

THOMAS, J., concurring

**SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. *v.* KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 20–197. Decided April 5, 2021

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. See *United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.*, 340 U. S. 36 (1950).

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When a person publishes a message on the social media platform Twitter, the platform by default enables others to republish (retweet) the message or respond (reply) to it or other replies in a designated comment thread. The user who generates the original message can manually “block” others from republishing or responding.

Donald Trump, then President of the United States, blocked several users from interacting with his Twitter account. They sued. The Second Circuit held that the comment threads were a “public forum” and that then-President Trump violated the First Amendment by using his control of the Twitter account to block the plaintiffs from accessing the comment threads. *Knight First Amdt. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump*, 928 F. 3d 226 (2019). But Mr. Trump, it turned out, had only limited control of the account; Twitter has permanently removed the account from the platform.

Because of the change in Presidential administration, the Court correctly vacates the Second Circuit’s decision. See *United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.*, 340 U. S. 36 (1950). I



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## I

On the surface, some aspects of Mr. Trump’s Twitter account resembled a public forum. A designated public forum is “property that the State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public.” *International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee*, 505 U. S. 672, 678 (1992). Mr. Trump often used the account to speak in his official capacity. And, as a governmental official, he chose to make the comment threads on his account publicly accessible, allowing any Twitter user—other than those whom he blocked—to respond to his posts.

Yet, the Second Circuit’s conclusion that Mr. Trump’s Twitter account was a public forum is in tension with, among other things, our frequent description of public forums as “government-controlled spaces.” *Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky*, 585 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (2018) (slip op., at 7); accord, *Pleasant Grove City v. Summum*, 555 U. S. 460, 469 (2009) (“government property and . . . government programs”); *Arkansas Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes*, 523 U. S. 666, 677 (1998) (“government properties”). Any control Mr. Trump exercised over the account greatly paled in comparison to Twitter’s authority, dictated in its terms of service, to remove the account “at any time for any or no reason.” Twitter exercised its authority to do exactly that.

Because unbridled control of the account resided in the hands of a private party, First Amendment doctrine may not have applied to respondents’ complaint of stifled speech. See *Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck*, 587 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (2019) (slip op., at 9) (a “private entity is not ordinarily constrained by the First Amendment”). Whether governmental use of private space implicates the First Amendment often depends on the government’s control over that space. For example, a government agency that leases a conference room in a hotel to hold a public hearing about a proposed regulation cannot kick participants out of the hotel simply because they express concerns about the



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carriers may be justified, even for industries not historically recognized as common carriers, when “a business, by circumstances and its nature, . . . rise[s] from private to be of public concern.” See *German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis*, 233 U. S. 389, 411 (1914) (affirming state regulation of fire insurance rates). At that point, a company’s “property is but its instrument, the means of rendering the service which has become of public interest.” *Id.*, at 408.

This latter definition of course is hardly helpful, for most things can be described as “of public interest.” But whatever may be said of other industries, there is clear historical precedent for regulating transportation and communications networks in a similar manner as traditional common carriers. *Candeub* 398–405. Telegraphs, for example, because they “resemble[d] railroad companies and other common carriers,” were “bound to serve all customers alike, without discrimination.” *Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co.*, 154 U. S. 1, 14 (1894).<sup>2</sup>

In exchange for regulating transportation and communication industries, governments—both State and Federal—have sometimes given common carriers special government favors. *Candeub* 402–407. For example, governments have tied restrictions on a carrier’s ability to reject clients to “immunity from certain types of suits”<sup>3</sup> or to regulations that make it more difficult for other companies to compete with the carrier (such as franchise licenses). *Ibid.* By giving

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<sup>2</sup>This Court has been inconsistent about whether telegraphs were common carriers. Compare *Primrose*, 154 U. S., at 14, with *Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange*, 270 U. S. 593, 605 (1926). But the Court has consistently recognized that telegraphs were at least analogous enough to common carriers to be regulated similarly. *Primrose*, 154 U. S., at 14.

<sup>3</sup>Telegraphs, for example, historically received some protection from defamation suits. Unlike other entities that might retransmit defamatory content, they were liable only if they knew or had reason to know that a message they distributed was defamatory. Restatement (Second) of Torts §581 (1976); see also *O’Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co.*, 113 F. 2d 539, 542 (CA1 1940).



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Though digital instead of physical, they are at bottom communications networks, and they “carry” information from one user to another. A traditional telephone company laid physical wires to create a network connecting people. Digital platforms lay information infrastructure that can be controlled in much the same way. And unlike newspapers, digital platforms hold themselves out as organizations that focus on distributing the speech of the broader public. Federal law dictates that companies cannot “be treated as the publisher or speaker” of information that they merely distribute. 110 Stat. 137, 47 U. S. C. §230(c).

The analogy to common carriers is even clearer for digital platforms that have dominant market share. Similar to utilities, today’s dominant digital platforms derive much of their value from network size. The Internet, of course, is a network. But these digital platforms are networks within that network. The Facebook suite of apps is valuable largely because 3 billion people use it. Google search—at 90% of the market share—is valuable relative to other search engines because more people use it, creating data that Google’s algorithm uses to refine and improve search results. These network effects entrench these companies. Ordinarily, the astronomical profit margins of these platforms—last year, Google brought in \$182.5 billion total, \$40.3 billion in net income—would induce new entrants into the market. That these companies have no comparable competitors highlights that the industries may have substantial barriers to entry.

To be sure, much activity on the Internet derives value from network effects. But dominant digital platforms are different. Unlike decentralized digital spheres, such as the e-mail protocol, control of these networks is highly concentrated. Although both companies are public, one person controls Facebook (Mark Zuckerberg), and just two control Google (Larry Page and Sergey Brin). No small group of people controls e-mail.



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(recognizing that a private space can become a public forum when leased to the government). Common-carrier regulations, although they directly restrain private companies, thus may have an indirect effect of subjecting government officials to suits that would not otherwise be cognizable under our public-forum jurisprudence.

This analysis may help explain the Second Circuit’s intuition that part of Mr. Trump’s Twitter account was a public forum. But that intuition has problems. First, if market power is a predicate for common carriers (as some scholars suggest), nothing in the record evaluates Twitter’s market power. Second, and more problematic, neither the Second Circuit nor respondents have identified any regulation that restricts Twitter from removing an account that would otherwise be a “government-controlled space.”

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Even if digital platforms are not close enough to common carriers, legislatures might still be able to treat digital platforms like places of public accommodation. Although definitions between jurisdictions vary, a company ordinarily is a place of public accommodation if it provides “lodging, food, entertainment, or other services to the public . . . in general.” Black’s Law Dictionary 20 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “public accommodation”); accord, 42 U. S. C. §2000a(b)(3) (covering places of “entertainment”). Twitter and other digital platforms bear resemblance to that definition. This, too, may explain the Second Circuit’s intuition. Courts are split, however, about whether federal accommodations laws apply to anything other than “physical” locations. Compare, e.g., *Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.*, 179 F. 3d 557, 559 (CA7 1999) (Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) covers websites), with *Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.*, 121 F. 3d 1006, 1010–1011 (CA6 1997) (en banc) (Title III of the ADA covers only physical places); see also 42 U. S. C. §§2000a(b)–(c) (discussing “physica[l]

locat[ions]”).

Once again, a doctrine, such as public accommodation, that reduces the power of a platform to unilaterally remove a government account might strengthen the argument that an account is truly government controlled and creates a public forum. See *Southeastern Promotions*, 420 U. S., at 547, 555. But no party has identified any public accommodation restriction that applies here.

## II

The similarities between some digital platforms and common carriers or places of public accommodation may give legislators strong arguments for similarly regulating digital platforms. “[I]t stands to reason that if Congress may demand that telephone companies operate as common carriers, it can ask the same of” digital platforms. *Turner*, 512 U. S., at 684 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). That is especially true because the space constraints on digital platforms are practically nonexistent (unlike on cable companies), so a regulation restricting a digital platform’s right to exclude might not appreciably impede the platform from speaking. See *id.*, at 675, 684 (noting restrictions on one-third of a cable company’s channels but recognizing that regulation may still be justified); *PruneYard*, 447 U. S., at 88. Yet Congress does not appear to have passed these kinds of regulations. To the contrary, it has given digital platforms “immunity from certain types of suits,” *Candeub* 403, with respect to content they distribute, 47 U. S. C. §230, but it has not imposed corresponding responsibilities, like nondiscrimination, that would matter here.

None of this analysis means, however, that the First Amendment is irrelevant until a legislature imposes common carrier or public accommodation restrictions—only that the principal means for regulating digital platforms is through those methods. Some speech doctrines might still

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apply in limited circumstances, as this Court has recognized in the past.

For example, although a “private entity is not ordinarily constrained by the First Amendment,” *Halleck*, 587 U. S., at \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (slip op., at 6, 9), it is if the government coerces or induces it to take action the government itself would not be permitted to do, such as censor expression of a lawful viewpoint. *Ibid.* Consider government threats. “People do not lightly disregard public officers’ thinly veiled threats to institute criminal proceedings against them if they do not come around.” *Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan*, 372 U. S. 58, 68 (1963). The government cannot accomplish through threats of adverse government action what the Constitution prohibits it from doing directly. See *ibid.*; *Blum v. Yaretsky*, 457 U. S. 991, 1004–1005 (1982). Under this doctrine, plaintiffs might have colorable claims against a digital platform if it took adverse action against them in response to government threats.

But no threat is alleged here. What threats would cause a private choice by a digital platform to “be deemed . . . that of the State” remains unclear. *Id.*, at 1004.<sup>5</sup> And no party

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<sup>5</sup>Threats directed at digital platforms can be especially problematic in the light of 47 U. S. C. §230, which some courts have misconstrued to give digital platforms immunity for bad-faith removal of third-party content. *Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Group USA, LLC*, 592 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_–\_\_\_ (2020) (THOMAS, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 7–8). This immunity eliminates the biggest deterrent—a private lawsuit—against caving to an unconstitutional government threat.

For similar reasons, some commentators have suggested that immunity provisions like §230 could potentially violate the First Amendment to the extent those provisions pre-empt state laws that protect speech from private censorship. See Volokh, *Might Federal Preemption of Speech-Protective State Laws Violate the First Amendment? The Volokh Conspiracy*, Reason, Jan. 23, 2021. According to that argument, when a State creates a private right and a federal statute pre-empts that state law, “the federal statute is the source of the power and authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed.” *Railway Employees v.*

