

(ORDER LIST: 592 U.S.)

MONDAY, MARCH 29, 2021

ORDERS IN PENDING CASES

20M65 HUANG, DONG S. V. HILL, JALEA J., ET AL.

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* with the declaration of indigency under seal is denied. The motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the supplemental appendix under seal is denied.

19-8709 GREER, GREGORY V. UNITED STATES

The motion of petitioner for leave to file Volume II of the joint appendix under seal is granted.

20-287 JOHNSON, ERNEST V. PRECYTHE, ANNE L., ET AL.

The parties are directed to file supplemental letter briefs addressing the following question: Given that the District Court dismissed without prejudice, would petitioner be barred from filing a new complaint that proposes the firing squad as the alternative method of execution? Petitioner's brief, not to exceed 5 pages, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before Monday, April 12, 2021. Respondents' brief, not to exceed 5 pages, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before Monday, April 26, 2021.

20-444 UNITED STATES V. GARY, MICHAEL A.

The motion of petitioner for leave to file Volume II of the joint appendix under seal is granted.

CERTIORARI GRANTED

20-601 CAMERON, ATT'Y GEN. OF KY V. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL CENTER, ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.

CERTIORARI DENIED

20-567 OHIO, EX REL. FELTNER V. CUYAHOGA COUNTY BD., ET AL.

20-605 WHOLEAN, KIERNAN, ET AL. V. CSEA SEIU LOCAL 2001, ET AL.

20-690 HAN, MICHAEL S. V. UNITED STATES

20-730 COOPER, LINDSAY R., ET AL. V. TEPCO, ET AL.

20-960 NGUYEN, KHUE V. NGUYEN, HAI P., ET AL.

20-965 PATEL, BALUBHAI, ET AL. V. CHAVEZ, MANUEL

20-980 SHARMA, VEENA V. SANTANDER BANK

20-984 GREWAL, ATT'Y GEN. OF NJ V. DEFENSE DISTRIBUTED, ET AL.

20-987 SPIELBAUER LAW OFFICE V. MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, ET AL.

20-988 SMITH, SUPT., HOUTZDALE, ET AL. V. TYSON, AARON E.

20-998 MAMA JO'S, INC. V. SPARTA INSURANCE CO.

20-1001 COLUMBIA MHC EAST, LLC, ET AL. V. STEWART, MELODY, ET AL.

20-1007 STEWART, MERRILEE V. RRL HOLDING CO., ET AL.

20-1011 SANAI, CYRUS M. V. STAUB, D. JOSHUA, ET AL.

20-1016 KOSTERLITZ, MICHAEL V. S/V KNOTTA KLU, ET AL.

20-1022 COULTER, JEAN V. JAMSAN HOTEL MANAGEMENT, ET AL.

20-1023 COULTER, JEAN V. IGNELZI, PHILIP A., ET AL.

20-1027 COLEMAN, JOSHUA V. LOUISIANA

20-1049 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK, ET AL. V. McCRAW, CALVIN, ET AL.

20-1051 JUDICIAL WATCH, INC. V. CLINTON, HILLARY R., ET AL.

20-1055 TRICOLI, ANTHONY V. WATTS, ROB, ET AL.

20-1065 HUDLER, CHRISTOPHER V. PENNSYLVANIA

20-1080 MAY, STEPHEN E. V. SHINN, DIR., AZ DOC, ET AL.

20-1087 TUNNELL, LEONARD H. V. MO SCH. RETIREMENT, ET AL.
 20-1090 BOYD, THASHA A. V. DEPT. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
 20-1101 HARDEN, TANIESHIA V. COMCAST CORP.
 20-1105 FUTIA, ANTHONY, ET AL. V. NEW YORK, ET AL.
 20-1109 CHATMAN, GEORGE C. V. ARROWHEAD CREDIT UNION
 20-1127 PADUANO, JOSEPH L. V. VIRGINIA
 20-1175 DeMUTH, SANDRA V. SMALL BUSINESS ADMIN., ET AL.
 20-1179 COLE, WILLIAM W. V. PRN REAL ESTATE, ET AL.
 20-1181 THOMPSON, KYLE S. V. MARYLAND
 20-1190 SIMMONS, RICHARD D. V. McDONOUGH, SEC. OF VA
 20-1193 LEE, CHRISTOPHER G. V. UNITED STATES
 20-1198 WILTZ, JERRY V. TEXAS
 20-1205) CRAIG, GAZELLE V. UNITED STATES
)
 20-7204) FAITHFUL, SHANE V. UNITED STATES
 20-1216 KHALAF, FAYSAL V. FORD MOTOR CO., ET AL.
 20-5908 CLOTAIRE, MIKEL V. UNITED STATES
 20-6409 RANGEL, HUGO H. V. UNITED STATES
 20-6602 BOUCHER, WAYNE V. LYONS, DEANNE
 20-6719 JACKSON, LUCILLE V. WILLIAMS, JOHN E.
 20-6912 RAMBO, ROY L. V. NOGAN, ADM'R, E. JERSEY, ET AL.
 20-6919 NAPPER, LAWRENCE J. V. LUMPKIN, DIR., TX DCJ
 20-6922 BONNELL, MELVIN V. OHIO
 20-6929 HUGUELEY, STEPHEN V. MAYS, WARDEN
 20-6934 CARTWRIGHT, FRED V. SILVER CROSS HOSPITAL, ET AL.
 20-6935 WOFFORD, MELVIN V. WOODS, WARDEN
 20-6937 NEWSOME, DARRIS A. V. CLARKE, DIR., VA DOC
 20-6938 MILHOUSE, MUHAMMAD E. V. CAMBA INC. STAFF MEMBERS, ET AL.
 20-6940 THOMAS, ELLERY D. V. MADDEN, WARDEN, ET AL.

20-6951 PALOMO, JULIO T. V. LUMPKIN, DIR., TX DCJ
20-6955 SKILLINGS, THERESA V. NEW YORK, NY
20-6956 STUART, H. DENISE V. ERICKSON LIVING MANAGEMENT
20-6968 LIGHT, KENTON L. V. TEXAS
20-6981 WALTER, PHILLIP J. V. TEXAS
20-6986 ESCUDERO, LORENZO V. LUMPKIN, DIR., TX DCJ, ET AL.
20-6988 CREATER, ANTWONE L. V. ILLINOIS
20-6996 BOOTH, DELROY T. V. BERRY, WARDEN
20-6997 BRYAN, JOE D. V. TEXAS
20-6998 BROCKINGTON, CLARA L. V. HAVNER, RONALD L., ET AL.
20-7035 SLAUGHTER, RONDELL V. FERGUSON, SUPT., PHOENIX, ET AL.
20-7054 WEBER, PAUL E. V. QUINLAN, AMY A., ET AL.
20-7055 VERRETT, BERNARD F. V. VANNOY, WARDEN
20-7057 WALLER, ROMARIO V. ARKANSAS
20-7106 HALPER, MARK V. MOORE, LINDA, ET AL.
20-7129 TORRENCE, TYREEK V. PENNSYLVANIA
20-7130 COBBINS, KAREEM J. V. HINTHORNE, WARDEN
20-7190 SANCHEZ, ERIK V. JACQUES, WARDEN
20-7195 MAYS, JAVAN F. V. LEWIS, WARDEN
20-7200 BURCIAGA, MICHAEL V. MADDEN, WARDEN
20-7229 TUBBS, WANDA V. LONG, COMM'R, TN DEPT. OF SAFETY
20-7243 LINEHAN, DAVID V. UNITED STATES
20-7247 POWELL, WALTER E. V. UNITED STATES
20-7254 VALENZELA, JUAN V. SMALL, WARDEN
20-7256 COBB, JAMES T. V. UNITED STATES
20-7259 GARCIA, JUAN V. UNITED STATES
20-7268 BRISCOE, JASON P. V. UNITED STATES
20-7272 BAKER, TYSLEN J. V. UNITED STATES

20-7273 BRIGAUDIN, PATRICK R. V. UNITED STATES
20-7276 MONTAGUE, RUSSELL L. V. UNITED STATES
20-7278 FRIEDMAN, CHARLES D. V. UNITED STATES
20-7283 LARVIE, JOHN V. UNITED STATES
20-7290 HANUMAN, MICHAEL S. V. UNITED STATES
20-7292 STASZAK, MATTHEW L. V. UNITED STATES
20-7294 SABATINO, JAMES P. V. UNITED STATES
20-7301 BOLATETE, BERNANDINO G. V. UNITED STATES
20-7305 HARRIS, LARRY D. V. UNITED STATES

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

20-569 ELIM ROMANIAN CHURCH, ET AL. V. PRITZKER, GOV. OF IL

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

20-830 WASHINGTON V. ALI, SAID O.

20-831 WASHINGTON V. DOMINGO-CORNELIO, ENDY

The motions of Criminal Justice Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as *amicus curiae* are granted. The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

20-1081 IL REPUBLICAN PARTY, ET AL. V. PRITZKER, GOV. OF IL

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

20-1170 FEINMAN, JAMES B. V. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

20-1187 CARMICHAEL, LEON V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

20-5795 TEDFORD, DONALD M. V. PENNSYLVANIA

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

20-7103 ALLEN, DERRICK M. V. NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL.

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8.

20-7250 HUSBAND, EUNICE V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

20-7269 AKEL, ANTONIO U. V. UNITED STATES

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.

20-7270 BARMORE, KEITH D. V. NICKLAUS, WARDEN

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

HABEAS CORPUS DENIED

20-7342 IN RE CHRISTOPHER VIGLIOTTI

20-7349 IN RE BOBBY MELLARD

The petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.

20-7366 IN RE JOHN P. ALEXANDER

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied, and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed. See Rule 39.8.

MANDAMUS DENIED

20-1035 IN RE JODY D. KIMBRELL

The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.

20-1209 IN RE RAYMOND L. ROGERS

The petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition is denied.

20-6950 IN RE JOHN POUILLARD

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied, and the petition for a writ of mandamus is dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See *Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals*, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (*per curiam*).

REHEARINGS DENIED

20-671 IN RE ATUL C. SHAH

20-751 KRAPACS, ASHLEY A. V. FLORIDA BAR

20-6093 ABUTALEB, HANY S. V. ABUTALEB, MONA M.

20-6363 CABEZAS, ANDRES F. V. UNITED STATES

20-6443 MYERS, SCOTT V. ROWELL, PATROLMAN, ET AL.

20-6546 NIMMER, JOHN C. V. HEAVICAN, MICHAEL G., ET AL.

20-6649 EL MUJADDID, EL AEMER V. BREWER, ANDREW, ET AL.

The petitions for rehearing are denied.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

D-71 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF FREDERICK J. MEAGHER, JR.

Frederick J. Meagher, Jr., of Binghamton, New York, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-3067 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF JOHN WALTER SHARBROUGH, III

John Walter Sharbrough, III, of Mobile, Alabama, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-3068 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF STUART RICHARD BLATT

Stuart Richard Blatt, of Boca Raton, Florida, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-3069 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF ELLIS CHARLES BAGGS

Ellis Charles Baggs, of Richmond, Virginia, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-3070 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF SCOTT BRETTSCHEIDER

Scott Brettschneider, of Mint Hill, North Carolina, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule

will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-3072 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF NICHOLAS G. KARAMBELAS

Nicholas G. Karambelas, of Washington, District of Columbia, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-3073 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF JEFFREY JOSEPH KECK

Jeffrey Joseph Keck, of Woodstock, Illinois, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESTONY MAYS, WARDEN *v.* ANTHONY DARRELL
DUGARD HINESON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–507. Decided March 29, 2021

PER CURIAM.

A Tennessee jury found Anthony Hines guilty of murdering Katherine Jenkins at a motel. Witnesses saw Hines fleeing in the victim’s car and wearing a bloody shirt, and his family members heard him admit to stabbing *someone* at the motel. But almost 35 years later, the Sixth Circuit held that Hines was entitled to a new trial and sentence because his attorney should have tried harder to blame another man. In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit disregarded the overwhelming evidence of guilt that supported the contrary conclusion of a Tennessee court. This approach plainly violated Congress’ prohibition on disturbing state-court judgments on federal habeas review absent an error that lies “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” *Shinn v. Kayer*, 592 U. S. ____, ____ (2020) (*per curiam*) (slip op., at 1); 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). We now reverse.

I

On March 1, 1985, Hines boarded a bus traveling from Raleigh, North Carolina, to Bowling Green, Kentucky. His girlfriend and her mother had given him the bus ticket and \$20. Hines also carried with him a hunting knife concealed beneath his shirt. When the mother asked about the knife, Hines explained: “I never go anywhere naked.” “I always have my blade.” Record in *Hines v. Carpenter*, No. 3:05–cv–00002 (MD Tenn.), Doc. 173–4, p. 112.

Hines’ travels brought him to the outskirts of Nashville,

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where he checked into the CeBon Motel. Jenkins worked there as a maid. A few hours after Hines' arrival, the manager put Jenkins in charge of the motel and provided her with a bag of money to make change for departing guests.

In the early afternoon, another visitor found Jenkins' body in one of the rooms. She was wrapped in a bloody bedsheet, and an autopsy later revealed several knife wounds that included deep punctures to her chest and genitalia. Her money, wallet, and car keys were missing, as was her vehicle. Around the same time, another employee saw a man leaving the motel in Jenkins' car. The employee tried to follow the vehicle, but it sped away.

Later that afternoon, a group of travelers found Hines and the car—now broken down—along the side of the road, and they offered to drive him toward his sister's home in Bowling Green. During the trip, the travelers observed that Hines had dried blood on his shirt and was carrying a folded-up jacket. They also noticed that Hines "seemed real nervous," "ke[pt] contradicting himself," and "talked a lot," at one point claiming that he had purchased the car from an "old lady for \$300 or \$400." *Id.*, Doc. 173–2, at 33, 56; *id.*, Doc. 173–3, at 34–35.

Hines told a different story to his family. His sister noticed the blood, and Hines admitted that he had stabbed somebody at the motel—although he described the victim as a male employee who had assaulted him. For good measure, Hines physically demonstrated how he had knifed the supposed assailant. Despite his inability to pay for a bus ticket just a few days earlier, Hines purchased a barbecue grill and informed his sister that he had acquired a substantial sum of money. Family members also noticed that he had the keys to Jenkins' car, which were on a distinctive keychain. According to Hines, he had taken the keys in a struggle with yet another man who had tried to rob him.

Hines altered his tale again when he surrendered to law enforcement. Before the sheriff started questioning him,

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Hines volunteered that “he took the automobile but he didn’t murder the woman.” *Id.*, at 54–55, 57. But Hines later changed his mind and offered to confess to the murder if the sheriff “could guarantee him the death penalty.” *Id.*, Doc. 173–4, at 72.

The investigation turned up other physical evidence connecting Hines to the crime. Police found Jenkins’ wallet where Hines had abandoned her car. And a search of his motel room revealed stab marks on the walls that were similar in size to the wounds on Jenkins’ body. When an investigator asked Hines about the damage, he identified the holes as “knife marks.” *Id.*, at 83–84.

The jury heard all of this evidence at trial. It also heard testimony from the man—Kenneth Jones—who had discovered Jenkins’ body. According to Jones, he knew the owners of the motel and had stopped by on the afternoon of the murder. Finding no one in the office, Jones had lingered outside before realizing that he needed to use the bathroom. He returned to the office, took a key, and entered the room. Hines’ counsel stressed to the jury this oddly fortuitous sequence of events, noting that “Jones was fooling around at that motel that Sunday afternoon”; that Jones seemed “nervous”; and that Jones just happened to be present when “[t]here was a lot of something going on.” *Id.*, Doc. 173–6, at 72–73. The jury also heard discrepancies between Jones’ account of finding the body and the timeline given by first responders. But it found Hines guilty.

The full truth came out several years later when Hines sought postconviction review in the Tennessee courts. In a new statement, Jones admitted that he was at the motel neither by happenstance nor by himself, but rather in the company of a woman other than his wife. The duo had rendezvoused at the motel nearly every Sunday for at least two years, and Jones was well known to the staff. But when Jones and his companion arrived on the day of the murder, they found no one to greet them. After waiting for a while,

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first at the motel and then at a nearby restaurant, Jones became impatient and helped himself to a room key from the office. Upon finding the body, he quickly returned to his vehicle—a fact confirmed by his companion who watched through the room’s open curtains as Jones entered and left. Jones then called the authorities, drove his companion home, and returned to the motel to meet the sheriff.

The postconviction proceedings also revealed that Hines’ attorney was generally aware of Jones’ affair from the outset, yet had decided to spare him the embarrassment of aggressively pursuing the matter. *Hines v. State*, 2004 WL 1567120, *8 (Tenn. Crim. App., July 14, 2004). But despite Hines’ current insistence that this choice amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, the Tennessee postconviction court found no prejudice. *Id.*, at *22, *27–*28; see also *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (1984) (“[T]he defendant must show that . . . counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial”). The court stressed “the strength of proof against [Hines],” and it dismissed as “farfetched” that trial counsel should have accused Jones of committing (and self-reporting) a grisly crime in a public place where he was “known by the staff.” *Hines*, 2004 WL 1567120, *27. Such an argument, the court explained, “could have resulted in a loss of credibility for the defense.” *Ibid.* The court also observed that the emergence of a new corroborating witness—Jones’ companion—further undermined any suggestion that he was the culprit. *Id.*, at *28. And though Jones’ evolving story deprived the jury of all the facts, the court reasoned that his “true purpose for being at the [m]otel” had little relevance to Hines’ conviction or sentence. *Ibid.*

Sixteen years later, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit disagreed. 814 Fed. Appx. 898 (2020). According to the majority, a better investigation “could have helped the defense to credibly cast Jones as an alternative suspect, or at the very least seriously undermine his testimony.” *Id.*, at 938.

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For example, trial counsel could have claimed that Jones killed Jenkins to cover up his affair. Counsel might also have highlighted that Jones was planning to rent a room from Jenkins on the day of the crime. *Id.*, at 938–939. Or counsel might have better stressed potential flaws in Jones’ version of events, such as discrepancies about the exact time he reported the murder. *Id.*, at 940. The majority further surmised that Hines had “no clear motive” for the murder, and it noted the absence of “DNA or fingerprint evidence.” *Id.*, at 939.

Missing from this analysis, however, was the voluminous evidence of Hines’ guilt. Among many other things, the majority disregarded Hines’ flight in a bloodstained shirt, his theft of the vehicle and money, and his ever-changing stories about stabbing and robbing various people on the day of the crime. See generally *id.*, at 937–942.

Judge Kethledge dissented. In his view, the majority “‘nowhere g[ave] deference to the state courts, nowhere explain[ed] why their application of *Strickland* was unreasonable rather than merely (in the majority’s view) incorrect, and nowhere explain[ed] why fairminded jurists could view [Hines’] claim only the same way the majority d[id].’” *Id.*, at 942. Judge Kethledge then reviewed all of the evidence ignored by the majority. He found “zero reason to think that, after investigation, counsel could have presented Jones as the ‘real killer.’” *Id.*, at 944. And he explained that impeaching Jones “would have been a waste of time” because Jones had “offered no testimony regarding Hine[s]’ guilt.” *Ibid.*

II

Hines’ legal theory is straightforward: A competent attorney would have presented the full truth about Jones’ affair and blamed him for the crime. According to Hines, this strategy would have deflected so much suspicion—or at

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least so undermined Jones' credibility—that counsel's omission created a “substantial” risk of “a different result.” *Cullen v. Pinholster*, 563 U. S. 170, 189 (2011). In fact, Hines reasons that, “had [he] not been found with Mrs. Jenkins' car, *Jones* would have been the primary suspect.” Brief in Opposition 17 (emphasis added).

Our analysis is straightforward too. Because a Tennessee court considered and rejected Hines' theory, a federal court “shall not” grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the earlier decision took an “unreasonable” view of the facts or law. §2254(d). This “standard is difficult to meet.” *Harriott v. Richter*, 562 U. S. 86, 102 (2011). The term “unreasonable” refers not to “ordinary error” or even to circumstances where the petitioner offers “a strong case for relief,” but rather to “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice syste[m].” *Ibid.* In other words, a federal court may intrude on a State's “sovereign power to punish offenders” only when a decision “was so lacking in justification . . . beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” *Id.*, at 103.

If this rule means anything, it is that a federal court must carefully consider all the reasons and evidence supporting the state court's decision. After all, there is no way to hold that a decision was “lacking in justification” without identifying—let alone rebutting—all of the justifications. *Ibid.* Any other approach would allow a federal court to “essentially evaluat[e] the merits *de novo*” by omitting inconvenient details from its analysis. *Shinn*, 592 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 8–9); see also *Richter*, 562 U. S., at 102–103.

The Sixth Circuit did precisely that. Nowhere in its 10-page discussion of Hines' theory did the majority consider the substantial evidence linking him to the crime: His flight in a bloody shirt; his possession of the victim's keys, wallet, and car; his recurring association with knives; or his ever-changing stories about tussling with imaginary assailants. 814 Fed. Appx., at 933–942. The court instead focused on

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all the reasons why it thought Jones “could have” been a viable alternative suspect. *E.g., id.*, at 938–942. And rather than engage with the “dissent[’s] recount[ing of] th[e] evidence” against Hines, the majority simply promised that it had “carefully considered” this proof before summarily dismissing it as “not overwhelming.” *Id.*, at 939.

Had the Sixth Circuit properly considered the entire record, it would have had little trouble deferring to the Tennessee court’s conclusion that Hines suffered no prejudice regarding his conviction or sentence. Again, the critical question was not whether the Sixth Circuit *itself* could see a “‘substantial’ . . . likelihood of a different result” had Hines’ attorney taken a different approach. *Cullen*, 563 U. S., at 189. All that mattered was whether the *Tennessee court*, notwithstanding its substantial “latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not [shown prejudice],” still managed to blunder so badly that every fairminded jurist would disagree. *Knowles v. Mirzayance*, 556 U. S. 111, 123 (2009).

It did not. The Tennessee court reasonably looked to the substantial evidence of Hines’ guilt. *Hines*, 2004 WL 1567120, *27–*28. And it reasonably rejected the “‘farfetched’” possibility that Jones committed and self-reported a gruesome murder, in the presence of a witness, at a place where he was well known to the staff. *Ibid.* In light of this straightforward, commonsense analysis, the Sixth Circuit had no license to hypothesize an alternative theory of the crime in which Jones became a suspect 35 years after the fact—much less rely on that fanciful theory to grant relief.*

*Even on its own terms, there is little merit to the Sixth Circuit’s speculation that a jury who heard Jones’ full story might have blamed him instead of Hines. After all, the story Jones told at trial was in many ways *more* suspicious than the truth. According to his initial account, Jones fortuitously stopped by the motel, hung around outside, and then stumbled upon the body. All without a witness to verify his actions. The jury

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Similarly untenable was the Sixth Circuit’s backstop theory that a more aggressive attorney could have changed the result by casting doubt on Jones’ credibility. 814 Fed. Appx., at 940. As an initial matter, this conjecture ignores that Jones’ brief testimony about discovering the body did not indicate that *Hines* was the culprit. Ample other evidence was what did that. Perhaps in light of this obvious disjuncture, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of why an attack on Jones’ credibility would have been productive ultimately circled back to the majority’s main assumption “that Jones was a viable alternative suspect.” *Id.*, at 941. Regardless, to the extent Jones’ credibility actually mattered, the jury already had several good reasons to be skeptical—for example, his peculiar tale of discovering the body; the insinuations of Hines’ attorney; and the discrepancies between Jones’ exact description of finding the body and the account of the first responders. None of these made a difference.

III

The Sixth Circuit had no reason to revisit the decision of the Tennessee court, much less ignore the ample evidence supporting that court’s conclusion. We grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent’s motion to proceed *in forma pauperis*, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR dissents.

heard this tale—and Hines’ attorney stressed its oddities—yet found that Hines was the murderer. A federal court cannot now claim that the truth would have made a difference.