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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERARDO GONZALEZ, *et al.*,  
Plaintiffs,  
v.  
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS  
ENFORCEMENT, an entity, *et al.*  
Defendants.

Case No. 2:12-cv-09012-AB (FFMx)

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND  
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

**TRIAL DATE: MAY 7, 2019**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

In an effort to regulate the flow of immigration, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) collaborates with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies (“LEAs”) to issue immigration detainers. These detainers allow LEAs to keep an individual in custody up to 48 hours after their scheduled release date. The purpose of the immigration detainer is to give ICE time to become aware of the individual’s immigration status, and, if necessary, take the detainee into custody for removal.

ICE has reworked its detainer form multiple times but currently uses the I-247A form for removal proceedings. The form provides four criteria for removability: (1) a final order of removal against the alien; (2) the pendency of ongoing removal

1 proceedings against the alien; (3) biometric confirmation of the alien’s identity and a  
2 records check of federal databases that affirmatively indicate, by themselves or in  
3 addition to other reliable information, that the alien either lacks immigration status or  
4 notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law; and  
5 (4) statements made by the alien to an immigration officer and/or other reliable  
6 evidence that affirmatively indicate the alien either lacks immigration status or  
7 notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law.

8 This lawsuit surrounds the third category of the I-247A, which authorizes ICE  
9 to remove an individual based solely on biometric confirmation of the individual’s  
10 identity and a review of multiple federal databases which may provide information on  
11 a person’s immigration status. The issues before the Court are: (1) whether the  
12 exclusive use of biometric confirmation and database checks violates the Fourth  
13 Amendment; and (2) whether the issuance of detainers to state and local law  
14 enforcement agencies that lack authority for civil immigration arrests violates the  
15 Fourth Amendment.

16 This matter was tried before the Court, sitting without a jury, from May 7, 2019  
17 to May 16, 2019. Jennifer Pasquarella and Jessica Karp-Bansal of the ACLU  
18 appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Gerardo Gonzalez and all those similarly situated  
19 (“Plaintiff”). J. Max Weintraub and John J. W. Inkeles of the United States  
20 Department of Justice appeared for Defendant Immigration and Customs Enforcement  
21 (“Defendant” or “ICE”).

22 The Court has heard the admissible evidence presented by the parties and the  
23 arguments of counsel. It has considered the credibility of the witnesses and all papers  
24 and exhibits presented by the parties for purposes of this trial, including admissions in  
25 the Final Pretrial Conference Order. The Court makes the following findings of fact  
26 and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52.

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1 **II. FINDINGS OF FACT**

2 **A. Background**

3 1. Plaintiff Gerardo Gonzalez is a natural born United States citizen. He was  
4 born in Pacoima, in the City of Los Angeles, California. Dkt. No. 484, Stipulated  
5 Fact (“SF”) 1. Gonzalez has never been removable from the United States.

6 2. On December 31, 2012, ICE issued an immigration detainer to the Los  
7 Angeles County Sheriff’s Department requesting that the Sheriff maintain custody  
8 of Plaintiff Gonzalez after he would otherwise have been released from custody.  
9 Dkt. No 484, SF 2.

10 3. Gonzalez’s immigration detainer was based on information reviewed in  
11 electronic databases. *See* Dkt. No. 484 SF, 3-4.

12 4. No ICE agent ever interviewed Plaintiff Gonzalez prior to issuing a  
13 detainer. Dkt. No. 484, SF 8.

14 5. Gonzalez represents a class of individuals comprised of all current and  
15 future persons who are subject to an immigration detainer issued by an ICE agent  
16 located in the Central District of California, where the detainer is not based upon a  
17 final order of removal signed by an immigration judge or the individual is not  
18 subject to ongoing removal proceedings and the detainer was issued solely on the  
19 basis of electronic database checks. Dkt. No. 484, at 1-2.<sup>1</sup>

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20 <sup>1</sup> There are three classes of individuals represented by Gonzalez in this action:  
21 (1) The Judicial Determination Class is comprised of all current and future persons  
22 who are subject to an immigration detainer issued by an ICE agent located in  
23 the Central District of California, where the detainer is not based upon a final  
24 order of removal signed by an immigration judge or the individual is not subject  
25 to ongoing removal proceedings. This Class is limited to those detained for  
26 more than 48 hours.  
27 (2) The Probable Cause Subclass is comprised of all current and future persons  
28 who are subject to an immigration detainer issued by an ICE agent located in  
the Central District of California, where the detainer is not based upon a final  
order of removal signed by an immigration judge or the individual is not subject  
to ongoing removal proceedings and the detainer was issued solely on the basis  
of electronic database checks.  
(3) The Statutory Subclass is comprised of all current and future persons who are  
subject to an immigration detainer issued by an ICE agent located in the Central

1 6. Defendant ICE is a component of the Department of Homeland Security  
2 (“DHS”). *Id.* at 5.

3 **B. ICE’s Use of Immigration Detainers**

4 7. An immigration detainer is a request by ICE to a federal, state, or local LEA  
5 that the agency hold an individual in custody for up to 48 hours after the person  
6 would otherwise be released so that ICE can take the person into custody. Dkt.  
7 No. 484, Admitted Fact (“AF”) 3, SF 16, Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) 1480:18-21  
8 (Robbins).

9 8. Detainers are check-box forms developed by DHS and issued by ICE agents.  
10 *See, e.g.*, Trial Ex. 96. Agents rely on their research, in the field professional  
11 expertise, and, if necessary, legal counsel when issuing detainers. Trial Tr. 1441:1-  
12 25 (Robbins).

13 9. No judicial process is undertaken before or after a detainer is issued;  
14 however, detainers are issued along with an ICE arrest warrant.<sup>2</sup> Dkt. No. 484,  
15 Admitted Fact (“AF”) 5; Trial Tr. 1038:13-16 (Garibay).

16 10. The detainer form indicates that a detainer is not valid unless served on the  
17 individual subject to that detainer. Trial Ex. 96; Trial Tr. 1422:7-1423:4 (Robbins).

18 11. ICE officers at ICE’s Pacific Enforcement Response Center (“PERC”) in  
19 Laguna Niguel, California issue detainers 24 hours a day to persons in custody in  
20 the Central District of California and after-hours to federal, state, and local LEAs in  
21 42 states nationwide and two U.S. territories.<sup>3</sup> Dkt. No. 484, SF 50; Trial Ex. 101.

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22 District of California, where the detainer is not based upon a final order of  
23 removal signed by an immigration judge or the individual is not subject to  
24 ongoing removal proceedings for whom ICE did not issue an administrative  
warrant of arrest at the time it issued an immigration detainer.

25 Plaintiff Simon Chinivizyan is a representative of the Judicial Determination Class  
and the Statutory Subclass.

26 <sup>2</sup> The warrant accompanying the detainer is either the I-200: a warrant of arrest, or the  
27 I-205: a warrant of removal.

28 <sup>3</sup> ICE officers do not currently issue detainers in Alaska, Washington, Oregon,

1 12. PERC agents issue detainers based on electronic database searches and do  
2 not perform any other investigation outside database checks. Dkt. No 484, SF 51.

3 13. PERC agents do not conduct interviews of subjects before issuing a detainer.  
4 Dkt. No 484, SF 52.

5 14. In California, the Transparent Review of Unjust Transfers and Holds  
6 (“TRUTH”) Act was passed to require LEAs to serve detainers. *See* Cal. Gov.  
7 Code § 7283

8 15. Since the inception of this lawsuit, ICE has used five different detainer  
9 forms: the December 2011 revision, the December 2012 revision, the June 2015  
10 Form I-247D, the August 2015 Form I-247X, and the April 2017 Form I-247A.  
11 *See* Exs. 92-96.

12 16. The introduction of the detainer form marked a change in ICE’s approach to  
13 removal.

### 14 **C. The Shift to Automatic Detainers**

15 17. In 1999, the United States introduced the Integrated Automated Fingerprint  
16 Identification System (“IAFIS”), a 10-rolled fingerprint identification system for  
17 use by federal, state, local, and international law enforcement and other authorized  
18 agencies. Trial Ex. 98.

19 18. The Automated Biometric Identification System (“IDENT”) is managed by  
20 the DHS US-VISIT Program and stores and processes biometric and biographic  
21 information—including fingerprints and, where available, facial recognition data—  
22 for DHS national security, law enforcement, immigration, intelligence, and other  
23 DHS mission-related functions. Trial Ex. 47.

24 19. ICE connects directly to IDENT through its EAGLE<sup>4</sup> interface. Dkt. No.  
25 484, SF 91.

26 20. IDENT contains over 237 million unique identities. Dkt. No. 484, SF 90.

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27 Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Florida.

28 <sup>4</sup> EID Arrest Guide for Law Enforcement.

1 21. IDENT contains fingerprint data for certain United States citizens, including  
2 those whom the FBI believes belong in the system, those who voluntarily enroll in  
3 certain “trusted traveler” programs, those who have applied to naturalize as United  
4 States citizens, and those who have filed applications for certificates of citizenship.  
5 Nemeth Dep. 26:4-27:6; 41:14-42:9; 59:15-19.

6 22. IDENT tracks information for each individual encounter with law  
7 enforcement. An encounter occurs when an individual’s fingerprint is live captured  
8 by an ICE officer or agent. Trial Tr. 1161:13-24 (Nemeth).

9 23. IDENT automatically compares the biometrics from each new encounter  
10 with biometrics already contained within the database and collected from previous  
11 encounters by law enforcement officers and immigration officers. If the biometrics  
12 do not match what is already in the system, IDENT automatically assigns a new  
13 identity for the encounter and assigns the fingerprints a Fingerprint Identification  
14 Number (“FIN”).

15 24. IDENT can determine an individual’s identity even where there are  
16 typographical errors in previous encounter entries. Trial Tr. 1165:8-12 (Nemeth).

17 25. IDENT is a very accurate source of biometric matching. *See* Nemeth Dep.  
18 Tr. 67:13-20.

19 26. In 2006, the government began its effort to create interoperability between  
20 IAFIS and IDENT. The goal of the project was to enable the near real-time  
21 exchange of biometric and biographic information between agencies that is  
22 complete, accurate, and timely. This would allow fingerprints entered into one  
23 system to be automatically run against the other system in order to identify  
24 matches. The process enabled verification of a person’s identity and facilitated the  
25 sharing of criminal and immigration information. Trial Ex. 98; Dkt. No. 484,  
26 SF 45.

27 27. By 2008, IDENT and IAFIS were interoperable. Dkt. No. 484, SF 102.  
28

1 28. In 2008, ICE launched the Secure Communities program, which harnessed  
2 the interoperability technology as a new tool for immigration enforcement. Dkt.  
3 No. 484. SF 48.

4 29. The program aimed to increase the number of criminal aliens identified  
5 “[t]hrough the deployment and use of biometric-based identification systems” and  
6 anticipated that “all persons booked into custody [would] be automatically checked  
7 for their immigration status as well as prior criminal history”. Trial Ex. 123 at 2-3.

8 30. Through Secure Communities, ICE sought to make the process of  
9 identifying aliens and issuing detainers more streamlined by requiring only “a  
10 single query by a participating local law enforcement agency (LEA)” to “confirm[]  
11 the identity and immigration status of a subject being processed during  
12 incarceration booking.” Trial Ex. 99 at 3.

13 31. Secure Communities signaled a shift in ICE procedures. Prior to Secure  
14 Communities, ICE manually identified individuals for removal in jails and prisons  
15 nationwide through the Criminal Alien Program (“CAP”). Trial Ex. 123 at 4.

16 32. CAP placed ICE agents in all prisons and some jails in order to identify  
17 individuals potentially subject to removal through interviews and records review.  
18 Trial Tr. At 1445:8-1446:17 (Robbins); Trial Ex. 98 at ICE 220.003.

19 33. This process required ICE agents to interview a person to determine whether  
20 to issue a detainer. Trial Tr. 1373:11-1374:1 (Marin); ICE 30(b)(6) Philip T.  
21 Miller, Dep. Tr. 22:6-16.

22 34. In November 2014, Secure Communities was terminated. Dkt. No. 484, SF  
23 20.

24 35. On February 20, 2017, Secure Communities was reinstated, and other field  
25 guidance regarding the enforcement of immigration laws was rescinded. *See* Trial  
26 Ex. 121.

27 36. The memorandum reintroducing Secure Communities also rescinded “all  
28 existing conflicting directives, memoranda, or field guidance regarding the  
enforcement of our immigration laws and priorities for removal” insofar as the

1 materials conflicted with the United States’ goal to “faithfully execut[e]  
2 immigration laws” and prioritize the removal of aliens who are convicted felons or  
3 who are involved in gang activity or drug trafficking. *Id.* at 2.

4 37. Since Secure Communities’ reinstatement, several states have passed laws  
5 prohibiting compliance with detainers, while others have laws authorizing or  
6 mandating compliance. Dkt. No. 484, SF 35.

7 38. ICE officers continue to issue detainers to state and local law enforcement  
8 agencies, even if those agencies do not honor detainers. *See* Trial Tr. 1420:15-24  
9 (Robbins).

#### 10 **D. Establishing Probable Cause for Removability**

11 39. In November of 2014, ICE adopted a policy determining that it must have  
12 probable cause before requesting a person’s arrest and detention on an immigration  
13 detainer. *See* Trial Ex. 97. The change was at least partially motivated by Fourth  
14 Amendment concerns regarding the use of immigration detainers. *Id.*

15 40. The Form I-247A, in use today, indicates that probable cause exists to  
16 support an individual’s removability based on one of the following criteria: (1) a  
17 final order of removal against the alien; (2) the pendency of ongoing removal  
18 proceedings against the alien; (3) biometric confirmation of the alien’s identity and  
19 a records check of federal databases that affirmatively indicate, by themselves or in  
20 addition to other reliable information, that the alien either lacks immigration status  
21 or notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law; and (4)  
22 statements made by the alien to an immigration officer and/or other reliable  
23 evidence that affirmatively indicate the alien either lacks immigration status or  
24 notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law. Trial Ex.  
25 96.

26 41. The I-247A form retained the probable cause language of the I-247D and I-  
27 247X,<sup>5</sup> and requests that the receiving law enforcement agency “maintain custody”

28 <sup>5</sup> The form reads: “DHS has determined that probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien. This determination is based on: . . . biometric confirmation of the



1 of the individual for a “period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS.” *See* Trial Exs. 94-  
2 96.

3 42. Paramount in determining probable cause of removability is identifying that  
4 a person is not a U.S. citizen. *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. 217:13-16 (Stock) (“The most  
5 important thing to do before you decide whether someone’s going to suffer  
6 immigration consequences . . . is to figure out whether the person is a citizen first”);  
7 Dkt. No. 481-11 (ICE 30(b)(6) Schichel Dep. Tr. 164:14-18) (stating that  
8 confirming a person’s alienage is “part of establishing probable cause” every time  
9 officers investigate a potential subject for a detainer).

10 43. Establishing probable cause of removability also requires a determination of  
11 a person’s current immigration status. Trial Ex. 96 (noting, in pertinent part, that  
12 probable cause can be based on checks that indicate “that the alien either lacks  
13 immigration status or notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S.  
14 immigration law”); *see also* Dkt. No. 479-3 (Schichel Dep. Tr. 157:13-22).

15 44. ICE uses IDENT to satisfy the biometric confirmation described in the I-  
16 247A. Trial Tr. 1418:20-1419:2 (Robbins). ICE relies on an individual’s  
17 fingerprints, which are taken at the time of arrest. *Id.*

18 45. In addition, law enforcement specialists at the Law Enforcement Support  
19 Center (“LESC”) and analysts at the PERC search multiple databases to find  
20 “affirmative evidence of removability”. Trial Tr. 1419:3-10 (Robbins).

## 21 **E. Determining Citizenship**

22 46. An individual’s citizenship and immigration status is not static and may  
23 change multiple times over a lifetime. *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. at 153:22-159:14  
(Bacon).

24 47. Accordingly, a person’s citizenship or immigration status at some fixed  
25 point in time may not be a reliable indicator of their current citizenship status. Trial

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26 alien’s identity and a records check of federal databases that affirmatively indicate, by  
27 themselves or in addition to other reliable information, that the alien either lacks  
28 immigration status or notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S.  
immigration law . . . [.]”

1 Tr. 1092:6-17 (Garibay) (testifying that while a person may not have been a United  
2 States citizen in 2010, that has no bearing on whether they are a citizen presently).

3 48. A foreign-born person can become a United States citizen in one of three  
4 ways: (1) naturalization, (2) acquisition, or (3) derivation. Trial Tr. 162:22-164:21  
5 (Bacon).

6 49. Generally, a person must be a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) to  
7 naturalize. Trial Ex. 131 at 1; Trial Tr. 512: 21-24 (Johansen-Mendez). People  
8 who serve or served honorably in the U.S. armed forces may be excused from this  
9 rule. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1439-40.

10 50. In addition, a person may pass in and out of lawful or unlawful status; a  
11 common example of this is a child’s derivation of citizenship. Trial Tr. 163:4-11  
12 (Bacon).

13 51. Determining whether a person acquired or derived citizenship is a complex  
14 inquiry and illustrates the fluidity one may experience with respect to immigration  
15 status. *See* Trial Tr. 242:20-255:23 (Stock).

16 52. For derivative citizenship, the analysis can turn on, among other things:  
17 which parent is a citizen, when that parent became a citizen, whether the person’s  
18 parents were married, whether and when the U.S. citizen parent lived in the United  
19 States and for how long, whether the father legitimated the child, whether the child  
20 lived in the custody of the U.S. citizen parent or parents, and at what point the  
21 child lived in the custody of the U.S. citizen parent(s). *Id.*

22 53. In some cases, a determination on derivative citizenship may depend on  
23 knowing whether a person’s grandparent(s) were U.S. citizens or whether a person  
24 or their parent(s) served in the U.S. Armed Forces. *Id.*

#### 24 **F. Determining Immigration Status**

25 54. Similarly, determining a person’s immigration status may be a complex  
26 inquiry requiring a thorough examination of the individual’s history.

27 55. Aside from foreign born-U.S. citizens, there are four major categories of  
28 foreign-born persons who lawfully reside within the United States: (1) immigrants,

1 (2) nonimmigrants, (3) refugees/asylees, (4) and non-citizens who otherwise have  
2 permission to be present. Trial Tr. 148:17-162:19 (Bacon)

3 56. Immigrants are non-citizens with permission to reside permanently in the  
4 United States. Generally, these are lawful permanent residents (“LPRs”). Trial Tr.  
5 149:9-18 (Bacon). United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)  
6 commonly grants LPR status, but the Department of State (“DOS”) may also grant  
7 it. Trial Tr. 144:20-148:15, 149:19-150:1 (Bacon).

8 57. An LPR’s status does not change unless an immigration judge determines  
9 that status should be taken away. Trial Tr. 531:14-16 (Johansen-Mendez).

10 58. Non-immigrants are non-citizens admitted to the United States on a visa for  
11 a specific purpose and/or period of time, such as for tourism, employment or study.  
12 Trial Tr. 151:14-154:20 (Bacon).

13 59. There are 23 statutory categories of nonimmigrant visas, which DOS  
14 generally grants. Trial Tr. 154:5 (Bacon); Trial Ex. 69. USCIS generally handles  
15 status changes after nonimmigrants enter the United States. Trial Tr. 155:2-156:3  
16 (Bacon) (describing an example of a status change from F1 student visa to H1-B  
17 employment visa, as adjudicated by USCIS).

18 60. If a nonimmigrant violates the condition(s) of their status, such as by  
19 overstaying their authorized period of stay, their lawful status terminates. *See*  
20 *generally* 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (rendering deportable any “nonimmigrant  
21 . . . who has failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status in which the alien was  
22 admitted or to which it was changed . . . , or to comply with the conditions of any  
23 such status.”).

24 61. Refugees and asylees are non-citizens who receive permission to reside in  
25 the United States based on a well-founded fear of persecution in their native  
26 country. Trial Tr. 159:18-160:8 (Bacon).

27 62. Refugee status is granted outside the United States and involves different  
28 agencies, including the United Nations and ultimately the DOS and USCIS. Trial  
Tr. 160:9-16 (Bacon).

1 63. Asylum is granted inside the United States by either USCIS or, if the person  
2 is placed in removal proceedings, by the Executive Office for Immigration Review  
3 (EOIR). Trial Tr. 160:15-16 (Bacon); 587:4-20 (Johansen-Mendez).

4 64. Once granted, asylum is “essentially a permanent status unless something’s  
5 done to change it, unless [the asylee] adjust[s] to lawful permanent residence or  
6 unless there’s cause to terminate that asylee designation.” Trial Tr. 516:2-7  
7 (Johansen-Mendez).

8 65. Those permitted to be present in the United States who otherwise lack  
9 formal status are non-citizens granted special protected status. Trial Tr. 161:4-  
10 162:19 (Bacon).

11 66. The two largest protected groups of non-citizens are those who USCIS has  
12 granted Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) and Deferred Action for Childhood  
13 Arrivals (“DACA”). *Id.*; Trial Ex. 72 at 1 (699,350 active DACA recipients); Trial  
14 Ex. 73 at 5 (approximately 437,000 TPS holders).

#### 15 **G. Two-Step Determination of Probable Cause**

16 67. The process ICE undertakes to determine probable cause for removal  
17 requires analysts at the PERC and officers at LESC to take two steps.

18 68. First, officers and analysts rely on IDENT to match biometric information.

19 69. IDENT creates a new biometric input whenever a law enforcement officer  
20 has an encounter with an individual. Trial Tr. 1161:13-24 (Nemeth).

21 70. When an individual is arrested by an LEA on a criminal charge, the person’s  
22 fingerprints are sent to the FBI and automatically run against IAFIS and IDENT.  
23 Dkt. No. 484 SF 45-46.

24 71. If there is a fingerprint match in IDENT,<sup>6</sup> a notification—an Immigrant  
25 Alien Query (“IAQ”)—is automatically generated and sent to LESC. Trial Tr.  
26 1436:7-17 (Robbins). Accordingly, if an individual has numerous encounters with

27 <sup>6</sup> This would mean DHS has some record of a prior encounter with that person,  
28 including, among other things, an encounter as the person entered the country, or an  
application for an immigration benefit.

1 law enforcement, IDENT would capture all biometric and biographical data on that  
2 individual, regardless of typographical errors.<sup>7</sup>

3 72. ACRIME<sup>8</sup> automatically searches the NCIC, NLETS, CIS, CLAIMS 3,  
4 CLAIMS 4, EID, IDENT, ADIS, SEVIS, and EOIR databases to match the FIN  
5 submitted with other encounters for that same FIN. Trial. Tr. 930:22-931:23; 933:  
6 8-21 (Garibay).

7 73. ACRIME then automatically generates an Immigrant Alien Response  
8 (“IAR”) from information stored on the ten databases; the IAR is the automatically  
9 delivered to the PERC. Trial Tr. 930:3-5 (Garibay).

10 74. The IAR contains basic biographic information and criminal history, as well  
11 as a short statement about immigration status and removability.<sup>9</sup>

12 75. Next, an analyst<sup>10</sup> conducts a first level review of the IAR and makes a  
13 recommendation to an ICE deportation officer about whether a detainer should be  
14 issued. Dkt. No. 484 SF 54, 58.

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15 <sup>7</sup> Thus, regardless of whether an individual has a common name spelling, or whether a  
16 field officer made errors when inputting biographical information, a person’s FIN  
17 number will remain the same across multiple encounters and will be able to be located  
18 on IDENT through its search inquiry.

18 <sup>8</sup> ACRIME (Alien Criminal Response Information Management System) is a web-  
19 based system that includes two primary applications:

- 19 (1) ACRIME Mod: which is used by the LESC to process IAQs and transmit  
20 IARs back to the LEA and responsible ERO field office(s) or the PERC  
21 (2) ACRIME Field: which is used by the PERC and ERO Field Offices to see  
22 the results of the LESC’s integrated records checks, process IARs, and  
23 initiate immigration enforcement, if applicable.

22 See Trial Ex. 78 at ICE029605.

23 <sup>9</sup> The short statement provides only limited insight into an individual’s immigration or  
24 citizenship status, and can often contain speculative language on a person’s status.  
25 See e.g. Ex. 170 at ICE 0023957 (“D.H.S. records indicate that the subject was legally  
26 admitted to the U.S. as a non-immigrant until the date noted above. If this person has  
27 remained longer in the U.S. without D.H.S. permission, this person *may be in*  
28 *violation of immigration laws*. If the departure date is indicated above, no electronic  
record of a new entry has been found. Subject *appears to be a non immigrant*  
overstay.”) (emphasis added).

<sup>10</sup> It is important to note that analysts are not federal employees nor immigration

1 76. The analysts need not search each database independently. Trial Tr. 933:5-9  
2 (Garibay).

3 77. However, the analyst may, at their discretion, run independent database  
4 checks. *See* Trial Tr. 1438:19-1439:11 (Robbins) (“ . . . on complex cases  
5 [analysts] have access to go through multiple databases to make sure they get it  
6 right, and they also have the ability to talk to legal counsel, their supervision, the  
7 [deportation officers], or the officer’s supervisors”); *see also* Trial Tr. 1437:19-  
8 1438:2 (Robbins) (“The analyst at the PERC will take the case. They will use  
9 [ACRIME] and other databases to make a recommendation on that particular  
10 case—an enforcement recommendation or a no action recommendation, to the  
11 deportation officer.”)

#### 12 **H. The Databases**

13 78. ICE does not rely on one single database to determine citizenship and  
14 immigration status.

15 79. When Plaintiff Gonzalez filed this case, agents at the PERC issued detainers  
16 based on searches of IDENT and four other databases: CIS, CLAIMS 3, TECS,  
17 and ENFORCE/EARM. Ex. 102 at ICE 652.

18 80. In December 2017, the PERC adopted ACRIME Field, which searches  
19 IDENT and nine other databases: CIS, CLAIMS 3, CLAIMS 4, ADIS, SEVIS,  
20 EOIR, EID, NCIC, and NLETs. Dkt. No. 484, SF 56; Trial Tr. 933:8-21  
(Garibay).

21 81. CIS—the Central Index System, is a database created by USCIS and  
22 contains biographical information on individuals. Trial Tr. 175:3-14 (Bacon).

23 82. CLAIMS 3 is a database ICE relies on for information on immigration  
24 benefits applications. CLAIMS 3 allows an ICE officer or analyst to review a  
25 person’s applications for, among other things, lawful permanent residency,  
26 temporary protected status, and work authorization. Trial Tr. 510:16-21  
27 (Johansen-Mendez).

28 \_\_\_\_\_  
agents, rather they are contractors.

1 83. CLAIMS 3 also provides information on how an application was adjudicated  
2 (grant or deny), and whether a credential (e.g., employment authorization card)  
3 was generated a result of the adjudication. Trial Tr. 510:22-511:2 (Johansen-  
4 Mendez).

5 84. CLAIMS 4 exclusively holds information about naturalization applications  
6 and provides information on how the application was adjudicated. Trial Tr. 511:  
7 16-19 (Johansen-Mendez).

8 85. ADIS<sup>11</sup> provides arrival and departure information for non-immigrant visa  
9 holders. ADIS pulls its arrival and departure information from TECS and IDENT.  
10 Dkt. No. 484, SF 77; Trial Ex. 54 at 12-13; Trial Tr. 513:1-514:17 (Johansen-  
11 Mendez).

12 86. ICE relies on other databases<sup>12</sup> to supplement information it receives from  
13 CIS, CLAIMS 3, CLAIMS 4, and ADIS.

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14 <sup>11</sup> Arrival and Departure Information System.

15 <sup>12</sup> Coupled with those discussed in substance, ICE also reviews:

16 PCQS (or “Person Centric Query Search” which provides a “snapshot” of results from  
17 CIS and CLAIMS but with a “little less detail”) *see* Trial Tr. 967:10-21 (Garibay);  
18 Trial Tr. 1515:9-17 (Johansen-Mendez);

19 SQ11 (a lookout alert system, e.g., for individual’s previously deported) (Trial Tr.  
20 969:4-16 (Garibay);

21 SQ94 (provides information on individuals that were issued an I-94 when admitted  
22 into the country) Trial Tr. 969:17-25 (Garibay);

23 ELIS 1 & 2 (provide extremely limited information on immigration benefits) Trial Tr.  
24 1512:8-1513: 4 (Johansen-Mendez);

25 TECS (a portal to NCIC—a database related to criminal history—and ADIS);

26 California Birth Index (database containing information (i.e., date of birth, full name,  
27 country of birth, gender, and mother’s maiden name) on U.S. citizens born in  
28 California; however, contains no information on births after 1995. *See* Trial Ex. 228;  
and

CCD (contains information about visas that noncitizens have applied for; may contain

1 87. SEVIS<sup>13</sup>, a database maintained by ICE, contains records of non-citizens  
2 who enter the United States as students and exchange visitors (F, M, and J visas),  
3 as well as their dependents. Dkt. No. 484, SF 65.

4 88. EOIR provides basic information about immigration court proceedings.  
5 EOIR does not reflect how the proceeding was adjudicated, simply that the case  
6 was terminated. Dkt. No. 484, SF 67; Dkt. No. 481-2 (Cano Dep. Tr. 66:6-12).

7 89. EID contains information about previous encounters with ICE officers. Trial  
8 Tr. 951:1-10 (Garibay). Specifically, EID provides information on whether a  
9 person is currently in removal proceedings and whether a person has been  
10 previously removed or deported. *Id.*

11 90. EID is a repository for all records created, updated, and accessed by other  
12 software applications, including ENFORCE and EAGLE. Trial Tr. 951:4-952:21  
13 (Garibay).

14 91. NCIC<sup>14</sup> and NLETS<sup>15</sup> are criminal databases and do not provide any  
15 information for establishing a person's citizenship or immigration status. These  
16 databases are relevant for removability purposes. *See e.g.*, 8 U.S.C. §§  
17 1182(a)(2)(A)-(I); Trial Tr. 607:7- 608:10 (Johansen-Mendez).

### 18 **I. Shortcomings in the Databases**

19 92. The databases on which ICE relies for information on citizenship and  
20 immigration status often contain incomplete data, significant errors, or were not  
21 designed to provide information that would be used to determine a person's  
22 removability.

23 93. The CIS database is the "spine" of USCIS's functions. Trial Tr. 137:6  
24 (Bacon).

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 information about an individual's passport) Trial Tr. 1532: 9-18 (Johansen-Mendez).

27 <sup>13</sup> Student and Exchange Visitor Information System.

28 <sup>14</sup> National Crime Information Center.

<sup>15</sup> National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System.



1 94. CIS was first established in 1985 and it provides basic biographical  
2 information on an individual. Trial Tr. 175:3-14 (Bacon).

3 95. CIS contains five pieces of data that analysts or officers may use in  
4 determining citizenship or immigration status: (1) first name, (2) last name, (3)  
5 date of birth, (4) country of birth, (5) and classification when the individual entered  
6 the United States. *Id.*

7 96. The five pieces of biographical information recorded on CIS are not  
8 independently verified. Trial Tr. 176:3-12 (Bacon).

9 97. Indeed, data entered into CIS is often erroneous. Dkt. No. 481-5 (ICE  
10 30(b)(6) Dep. Hamm Tr. 219:17-220:2); *see also* Trial Tr. 521:8-524:1, 527:3-7,  
11 523:13-19 (Johansen-Mendez).

12 98. In 1995, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) described CIS as  
13 “incomplete and inaccurate,” noting that 22 percent of records “contained either  
14 misspelled names, incorrect name order, or incorrect nationality.” Dkt. No. 484,  
15 SF 104; Trial Ex. 62 at 3.

16 99. Moreover, a 2012 DHS study reported that CIS’s class of admission field  
17 was wrong for 12 percent of individuals it studied. Trial Ex. 58 at 1.

18 100. Many of the errors in the class of admission field result from USCIS’s  
19 failure to update CIS when a person’s immigration status changes. The class of  
20 admission field is “derived from DHS’s administrative action related to a person’s  
21 initial application/petition or apprehension.” Trial Ex. 43 at 7.

22 101. Updates to the class of admissions field are meant to occur automatically  
23 when other databases that feed information to CIS are updated, but there are often  
24 problems with these uploads. *Id.*; Trial Ex. 251 at 30 (“CIS does not always  
25 contain the latest status updates from USCIS benefits case tracking systems . . . In  
26 these cases, uploads to the CIS may be delayed by data input and uploading  
27 processes, or the transfer of data between systems may fail initially.”); *id.* at xi  
28 (“Among other issues, when decisions concerning noncitizens’ statuses, such as  
changes affecting employment status and length of authorized stay in the United

1 States, are updated in one system, one or more uploads from a case tracking system  
2 are required for them to appear in the Central Index System (CIS). This process  
3 delays their availability in CIS and introduces *opportunity for error*, especially if  
4 there are problems with uploads.”) (emphasis added); Trial Tr. 522:1-9 (Johansen-  
5 Mendez) (CIS often “would have an old class of admission that was no longer  
6 updated.”).

7 102. In an April 10, 2012 email to ICE Headquarters, Senior ICE official David  
8 Marin wrote: “For the past couple of months, AFOD Martinez has noticed an  
9 increase in the volume of biometric Immigration Alien Responses (IAR) for  
10 individuals that are determined, via agency database checks, to be removable, only  
11 to later discover that the person is a United States citizen.” Dkt. No. 484, SF 107;  
12 Trial Ex. 14 at 1. Mr. Marin then asked for a “mechanism in which we can modify  
13 the CIS database to indicate the individual’s *true nationality and citizenship*”  
14 because “[w]e have found that it is *not easy to get USCIS to change someone’s*  
15 *status in CIS.*” *Id.* (emphasis added).

16 103. In a follow-up email on May 9, 2012, Marin wrote that “[US]CIS is not  
17 updating its databases, so when we run our queries it shows the subject is an  
18 [Lawful Permanent Resident], we take appropriate action. This case appears to be  
19 exactly that; CIS databases show the subject as a LPR, so the hold was properly  
20 placed based on the information we had at the time. Now the subject claims to be  
21 a [United States Citizen] and has a [naturalization certificate]; if this is true and the  
22 Central Index System was timely updated, we may not have run into this issue.  
23 *Unfortunately these types of cases occur frequently.*” Dkt. No. 484., SF 108; Trial  
24 Ex. 15] (emphasis added).

25 104. DHS is aware of the errors in the class of admission field in CIS. *See* Trial  
26 Ex. 43 at 7 (if law enforcement seeks to detain an individual based on the class of  
27 admission code in CIS, they would request the physical A-File for further  
28 investigation); Trial Tr. 186:2-187:5 (Bacon) (same); Trial Ex. 244 at 6 (advising  
SAVE agencies not to rely on the class of admission code alone because it can be

1 wrong, but to view it together with other information, such as immigration  
2 documents).

3 105. Further, CIS’s primary function is not to provide indicia of citizenship or to  
4 establish probable cause for removal; CIS is meant to direct users to a person’s A-  
5 File. Trial Tr. 140: 23-24 (Bacon) (“CIS has only one real function and that’s to  
6 direct people to where the A-File is.”); Trial Tr. 420:25 – 421:4 (Meinhardt) (“the  
7 main reason for accessing [CIS] is to pin down not only just the bare essentials  
8 information, but really the A-File number”); *see also* Trial Ex. 42 at 4 (“The  
9 purpose of CIS is to provide a searchable central index of A-Files and to support  
10 the location and transfer of A-Files among DHS personnel and offices as needed in  
11 support of immigration benefits and enforcement actions.”).

12 106. CLAIMS 3 and CLAIMS 4 are USCIS case management systems designed  
13 to track and process applications for certain immigration benefits and  
14 naturalization. Trial Ex. 41 at 2; Trial Ex. 42 at 1.

15 107. CLAIMS 3 is an “old, legacy, mainframe system[] that do[es] not have the  
16 capability to interface in real-time with other systems.” *Id.*

17 108. CLAIMS 3, like CIS, contains information that is often incorrect. *See* Dkt.  
18 No. 481-5 (ICE 30(b)(6) Hamm Dep. Tr. 220:14-19) (“[t]he information is  
19 outdated. It’s antiquated. It’s not updated appropriately.”).

20 109. Further, individuals familiar with CLAIMS 3 consider the database’s error  
21 rate to be close to 30 percent. *See id.*; *see also* Trial Tr. 791:7-792:17 (Corrales);  
22 Trial Ex. 237 at 12 (“USCIS’ CLAIMS 3, used to store immigration benefits  
23 application data, was not updated in a timely manner”).

24 110. Both CLAIMS 3 and CLAIMS 4 destroy information after 15 years. Trial  
25 Tr. 789:16-18 (Corrales); Trial Tr. 773: 13-15 (Corrales).<sup>16</sup>

26 111. As a result, any individuals who obtained LPR status before 2004 and have  
27 not had any further interaction with USCIS would not be located in a search of

28 <sup>16</sup> This means that neither CLAIMS database contains any information from before  
September 27, 2004.

1 CLAIMS 3. This information would only be located in CIS, which has already  
2 been discussed as an error-laden source of information.

3 112. ADIS is intended as a system for generating leads on visa overstays to be  
4 further investigated including through non-database sources. Trial Ex. 54 at 2  
5 (purpose of ADIS is “[f]acilitating the identification and investigation of  
6 individuals who may have violated their terms of admission.)

7 113. ADIS has its limitations as a source of information in that no comprehensive  
8 system to record entry and exit information has been adopted and there is limited  
9 information on individuals who enter at land borders. Trial Ex. 237 at 7, 18-21;  
10 *see also* Trial Ex. 236 at 3, 12-13.

11 114. Indeed, Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) policy is not to take any  
12 enforcement action “based solely on ADIS (or any other system-generated) alerts,”  
13 and to mitigate risk of error by “corroborat[ing] all information [in ADIS] before  
14 taking an adverse action” against a person. Trial Ex. 54 at 14.

15 115. As recently as 2017, the DHS OIG found that ADIS incorrectly identified  
16 visa overstays more than 42 percent of the time. Trial Ex. 237 at 24. Twenty-five  
17 percent of people ADIS and SEVIS identified as visa overstays had actually  
18 applied for and/or received permission to extend their stay from USCIS. *Id.*  
19 Seventeen percent had in fact departed the country as required, but may have  
20 returned on a subsequent visit with permission on a new, non-immigrant visa. *Id.*

21 116. In contrast, ICE relies solely on ADIS for information about non-immigrants  
22 entering and exiting the country on visas without corroborating the information  
23 stored on ADIS.

24 117. Without a comprehensive collection of information about both exits and  
25 entries, ADIS has severe limitations as a source of information about who has  
26 entered the country on a visa and whether they have overstayed that visa.

27 118. SEVIS contains information on three types of visa holders, and shares the  
28 same entry/exit information in ADIS. Dkt. No. 484, SF 65; Trial Ex. 54 at 3.

1 119. TECS, the predecessor to ADIS, also has limitations on its information. *See*  
2 Trial Ex. 251 at A-17 (“TECS is the most error prone database accessed by E-  
3 Verify, which particularly affects the ability to accurately verify nonimmigrants”);  
4 Trial Ex. 236 at 12 (“Because of concerns about the reliability of the department’s  
5 overstay data, neither DHS nor its predecessor has regularly reported annual  
6 overstay rates to Congress since 1994.”).

7 120. In addition to the numerous errors in the databases discussed above, a  
8 number of immigration and citizenship statuses are either not captured, or captured  
9 on databases with dubious reliability.

10 121. As an initial matter, there is no national database of all U.S.-born citizens.<sup>17</sup>

11 122. Similarly, ICE has never had access to any database of derivative or  
12 acquired citizens, because none exists. Dkt. No. 484, SF 115.

13 123. With respect to asylees and refugees, ICE could potentially derive  
14 information in CIS’s class of admissions, but only to the extent the information  
15 captured in the class of admissions field is either properly updated or completely  
16 filled out.

17 124. ICE is not required to search the Refugees, Asylum and Parole System  
18 (“RAPS”) database—the database containing information about refugee and  
19 asylum applications. Trial Ex. 53 at 66.

20 125. ICE relies upon CLAIMS 3 for information on TPS and DACA. Dkt. No.  
21 484, SF 74.

22 126. All told, the collection of datapoints ICE gathers from the various databases  
23 does not provide affirmative indicia of removability to satisfy probable cause  
24 determination because the aggregation of information ICE receives from the  
25 databases is largely erroneous and fails to capture certain complexities and nuances  
26 of immigration law.

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>17</sup> While CCD may contain some passport information, it is not a broad-reaching  
database that captures all U.S.-born citizens.

1 127. ICE does not look at databases for a single record that affirmatively  
2 indicates probable cause for removal, but instead weaves together a patchwork web  
3 of databases owned and maintained by separate and distinct agencies to make  
4 complex determinations about citizenship, immigration status, and removability.  
5 No single database contains all the information needed to make a probable cause  
6 determination; no one piece of information provides ICE probable cause to issue a  
7 detainer to members of the Probable Cause Subclass, and the supplementation of  
8 additional databases—each with its own deficiencies—does not provide sufficient  
9 indicia of probable cause.

10 **J. The Effect of ICE’s Reliance on the Databases for Probable Cause**  
11 **Determinations**

12 128. Errors in the databases ICE reviews to make its probable cause  
13 determinations for removal have, on multiple occasions, led to arrests of U.S.  
14 citizens and lawfully-present non-citizens.

15 129. Data produced by ICE during the period of May 2015 to February 2016  
16 reveals that of the 12,797 detainees issued during that time frame, 771 were lifted  
17 because the individuals were either U.S. citizens or otherwise not subject to  
18 removal. *See* Trial Tr. 812:12-817:25 (Corrales); Trial Ex. 125.

19 130. Of those 771 detainees lifted, 42 explicitly provide that the detainer was  
20 lifted because the individual was a U.S. citizen. Trial Ex. 124.

21 131. Further, evidence introduced in this case includes dozens of additional  
22 examples of U.S. citizens wrongly subject to detainees because of database errors.

23 *See* Trial Ex. 163. These examples<sup>18</sup> illustrate the real-life impact of the relying on

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24 <sup>18</sup> The narratives resolving these improperly issued detainees include language  
25 highlighting the fallible nature of the databases. *See e.g.*, Trial Ex. 175 (detainer lifted  
26 because CIS wrongly showed lifted LPR status) (“Upon review of database  
27 information it was determined that subject was amenable to DHS/ICE enforcement  
28 action with the following status: LPR-SA1. Based on this information an ICE  
Immigration Detainer was lodged. On 12/05/2015, the detainer was lifted . . . [.]  
Subject appears to have derived citizenship in the United States.”); Trial Ex. 187  
(detainer lifted two weeks later after second level review of subject’s file at PERC  
because subject derived citizenship from naturalized parent) (“Upon review of

1 a makeshift set of databases to make citizenship and immigration status  
2 determinations.

3 132. The cited instances of citizens being misclassified are not exhaustive.  
4 Indeed, practitioners in immigration law echo the frequency with which ICE issues  
5 detainers to U.S. citizens and lawfully present non-citizens. *See* Trial Tr. at 230:7-  
6 232:22, 240:17-242:12 (Stock) (describing routine database error that leads to  
7 derivative citizens being wrongly identified as lawful permanent residents); Trial  
8 Ex. 36 (describing same); Trial Tr. 916:7-20 (Corrales) (testifying that while  
9 counsel at ICE, she was tasked with reviewing 50 to 200 memos regarding  
10 potential claims to U.S. citizenship arising solely out of the Los Angeles area in a  
11 two year period.).

12 133. ICE endeavors to reduce its error rates when issuing detainers. *See* Trial Tr.  
13 1469:19-20 (Robbins).

#### 14 **K. Alternate Sources of Information**

15 134. Biometric verification and database checks are not the only methods for ICE  
16 to gather information that could support probable cause for removal.

17 135. As discussed above, while CIS provides cursory biographical information,  
18 its primary function is to direct users to a person's A-File. Trial Tr. 420:25-421:4  
19 (Meinhardt) ("the main reason for accessing [CIS] is to pin down not only just the  
20 bare essentials information, but really the A-File number"); *see also* Trial Ex. 42 at  
21 4 ("The purpose of CIS is to provide a searchable central index of A-Files and to

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22 database information it was determined that subject was amenable to DHS/ICE  
23 enforcement action as a LPR. Based on this information an ICE Immigration Detainer  
24 was lodged . . . . [Second level review] performed by PERC, subject had proceedings  
25 [sic] terminated in 2013 due to his probative claim to [citizenship] . . . father  
26 [naturalized] on 10/11/2000 when subject was 16, subject autoderived on 02/27/2001  
27 when [the Child Citizenship Act of 2000] went into effect."); *see also* Trial Ex. 202  
28 (detainer lifted because subject was naturalized in 1983 and no database had  
information on subject's naturalization application); Trial Ex. 164 (detainer issued to  
U.S. born citizen); Trial Ex. 165 (detainer issued to U.S. born citizen based on  
database checks determining subject had entered without inspection, two months later,  
second level review determined subject's U.S citizenship)

1 support the location and transfer of A-Files among DHS personnel and offices as  
2 needed in support of immigration benefits and enforcement actions.”).

3 136. An A-File is a physical file that contains hard copy documents on a person’s  
4 immigration status. Trial Tr. 169:18-170:12 (Bacon). The A-File is capable of  
5 painting a more robust picture of a person’s current immigration status.

6 137. USCIS maintains millions of A-Files and has millions more in digitized  
7 format.

8 138. Further, physical A-Files may be delivered by expedited mail without  
9 serious difficulty.

10 139. Moreover, the most reliable source of information on a subject’s  
11 immigration or citizenship status is the individual. Trial Tr. 369:9-13 (Stock) (“I  
12 think you need to interview the person . . . . Because often, when you interview the  
13 person, you discover facts that would cause you to realize that they are a United  
14 States citizen.”); this is because some questions regarding an individual’s status  
15 can only be answered during the interview process. Trial Tr. 1364:4-13 (Marin)  
16 (testifying that “in some cases” there is information that would only be available to  
17 ICE through an interview of a person).

18 140. The interview process is not new to ICE; face-to-face interviews and jail  
19 checks were ICE policy prior to the introduction of Secure Communities. *See* Dkt.  
20 No. 481-7 (ICE 30(b)(6) Philip T. Miller, Dep. Tr. 22:6-16; Trial Tr. 1373:11-  
1374:1 (Marin)

## 21 **I. The SAVE and E-Verify Programs**

22 141. SAVE and E-Verify are two long-standing DHS programs designed to verify  
23 immigration status and employment status, respectively, using electronic  
24 databases. Trial Tr. 624:11-625:11 (Winkler). The programs use the same core  
25 databases ICE relies upon, as well as several others. *See* Trial Exs. 240 at 4; 241 at  
26 8; 242 at 20-24; 243 at 4.

27 142. SAVE and E-Verify provide an instructive comparison to ICE’s use of  
28 databases to issue detainers. Both programs take into account the significant



1 challenges to using databases that are incomplete and error-prone when verifying  
2 immigration and employment status. As a result, as Rachel Winkler—who served  
3 in USCIS as a subject matter expert on verification programs—explained, neither  
4 program uses databases on their own to determine a person’s immigration status.  
5 Trial Tr. 646:15-648:7 (Winkler).

6 143. To account for systemic errors in the databases, both SAVE and E-Verify  
7 have built in layers of review. The programs incorporate manual database searches  
8 and paper records reviews to resolve disparities between records provided by an  
9 individual and records in the databases. Trial Ex. 244 at 2; Trial Tr. 657:3-660:4  
10 (Winkler).

11 144. Both SAVE and E-Verify have been subject to significant government  
12 oversight, including studies to evaluate the reliability of the databases used. Trial  
13 Tr. 663:22-664:16, 672:3-14 (Winkler).

14 145. One study commissioned by USCIS in 2012 and conducted by Westat,  
15 examined E-Verify’s accuracy rate at each of the different levels of review. Trial  
16 Ex. 251.

17 146. The study found that, of 8.2 million cases submitted in fiscal year 2009, only  
18 58 percent of eligible workers could be accurately verified during E-Verify’s  
19 automated review level.<sup>19</sup> *Id.* at xi.

20 147. The study also found that 90 percent of eligible workers could be accurately  
21 verified during second level review, at which stage USCIS employees take 24  
22 hours to run manual checks of the database. *Id.* at xiii; *id.* at 6.

23 148. At the final stage of review, which involves the review of paper immigration  
24 documentation, E-Verify could accurately verify 94 percent of eligible workers.  
25 *Id.* at x (“It is estimated that 94 percent of FNCs were accurately issued to

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26  
27 <sup>19</sup> During automatic searches, E-Verify “checks some systems to determine if  
28 employment authorization can be confirmed.” Trial Ex. 251. The databases reviewed  
at the automatic review level include, among others: CIS, TECS and CLAIMS 4. *Id.*

1 unauthorized workers and 6 percent were inaccurately issued to employment-  
2 authorized workers.”).

3 149. The highest percentage (35 percent) of employment-authorized workers who  
4 could not be verified at all were foreign-born U.S. citizens. Trial Ex. 251 at 48.

5 150. The report cited two reasons for this: (1) the absence of most naturalization  
6 data in DHS systems from before the mid-1990s (which is consistent with  
7 CLAIMS 4’s 15-year retention schedule, given that 15 years before 2012 was  
8 1997) and (2) the unavailability of information about derivative citizens. *Id.* at 76  
9 (“Most USCIS naturalization data before the mid-1990s are still not reflected in  
10 USCIS systems. Data are also frequently not available for workers who derived  
11 U.S. citizenship status.”); *see also id.* at 51 (“Retaining accurate information on  
12 noncitizens who have become U.S. citizens remains a major challenge to E-Verify  
13 . . . .”); *id.* at A-8 (derivative citizenship information “not normally entered into an  
14 automated system”).

### 15 III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

16 1. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

17 2. Venue is proper in this district as a significant portion of the events  
18 underlying the Complaint occurred within the Central District of California, and  
19 Plaintiffs are part of a class of individuals who have been or will be subject to an  
20 immigration detainer issued by an ICE agent located in this District.

#### 21 **Establishing Fourth Amendment Probable Cause**

22 3. The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and  
23 seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

24 4. To prevail on their unlawful seizure claim, Plaintiffs must prove that class  
25 members have been or will be seized based solely on their ICE detainers without  
26 lawful authority or probable cause. *See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968)  
27 (“The infringement on personal liberty of any ‘seizure’ of a person can only be  
28 ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment if we require the police to possess  
‘probable cause’ before they seize him.”); *see also Velazquez v. City of Long*

1 *Beach*, 793 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 2015) (a “claim for unlawful arrest is  
2 cognizable . . . as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was  
3 without probable cause or other justification”) (internal quotation marks omitted)

4 5. The probable cause standard is “incapable of precise definition or  
5 quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on  
6 the totality of the circumstances.” *Maryland v. Pringle*, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).

7 6. Thus, “[t]o determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an  
8 individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide  
9 ‘whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively  
10 reasonable . . . officer, amount to’ probable cause.” *Id.*; *see also Gerstein v. Pugh*,  
11 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) (probable cause requires “facts and circumstances  
12 ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed  
13 or was committing an offense.’”)

#### 14 **Computer Databases May be Used to Establish Probable Cause**

15 7. Law enforcement agencies may rely on computer databases to establish  
16 probable cause if it is reasonable for them to do so. *See Herring v. United States*  
17 555 U.S. 135, 146-47 (2009) (declining to apply exclusionary rule because an  
18 officer’s reliance on a computer database is reasonable where no evidence of  
19 routine or widespread errors on the database exists); *id.* at 146 (“In a case where  
20 systematic errors were demonstrated, it might be reckless for officers to rely on an  
21 unreliable warrant system.”); *Arizona v. Evans*, 514 U.S. 1, 17 (1995) (O’Connor,  
22 J., concurring) (“Surely it would *not* be reasonable for the police to rely . . . on a  
23 recordkeeping system . . . that routinely leads to false arrests.”) (emphasis in  
24 original).

#### 25 **Probable Cause is Required to Issue Immigration Detainers**

26 8. The Fourth Amendment applies to immigration arrests generally, or arrests  
27 on detainers specifically. *See e.g., Tejada-Mata v. INS*, 626 F.2d 721, 724-25 (9th  
28 Cir. 1980) (applying “the constitutional requirement of probable cause” to

1 immigration arrests); *Morales v. Chadbourne*, 793 F.3d 208, 211 (1st Cir. 2015)  
2 (holding an ICE agent must have probable cause to issue an immigration detainer).

3 9. The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizure in the  
4 context of a warrantless detainer serves an exceedingly important function in the  
5 immigration context because many of the backstops that exist in the criminal  
6 justice system are absent in the immigration system. *See e.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)  
7 (no right to pre-trial release on bail or bond); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (no right  
8 to an attorney at the government’s expense in removal proceedings); Dkt. No. 484,  
9 AF 5-7; Dkt. No. 264 at 2-3 (no judge or neutral arbiter ever reviews an ICE  
10 official’s probable cause determination to issue a detainer or make an arrest).

11 10. Given the lack of additional safeguards in the immigration context, the initial  
12 process ICE officials utilize to make arrests and issue detainers must be  
13 sufficiently supported by lawful authority and probable cause.

14 **ICE Violates the Fourth Amendment by Issuing Detainers through State and**  
15 **Local Officers Who Lack Authority to Make Civil Immigration Arrests**

16 11. The Court first considers whether ICE violates the Fourth Amendment by  
17 issuing detainers through state and local law enforcement agencies that  
18 independently lack the authority to issue immigration detainers.

19 12. State and local law enforcement “generally lack authority to arrest  
20 individuals suspected of civil immigration violations.” *Santos v. Frederick Cnty.*  
21 *Bd. of Com’rs*, 725 F.3d 451, 465 (4th Cir. 2013)

22 13. While “federal law does not preclude local enforcement of the criminal  
23 provisions” of federal immigration law, *Gonzalez v. City of Peoria*, 722 F.2d 468,  
24 475 (9th Cir. 1983), *overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina*,  
25 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999), the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)  
26 expressly entrusts the enforcement of civil immigration law to federal agents and  
27 officers. *Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387, 408 (2012).

28 14. Thus, where state officers may perform the functions of immigration law,  
federal law makes clear those circumstances. *Id.* (“Federal law specifies limited

1 circumstances in which state officers may perform the functions of an immigration  
2 officer.” ).

3 15. A number of statutes highlight the scope of authority federal law generally  
4 grants to state and local governments. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (granting  
5 immigration enforcement authority to state or local government officials in a  
6 formal agreement with a state or local government.); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10)  
7 (authority may be extended in the event of an “imminent mass influx of aliens  
8 arriving off the coast of the United States).

9 16. Case law also suggests that state and local law enforcement agencies must  
10 consent to the delegation of federal immigration functions. *See Michigan v.*  
11 *DeFillippo*, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (“Whether an officer is authorized to make an  
12 arrest ordinarily depends, in the first instance, on state law.”).

13 17. This is true even when it comes to arrests for federal offenses. *See Ker v.*  
14 *State of Cal.*, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963) (“This Court, in cases under the Fourth  
15 Amendment, [has] long recognized that the lawfulness of arrests for federal  
16 offenses is to be determined by reference to state law insofar as it is not violative  
17 of the Federal Constitution.”); *Gonzales v. City of Peoria*, 722 F.2d at 475  
18 (assessing lawfulness of arrest by local police for unlawful entry in violation of 8  
19 U.S.C. § 1325 by first concluding federal law permitted the arrest and then asking  
20 “whether state law grants Peoria police the affirmative authority to make [the]  
21 arrest[.]”); *see also Santos v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Com’rs*, 725 F.3d 451, 464 (4th  
22 Cir. 2013) (“[l]ocal law enforcement officials may detain or arrest an individual for  
23 criminal violations of federal immigration law without running afoul of the Fourth  
24 Amendment, so long as the seizure is supported by reasonable suspicion or  
25 probable cause and is authorized by state law.”)

26 18. A fundamental tenet of federalism requires states to determine the powers  
27 and responsibilities of their own officers and any attempt to subvert states’ control  
28 over their law enforcement runs afoul of the Tenth Amendment. *Cf Printz v.*  
*United States*, 521 U.S. 898, 922, 928-32 (1997) (holding the Tenth Amendment

1 prevents the federal government from “impress[ing] into its service—at no cost to  
2 itself—the police officers of the 50 States”).

3 19. Thus, even where federal law permits state or local officers to make civil  
4 immigration arrests, the authority for such arrests must come from state law. *See*  
5 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (permitting federal-state agreements authorizing state and  
6 local officials to perform immigration enforcement functions, but only “to the  
7 extent consistent with State and local law.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1252c(a) (permitting arrest  
8 “to the extent permitted by relevant State and local law”).

9 20. ICE concedes that a detainer itself does not provide the legal authority for a  
10 state or local officer to make a civil immigration arrest. *See* Dkt. No. 297-1 ¶ 162  
11 (“[T]he detainer does not authorize, but merely requests, action by the LEA); *see*  
12 *also* Dkt. No. 481-9 (ICE 30(b)(6) Rapp Dep. Tr. 134:23-135:24) (explaining that  
13 it “would be up to the individual LEA to determine what authority or right they  
14 have to hold an individual [on an immigration detainer] beyond the completion of  
15 their [] criminal process.”).

16 21. ICE is liable for the arrests other law enforcement agencies make on  
17 immigration detainees, including arrests made by state and local entities that have  
18 no authority to make arrests on detainees. Dkt. No. 42 at 8.

19 22. For the foregoing reasons, the Court determines that ICE violates the Fourth  
20 Amendment by issuing detainees to state and local law enforcement agencies in  
21 states that do not expressly authorize civil immigration arrests in state statute.

22 Accordingly, the Court enters judgment for Plaintiffs on that claim.

23 **ICE’s Issuance of Detainers Through the Reliance on Inaccurate, Incomplete,**  
24 **and Error-Filled Databases Violates the Fourth Amendment**

25 1. Next, the Court considers whether the databases ICE relies on to issue its  
26 detainees are reliable sources of information for establishing probable cause.

27 2. This claim is brought on behalf of the Probable Cause Subclass, which is  
28 comprised of all current and future persons who are subject to an immigration

1       detrainer issued by an ICE agent located in the Central District of California, where  
2       the detrainer is not based upon a final order of removal signed by an immigration  
3       judge, or the individual is not subject to ongoing removal proceedings and the  
4       detrainer was issued solely on the basis of electronic database checks. *See* Dkt. No.  
5       484 at 1-2.

6       3. As discussed above, database sources must be reliable to satisfy the Fourth  
7       Amendment. *See e.g., Arizona v. Evans*, 514 U.S. 1, 17 (1995) (O'Connor, J.  
8       concurring); *see also United States v. Esquivel-Rios*, 725 F.3d 1231, 1238 (10th  
9       Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J.) (holding, "in a case that hinges entirely on the reliability  
10       of a computer database, the district court overlooked" testimony "casting doubt on  
11       its reliability").

12       4. Courts consider a number of factors when determining whether a database is  
13       reliable.

14       5. First, courts look to whether a database contains the complete set of pertinent  
15       information; that is, whether it lacks certain material information. A database that  
16       is incomplete in a manner that necessarily produces erroneous arrests is not a  
17       database that can be reasonably relied upon by officers. *See Smith v. Oklahoma*  
18       *City*, 696 F.2d 784, 787 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding a violation of the Fourth  
19       Amendment because an arrest warrant relied on a computer database that did not  
20       provide the necessary information to issue such warrants); *see also Morales v.*  
21       *Chadbourne*, 235 F. Supp. 3d 388, 401 (D.R.I. 2017), *appeal dismissed*, No. 17-  
22       1300, 2017 WL 4574440 (1st Cir. May 24, 2017) ("A database search is only  
23       successful and its results are only reliable under a probable cause analysis if the  
24       information contained in the database is complete and if the search is thorough and  
25       based on available identifies.")

26       6. In a case addressing the issue, the Ninth Circuit determined that the Immigrant  
27       Index System database, which included records limited in time, did not contain  
28       records predating 1983, and excluded "millions of people who are legitimately

1 present in the United States,” did not provide sufficient cause for the search.  
2 *Orhorhaghe v. I.N.S.*, 38 F.3d 488, 493 (9th Cir. 1994).

3 7. Courts also consider the error rates and inaccuracies within a database to  
4 determine their reliability. *See People v. Jones*, 443 N.Y.S.2d 298, 304 (N.Y. City  
5 Crim. Ct. 1981) (granting suppression in case where officers estimated an  
6 inaccuracy rate of a computer generated alarm system “as high as twenty percent,  
7 an inaccuracy rate that is unquestionably substantial.”).

8 8. For example, courts have identified Fourth Amendment concerns where  
9 underlying information was not up-to-date or the database provided static  
10 information regarding a fact that can change over time. *See e.g., United States v.*  
11 *Beltran Vivanco*, No. CR 14-840 RB, 2014 WL 12789017, at \*5 (D.N.M. Aug. 13,  
12 2014) (finding Fourth Amendment violation where officer “relied on a database  
13 that suffered from a fatal flaw,” specifically that the database “utilized static  
14 insurance information to make the dynamic assessment of whether a vehicle is  
15 currently insured”).

16 9. Finally, in determining whether a database is reliable for the purposes of  
17 probable cause, courts consider whether the databases were intended to supply  
18 probable cause for an arrest and whether attendant safeguards are in place to ensure  
19 accuracy and completeness. *See Millender v. Cnty. of Los Angeles*, 620 F.3d 1016,  
20 1029 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (disregarding information gathered on CALGANG  
21 database for purpose of determining probable cause for search warrant for firearms  
22 because the database “is not designed to provide users with information upon  
23 which official action may be taken” and “cannot be used to provide probable cause  
24 for an arrest”), *rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Messerschmidt v. Millender*, 132  
25 S.Ct. 1235 (2012).

26 10. The evidence presented at trial establishes that ICE violates the Fourth  
27 Amendment by relying on an unreliable set of databases to make probable cause  
28 determinations for its detainees. The flaws that exist in the databases are precisely  
those flaws courts have deemed fatal: (1) the databases provide static, often



1 outdated, information about dynamic facts; (2) the databases are incomplete, often  
2 missing crucial pieces of information otherwise necessary for making probable  
3 cause determinations; and (3) the databases were never intended to be used to  
4 make probable cause determinations in the immigration context.

5 11. While ICE relies on several different databases in an attempt to compile  
6 enough information on a subject and make an adequate probable cause  
7 determination, the databases used by ICE, which have their limitations detailed  
8 herein—standing alone without any additional checks—do not sufficiently  
9 establish probable cause of removal. A number of factors guide the Court’s  
10 reasoning.

11 12. First, information stored in the multiple databases ICE searches is often static  
12 and outdated. Citizenship and immigration status are complex inquiries that  
13 sometimes require information that cannot be obtained through databases that do  
14 not receive constant updates or real-time information about a subject. *See People*  
15 *v. Joseph*, 470 N.E.2d 1303, 1306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“When . . . computerized  
16 records are not kept up to date, a citizen may be subject to a deprivation of his  
17 liberty without any legal basis.”).

18 13. ICE’s reliance on static databases to assess citizenship and immigration status  
19 and determine whether an individual should remain in the custody of law  
20 enforcement agencies beyond their sentence is similarly unreasonable.

21 14. None of the databases on which ICE depends necessarily reflect a person’s  
22 immigration status at the time when a detainer is set to be issued. This is because  
23 those databases reflect a person’s immigration status at a particular point in time,  
24 but fail to reliably show how or whether that status has changed over time.

25 15. For example, the databases do not interact with one another in an effort to  
26 cross-reference or check the accuracy of the information entered.

27 16. CIS—the central database ICE relies upon in its determination of immigration  
28 status—provides no information on derivative citizenship. CIS regularly reports  
incorrect information about derivative citizens. *See* Trial Tr. 258:4-14, 261:12-15

1 (Stock). The result is a potential misclassification of “[t]housands and thousands  
2 of people, potentially even millions” given the various requirements for derivation  
3 of citizenship, their dynamism, and the failure of immigration officials to  
4 adequately or properly track those changes in status. Trial Tr. 274:19-275:10  
5 (Stock). The result, of course, is that many U.S. citizens become exposed to  
6 possible false arrest when ICE relies solely on deficient databases.

7 17. Further, CIS “frequently” shows naturalized citizens as green card holders or  
8 fails to reflect an extension of a non-immigrant’s period of stay. Trial Exs. 14-15.

9 18. The other databases on which ICE relies suffer similar flaws. At best, the  
10 databases reflect a person’s immigration status at a particular point in the past,  
11 but—independently and as a set—the databases fail to reliably show how or  
12 whether that status has changed over time.

13 19. Further, the databases suffer from serious incompleteness, which impacts  
14 ICE’s ability to rely on the databases in making probable cause determinations.

15 20. In *Orhorhaghe*, the Ninth Circuit considered a warrantless immigration arrest,  
16 which relied upon a database that did not contain any information about a subject’s  
17 entry into the United States. INS relied on the absence of information in the  
18 database as an indication that the subject had illegitimately entered the United  
19 States. The Ninth Circuit found that “the absence of any record of Orhorhaghe’s  
20 entry into the United States from the INS computer system did not provide any  
21 additional basis for suspecting that he was an illegal alien rather than a legal alien  
22 or American citizen. INS agents would be unable to locate any entry records for  
23 literally millions of people who are legitimately present in the United States. Most  
24 obviously, there would be no occasion to record the entry of native-born American  
25 citizens . . . [.]” 38 F.3d at 498; *see also Duckett v. United States*, 886 A.2d 548,  
26 549-550, 552 n.8 (D.C. 2005) (finding that the reliance on a lack of vehicle  
27 registration information in a law enforcement database that downloaded DMV  
28 records on a weekly basis did not provide reasonable grounds for a stop, since a

1 lack of registration information could mean either that the car was not registered or  
2 that it had been registered less than a week previously.)

3 21. These cases demonstrate that relying on the absence of information in a  
4 database known for being incomplete is unreasonable. Whether the database lacks  
5 historical records, *Orhorhaghe*, 38 F.3d at 498-99; categorically excludes certain  
6 kinds of information, *Esquivel-Rios*, 725 F.3d at 1236; or is outdated or has delays  
7 in its updating of information, *Duckett*, 886 A.2d at 552 n.8; databases in such a  
8 state cannot be relied upon for probable cause determinations.

9 22. In addition, the core databases ICE relies on suffer from structural flaws,  
10 incompleteness, and pervasive errors that render the databases unreliable.

11 23. Evidence before the Court has shown that the set of databases ICE checks, and  
12 the information stored therein, contain serious errors.

13 24. Testimony before the Court, from practitioners familiar with each of the  
14 databases suggests errors were common, and often anticipated in each of the  
15 databases. Communications between an ICE senior officer and ICE Headquarters  
16 indicates that the misclassification of U.S. citizens as LPRs was a frequent  
17 occurrence. Dkt. No. 484, SF 108; Trial Ex. 15.

18 25. Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the databases ICE uses are unreliable  
19 because no single database used was intended to provide any indication of  
20 probable cause of removability.

21 26. Immigration and citizenship law are complex and require a taxing  
22 examination of a person's history—the databases ICE uses were not created to  
23 track those complexities. The evidence before the Court shows ICE relies on the  
24 databases to cobble together information from disparate systems that are not at all  
25 intended to establish probable cause of removal.

26 27. The use of information stored on the databases here deviates from the purpose  
27 for which those databases were designed—accordingly, the use must be examined  
28 with careful scrutiny. *See, e.g., Beltran-Vivanco*, 2014 WL 12789017 at \* 7  
(noting that the database relied on by the officer “was not designed to provide a

1 dynamic record of a vehicle’s current insurance status” and finding a Fourth  
2 Amendment violation).

3 **Plaintiffs Meet the Requirements for Injunctive Relief**

4 28. “[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction . . . must demonstrate: (1) that it  
5 has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as  
6 monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,  
7 considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy  
8 in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a  
9 permanent injunction.” *Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms*, 561 U.S. 139, 156-  
10 57 (2010).

11 29. “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights  
12 unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” *Melendres v. Arpaio* (9th Cir.  
13 2012), 695 F.3d at 1002 (quoting *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). The  
14 Ninth Circuit has repeatedly “upheld injunctions against pervasive violations of the  
15 Fourth Amendment” like those present here. *See e.g., Easyriders Freedom*  
16 *F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan*, 92 F.3d 1486, 1501 (9th Cir. 1996).

17 30. The class members here face days of unconstitutional imprisonment as a result  
18 of immigration detainers. Such injury is not adequately compensated by monetary  
19 damages. *Nelson v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin.*, 530 F.3d 865, 882 (9th  
20 Cir. 2008) (“Unlike monetary injuries, constitutional violations cannot be  
21 adequately remedied through damages and therefore generally constitute  
22 irreparable harm.”), *rev’d and remanded on other grounds*, 562 U.S. 134 (2011).

23 31. The balance of hardships favors Plaintiffs as Defendants “cannot reasonably  
24 assert that [they are] harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined  
25 from constitutional violations.” *Zepeda v. INS*, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983).  
26 The injunction Plaintiffs request encompasses only what is necessary to remedy the  
27 Fourth Amendment violations. It leaves numerous feasible avenues for ICE to  
28 investigate and effectively enforce immigration law.

1 32. Finally, “it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s  
2 constitutional rights.” *Melendres*, 695 F.3d at 1002. Plaintiffs only seek for  
3 Defendants to adhere to their constitutional mandate and cease issuing unlawful  
4 detainers that result in unlawful imprisonment.

5 33. For the foregoing reasons, concurrently with adopting the above findings of  
6 facts and conclusions of law, the Court shall issue a permanent injunction  
7 enjoining ICE from issuing detainers to state and local law enforcement agencies  
8 in states where there is no explicit state statute authorizing civil immigration  
9 arrests on detainers and enjoining ICE from issuing detainers to Probable Cause  
10 Subclass members based solely on database searches that rely upon information  
11 from sources that lack sufficient indicia of reliability for a probable cause  
12 determination for removal.

13 Plaintiffs shall submit a Proposed Judgment within 14 days of the issuance of this  
14 order.

15 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

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18 Dated: September 27, 2019



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19 HONORABLE ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR.  
20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE  
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