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19 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
20 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
21 **SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

22 AGUSTIN CACCURI, on behalf of himself
23 and all others similarly situated,

24 Plaintiff,

25 v.

26 SONY INTERACTIVE ENTERTAINMENT
27 LLC,

28 Defendant.

Civil Action No.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

1 Plaintiff Agustin Caccuri, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, brings
2 this Class Action Complaint against Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC for violation of federal
3 and state antitrust and unfair competition laws. Based upon personal knowledge, information and
4 belief, and the investigation of counsel, Plaintiff alleges as follows:

5 I. INTRODUCTION

6 1. This is an antitrust and unfair competition class action seeking damages and
7 injunctive relief for violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, and the
8 California Business and Professions Code § 17200, against Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC
9 (“Sony” or “Defendant”). Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other similarly
10 situated Class members who purchased digital video games on Sony’s PlayStation Store (the
11 “Class”) between April 1, 2019 and the present (the “Class Period”).

12 2. Sony manufactures the PlayStation, a line of video game consoles that launched
13 in 1994 and has become one of the most popular video game systems in the world. Sony’s most
14 recent model, the PlayStation 5, is expected to become the best-selling video game console of all
15 time. PlayStation 5 launched on November 12, 2020, and by March 31, 2021, Sony had sold 7.8
16 million units.¹ Despite record sales numbers, Sony has been unable to supply anywhere close to
17 enough units to meet consumer demand.² Sales are predicted to surpass 200 million units within
18 the next five years.³

22 ¹ See Sam Byford, *Sony has sold 7.8 million PS5 consoles*, The Verge (Apr. 28, 2021),
23 <https://www.theverge.com/2021/4/28/22407195/sony-ps5-sales-numbers-q4-2020-earnings>.

24 ² See N.F. Mendoza, *PlayStation rakes in \$2.6 billion in PS5 sales*, TechRepublic (Feb. 25,
25 2021), <https://www.techrepublic.com/article/playstation-rakes-in-2-6-billion-in-ps5-sales/>.

26 ³ Aernout van de Velde, *PS5 Sales to Exceed 200 to 300 Million Units in 5 to 6 Years, Analyst
27 Says; Could Terminate the Long-Running Console War*, WCCF Tech (Oct. 17, 2020),
<https://wccftech.com/ps5-sales-200-300-million-700-console-war/>; Lionel Sujay Vailshery,
Forecast unit sales of the PlayStation 5 worldwide from 2020 to 2024 (Apr 12, 2021),
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1124784/unit-sales-ps5-worldwide/>.

1 3. Sony has used the console’s popularity to build PlayStation into a multinational
2 and multifaceted digital entertainment brand⁴ which includes an online store for purchasing and
3 downloading digital video games directly to the console (the PlayStation Store),⁵ a unified online
4 multiplayer gaming and digital media delivery service (the PlayStation Network),⁶ a
5 subscription-based digital video game streaming service (PlayStation Now)⁷, a digital movie and
6 TV distribution service (PlayStation Video),⁸ and Sony’s video game development arm
7 (PlayStation Studios).⁹

8 4. The bulk of the profits Sony derives from the PlayStation franchise come not
9 from sales of its consoles, but from the digital video games and other digital content sold through
10 the PlayStation Store and the PlayStation Network, which produced over \$17 billion in revenues
11 for Sony in the fiscal year ending March 31, 2021.¹⁰

12 5. The PlayStation Store launched in 2006 alongside the PlayStation 3 console,
13 allowing users to purchase digital copies of PlayStation games and download them directly to the
14 console as an alternative to buying physical disks and inserting them into the console’s disk
15 drive. Since the launch of the original PlayStation in 1994, the games had been available only on
16 disks. Now users can access the PlayStation Store from their console, purchase games, and

17 ⁴ See *About Us: We are PlayStation*, Sony Interactive Entm’t, <https://www.playstation.com/en-us/corporate/about-us/> (last visited Apr. 29, 2021).

18 ⁵ See *About PlayStation Store*, Sony Interactive Entm’t, <https://www.playstation.com/en-us/about-playstation-store/> (last visited Apr. 29, 2021).

19 ⁶ See *PlayStation Network*, Sony Interactive Entm’t, <https://www.playstation.com/en-us/playstation-network/> (last visited Apr. 29, 2021).

20 ⁷ See *PlayStation Now*, Sony Interactive Entm’t, <https://www.playstation.com/en-us/ps-now/>
21 (last visited Apr. 29, 2021).

22 ⁸ See *PlayStation Video*, Sony Interactive Entm’t, <https://www.playstation.com/en-us/playstation-video/> (last visited Apr. 29, 2021).

23 ⁹ See *SIE PlayStation Studios*, Sony Interactive Entm’t, <https://www.playstation.com/en-us/corporate/playstation-studios/> (last visited May 3, 2021).

24 ¹⁰ See Sony Corporation, *Financial Statements and Consolidated Financial Results for the Fiscal*
25 *Year Ended March 31, 2021* (Apr. 28, 2021), available at https://www.sony.com/en/SonyInfo/IR/library/presen/er/pdf/20q4_sony.pdf. Dollar figure based on the following exchange rate
26 from April 28, 2021: 1 JPY = 0.0092 USD.
27

1 download them directly to their console through the PlayStation Network. In 2020, digital
2 downloads made up 62% of sales for PlayStation games, compared to only 43% in 2018.¹¹

3 6. Until recently, consumers could also purchase download codes for digital
4 PlayStation games from the same online and brick-and-mortar retailers who also sell physical
5 games such as Amazon, GameStop, Best Buy, and Wal-Mart. The codes could be redeemed on
6 the PlayStation Store for digital copies of PlayStation games.

7 7. On April 1, 2019, Sony eliminated retailers' ability to sell download codes for
8 digital PlayStation games. Because delivering digital content to PlayStation consoles requires
9 access to Sony's PlayStation Network, the new policy established the PlayStation Store as the
10 only source from which consumers can purchase digital PlayStation games, and the only source
11 to which video game publishers can sell digital PlayStation games. Sony also requires publishers
12 who sell digital games on the PlayStation Store to relinquish full control over the retail price. As
13 a result, the policy swiftly and effectively foreclosed any and all price competition in the retail
14 market for digital PlayStation games.

15 8. Sony's new restrictions established a monopoly over the sale of digital
16 PlayStation games. Sony's monopoly allows it to charge supracompetitive prices for digital
17 PlayStation games, which are significantly higher than their physical counterparts sold in a
18 competitive retail market, and significantly higher than they would be in a competitive retail
19 market for digital games.

20 9. A comparison of prices for the most popular digital games on the PlayStation
21 Store with prices for the same games available on disk from an array of retailers suggests prices
22 on the PlayStation store are, on average, about 75% percent higher than those for games on disk,
23 and in some cases closer to 175% higher.¹² There is no legitimate reason digital games should be
24

25 ¹¹ Mustafa Mahmoud, *62% of all full PlayStation game sales were digital in 2020*, Kitguru (Mar.
26 12, 202), <https://www.kitguru.net/gaming/mustafa-mahmoud/62-of-all-full-playstation-game-sales-were-digital-in-2020/>.

27 ¹² See ¶¶ 56-58 and Table 1, *infra*.

1 more expensive than their physical counterparts. In fact, given the costs saved on packaging and
2 distribution, prices for digital games in a truly competitive market would likely be lower than
3 they are for games on disk.

4 10. Sony's ability to maintain supracompetitive prices on the PlayStation Store while
5 consumers continue to switch from disks to digital game in ever increasing numbers, along with
6 Sony's skyrocketing revenues from digital games, demonstrate that prices for digital games on
7 the PlayStation store are not responsive to changes in prices for PlayStation games on disk.

8 11. The relevant product market in this case is the market for downloadable,
9 digitally-delivered video game content that is compatible with a PlayStation console ("digital
10 PlayStation games").

11 12. As a direct and proximate result of Sony's unlawful acquisition and maintenance
12 of a monopoly over the sale of digital PlayStation games, Plaintiff and Class members have paid
13 and will continue to pay significantly more for digital games than they would have absent Sony's
14 monopoly. Plaintiff seeks damages for himself and Class members equal to the amount they have
15 already overpaid, treble damages, and injunctive relief to end to the overcharges they will
16 continue to pay as long as Sony is allowed to keep its unlawful monopoly.

17 **II. THE PARTIES**

18 13. Plaintiff Agustin Caccuri is an individual residing in Santa Monica, California.
19 Plaintiff owns a PlayStation 5 Digital Edition console, has purchased digital video games on the
20 PlayStation Store and downloaded them to his console during the Class period, and plans to
21 purchase and download more digital games from the PlayStation Store in the future.

22 14. Defendant Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC ("Sony") is a corporation
23 organized and existing under the laws of California, with its headquarters and principal place of
24 business at 2207 Bridgepointe Parkway, San Mateo, California. It is a wholly-owned subsidiary
25 of the Japanese consumer electronics and media conglomerate Sony Corporation, and is the sole
26 owner the PlayStation digital entertainment brand.

V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Industry Background

20. The video game market has grown substantially in recent years. Revenues in the video game industry reached \$180 billion worldwide in 2020, exceeding those from movies and from the major North American sports leagues combined.¹³

21. Video games are played on one of several different electronic platforms, including: (i) smartphones and tablets; (ii) personal computers; (iii) video game consoles; and (iv) specialized handheld devices. This case concerns video games consoles, specifically the market for downloadable, digitally-delivered video game content that is compatible with a PlayStation console (“digital PlayStation games”).

22. For the past two decades, three companies have dominated the market for video game consoles: Sony, which manufactures the PlayStation console; Microsoft, manufacturer of the Xbox; and Nintendo. All three companies periodically release new models of their consoles, with updated hardware and software and new design features.

23. The original PlayStation launched in 1994, and Sony recently released the fifth iteration of that console.¹⁴ Microsoft has released eight versions of its Xbox since 2001, when it entered the market.¹⁵ Nintendo has the longest history of the three, having released seven console models since its 1985 debut.¹⁶

24. Games are not cross-compatible on different consoles, so once a consumer purchases a console, he or she must purchase games that are designed for that particular console.

¹³ Jordan Williams, *Video game industry bigger than sports, movies combined: report*, The Hill (Dec. 23, 2020), <https://thehill.com/blogs/in-the-know/in-the-know/531479-video-game-industry-bigger-than-sports-movies-combined-report>.

¹⁴ See Jimmy Thang, *The Evolution of PlayStation Consoles*, GameSpot (Sept. 7, 2020), <https://www.gamespot.com/gallery/the-evolution-of-playstation-consoles/2900-899/>.

¹⁵ See Gabe Gurwin, *The History of the Xbox*, Digital Trends (Mar. 16, 2021), <https://www.digitaltrends.com/gaming/the-history-of-the-xbox/>.

¹⁶ See Jeff Dunn and Kevin Webb, *A visual history of Nintendo's video game consoles*, Bus. Insider (May 16, 2019), <https://www.businessinsider.com/nintendo-consoles-in-history-photos-switch-2017-1>.

1 The consoles are substantially differentiated, with distinctively designed controllers and other
2 factors that lead to a different experience for the player, even where the same games are
3 available on more than one console. Consumers, therefore, tend to prefer one console over the
4 others, and are far more likely to continue buying the new models of one console than to switch
5 to a different console entirely.

6 25. The supply chain for video games has historically been characterized by three
7 players: (i) developers, who design and execute the creation of games and produce the software;
8 (ii) publishers, who handle funding, marketing, and distribution to retailers; and (iii) retailers,
9 who sell games to the console-owning public.¹⁷

10 26. The relationship between developers and publishers is akin to that between book
11 authors and publishing houses. The author produces a manuscript and then relies on a publishing
12 house to print and market the books, and deliver them to bookstores. Similar to the way that
13 publishing houses often offer advances to authors who agree to write manuscripts for them,
14 video game publishers also provide funding to developers.

15 27. The three major video game console manufacturers also develop and publish
16 games for their consoles in-house, called “first-party games” which are often available
17 exclusively on that company’s console. Nintendo relies heavily on first-party games, which make
18 up about 85% of game sales for its Switch console.¹⁸ Most PlayStation games, on the other hand,
19 are developed and published by third parties, with about 17% of game sales being first-party in
20 2020.¹⁹

21
22 ¹⁷ See *Intro to the Industry: The difference between game developers and publishers*, Gaming
23 Street (Sept. 18, 2019), [https://gamingstreet.com/intro-to-the-industry-the-difference-between-
game-developers-and-publishers/](https://gamingstreet.com/intro-to-the-industry-the-difference-between-game-developers-and-publishers/).

24 ¹⁸ Ben Gilbert, *Nintendo's recent success highlights a critical risk to the gaming giant's business*,
25 Bus. Insider (Feb. 4, 2019), [https://www.businessinsider.com/nintendo-reliance-on-first-party-
games-huge-risk-to-business-2019-2](https://www.businessinsider.com/nintendo-reliance-on-first-party-games-huge-risk-to-business-2019-2).

26 ¹⁹ Sony Corporation, Supplemental Information for the Consolidated Financial Results for the
27 Fourth Quarter Ended March 31, 2021 at 9 (Apr. 28, 2021), [sony.com/en/SonyInfo/IR/library/
presen/er/pdf/20q4_supplement.pdf](https://www.sony.com/en/SonyInfo/IR/library/presen/er/pdf/20q4_supplement.pdf)

1 **B. The Rise of Digital Video Games**

2 28. Historically, video games were sold exclusively on disks that users inserted into
3 the console. Games could be purchased or rented from a variety of online and brick-and-mortar
4 retailers, including many that bought and sold used copies. The disks could also be traded and
5 shared amongst friends.

6 29. More recent versions of all three consoles also allow users to purchase and
7 download digital copies of games directly to the console, which connects to the internet, thereby
8 avoiding the need for any physical disk. Sony, Microsoft, and Nintendo each operate their own
9 virtual store where consumers can buy and download digital games directly on their console.

10 30. Sales of digital games for the three consoles exceeded sales of their physical
11 counterparts for the first time in 2020, and the trend is likely to continue, with video game disks
12 following the path taken by DVDs and CDs towards the history books.²⁰

13 31. All three digital stores operate in a similar fashion: game publishers provide the
14 game software to the digital store, which then makes the games available for purchase. The store
15 collects payment, and facilitates digital delivery to users' console. For their services maintaining
16 the platform and the necessary infrastructure for delivering digital content, Sony, Microsoft, and
17 Nintendo take a cut of every sale on their respective stores, remitting the balance to the
18 publishers.

19 32. Sony's PlayStation Store differs from both Microsoft and Nintendo's digital
20 stores, however, in that game developers must cede total control over the retail price to Sony.²¹
21 Microsoft and Nintendo, on the other hand, allow developers who sell games through their
22

23 ²⁰ See Dylan Warman, *For the First Time, Digital Game Sales Outnumber Physical Sales*,
24 ScreenRant (Aug. 12, 2020), <https://screenrant.com/digital-game-sales-consoles-outnumber-physical-first-time/>

25 ²¹ See PlayStation Global Developer & Publisher Agreement ¶ 15.2.2 (effective Mar. 23, 2017)
26 (“Each SIE Company has the sole and exclusive right to set the retail price to Users for Digitally
27 Delivered Products sold or otherwise made available for purchase on or through [PlayStation
28 Network].”), available at <https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/946581/000162828017005833/ex10-48.htm>.

1 platforms to set the retail price, and then take 30% of that price on each sale for platform fees.²²
2 Sony follows a similar revenue sharing model with some publishers, and is reported to take the
3 same 30% cut.²³ With other publishers, however, Sony maintains agreements whereby it pays the
4 publisher an agreed upon “wholesale price” for each game sold, with the full retail markup going
5 to Sony.²⁴

6 **C. Competition in the Retail Market for Digital Video Games**

7 33. In the retail market for digital video games, price competition occurs principally
8 in one of two ways. First, where publishers maintain some control over the retail price, they
9 compete with one another to gain market share by offering a lower price to consumers. Second,
10 where download codes are available from outside retailers, the retailers compete amongst
11 themselves and with the in-console stores to offer the best price.

12 34. For Xbox and Nintendo games, consumers can buy these download codes from
13 the same retailers who sell games on disks, which they then use to download the games directly
14 to their consoles.

15 35. PlayStation games were previously sold in the same manner, but as of April 1,
16 2019, Sony stopped allowing retailers to sell download codes for PlayStation games. As a direct
17 and proximate result, the only place consumers can purchase digital copies of PlayStation games
18 is directly from the PlayStation Store, where Sony has complete control over retail prices.

19 **D. The PlayStation 5 Launch**

20 36. On November 12, 2020, Sony launched the PlayStation 5. As of March 31, 2021,
21 Sony had sold over 7.8 million units, making the PlayStation 5 the fastest-selling console of all

22 ²² See *Frequently Asked Questions*, Nintendo Developer Portal, <https://developer.nintendo.com/faq> (last visited Apr. 28, 2021); Microsoft Store App Developer Agreement, Version 8.6 (effective July 10, 2020), available at <https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE4o4bH>

23 ²³ See Tom Marks, Report: *Steam's 30% Cut Is Actually the Industry Standard*, IGN (Jan. 13, 2020), <https://www.ign.com/articles/2019/10/07/report-steams-30-cut-is-actually-the-industry-standard>.

24 ²⁴ PlayStation Global Developer & Publisher Agreement ¶ 15.2.1.

1 time,²⁵ but Sony has nevertheless been unable to meet demand for the console. Upon release,
2 PlayStation 5 consoles were almost immediately sold out at every retailer. Today, it is still very
3 difficult for consumers to get their hands on a PlayStation 5 gaming console, with inventory
4 restocks at major retailers and on Sony's website selling out almost instantaneously.²⁶
5 PlayStation 5 sales are expected to eventually surpass 200 million units.²⁷

6 37. The PlayStation 5 is available in two versions: the Base Model which is available
7 for \$499 retail, and the Digital Edition which is \$100 less expensive at \$399 retail.

8 38. The Base Model includes the previously-standard optical disk drive, allowing
9 users to choose whether to purchase physical disk copies of games, available from retailers such
10 as those mentioned above, or to buy digital copies and download directly to their console. The
11 less expensive Digital Edition does not include a disk drive, so users can only purchase games in
12 digital format at Sony's monopoly prices.

13 **E. Sony Eliminates Retail Competition for Digital PlayStation Games**

14 39. Until recently, consumers could purchase download codes for digital PlayStation
15 games from the same array of retailers that sell physical games. This allowed PlayStation users
16 to purchase a digital copy of a video game from their preferred retailer at the retailer's chosen
17 price.

18 40. However, starting on April 1, 2019, Sony implemented a new policy preventing
19 retailers from selling digital download codes. Since access to Sony's PlayStation Network is
20 required to enable digital delivery of PlayStation games, the result of this scheme is that
21 consumers can purchase digital games only through the PlayStation Store or not at all. For

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23 ²⁵ See Andy Robinson, *Sony reports 7.8m PS5s shipped in 'PlayStation's best year ever'*, Video
24 Games Chronicle (Apr. 28, 2021), <https://www.videogameschronicle.com/news/sony-reports-7-8m-ps5-sales-in-playstations-best-year-ever/>.

25 ²⁶ See Kevin Webb, *Sony's PlayStation 5 remains hard to find months after its launch*, Bus.
Insider (Apr. 14, 2021), <https://www.businessinsider.com/where-to-buy-ps5>.

26 ²⁷ See Aernout van de Velde, *PS5 Sales to Exceed 200 to 300 Million Units in 5 to 6 Years,*
27 *Analyst Says; Could Terminate the Long-Running Console War*, WCCF Tech (Oct. 17, 2020),
<https://wccftech.com/ps5-sales-200-300-million-700-console-war/>.

1 owners of the PlayStation 5 Digital Edition, that means the only place they are able to purchase
2 any video games for their console is through the PlayStation Store.

3 41. Sony, at all relevant times, retained exclusive control over the design, features and
4 operating software for PlayStation consoles, and over the necessary software for delivering
5 digital content to PlayStation consoles.

6 42. Sony specifically intended to and did eliminate price competition from other
7 digital video game retailers. As a result, Sony has an unlawful monopoly over the market for
8 digital PlayStation games, from which it derives supracompetitive profits.

9 43. Before the April 2019 policy changes, publishers could sell both physical
10 PlayStation games and digital games, via download codes, through a variety of retailers.
11 Retailers profit from markups on the final purchase price, but price competition among them puts
12 downward pressure on retail price markups. Sony also charges a Platform Royalty Fee on each
13 game sold by retailers for use on its gaming consoles, including PlayStation 5. On information
14 and belief, Sony's Platform Royalty Fee for physical games sold at external retailers is 11.5%.

15 44. By foreclosing retail competition for digital PlayStation games, Sony effectively
16 takes the retail markup for itself in addition to its royalty fee. It also charges a higher total fee
17 than the sum of both the retail markup and the Platform Royalty Fee for games sold by retailers.
18 Consumers, limited to a single source for purchasing any digital PlayStation content, are forced
19 to pay a higher price for digital PlayStation games than they would in a free and unrestrained
20 competitive retail market.

21 45. Additionally, by taking complete control over retail prices for digital PlayStation
22 games, Sony foreclosed price competition among video game publishers to a significant degree,
23 because they can no longer execute a strategy of offering lower retail prices to gain a higher
24 share of sales. Instead, Sony sets the price to maximize its own profits, and Sony's interests in
25 choosing a retail price strategy conflict with the interests of video game publishers. Because
26 Sony is responsible for all the marginal costs associated with each sale, it is incentivized to set
27 the price higher to obtain a greater margin on each sale. Publishers, who incur no additional costs
28

1 with each additional game sold, would maximize their profits at a lower price point but greater
2 sales volume, relative to Sony.

3 46. Sony owns, possesses or controls 100% of the PlayStation Store, maintains and
4 operates the PlayStation Store with Sony employees or agents, and controls all of the sales,
5 revenue collections and other business operations.

6 47. The revenue Sony generates through sales of digital video games has been
7 increasing sharply since it established its monopoly on digital PlayStation games. In 2019, Sony
8 made \$12.48 billion through sales of digital PlayStation games and associated content.²⁸ For the
9 fiscal year ending March 31, 2021, that number was \$17.32 billion.²⁹

10 VI. MONOPOLY POWER IN THE RELEVANT MARKET

11 48. The relevant product market in this case is the market for downloadable, digitally-
12 delivered video game content that is compatible with a PlayStation console (“digital PlayStation
13 games”). The relevant geographic market is the United States, its territories, possessions, and the
14 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

15 49. As discussed above, the market for video game consoles is dominated by three
16 companies of roughly equal market share: Sony (PlayStation); Microsoft (Xbox); and Nintendo.
17 The price for the consoles is generally between \$300 and \$600. Games are not cross-compatible
18 on different consoles, so once a consumer purchases a console, he or she must purchase games
19 that are designed for that particular console.

20 50. Due to the high cost of consoles, the differentiation among them, and the lack of
21 cross-compatibility, each console creates a separate aftermarket for games that can be played on
22 it. Games that cannot be played on the same console are not substitutable. A small but

23 ²⁸ Ravi Sinha, *PlayStation Network Generated 2nd Highest Revenue Ever in 2019*, GamingBolt
24 (Feb. 2, 2020), <https://gamingbolt.com/playstation-network-generated-2nd-highest-revenue-ever-in-2019>

25 ²⁹ Sony Corporation, *Financial Statements and Consolidated Financial Results for the Fiscal*
26 *Year Ended March 31, 2021* (Apr., 28, 2021), available at https://www.sony.com/en/SonyInfo/IR/library/presen/er/pdf/20q4_sony.pdf. Dollar figure based on the following exchange rate
27 from April 28, 2021: 1 JPY = 0.0092 USD.

1 significant, non-transitory increase to the price of games for one console will not, therefore,
2 cause a consumer to switch to one of the other consoles.

3 51. Prices for digital games on the PlayStation Store are not responsive to changes in
4 prices for physical games available from other retailers, and physical games are not substitutes
5 for digital games. A small but significant, non-transitory increase in price for digital PlayStation
6 games will not cause a significant number of consumers to switch to buying physical copies of
7 PlayStation games instead.

8 52. Historically, there was vigorous price competition among retailers and among
9 publishers within the console-specific game markets. Retailers tried to offer the best prices to
10 consumers and thereby gain a higher share of the market while maintaining profits. Publishers
11 had an incentive to lower their wholesale prices so retailers could offer a better price in turn,
12 resulting in pricing and sales volumes that maximized profits for both publishers and retailers.

13 53. By prohibiting sale of digital PlayStation games except through the PlayStation
14 Store, Sony established a complete monopoly in the market for digital PlayStation games. Sony
15 has a 100% market share in the relevant market, and complete control over retail prices in the
16 relevant market.

17 **VII. ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS**

18 54. Sony's acquisition and maintenance of a monopoly in the market for digital
19 PlayStation games causes consumers to pay more for their digital PlayStation games than they
20 would have in a competitive market. It has also resulted in reduced output of PlayStation games
21 than would exist in a free and unrestrained competitive market.

22 55. The lack of a truly competitive environment has also led to reduced output and
23 supply of PlayStation video games because publishers are barred from selling these games at
24 prices below Sony's chosen retail price. Under basic economic principles, lower prices would
25 generate both increased demand and increased supply to meet that demand. Sony's unlawful
26 monopoly naturally restricts output.

56. Evidence of the anticompetitive price effect is already manifesting itself as demonstrated by the current price differences for PlayStation video games across different retailers. Table 1, below, reflects the prices of the first ten games listed on the PlayStation Store's "Best-Seller" list³⁰ as of this writing, along with the prices of the same games on disk from four prominent retailers. As shown, Sony's prices on the PlayStation Store are between 12% and 171% higher for these games than the average prices for each across the other four retailers.

Table 1

Game	PS Store	Wal-Mart	GameStop	Best Buy	Amazon	Non-PS Store Average	Price Δ on PS Store
Madden NFL 21	\$59.99	\$19.98	\$27.99	\$19.99	\$29.16	\$24.28	+147%
Ghost of Tsushima	\$59.99	\$56.50	\$37.99	\$59.99	\$59.99	\$53.62	+12%
NBA 2K21	\$59.99	\$29.72	\$18.99	\$19.99	\$19.99	\$22.17	+171%
Watch Dogs Legion	\$59.99	\$36.49	\$49.99	\$59.99	\$30.00	\$44.12	+36%
Marvel's Avengers	\$39.99	\$29.00	\$22.99	\$24.99	\$24.99	\$25.49	+57%
MLB The Show 20	\$19.99	\$9.99	\$8.99	\$19.99	\$16.97	\$13.99	+43%
Resident Evil 3	\$59.99	\$27.99	\$34.99	\$39.99	\$25.50	\$32.12	+87%
NHL 21	\$59.99	\$28.89	\$29.99	\$19.99	\$25.00	\$25.97	+131%
Average Price Δ on PS Store:							+74%

57. The market for video game on disk provides a helpful benchmark for what prices would look like in a competitive market for digital games. There is no legitimate reason digital games should be more expensive than their physical counterparts. In fact, given the costs saved on packaging and distribution, prices for games in a truly competitive market for digital games would likely be lower than they are for games on disk. The only plausible explanation for the stark price differences is Sony's monopoly power in the market for digital PlayStation games. As video game disks go the way of CDs and DVDs before them, Sony has positioned itself to gain an ever-increasing share of, and eventually, a monopoly in the market for *all* PlayStation games.

³⁰ See *PlayStation Store: Best Sellers*, Sony Interactive Entm't, <https://store.playstation.com/en-us/category/877e5ce2-4afc-4694-9f69-4758e34e58cd/1> (last visited May 4, 2021).

1 compelled to pay, and did pay, artificially inflated prices for one or more of the aforementioned
2 products and services.

3 64. During the relevant time period, Sony employed various instrumentalities of
4 interstate commerce to effectuate the illegal acts alleged herein, including the United States mail,
5 interstate and foreign travel, and interstate and foreign wire commerce.

6 65. Defendant's conduct was within the flow of and was intended to have and did
7 have a direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect on interstate commerce.

8 66. Sony's conduct has also had substantial intrastate effects in that, among other
9 things, consumers paid overcharges in each state. Sony's conduct materially deprived the
10 consuming public—including of purchasers in each state—of any choice to purchase more
11 affordable digital PlayStation games from retailers other than Sony. The absence of competition
12 for PlayStation 5 games has, and continues to, directly and substantially affect and disrupt
13 commerce within each state.

14 **X. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

15 67. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated as
16 a class action under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2) and (3), seeking damages and
17 injunctive relief on behalf of the following Class:

18 All persons in the United States, exclusive of Sony and its employees,
19 agents and affiliates, and the Court and its employees, who purchased
20 any digital video game content directly from the PlayStation Store at
any time from April 1, 2019 through the present.

21 68. Plaintiff and the Class seek damages for the overcharges they have paid since
22 Sony monopolized the relevant market, and permanent injunctive relief to prevent or remedy the
23 unlawful conduct alleged herein and thereby ensure competition in the relevant market.

24 69. Members of the Class are so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder
25 of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are at least ten million Class
26 members, who reside in and have purchased digital PlayStation games in every state and territory
27 throughout the United States. Moreover, given the costs of complex antitrust litigation, it would
28

1 be uneconomic for many class members to bring individual claims and join them together. The
2 Class is readily identifiable from information and records in the possession of Defendant.

3 70. Plaintiff is a member of the Class he seeks to represent, and his claims arise from
4 the same factual and legal bases as those of the Class; he asserts the same legal theories as do all
5 Class members.

6 71. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of Class members. Plaintiff's claims
7 arise out of the same course of anticompetitive conduct that gives rise to the claims of the other
8 Class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Class were damaged by the same wrongful
9 conduct: Sony's monopolization of the retail market for digital PlayStation games. Plaintiff and
10 all members of the Class paid supracompetitive prices for digital PlayStation games and were
11 deprived of the benefits of retail competition as a result of Sony's unlawful monopoly.

12 72. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class.
13 The interests of Plaintiff are aligned with, and not antagonistic to, those of the other members of
14 the Class.

15 73. Plaintiff is represented by counsel who are experienced and competent in the
16 prosecution of class action antitrust litigation.

17 74. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class predominate over
18 questions that may affect only individual Class members. Overcharge damages with respect the
19 Class as a whole are appropriate because Sony acted on grounds generally applicable to the
20 entirety of the Class. Such generally applicable conduct is inherent in Sony's unlawful creation
21 and maintenance of a monopoly in the market for digital PlayStation games. Questions of law
22 and fact common to the Class include, but are not limited to:

- 23 a) Whether Sony unlawfully created, maintained and continues to maintain
24 monopoly power in the relevant market;
- 25 b) Whether Sony's unlawful monopoly has caused and continues to cause
26 anticompetitive effects in the relevant market;
- 27 c) Whether procompetitive justifications exist, and if they do, whether there were
28 less restrictive means of achieving them;

- 1 d) Whether Sony's unlawful monopoly has substantially affected intrastate and/or
- 2 interstate commerce;
- 3 e) Whether Sony's unlawful monopoly caused antitrust injury through overcharges
- 4 to the business or property of Plaintiff and the members of the Class;
- 5 f) Whether injunctive relief is warranted to restore competition in the relevant
- 6 market;
- 7 g) The quantum of overcharges paid by the Class in the aggregate.

8 75. The common questions of law and fact are identical for each and every member of
9 the Class.

10 76. Plaintiff will thoroughly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, having
11 obtained qualified and competent legal counsel to represent himself and those similarly situated.

12 77. The prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a
13 risk of inconsistent adjudications and cause needless expenditure of judicial resources.

14 78. Plaintiff is typical of the Class in that his claims, like those of the Class, are based
15 on the same anticompetitive business practices and the same legal theories.

16 79. Class action treatment is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication
17 of the controversy. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly-situated persons to
18 prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the
19 unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort, or expense that numerous individual actions would
20 engender. The benefits of proceeding through the class mechanism, including providing injured
21 persons or entities a method for obtaining redress on claims that could not practicably be pursued
22 individually, substantially outweighs potential difficulties in management of this class action.

23 80. Plaintiff knows of no special difficulty to be encountered in litigating this action
24 that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.
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1 **XI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

2 **FIRST CLAIM**

3 **Monopolization Under Section 2 of The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2**
4 **and Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 4**

5 81. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as
6 if fully set forth herein.

7 82. Sony has willfully and unlawfully acquired, maintained, and continues to
8 maintain monopoly power in the market for digital PlayStation video games. Specifically, Sony
9 has unlawfully acquired monopoly power by: (i) establishing the PlayStation Store as the
10 exclusive distributor of digital PlayStation games; and (iii) maintaining complete control over
11 retail prices on the PlayStation Store.

12 83. Sony's unlawful acquisition of monopoly power has reduced competition in the
13 relevant market resulting in decreased output and supracompetitive prices for digital PlayStation
14 games.

15 84. There is and was no legitimate, non-pretextual, procompetitive business
16 justification for Sony's conduct that outweighs its harmful effect.

17 85. Plaintiff and Class members have been injured by Sony's unlawful
18 monopolization because they have been: (a) deprived of lower cost alternatives for digital
19 PlayStation games; (b) forced to pay supracompetitive prices for those games; and/or (c)
20 subjected to a lower of those games. Plaintiff and Class members paid more for digital
21 PlayStation games than they otherwise would have absent Sony's unlawful monopolization of
22 the digital PlayStation game market.

23 86. Plaintiff and Class members have suffered economic injury to their property as a
24 direct and proximate result of Sony's monopolization of the relevant market in violation of 15
25 U.S.C. § 2, and are, therefore, entitled to treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees in amounts to
26 be proved at trial.

1 **THIRD CLAIM**

2 **Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under Section 2 of The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2**
3 **and Sections 2 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26**

4 94. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as
5 if fully set forth herein.

6 95. Sony's unlawful creation and maintenance of a monopoly in the digital
7 PlayStation game market violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C § 2. Its unlawful
8 conduct is continuing and will continue unless it is permanently enjoined. The anticompetitive
9 effects of Sony's unlawful conduct in the relevant market are continuing and will continue absent
10 an injunction.

11 96. Plaintiff and the Class have been injured in their business or property by reason of
12 Sony's antitrust violations alleged in this Count. These injuries will continue until Sony's
13 anticompetitive conduct ceases and competition is restored.

14 **FOURTH CLAIM**

15 **Damages Under the California Unfair Competition Law**
16 **Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, *et seq.***

17 97. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as
18 if fully set forth herein.

19 98. Sony's monopolization of the market for digital PlayStation games locks
20 consumers into purchasing digital PlayStation games from the PlayStation Store. This video
21 game aftermarket restriction is unfair, immoral, unethical, unscrupulous, and substantially
22 injurious to consumers and the utility of its conduct, if any, does not outweigh the gravity of the
23 harm to its victims.

24 99. Sony's monopolizing conduct is also unfair because it violates public policy as
25 declared by specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions, including the Sherman
26 Act.

1 that reasonable notice of this action, as provided by Rule 23(c)(2), be given to the Class, and
2 appointing the Plaintiff as the named representative of the Class;

3 C. Injunctive relief ensuring free and unrestrained competition in the market for
4 digital PlayStation games, and preliminarily and permanently enjoining Sony from continuing
5 the unlawful conduct alleged herein, and from engaging in similar or related conduct in the
6 future;

7 D. Monetary relief consisting of treble damages in an amount to be determined at
8 trial; pre- and post-judgment interest; and costs, expenses, and reasonable attorneys' fees; and

9 G. Any other and further relief the case may require and the Court may deem just
10 and proper under the circumstances.

11 **XIII. JURY DEMAND**

12 106. Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff, on behalf of
13 himself and the proposed Class, demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

14 Dated: May 5, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jeff S. Westerman

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