the elimination of the office of CEO. The CEO position, an elected position, creates an unnecessary layer of politics within our government for which the return to the citizens of DeKalb County is minimal. The true facilitation of running the government already lies with the Executive Assistant to the CEO (who also has reporting responsibilities to the Board of Commissioners).

The Special Purpose Grand Jury recommends making all current County commission seats full-time positions. Essential to this concept would be that commissioners would be adequately compensated and would be prevented from having any undocumented outside business interests which could potentially conflict with their responsibilities to govern. The expectation of these full-time commissioners would be that they would have the opportunity to be better informed and make better decisions on behalf of their constituents. This system would also help to eliminate potential conflicts between their private life and public responsibility.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury strongly recommends that the position of Director of Public Safety be eliminated immediately. It should be noted that testimony heard by the Special Purpose Grand Jury revealed that some police officers report directly to the Director of Public Safety and not to an employee of the police department. This arrangement calls into question the true function of the Director's role and creates unnecessary tension and bureaucracy within the police department. This Grand Jury finds that the Office of Public Safety Director is not necessary and only hinders the ability of the Police Chief to properly manage the Police Department in all aspects. More importantly, as a political appointee of the CEO, the position and its functions runs the risk of becoming a repository of "internal investigations" where cases can be hidden and never see the light of public scrutiny. We recommend the position of Public Safety Director be eliminated immediately.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury recommends that the Purchasing and Contracting Department be reorganized in a way that proper subject matter experts are overseeing various areas of the procurement and contracting

process. For instance, contracting officers or attorneys with knowledge of the Georgia Competitive Award Statutes (and other related public construction statutes) should be solely focused on contracts subject to those statutory requirements. Other contracting officers should be solely focused on procurement procedures and the issuance of contracts related to goods and those services not related to public construction projects.

Along these lines, the Special Purpose Grand Jury strongly encourages that the contracting and procurement policies be revised so that the ITB and the RFP process called for by the state competitive award statutes be adopted by the county for all contract awards, including those that are not related to the public construction projects. In doing so, a uniform process can be applied to the ITB and RFP process used in the county regardless of the type of contract to be awarded and/or for what type of project a contract is covering. Lastly, following the RFP process laid out in the competitive award statutes will require the opening of price before short listing of vendors and interviews. In doing so, the selection committee can engage in negotiations with vendors during said interviews (and in subsequent Best and Final Offers) that could result in better services and better pricing for the County.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury strongly recommends that the Organizational Act be revised so that Sections 18 and 22 fully incorporate by reference the purchasing and contracting policies and procedures manual (which should also be modified per the above recommendation regarding changes to the ITB and RFP process to be used). In addition, it is recommended that specific acts be made illegal and recognized as a misdemeanor per local ordinance including the following: communication by a

selection committee member to any vendor submitting on the RFP or RFQ that is being evaluated by the committee member; communication by a selection committee member to any individual outside of the selection committee for the purposes of influencing or otherwise altering the status of a submitting vendor or the outcome of the selection committee's recommendation; receipt of gifts by a vendor with a current contract with the county or that is a potential offeror on an advertised RFP or RFQ, and the purposeful communication by any individual to a known selection committee member for the purpose of discussing selection committee information prior to recommendation and/or influencing the selection committee process and outcome.

D. Fundamentally change or otherwise eliminate the LSBE Program

The Special Purpose Grand Jury strongly recommends that the current LSBE Program (and the applicable ordinance regarding same) be significantly revised or otherwise eliminated altogether. The LSBE mandates were intended to serve a laudable purpose: to open greater opportunities for participation in government-funded contracts by local small businesses. The achievement of this purpose, according to testimony heard by the Special Purpose Grand Jury, has not happened and is not actively tracked in a meaningful way by the Purchasing and Contracting Department.

Over the years this program has become susceptible to fraudulent practices by those trying to take perverse advantage of them and the millions of DeKalb dollars that flow from them. One common abuse has featured non-LSBE firms who partner with, and sometimes create, sham firms who meet

LSBE eligibility criteria on paper but who perform no actual work — or, in the words of LSBE regulations, perform no “commercially useful function” — on the government-funded project.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury heard multiple times about a general contractor submitting paperwork indicating that the LSBE is properly certified and is performing the contracted work, but the general contractor actually performed the work with its own forces. Here, a general contractor may run the payroll through the LSBE to create the illusion that employees are working for the LSBE. The LSBE is usually paid a small sum and the LSBE allows the use of its name on invoices, trucks, and equipment to create the appearance of LSBE participation (thus allowing the prime contractor to receive the extra bid points allotted to prime contractors who make use of an LSBE for 20% of the contracted work). The Grand Jury finds that in this case, the LSBE is a mere pass-through performing no commercially useful function and, in certain instances, their presence only added additional costs to the project and to the County.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury finds that the following are “red flags” of LSBE abuse:

- Contracts for work for which LSBE has no previous history, licenses, or equipment
- LSBE has no business office and little equipment
- LSBE business owners absent for job
- Ghost employees or certified payroll irregularities
- Small LSBE contractors in unusual businesses

- **General contractors always using the same LSBE (and the LSBE provides a different function under different contracts)**

The Special Purpose Grand Jury recommends the elimination of this program and retraction of the LSBE ordinance. In the alternative, if the program is to stay in place, the following are recommended measures for correcting the program:

- **The program must be funded well enough to ensure compliance to the program's criteria by those LSBEs seeking certification. Those criteria should include the following:**
 - **Revenues (based on verified, certified financial statements)**
 - **Location (with primary office verified by submission of documents to include insurance documents, bills, etc.)**
 - **Area of focus by the LSBE (for which a pre-qualification process should be established and verified)**
- **Implement a Semi-Annual Prequalification Process that allows companies to seek LSBE certification upon approval of qualified status — the process should certify LSBE firms only in the substantive areas of work for which the County has verified (through the prequalification process) that the company can actually perform;**
- **Increasing staffing in the County's administration of the LSBE program and also changing its culture so that employees understand that their mission includes not only assisting small local businesses in obtaining work in DeKalb but also ensuring accountability and integrity to prevent**

fraudulent and improper actions from depriving procurement opportunities for legitimate firms seeking to actually perform work under a subcontract with a prime contractor with the County;

- Provide discretion to the Purchasing and Contracting Department as to which contracts the LSBE bid/RFP requirement and advantage will apply. Testimony from various employees of the department agreed that this change is necessary.
- Include harsh penalties to the prime contractors that do not properly utilize LSBEs on a contract. Also provide for de-certification of a LSBE company (and its owner) when a pass-through arrangement is uncovered.

E. Internal Audit Activity Independent of the CEO or Management

As stated above, to maintain objectivity, internal auditors should have no personal or professional involvement with or allegiance to the area being audited, and should maintain an un-biased and impartial mindset in regard to all engagements.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury recommends the revision of Section 10, subsection D of the Organizational Act to reflect the following. The internal audit function should report to the Board of Commissioners. The function is to review the conduct of CEO/BOC or any Department. This activity can create significant tension since independence is necessary for the auditor to objectively assess the actions of the entity being audited.

Therefore, the internal audit activity should have a mandate through a

written audit charter that establishes its purpose, authority, and responsibility to support its independence and objectivity within DeKalb County and its various Departments. The internal auditors should have access to records and personnel as necessary, and be allowed to employ appropriate probing techniques without impediment.

Internal auditors should not assume any operational responsibility. Objectivity can be presumed to be impaired when internal auditors perform an assurance review of any activity for which they had any authority or responsibility within the past year or a period significant enough to influence their judgment or opinion. Internal auditors should not accept gifts or favors from others such as employees, clients or business associates.

The internal auditors should adopt a policy that endorses their commitment to abiding by the Code of Ethics, avoiding conflicts of interest, and disclosing any activity that could result in a possible conflict of interests.

F. Training for the County Employees

The Special Purpose Grand Jury encourages all Board of Commissioners and Procurement officers that work in our government to become more knowledgeable to the various forms of collusion. Most criminal antitrust prosecutions involve activity known as "bid rigging" or "price fixing". It is not necessary that the conspirators entered into a formal written or express agreement. Price fixing, bid rigging and other collusive agreements can be established either by direct evidence, or by circumstantial evidence, such as suspicious bid patterns, travel and

expense reports, telephone records, e-mails and business diary entries.

G. Ethics Reform

We heard testimony concerning DeKalb County elected officials and employees accepting meals, gifts, money, trips and other compensation from vendors, lobbyists and others that greatly concerned the Special Purpose Grand Jury. The Special Purpose Grand Jury recommends that the County maintain a registry of lobbyists and business consultants working on behalf of vendors doing business with the County. The County needs to adopt policies and practices to monitor and enforce the access and influence afforded these lobbyists and consultants.

We are all members of DeKalb County. In this country, governmental organizations derive their authority from the trust and confidence placed in it by its citizens. Without this trust, representative democracy could not exist, either because people would not respect the authority of their institutions, or because government would usurp that authority for itself, and cease acting in the interests of its citizens.

A critical task of DeKalb County government officeholders and employees is to preserve and protect the public's trust in government. Like any trustee, government officeholders and employees owe a special duty of care to those who place the institutions and resources of government under our management and control.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury has heard sufficient testimony to

conclude that a comprehensive and enforceable code of ethics should be a priority for DeKalb County Government. This code of ethics will address gifting, transparency and other regulations.

Public officeholders and employees need to have an understanding of what will or will not constitute proper behavior in their jobs. Ethics provides the roadmap for behavior that promotes essential public trust in government. Ethics is of such importance that our recommendation is for DeKalb County to create a full time Ethics Officer position, supported with proper departmental resources, that reports to the Board of Commissioners. The sole purpose of this position and department will be to establish and enforce new ethical guidelines for employees, vendors and elected officials. As a point of reference, we have reviewed the Ethical Guidelines for Employees of the City of Atlanta and the United States Government Executive Branch Code of Ethics. These documents can be found at the following locations:

U. S. Government:

[http://www.pacom.mil/documents/pdf/newcomers-code-of-ethics\[1\].pdf](http://www.pacom.mil/documents/pdf/newcomers-code-of-ethics[1].pdf)

City of Atlanta:

<http://www.atlantaga.gov/index.aspx?>

We would like for the new Ethics Officer to use this information as a model for establishing Ethical Guidelines for DeKalb County.

The current Board of Ethics established by the Organizational Act is inept for many reasons. Most pertinent, the members of the Board are political appointees. The Special Purpose Grand Jury notes that the Board of Ethics website has not been updated since 2010 and lists its last meeting having been in

November of 2010.

H. Transparency

The Special Purpose Grand Jury recommends the establishment of a website for greater transparency. The Special Purpose Grand Jury recommends for consideration two such websites. For example, the State of Nebraska's budget transparency website³— "Nebraska Spending"— which was created in July 2007 as part of several accountability reforms initiated by their State Treasurer's office. The website allows Nebraskans to access state revenue and spending information in a straightforward and comprehensible format. The website includes:

- **Fiscal Year Expenditures**

Which provides transaction-level detail on the expenditures made by the state. Such information is formatted in a searchable database that can target spending down to accounts such as "Board & Lodging".

- **Current Fiscal Year Budget**

Which includes a pie chart that details each agency's percent of the state's overall appropriation, as well as definitions of the different funds that provides resources to each agency.

- **Source of Funds**

Which shows the dollars received, the source of dollars, and a historical comparison using bar graphs.

Internationally, the Ministry of Infrastructure in Ontario, Canada launched a

³<http://nebraskaspending.com/>

website to allow users to track the progress of recently announced infrastructure stimulus projects in their community and across the province.⁴ The website provides another model/example to provide greater transparency and accountability to residents regarding infrastructure stimulus funding by highlighting the citizen's contribution towards projects, tracking construction progress and providing regular updates on new investments. This website also provides interactive maps of infrastructure projects, webcams of jobsites, and videos with more information on projects. The "By the Numbers" section of the site uses graphs and charts to detail how infrastructure dollars are being spent across broad categories of spending.

I. Asset Management

The Special Purpose Grand Jury has heard sufficient testimony and seen enough evidence to conclude that the Department of Watershed Management's internal controls were inadequate to ensure that assets were properly accounted for and safeguarded. During our visit to the Wastewater treatment facility and the questioning of its employees, the Special Purpose Grand Jury witnessed and saw an abysmal lack of inventory control or monitoring equipment. Indeed, during our tour, the Special Purpose Grand Jury witnessed a sewage spill actively occurring near Snapfinger Creek which was unknown to the employees until we arrived at the scene. Worse, it was unknown how long this raw sewage had been spilling. This is simply

⁴ <https://www.infrastructureapp.mei.gov.on.ca/en/>

unacceptable.

Understanding the vulnerability of physical assets, consequently, will provide a clearer picture of the vulnerability of other assets. During the past year, this Special Purpose Grand Jury heard testimony and saw media accounts of employee thefts in DeKalb County. We did not see sufficient measures in place for the protection of the Department of Watershed Management's assets. Protecting the County's physical assets often will serve as a first step in protecting many of its other assets.

Related to the protection of the physical assets of our Department of Watershed Management is the actual maintenance of these assets. This Special Purpose Grand Jury was comprised of citizens with varied backgrounds to include – management and operations of various companies. Business experience dictates that maintenance is the key to the sustainability of every water and wastewater system. A preventive maintenance program, combined with good operational practices, will reduce the need for much corrective or emergency maintenance. A good preventive maintenance program will service not only mechanical and electrical equipment, but also the distribution and collection systems, as well as grounds and buildings.

J. Corporate Credit Card use and P-Cards

All officials that are capable of being issued a P-Card should only be issued a P-Card for official purposes. Any other extraneous credit card currently held and funded by County by an employee or official of the County should be eliminated. The Special Purpose Grand Jury has been made aware of the fact that CEO Ellis has a corporate card funded by the County that is not under the P-Card

restrictions. The Special Purpose Grand Jury takes great exception to this.

K. Information Technology

The Special Purpose Grand Jury recommends that the IT organization and all its functions be outsourced to a private company for management and enhancement.

CONCLUSION

Customers are the lifeblood of the utility and the purpose of the utility's existence. As with day-to-day operations, the utility should strive to meet, and if possible, exceed customer expectations when it comes to evaluating vulnerabilities, planning for emergencies and responding to, and recovering from disasters. Communications, service continuation, and financial integrity are the focus of assuring that this very important asset is protected.

Based upon the evidence gathered during the course of our investigation, the Special Purpose Grand Jury, as a group of citizens, has been increasingly concerned about the path that DeKalb County government is on. We have seen decisions involving millions of dollars made with little or no information or for the most venal reasons.

As interested citizens we have carefully considered our decisions and recommendations. It is now up to the elected leaders of DeKalb County to carefully consider these recommendations and implement those they believe would best serve the public interest.

In many ways, DeKalb County is still a great place to live, work, and raise our children but in order to remain great, changes must be made.

In addition to the publication of presentments, we recommend that a copy of these presentments be delivered to:

Mr. Burrell Ellis, CEO, DeKalb County

Ms. Elaine Boyer, DeKalb County Board of Commissioners, District 1

Mr. Jeff Rader, DeKalb County Board of Commissioners, District 2

Mr. Larry Johnson, DeKalb County Board of Commissioners, District 3

Mr. Sharon Sutton, DeKalb County Board of Commissioners, District 4

Mr. Lee May, DeKalb County Board of Commissioners, District 5

Mr. Kathie Gannon, DeKalb County Board of Commissioners, District 6

Mr. Stan Watson, DeKalb County Board of Commissioners, District 7

Done this 18th day of January, 2013

By the Special Purpose Grand Jury

Acknowledgements, Thanks, and Request for Discharge

From the beginning, each individual Special Purpose Grand Jury member believed that he/she was engaged in important work. It was our goal as a body to determine whether or not the elected officials and County employees were making decisions that were ethical, legal and otherwise in the best interests of the citizens of DeKalb County. This task was undertaken at no small price, both personally and financially, by each Special Purpose Grand Jury member.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury wishes to thank and commend many of the witnesses who appeared before us, including members of the County staff who brought records for our review and prepared for their testimony by looking at notes to assist us. The ability of this Special Purpose Grand Jury to make meaningful recommendations that are intended to clean up our County government, promote fair and transparent processes and procedures, and ensure the best services for the citizens of DeKalb County hinged on the veracity of the testimony provided by witnesses.

It is unfortunate that the former Chief Executive Officer, Vernon Jones, refused to provide meaningful testimony to the Special Purpose Grand Jury. His refusal to answer questions related to his structuring of the County government, the appointment of unqualified friends to high-ranking positions (including the Department of Watershed Management), his relationships with outside vendors, in particular "business developer" Jeffrey Walker (whose brother was a high-ranking Department of Watershed Management official up to the time of his death in late 2007 and whose sister was a Jones appointee as Chief Judge of Records Court)

and as to other matters of great concern certainly led the Special Purpose Grand Jury to conclude that he has something to hide. Mr. Jones had an opportunity to assist this Special Purpose Grand Jury in its efforts to address and make right the many flaws of his administration. He failed to rise to the occasion.

In light of the huge amount of testimony heard and our review of voluminous documents and records, this Special Purpose Grand Jury is certain that numerous witnesses lied under oath as to matters related to procurement and contract manipulation, kickbacks, and abuse of the County's Local Small Business and Minority Business program. To the extent possible, the Special Purpose Grand Jury believes these individuals should be criminally investigated further by the District Attorney's Office.

The Special Purpose Grand Jury wishes to express our appreciation to District Attorney Robert James, to Assistant District Attorneys John Melvin, Kellie Hill, Cynthia Hill, and to investigators Clay Nix, Crispin Henry, and Jerald Dalton for providing legal guidance and investigative support. Additionally, we thank Kim Ackerman and Jamita Vortice-Bowden for their administrative support throughout the term of the Special Purpose Grand Jury.

We also want to express our appreciation to court reporter Mary K. McMahan. Lastly, we thank the DeKalb County Sheriff's staff for their professionalism and their support provided to the Special Purpose Grand Jury. In particular, Deputy Small is an exemplary representative of the Sheriff's Department and was a pleasure to work alongside.


That being said, it is our purpose that the citizens of DeKalb County know

the results of our investigation, hear our recommendations, and that the Judges of the Superior Court consider our work complete.


WITNESSES TESTIFYING BEFORE THE 2012 SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY

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Ajy, Kimberly
Albuquerque, Hector
Allen, Dion
Alvarado, Joel
Amato, Michael
Barnes, Roy
Basista, Joe
Bekele, Yafet
Bell, Dr. James Michael
Bennett, Barry
Bocarro, Robert
Broome, Yolanda
Carruth, Sgt. Jerry
Champion, Paul
Chatterjee, Jib
Coffin, Sgt. Bruce P.
Cole, Claude
Cornelius, Brenda
Crowe, Sgt John
Cummings, Brandon
Cummings, Danice
Daftarian, Terri
Daniel, Rick
Ellis, Burrell
Figueroa-Fred Det. Alexander
Gallemore, David W.
Gudowicz, Chester
Haeri, Hadi
Hall, Nina
Harris, Ken
Hightower, Michael
Hilliard, Hakim
Idowu, Omotayo
Jacobs, Larry
Jones, Vernon
Kung'u, Dr. Francis
Lambert, Charles
Lane-Woodard, Dep Chief
Annette
Lindsey, Angela
Linkous, Bill
Macrina, Joanne
Maghsoudlou, Nadine
Malone, William
Mason, Charles
Medlin, Lt. Craig
Miller, William (Wiz)
Mohammad, Sartaj
Morris, Chris
Oak Sgt, Daniel DCPD
O'Brien, Chief Eddie

O'Brien, Chief William
O'Mard, Eugene
Nix, Clay
Payton, Det. Jaime
Phillips, Terry
Reeves, Mike
Rhinehart, Ted
Robles, Eneida
Rogers, Kurlis
Roy, Samit
Saunders, Kenneth
Simama, Jabari
Sirdah, Ismail
Shaw, Doyle
Shealey, Gregory
Shealey, Trina
Sheffield, Merri
Stanfield, Sgt. Shane- DCPD
Stewart, Phyllis
Stogner, Richard
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Taylor, Tony
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Thompson, Troy
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Van Gundy, BJ
Vann, Christian
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Walker, Joy
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Withers, Judge Nelly
Wright, Debra
Zarrei, Merat




ALBERT TRUJILLO, FOREMAN




KATHARYNE FOWLKES MENSAH,

ASSISTANT FOREMAN



CATHERINE O. SCHEFFER, SECRETARY



JANET HORTON, ASST. SECRETARY

GEORGIA MAE BROCK

JOYCE A. BROWN

KEVIN CARRAGHER

NANCY CHAMBERS

ALAN CRAVEN

BARRETT CROSS

JIMMY F. DAVIS

JEFFREY J. ENGELKING

CLEMENT GRIFFIN

ROBERT E. HICKS

WALTER HOUSTON

NYOKA KIMBRO

GLORIA A. MCCLAIN

ERIC D. MONGERSON

EDGAR L. SARDEN

VICKIE L. SCOTT

WYNESHIA SIMS

KIMBERLY M. WILSON

NYKKI I. YOUNG

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that the undersigned has this day served a true and correct copy of the
above via Electronic and United States Mail upon:

Fani T. Willis
Will Wooten
District Attorney's Office
136 Pryor Street SW, 3rd Floor
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Fani.willisda@fultoncountyga.gov
Will.wooten@fultoncountyga.gov

DATED this the 23rd day of January, 2023



Exhibit 4

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5903	5	7/15/2022	Bregor	Salem	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/15/2022	Daab	Belle Isle	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/15/2022	Derderian	Fairfield Township	OH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/15/2022	J Bango	High Falls	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/15/2022	Johnson	Mariposa	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/15/2022	Morse	Choctaw	OK	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/15/2022	Stockton	New Castle	DE	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/15/2022	taylor	auburn	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/15/2022	Testa	TORRANCE	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/15/2022	Tucker	Watsonville	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	A Sherman	KELSEYVILLE	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Beaudoin-Schwartz	Ellicott City	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	BENEDICT	Dundee	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Carlo	Fresno	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Chadwick	Bradford	NH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Cicero	Tyler	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Clymer	Mason	OH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Coleman	Gwynn Oak	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Dickson	Ludington	MI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	DiFeo	Sedro Woolley	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Farrelly	Indianapolis	IN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Feinman	Richmond	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Hudson	Wayne	PA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Jurick	Honolulu	HI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Kelly	Bellevue	NE	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Knight	Rocklin	CA	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	10	7/15/2022	Konomos	Scottsdale	AZ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Majczan	Furlong	PA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Martin	Dalton	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Mastrangelo	Santa Monica	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Myers	Lexington	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Nelson	Hillsboro	OR	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	pedley	Greenwood Village	CO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Petrovich	Metairie	LA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Redsecker	North Las Vegas	NV	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Reiker	Pacifica	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Roberts	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Schill-Brumfield	Fresno	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Schwanke	Baltimore	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Seiler	Oak Lawn	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Stone	Emeryville	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Tuckerman	Wakeman	OH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Van Glahn	Old Greenwich	CT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/15/2022	Wilson	Denville	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	7/15/2022	Ewan	Millville	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	7/15/2022	Fristoe	Seattle	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	7/15/2022	GALLAGHER	Shevlin	MN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	7/15/2022	Kuppe	Rockford	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	7/15/2022	Vance	pasadena	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	7/15/2022	Willard	Middleton	WI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	7/15/2022	TORRES	Lake Como	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	7/15/2022	Wagman	El Paso	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	7/15/2022	Ward	Chicago	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20.22	7/15/2022	Markos	Manhattan	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	A Medina	Milwaukie	OR	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Abernathy	Pinson	AL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Aghayere	Lorton	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Allen	Worcester	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Basher	West Chester	PA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Batiste	Rosharon	TX	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	25	7/15/2022	Baughman	Sarasota	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Broyles	Powder Springs	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Budnick	South Windsor	CT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Bundy	Los Angeles	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Carreno	Whittier	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Catoggio	TEWKSBURY	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Chernick	Brooklyn	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
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5903	25	7/15/2022	D'Angelo-Wilson	Salem	OR	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Davidson	Dallas	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Davis-Therault	Fayetteville	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Dinneen	COLUMBUS	OH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Eddy	Minneapolis	MN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	elliott	Lee's Summit	MO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Ennis	Brookhaven	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Foxworthy	Santa Cruz	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Frangiosa	Wake Forest	NC	6/29/2023 15:55
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5903	25	7/15/2022	Hansen	KIRKLAND	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Harris	Orlando	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Hessert	North Hollywood	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Holcombe	Southlake	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Hudson	Champaign	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Ivey	phoenix	AZ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Jenkins	Sea Cliff	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Johnson	La Quinta	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Kaplan	Poultney	VT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Karbo	Paradise Valley	AZ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Keeling	Dunlap	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Kimbrough	Indianapolis	IN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	King	Albuquerque	NM	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Larson	Aliso Viejo	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Le Melle	New York	NY	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	25	7/15/2022	Leaks	Memphis	TN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Ledesma	Campbell	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Lepard	Sherborn	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Libby	Chestnut Hill	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Llera	Davie	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
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5903	25	7/15/2022	Nidle	Kent	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Nydick	Freehold	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Ortiz	Deltona	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Philipson	Oldsmar	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Regan	Hudson	NH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Rider	Renton	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Robertson	Portland	OR	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Roddy	Merrillville	IN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Rudolph	San Dimas	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Scotton	Whiting	IA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Serwin	Petaluma	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Sivilli	Chicago	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Smith	Palo Alto	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Sparks	Meridian	ID	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Spelman	Cocoa	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Straka	Fairview Park	OH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Strawderman	Midlothian	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Swope	Roswell	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Tansey	Palm Springs	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Topel	Shorewood	WI	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	25	7/15/2022	Truitt	Mauricetown	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Vassmer	Kingston	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Von Herrmann	Sonora	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Vukovic	Los Angeles	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Weinberg	Minneapolis	MN	6/29/2023 15:55
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5903	25	7/15/2022	Witiak	Fayetteville	NC	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Woods	Kittery Point	ME	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Wright	Marshfield	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Young	Pleasant Hill	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Young	Kalamazoo	MI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/15/2022	Younger	Aptos	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	30	7/15/2022	Carpentter	Freeport	ME	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	30	7/15/2022	Dill	Herndon	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Barber	Port Angeles	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
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5903	50	7/15/2022	Cornell	San Jose	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
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5903	50	7/15/2022	Durkin	Milton	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Hansen	Beaverton	OR	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Libnic	Portland	OR	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Mahala	Staten Island	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Mann	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	McLaughlin	Sarasota	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Merriman	bainbridge is.	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Mitchell	Alameda	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Monfre	Oak Creek	WI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Nash	Chevy Chase	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Noble	Arlington	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Rice	San Diego	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Robinson	Houston	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Sauter	Rancho Mirage	MT	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	50	7/15/2022	Sobon	Decatur	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Thackray	Louisville	CO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Thomas	Pittsburgh	PA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/15/2022	Willett	Fort Collins	CO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	100	7/15/2022	Howard	Nashville	TN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/15/2022	Anstett	Lake Forest Park	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/15/2022	Boyle	Mercer Island	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/15/2022	Cottle	Decatur	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/15/2022	Fontanez	Hammond	IN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/15/2022	Katis	Jackson	WY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/15/2022	OWIESNY	Chicago	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/15/2022	Shapiro	Lodi	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/15/2022	Thomas	Santa Monica	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
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5903	250	7/15/2022	Pfaehler	Naples	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	250	7/15/2022	Watkins	Dallas	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	2	7/16/2022	Livesay	Kingsport	TN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/16/2022	Borrel	Middletown	DE	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/16/2022	Cingle	State College	PA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/16/2022	Douglas	Plano	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/16/2022	Garrett	The Colony	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/16/2022	Griffin	Millis	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/16/2022	Hess	Puyallup	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
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5903	5	7/16/2022	Peterson	Sebastopol	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/16/2022	Sachter	Bronx	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/16/2022	Schwarz	Lockport	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/16/2022	Selgo	Goodyear	AZ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/16/2022	Sturgis	North Las Vegas	NV	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/16/2022	Walton	Lafayette	LA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	7	7/16/2022	Gormley	Rehoboth	DE	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Ackerman	Palo Alto	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Baratta	Liberty Lake	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Dawson	Concord	CA	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	10	7/16/2022	Friedman	aventura	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Gibson	Prairie Village	KS	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Gresham	Katy	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Groninger	Yorba Linda	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Gross	Oceanside	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Hadjithomas	Eules	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Harris	Madison	WI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Hinton	Van Nuys	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Joslyn	North Las Vegas	NV	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Kauffman	Kirkland	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	King	Danbury	CT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Lezama	Laguna Hills	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	lineberger	Kannapolis	NC	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Masielle	Peachtree City	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	McClean	Davis	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Miani	Boston	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Moran	Charlottesville	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Rubin	Henrico	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Sikora	Victorville	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Trock	Silver Spring	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Velasquez	Sacramento	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Vogel	White Lake	MI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/16/2022	Wiltshire	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	7/16/2022	Carey	Sunnyside	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	7/16/2022	Georges	Culver City	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	7/16/2022	Gogoleski	Portland	OR	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	7/16/2022	harris	spokane	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	7/16/2022	Markstrom	Frederick	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	7/16/2022	Winn	Richland	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	7/16/2022	Bridle	Venice	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	7/16/2022	Johnson	Staten Island	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	7/16/2022	O'Neil	Santa Clara	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	7/16/2022	Rodriguez	Alhambra	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	7/16/2022	Sheridan	Penn Valley	PA	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	25	7/16/2022	Aarons	San Diego	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Azar Porterfield	DEKALB	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Barrett	Redmond	OR	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Brocklesby	Sunderland	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Brown	Germantown	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Buharalija	Norcross	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Castillo	Saint Louis	MO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Cauffman	Clinton	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Cavalier	Sonoma	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Collmer	Salt Lake City	UT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Cornett	Milford	OH	6/29/2023 15:55
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5903	25	7/16/2022	Crump	Madera	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Davis	St. Petersburg	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Delahousie	Duarte	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Duncan	Montclair	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Easton	Rutherford	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Fernandez	Columbia	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Fries	Manorville	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Hedrick	St Charles	MO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Hochman	San Francisco	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Honea-Boles	Lufkin	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	J Zaber	Homewood	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	James	Columbus	OH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Jeffer	Los Gatos	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Johansen	Stevenson Ranch	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Jones	Richmond	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Katz	Blue Mounds	WI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	kelley	Lakewood	OH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Kenner	Basking Ridge	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Krieger	Winfield	IA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Kuderik	Birmingham	MI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Lauer	Mechanicsville	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Lee	Berkshire	NY	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	25	7/16/2022	Levy	Royal Oak	MI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Mason	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	McCarty	Vienna	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Miller	Darien	CT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Misra	Tuscaloosa	AL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Moyer	West Hempstead	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	O'Loughlin	Fort Lupton	CO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Resnick	Cinnaminson	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Richards	Dana Point	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Sanborn	Carmichael	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Sanguinetti	Portland	OR	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Scherer	Biltmore Lake	NC	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Seville	Covina	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Singh	Irving	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Smith	San Francisco	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Spradlin	Macungie	PA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Starck	Payson	AZ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Sutter	Chicago	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Swain	Wells	ME	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Taylor	Seattle	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Telesco	Big Indian	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Thomas	Richmond	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Turnbull	Milwaukee	WI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	White	San Diego	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/16/2022	Womack	Park City	UT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Aoki	Seattle	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Clay	Alpharetta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Darrin	Frederick	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	DeShong	McLean	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Ducar Benentt	Cambridge	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Farley	Santa Rosa	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Gernon	Northfield	MN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Hansen	Sacramento	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	hutton	Miami	FL	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	50	7/16/2022	Johnson	Cherry Valley	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Kroninger	Berkeley	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Letts	Carmel	IN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Payton	Boulder	CO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Reed	Bartlett	TN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Rudd	Decatur	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Schall	Edina	MN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Stern	New York	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Switzer	Chico	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Unruh	Reedley	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/16/2022	Van Dolah	Kneeland	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	100	7/16/2022	gale	Tarzana	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/16/2022	Archie	St. Louis	MO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/16/2022	g schmidt	augusta	KS	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/16/2022	Gray	New Orleans	LA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/16/2022	Schlackman	Rochester	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/16/2022	Stephens	Austin	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	150	7/16/2022	Murray	Carmel Valley	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	250	7/16/2022	Owens	Takoma Park	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	500	7/16/2022	Panitch	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	2	7/17/2022	Gahman	Oceanside	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/17/2022	Ader	Brooklyn	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/17/2022	Bales	Chicago	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/17/2022	Luebke	Marlborough	NH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	7/17/2022	Rodriguez	LOS ANGELES	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/17/2022	Anderson	Redondo Beach	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/17/2022	Boyd	Pensacola	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/17/2022	Haskell	Hansville	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/17/2022	Holms	Newtown	CT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/17/2022	Keating	Arlington Heights	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/17/2022	Leung	Rochester	MI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/17/2022	Mason	Ooltewah	TN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/17/2022	O Liddy	Thornton	CO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/17/2022	Penner	Hovland	MN	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	10	7/17/2022	Pluta	Valley Village	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/17/2022	Raso	Pineville	LA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/17/2022	Stelter	Waxhaw	NC	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	7/17/2022	Phelan	Los Angeles	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	7/17/2022	Flynn	Los Angeles	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	7/17/2022	Lemke	Milwaukee	WI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	7/17/2022	Sweitzer	MISSOULA	MT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Berg	Colorado Springs	CO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Bicket	Barstow	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Brown	Campbell	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Burris	SEFFNER	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Daniels	Manhattan Beach	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Dotson	Fallbrook	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	GIBBS	Falls Church	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Hairston	Baltimore	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Halpin	Albuquerque	NM	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Hartle	Juneau	AK	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Henry	White Plains	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Herrera	Miami	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Isaf-Lauri	Montgomery	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Leary	Palo Alto	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	M McNagny	Jericho	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Matuscak	Hudson	OH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	McLaughlin	Delmar	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	ormsbee	Maplewood	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Politoski	Hillsboro	OR	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Segal	Beverly Hills	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Suarez	Pacifica	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/17/2022	Taylor	Seattle	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/17/2022	Calvani	Philadelphia	PA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/17/2022	Hoffman	Glen Ellyn	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	7/17/2022	Scott	Dawson	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/17/2022	Adderly	Beverly Hills	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/17/2022	Carter	Paterson	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	101	7/17/2022	wollman	NEEDHAM	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/17/2022	Ytsma	Boise	ID	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/18/2022	Donaldson	Onekama	MI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	7/18/2022	Burton	South Burlington	VT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/18/2022	Saril	New rochelle	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/18/2022	Scrushy	Carmel	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/18/2022	Tompkins	Cherry Hill	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/18/2022	Vernick	New York	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	3	7/19/2022	Pilewskie	San Mateo	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/19/2022	Alberg	Chevy Chase	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/19/2022	Bloom	Chatham	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/19/2022	Dobrowits	Bayside	WI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/19/2022	Gaudet	Saline	MI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	7/19/2022	Tinkley	Tucker	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/19/2022	Ray	Santa Monica	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	500	7/19/2022	Fisher	Greenville	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/20/2022	Grisham	Gainesville	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/20/2022	D'Aurora	Pittsboro	NC	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/20/2022	Walker	Brooklyn Park	MN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	7/20/2022	Wolaver	New York	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/21/2022	Bourg	Lawrenceville	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/21/2022	Morales	Richland	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	7/23/2022	Pursifull	Snoqualmie	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	7/31/2022	Rudden	NY	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	500	8/2/2022	Larche	Skokie	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	8/3/2022	Allen	South Ryegate	VT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/3/2022	Herman	New York	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	8/3/2022	Fraser	Nyack	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	8/3/2022	Slack	Los Angeles	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/4/2022	Giraud	Seattle	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/4/2022	Murray	Archer	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	8/5/2022	McCarthy	Stratford	CT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	8/5/2022	Potter	Las Cruces	NM	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	8/5/2022	Miranda	Princeton	MA	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	25	8/5/2022 Green	TUCSON	AZ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/5/2022 Kraemer	Milwaukee	WI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/5/2022 Watson	Macon	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/5/2022 Woodley	San Jose	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/5/2022 Alder	Cathedral City	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/5/2022 Cole	West Sacramento	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/5/2022 Morris	Chula Vista	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/5/2022 Tenneriello	Philadelphia	PA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	8/6/2022 Winckler	BRANDON	SD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	8/6/2022 Thompson	Rockaway	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	8/6/2022 Lasko	New York	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/6/2022 blasdel	butlington	VT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/6/2022 Chrzan	Huntington	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/6/2022 Kent	San Jose	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/6/2022 Yarborough	Augusta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/6/2022 Brown	Owasso	OK	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/6/2022 Carrigan	Holly	MI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/6/2022 Cicchino	Maplewood	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/6/2022 Neerman	Raleigh	NC	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/6/2022 Pavelchek	Olympia	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	100	8/6/2022 Gardner	Orange	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	250	8/6/2022 Schwartz	Somerville	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	3	8/7/2022 Nathan	Oakland	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/9/2022 Wallin	Phoenix	AZ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	30	8/9/2022 Moncried	Gainesville	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/10/2022 Schuder	gainesville	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	8/11/2022 Krekeler	Tomball	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	8/11/2022 Guglielmino	Vashon	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	8/12/2022 Vela	San Francisco	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	8/12/2022 Burgis	St. Louis	MO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	8/15/2022 Johnson	Mariposa	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	8/15/2022 Le Melle	New York	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	8/15/2022 Mabena	Rochester	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	8/15/2022 Chadwick	Bradford	NH	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	10	8/15/2022	Rasch	North St Paul	MN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	8/15/2022	Rasch	North St Paul	MN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/15/2022	Long	Burbank	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/15/2022	Vukovic	Los Angeles	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/15/2022	kelley	Lakewood	OH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/15/2022	Mann	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	8/16/2022	Garrett	The Colony	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	8/16/2022	Griffin	Millis	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	8/17/2022	Ader	Brooklyn	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	8/17/2022	Blood	San Jose	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	8/17/2022	Maclay	Richmond	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	8/17/2022	Henderson	O'Fallon	MO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	8/17/2022	Bell	Palm Beach Gardens	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/17/2022	Knowles	Hallandale Beach	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/17/2022	Marion	Putnam	CT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/17/2022	Smullin	Huntsville	UT	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/17/2022	Anton	Savannah	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	8/18/2022	GARNER	UNINCORPORATED	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	8/18/2022	Andros	Smyrna	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	8/18/2022	Johnson	Santa Rosa	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	8/18/2022	Brice	Owings Mills	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/18/2022	Adams	Chatham	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/18/2022	Gingerella	ANDOVER	NJ	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/18/2022	Jason	Saline	MI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/18/2022	Keefer	Piney Flats	TN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/18/2022	Kubena	Granville	OH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/18/2022	Sollinger	Evanston	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/18/2022	walsh	boston	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/18/2022	Willard	Fairview	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/18/2022	Taylor	Seattle	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	8/18/2022	Maylett	Bellevue	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	250	8/18/2022	Goldfarb	Wellsville	PA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	250	8/18/2022	Laduzinsky	Pleasant Hill	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	3	8/19/2022	Pilewskie	San Mateo	CA	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	10	8/19/2022	Fisher	Oakland	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10.42	8/19/2022	Ashe	Fairfax	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/19/2022	Blain	Sandia Park	NM	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/19/2022	Dinsmore	Dayton	OH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/19/2022	Fite	Sand Springs	OK	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/19/2022	McCusker	Glendora	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/19/2022	Sprecher	Takoma park	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/19/2022	Lindley	Smyrna	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	8/19/2022	Donaldson	Chicago	IL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	8/19/2022	Saldana	New York	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/20/2022	Lingle-Munos	Indianapolis	IN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/20/2022	Stone	Kingston	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	3	8/21/2022	Nemeth	Whitelake	MI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	8/21/2022	Wiederin	Omaha	NE	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	8/27/2022	mckinney	McLoud	OK	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	8/29/2022	leger	church point	LA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/29/2022	Congdon	Boise	ID	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	8/29/2022	Fernandez	Columbia	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	8/31/2022	Rudden	NY	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	9/2/2022	Charles	Aurora	CO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	9/2/2022	Charles	Aurora	CO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	9/6/2022	Kent	San Jose	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	3	9/7/2022	Nathan	Oakland	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	9/11/2022	Krekeler	Tomball	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	9/11/2022	Guglielmino	Vashon	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	9/12/2022	Vela	San Francisco	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	9/12/2022	Fogarty	Saint Petersburg	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	9/12/2022	Burgis	St. Louis	MO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	9/12/2022	Kelley	olympia	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	9/12/2022	McKain	Saint Petersburg	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	1000	9/12/2022	Anagnostis	Belmont	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	9/14/2022	mccoy	danville	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	250	9/14/2022	Goldfarb	Wellsville	PA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	9/15/2022	Johnson	Mariposa	CA	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	5	9/15/2022	Le Melle	New York	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	9/15/2022	Mabena	Rochester	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	9/15/2022	Chadwick	Bradford	NH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	9/15/2022	Long	Burbank	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	9/15/2022	Vukovic	Los Angeles	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	9/15/2022	Mann	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	9/16/2022	Garrett	The Colony	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	9/16/2022	Griffin	Millis	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	9/17/2022	Ader	Brooklyn	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	3	9/19/2022	Pilewskie	San Mateo	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	9/21/2022	Wiederin	Omaha	NE	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	9/22/2022	Battaglia	Southfield	MI	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	9/22/2022	Schuder	gainesville	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	9/24/2022	Douglas	Goodlettsville	TN	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	9/24/2022	Hanneman	Plano	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	9/24/2022	Scott	Olympia	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	9/26/2022	Stapleton	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	1000	9/27/2022	Fisher	Greenville	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	9/30/2022	Rudden	NY	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	10/2/2022	Charles	Aurora	CO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	10/6/2022	Caine	Westlake village	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	10/6/2022	Kent	San Jose	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	3	10/7/2022	Nathan	Oakland	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	10/11/2022	Guglielmino	Vashon	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	10/12/2022	Vela	San Francisco	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	10/12/2022	Fogarty	Saint Petersburg	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	10/12/2022	Burgis	St. Louis	MO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	10/13/2022	Scott	Olympia	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	10/15/2022	Johnson	Mariposa	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	10/15/2022	Le Melle	New York	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	10/15/2022	Mabena	Rochester	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	10/15/2022	Chadwick	Bradford	NH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	10/15/2022	Long	Burbank	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	10/15/2022	Vukovic	Los Angeles	CA	6/29/2023 15:55

5903	50	10/15/2022	Mann	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	10/16/2022	Garrett	The Colony	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	10/16/2022	Griffin	Millis	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	10/17/2022	Ader	Brooklyn	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
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5903	10	10/21/2022	Wiederin	Omaha	NE	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	10/27/2022	Burke	Las Vegas	NV	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	10/30/2022	Slotter	DACULA	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	11/2/2022	Charles	Aurora	CO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	11/6/2022	Caine	Westlake village	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	11/6/2022	Kent	San Jose	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	3	11/7/2022	Nathan	Oakland	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	11/11/2022	Krekeler	Tomball	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	11/11/2022	Guglielmino	Vashon	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	11/12/2022	Fogarty	Saint Petersburg	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	11/12/2022	Burgis	St. Louis	MO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	11/15/2022	Johnson	Mariposa	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	11/15/2022	Le Melle	New York	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	11/15/2022	Mabena	Rochester	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	11/15/2022	Chadwick	Bradford	NH	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	11/16/2022	Garrett	The Colony	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	11/16/2022	Griffin	Millis	MA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	11/17/2022	Ader	Brooklyn	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	3	11/19/2022	Pilewskie	San Mateo	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
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5903	25	12/6/2022	Caine	Westlake village	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	12/11/2022	Krekeler	Tomball	TX	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	12/12/2022	Fogarty	Saint Petersburg	FL	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	15	12/12/2022	Burgis	St. Louis	MO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	12/15/2022	Le Melle	New York	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	5	12/15/2022	Mabena	Rochester	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	12/15/2022	Chadwick	Bradford	NH	6/29/2023 15:55
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5903	5	12/17/2022	Ader	Brooklyn	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	3	12/19/2022	Pilewskie	San Mateo	CA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	10	12/21/2022	Wiederin	Omaha	NE	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	3	12/28/2022	Riffle	Roswell	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	12/28/2022	Kaminsky	Alpharetta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	20	12/28/2022	Mitchell	Binghamton	NY	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	12/28/2022	Alberg	Chevy Chase	MD	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	12/28/2022	Alter	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	12/28/2022	Karen Pippin	Festus	MO	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	25	12/28/2022	Serra	Waleska	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	35	12/28/2022	Robertson	Floyd	VA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	12/28/2022	Brown	Decatur	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	12/28/2022	Brown	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	12/28/2022	Colquitt	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	50	12/28/2022	Pavelchek	Olympia	WA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	12/28/2022	grandhige	Tucker	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	12/28/2022	Koblentz	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	101	12/28/2022	Shapiro	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	150	12/28/2022	Lampley	Fairburn	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	200	12/28/2022	Lucas	Stockbridge	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	500	12/28/2022	Dangerfield	Moncks Corner	SC	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	1000	12/28/2022	Foland	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	1000	12/28/2022	Foland	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	1000	12/28/2022	Hormozdi	Norcross	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	500	12/29/2022	Chadha	Smyrna	GA	6/29/2023 15:55
5903	1500	12/30/2022	Conney	Atlanta	GA	6/29/2023 15:55