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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

TILLMAN PUGH, MARGARET SULKOWSKI, DAVID HENDERSON, and ROY REESE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs.

VS.

METLIFE, INC., METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, METLIFE RESOURCES, INC., METLIFE SECURITIES, INC., and DOES 1 THROUGH 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: RG 1889 1665

CLASS ACTION, REPRESENTATIVE
AND PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL PAY
DEDUCTIONS, CHARGEBACKS,
FAILURE TO REIMBURSE EMPLOYEE
EXPENSES, WAITING TIME
PENALTIES, OTHER VIOLATIONS OF
THE CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE,
VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA
BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE,
DAMAGES, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND
RESTITUTION

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL** 

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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The Representative Plaintiffs TILLMAN PUGH, MARGARET SULKOWSKI, DAVID HENDERSON and ROY REESE ("Plaintiffs"), by and through their attorneys, for their complaint, make the following allegations upon personal knowledge as to themselves and their own acts, and upon information and belief as to all other matters, as follows:

#### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**

- 1. This is a class action, seeking unpaid wages, including payments for unlawful wage deductions, reimbursement of business expenses, liquidated damages and other penalties, injunctive and other equitable relief and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, under California law, including, *inter alia*, Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations, Labor Code sections 200-204, inclusive, 216-218.6, 221, 223, 226, 226.7, 400-410, 510, 1174, 1194, 1194.2. 1197 and 2802, Business and Professions Code sections 17200, *et seq.* and Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
- 2. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other members of the California Class defined herein below who are, or have been, employed by Defendants<sup>1</sup> to sell and/or assist in the selling and/or to market and/or assist in marketing securities and other financial products to the public on their behalf within the applicable statutory periods.
- 3. The "California Class Period" is designated as the time commencing from four years before the date this action was filed through the date of final judgment herein, based upon the allegations that the violations of California's wage and hour laws, as described more fully below, have been ongoing since that time. During the Class Period, Defendants have had a consistent policy of, among other things: (1) making improper deductions from the earned and paid commissions of Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members and requiring cash contributions be made back to Defendants for commissions previously paid and for claimed customer losses by Defendants' customers; (2) requiring Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members to pay and/or otherwise suffer deductions from their commissions to pay other

<sup>&</sup>quot;Defendants" and/or "MetLife" hereinafter refers to METLIFE, INC., METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, METLIFE RESOURCES, INC. and METLIFE SECURITIES, INC.

agents/employees of Defendants for their services to the clients; (3) failing to reimburse or otherwise indemnify Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members for their reasonable business expenses and losses incurred in discharging their duties; (4) willfully failing to pay compensation in a prompt and timely manner to Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members whose employment with Defendants purportedly terminated; and (5) willfully failing to provide Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members with accurate semi-monthly itemized wage statements of the total number of hours each of them worked, the applicable deductions and the applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period.

#### **INTRODUCTION**

- 4. California's Labor Code and Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders provide expansive protection to workers, including, but not necessarily limited to, entitlements to proper wages, protection against improper wage deductions and substantial penalties for violations of the California labor laws.
- 5. Defendants provide financial services including the sale of securities and financial products to the public. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and, based thereon, allege that, within the Class Periods, Defendants have operated numerous facilities throughout the State of California. In so doing, Defendants have employed hundreds of individuals in recent years alone in allegedly exempt "Financial Services Representative" ("FSRs") positions. MetLife also improperly treats certain FSRs as "statutory employees" or independent contractors, when these individuals have not met any test for these designations and are not exempt from state labor laws.
- 6. Despite actual knowledge of these facts and legal mandates, Defendants have enjoyed an advantage over their competition and have disadvantaged their employees by electing not to pay proper wages and/or "penalty" (a.k.a. "waiting time") wages to FSRs by, among other things, making improper deductions from their wages and by failing to reimburse them for expenses they incurred on Defendants' behalf.
- 7. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and, based thereon, allege that officers of MetLife knew of these facts and legal mandates, yet, nonetheless, repeatedly authorized and/or ratified the violation of the laws cited herein.

8. Despite MetLife's knowledge of the entitlement of Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members to proper pay, reasonable expense reimbursement, and Defendants' compliance with the other requirements of California labor laws, MetLife failed to provide the same to Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members in violation of California state statutes, Industrial Welfare Commission Orders and Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations. This action is brought to redress and end this long-time pattern of unlawful conduct.

#### JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 9. This Court has jurisdiction over the claims of Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members under California Labor Code sections 202, 203, 204, 216-218.6, 221, 440-410, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 2699 and 2802, and California Business and Professions Code sections 17200, *et seq.*, asserted on their behalf, the general public and all "aggrieved persons." Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members are seeking to recover damages in excess of \$25,000 for the losses that they have suffered due to Defendants' illegal and unfair actions.
- 10. Venue is proper in this county because MetLife maintains an agent field force in the County of Alameda and transacts business, has agents, and is otherwise within this Court's jurisdiction for purposes of service of process. The unlawful acts alleged herein have a direct effect on Plaintiffs and those similarly situated within the State of California and within this county. MetLife operates said agent field force and has employed numerous Class Members in this county as well as throughout the State of California.

### **PARTIES**

- 11. During the relevant times herein, Plaintiff TILLMAN PUGH was employed by Defendants in Alameda County and at other places as a Financial Services Representative pursuant to, among other things, a series of successive written compensation plans with Defendants.
- 12. During the relevant times herein, Plaintiff MARGARET SULKOWSKI was employed by Defendants in Alameda County and at other places as a Financial Services Representative pursuant to, among other things, a series of successive written compensation plans with Defendants.

- 13. During the relevant times herein, Plaintiff DAVID HENDERSON was employed by Defendants in Alameda County and at other places as a Financial Services Representative pursuant to, among other things, a series of successive written compensation plans with Defendants.
- 14. During the relevant times herein, Plaintiff ROY REESE was employed by Defendants in San Diego County and at other places as a Financial Services Representative pursuant to, among other things, a series of successive written compensation plans with Defendants.
- 15. In said positions, Plaintiffs were repeatedly subjected to the following improper and illegal acts of Defendants who: (1) made improper deductions from the earned and paid commissions of Plaintiffs and required cash contributions be made back to Defendants for commissions previously paid and for claimed customer losses by Defendants' customers; (2) required Plaintiffs to pay and/or otherwise suffer deductions from their commissions to pay other agents/employees of Defendants for their services to the clients; (3) failed to reimburse or otherwise indemnify Plaintiffs for their reasonable business expenses and losses incurred in discharging their duties; (4) willfully failed to pay compensation in a prompt and timely manner to Plaintiffs whose employment with Defendants purportedly terminated; and (5) willfully failed to provide Plaintiffs with accurate semi-monthly itemized wage statements of the total number of hours they worked, the applicable deductions and the applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon, allege that this conduct of MetLife is/was commonplace at every location owned and operated thereby.
- 16. As used throughout this Complaint, the terms "Class Members" refers to the named plaintiffs as well as each and every person eligible for membership in the California Class, as further described and defined below.
- 17. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiffs were, and now are, persons within the Class of persons further described and defined herein.
- 18. At all times herein relevant, Defendants METLIFE, INC., METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, METLIFE RESOURCES, INC. and METLIFE SECURITIES,

INC. (hereinafter "MetLife") and/or "Defendants") were, and are, foreign corporations with a principal place of business in New York City and doing business as NASD registered securities brokerage firm in the County of Alameda, and elsewhere. Despite MetLife's attempt to avoid its obligations under California law by treating its FSRs as statutory employees or independent contractors, at all relevant times herein, MetLife served as Plaintiffs' and the other California Class Members' employer within the meaning of Industrial Welfare Commission ("IWC") Wage Order No. 7-2001, 8 C.C.R. § 11070(2)(F).

- 19. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and, on that basis, allege that Defendants have, and do, directly and/or indirectly employed and/or exercised control over the wages, hours and working conditions of Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members.
- 20. Unless otherwise alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and, on that basis allege, that at all times material, each Defendant was the agent and employee of its codefendants, and in doing the things alleged in this Complaint was acting within the course and scope of that agency and employment.
- 21. The true names and capacities of defendants sued as Does are unknown to Plaintiffs, but Plaintiffs will amend their Complaint when and if the true names of said defendants become known to them. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and, on that basis, allege that each of the defendants sued herein as a Doe is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings referred to herein and any reference to "Defendant" or "Defendants" shall mean "Defendants and each of them."

### **COMMON SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS**

21. MetLife employed Plaintiffs and all Class members as FSRs. In recent years, MetLife began to wrongfully misclassify some of its FSRs as independent contractors. Regardless of how FSRs were classified, however, MetLife routinely made improper deductions from the wages of its FSRs to charge them with the Company's operating and overhead expenses as well as its business losses, and required FSRs who were assisted by Professional Marketing Assistants ("PMAs") to pay the salary and benefits expenses of the PMAs.

### MetLife Misclassified Some of Its FSRs as Independent Contractors

- 22. Prior to on or about December 2013, all MetLife FSRs were required to sign the "Appointment of Financial Services Representative and Registered Representative" agreement that described the basic economic relationship between the Financial Services Representative and MetLife.
- 23. Since on or about December 2013, MetLife required all of its FSRs to sign either a "Financial Services Representative Common Law Employee Agent Agreement," or a "Financial Services Representative Statutory Employee Agent Agreement," depending on classification criteria established by MetLife. In addition, FSRs who were approved to offer and service securities, investment advisory and/or variable insurance products were required to sign a "Registered Representative/Investment Adviser Representative Agreement."
- 24. FSRs who were classified by MetLife as "statutory employees" purportedly fell within a hybrid tax status (see 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(3)(B)) and were furnished annual tax information on the IRS form for employees (Form W-2) rather than the form used for independent contractors (Form 1099). These FSRs were defined by 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(3)(B) as "employees," but nonetheless MetLife wrongfully designated the "statutory employee" FSRs also as independent contractors.
- 25. Although MetLife thus incorrectly designated its "statutory employee" FSRs additionally as independent contractors, they performed exactly the same duties and had the same responsibilities as all other FSRs, and were, in reality, employees of MetLife rather than independent contractors, for numerous reasons:
  - MetLife retained control over their work, which could be done only in designated ways, under supervision and regulation by MetLife. MetLife provided detailed instructions and guidelines to the FSRs on how to conduct MetLife's business, and reviewed and approved the process at each step.
  - b. FSRs were recruited by MetLife for long-term careers with the Company, with pension, health insurance and other long-term Company benefits.

- c. FSRs had little or no genuine ownership of the business they conducted for MetLife. An FSR who left MetLife forfeited his or her business, as neither the client relationships and information developed by the FSR nor the future revenue on policies written by the FSR were portable or transferable, except under terms as dictated by MetLife.
- d. FSRs were prohibited from carrying on any non-MetLife work or business without prior MetLife approval, and had restricted ability to offer customers access to products from competing companies.
- 26. In sum, MetLife's "statutory employee" FSRs were independent contractors in name only; in reality, they were employees and were entitled to all the benefits and protections of employment under California labor law.

### MetLife's System of Illegal Wage Deductions and Charges

#### MetLife Runs a "Company Store"

27. MetLife charged its FSRs for the use of cubicle space in a MetLife office; for office telephone service, internet and computer support; and for mandatory professional liability insurance. MetLife charged its FSRs for each of these "company store" facilities by either deducting their costs from commissions due to the FSR, or by directly charging the FSR for payment and claiming the commission wasn't earned by agreement until after such deductions.

### MetLife Illegally Shifted Routine Business Losses to Its Employees

- 28. MetLife imposed its business losses on the FSR in many routine circumstances when the business written by an FSR did not generate the revenue that MetLife expected.
- 29. Numerous, commonly occurring circumstances could and would reduce the revenue actually received from a customer (or retained by MetLife) below what the Company had anticipated when it originally brought the customer's insurance policy, annuity or other new business into force. Expected premiums or other revenue would not be received or retained, for example, if:
  - a. the customer canceled the policy for some reason;
  - b. MetLife itself terminated the policy and refunded customer premiums

(e.g., in response to customer complaints, or because the Company concluded in retrospect that the underlying application was materially flawed);

- c. the policy lapsed because the customer failed to timely pay premiums; or
- d. various other reasons.
- 30. Regardless of whether such revenue-reducing events were caused by the FSR, the customer, or the Company itself, MetLife thereupon purported to reverse and charge back part or even all of the compensation previously paid to the FSR on the disappointing business including the part of the total commission that was withheld to cover MetLife's routine business expenses.

#### MetLife Exercised Self-Help to Collect Its Illegal Charges

- 31. MetLife exercised self-help practice to collect its illegal charges by paying itself out of an FSR's earnings before paying any of those earnings to the FSR. An FSR was compensated only if, and to the extent that, the FSR's earnings exceeded the company store debts claimed as owing to MetLife.
- 32. Any debts not covered by current earnings were carried over to be charged against future earnings. MetLife routinely delayed post-termination payment of an FSR's unpaid earnings in order to allow additional debts to accrue against them, such as for any post-termination lapses of business originally written by the FSR (though the Company instantly ceased crediting any post-termination commissions on the FSR's business).

## MetLife Illegally Shifted Support Staff Costs onto Its FSRs

33. MetLife encouraged its "statutory employee" FSRs to utilize Professional Marketing Assistants ("PMAs") to assist them in marketing MetLife products and the FSR's services to prospective clients. According to MetLife, PMAs were purportedly employed by individual FSRs, not by MetLife itself, and the FSRs were required by MetLife to pay all the salary and benefits expenses of any PMAs who worked with them. MetLife repeatedly reduced the number of its regular in-house branch office support staff who were previously available to provide administrative support to FSRs, thereby forcing FSRs to use and rely on PMAs, who were co-employed by MetLife and Oasis Outsourcing ("Oasis") (see below), to carry out

essential administrative tasks such as processing new business and handling service calls from existing MetLife clients.

- Despite MetLife's efforts to distance itself from responsibility for PMAs, the PMA's only job function was to work on MetLife business—i.e., the FSR's business—on MetLife premises. PMAs received mandatory MetLife compliance training, and an FSR's selection of a PMA required MetLife review and approval. Moreover, MetLife partnered with Oasis, a third party human resources company, to develop a program whereby Oasis coemployed with its partner MetLife every PMA who worked with a MetLife FSR, and MetLife concomitantly required the FSRs to outsource all the human resources, benefits and payroll administration tasks relating to their PMAs to Oasis, which then charged the FSRs administrative fees for such services.
- 35. In effect, MetLife outsourced all the human resources, benefits, and payroll administration associated with the employment of a PMA to Oasis, which co-employed the PMA whose services would then be used by an individual FSR. On its website, Oasis has described itself as a "Professional Employer Organization" ("PEO") that provides "human resources outsourcing services to client companies through the use of a co-employment relationship." Oasis further explained that "[t]he PEO [i.e., Oasis] acts as the administrative employer and the client [i.e., MetLife] acts as the worksite employer. The employer maintains control of the business and is in charge of all business decision-making including employee supervision and staffing decisions. The PEO handles the time-consuming administrative tasks associated with the employment relationship[,]" i.e., the maintenance of legally compliant HR and benefits practices. Oasis described the shared employment relationship such as the one it had with MetLife as "co-employment."
- 36. MetLife developed its program of mandatory PMA "co-employment" with Oasis because by requiring the FSRs to pay Oasis, MetLife's co-partner and co-employer, for the salary and benefits expenses of PMAs (which payments were used by Oasis to pay the salary and benefits expenses of the PMAs), for work performed on MetLife's premises for the benefit of MetLife, it could shift its own business expenses onto the backs of its other employees, *i.e.*, the

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FSRs, and further, sought to ensure that uniform compliance and other policies acceptable to MetLife applied to all the PMAs who worked within its business establishment. The end result was that MetLife shifted, through its co-partnering and co-employment arrangement with Oasis, its PMA staffing costs fully to its FSRs, via the pretense that the PMAs were not MetLife employees, and that the FSRs, through Oasis, were responsible for the payment of the PMAs' salary and benefits expenses.

37. Neither Plaintiffs nor any of the other members of the Class had any choice as to whether to accept the employment policies of MetLife with regard to wage deductions described herein or to choose alternate terms of employment.

## The Financial Services Representative Statutory Employee Agent Agreement Promised Nothing to MetLife's FSRs

- 38. Paragraph 15(a) of the Financial Services Representative Statutory Employee Agent Agreement ("FSR-SEAA") concerns the Compensation Plan and Schedules of the FSRs. It says that plans and schedules "may be *issued, amended, modified or terminated by the Company... at any time, in its sole discretion.*" (Emphasis added).
- 39. Paragraph 16 of the FSR-SEAA concerns Adjustments for Amounts Owed. It says that:

the Company may at any time factor into the calculation of any amounts payable from the Company . . . to Representative . . . any indebtedness of Representative to the Company . . . which may exist at any time, whether such indebtedness is based on debts accrued under the Agreement or any other agreement, implied or written, with the Company . . .; and such indebtedness shall be a first and prior lien against all amounts due or to become due to Representative under the Agreement or such other agreement.

(Emphasis added).

## The Registered Representative/Investment Adviser Representative Agreement Also Promised Nothing to MetLife's FSRs

40. Paragraph 5.1 of the Registered Representative/Investment Adviser Representative Agreement ("RR/IARA") also concerns MetLife Compensation Plans. Like the FSR-SEAA, the RR/IARA also says that the Compensation Plans "may be *substituted or revised*"

by the Firm in its sole discretion . . . from time to time and [simply] upon notice." (Emphasis added).

- 41. Paragraph 5.3 of the RR/IARA concerns disputes. It says that "[i]n event of a dispute as to whether an Independent Contractor is eligible for Compensation, the *Firm shall determine the same and its judgment shall be final*. (Emphasis added).
- 42. Paragraph 5.4 of the RR/IARA concerns compensation. It says that the FSR's right to receive "any Compensation on the sale or servicing of Available Products under this Agreement shall cease upon the termination of this Agreement." Moreover, the FSR has "no vested rights in any Compensation payable under this Agreement." (Emphasis added). Finally, if the FSR has been "found to have . . . breached any provision in this Agreement, the Firm may, in its sole discretion, . . . void [FSR]'s rights to receive any Compensation. (Emphasis added).
- 43. Paragraph 5.6 concerns compensation. It says that "[i]n the event any sale or transaction made by [FSR] is cancelled by the Firm, issuer, sponsor or distributor; or *declared*, *in the sole determination of the Firm*, void, voidable, illegal or *inappropriate*, [FSR's] eligibility to receive Compensation in connection with such sale or transaction shall *terminate*. (Emphasis added).
- 44. Paragraph 5.7 concerns the "indebtedness" (not further defined) of the FSR to MetLife. It says that:

[T]he Firm may at any time factor into the calculation of any amounts payable by the Firm to [FSR]... any indebtedness of [FSR] to the Firm... which may exist at any time, whether such indebtedness is based on debts accrued under the Agreement or any other agreement, implied or written, with the Firm...; and such indebtedness shall be a first and prior lien against all amounts due or to become due to Independent Contractor under the Agreement or such other agreements... Any indebtedness accruing hereunder or otherwise, whether before or after termination of this Agreement, shall survive the termination of this Agreement.

(Emphasis added).

45. Paragraph 5.8 sums up all of the above: "*Upon demand by the Firm*, [FSR] shall promptly return to the Firm all Compensation received in violation of or contrary to any provision under this Section 5 of the Agreement." (Emphasis added).

46. Simply put, the FSR-SEAA and the RR/IARA state that in return for the FSR's promise to perform by selling and servicing MetLife clients, MetLife promises nothing but attenuated "commissions" that may well be clawed back. Thus, the FSR-SEAA and the RR/IARA fail to meet the minimum requirements of a contract, are illusory, and are, therefore, void *ab initio*.

47. In the alternative, the FSR-SEAA and the RR/IARA are procedurally and substantively unconscionable. They are procedurally unconscionable since they are contracts of adhesion that the FSRs were forced to accept as a condition of their initial and continuing employment with MetLife. The FSR-SEAA and the RR/IARA are substantively unconscionable since they are unreasonably favorable to MetLife.

#### California Code Violations

- 48. Cal. Labor Code section 3751(a) provides, "[n]o employer shall exact or receive from any employee any contribution, or make or take any deduction from the earnings of any employee, either directly or indirectly, to cover the whole or any part of the costs of compensation under this division." Cal. Labor Code section 3751.
- 49. Through the misclassification of Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members as exempt employees, MetLife has also incorrectly and unlawfully treated said Class Members as exempt from and not entitled to the protections of California Labor Code sections 201 and 202 which require MetLife to pay all wages due to members of the California Class immediately upon discharge. California Labor Code section 203 provides that, if an employer willfully fails to timely pay such wages, the employer must, as a penalty, continue to pay the subject employees' wages until the back wages are paid in full or an action is commenced, for a period not to exceed 30 days of wages.
- 50. Furthermore, MetLife has violated California Labor Code section 1174(d) by failing to provide or require the use, maintenance or submission of time records by members of the California Class. MetLife also failed to provide Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members with accurate semi-monthly itemized wage statements of the total number of hours worked by each, and all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period, in violation of

California Labor Code section 226. In so doing, Defendants have not only failed to pay their workers the full amount of compensation due, they have, until now, effectively shielded themselves from their employees' scrutiny for their unlawful conduct by concealing the magnitude (the full number of hours worked), deductions made from pay, failures to reimburse reasonable business expenses and the financial impact of their wrongdoing.

- 52. Plaintiffs and all persons similarly situated in the California Class are entitled to unpaid compensation, yet, to date, have not received such compensation despite their termination of their employment with MetLife.
- 53. In many, if not most instances, more than 30 days have passed since Plaintiffs and other California Class Members have left MetLife's employ.
- 54. As a consequence of MetLife's willful conduct in not paying compensation for all hours worked, Plaintiffs and other California Class Members are entitled to 30 days' wages as penalty under California Labor Code section 203, together with interest thereon and attorneys' fees and costs.
- 55. As a direct and proximate result of MetLife's unlawful conduct, as set forth herein, Plaintiffs and other California Class Members have sustained damages, as described above, including loss of earnings for hours worked on behalf of Defendants, in an amount to be established at trial. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, as set forth herein, Plaintiffs and other California Class Members herein are entitled to recover "waiting time" penalties/wages (pursuant to California Labor Code section 203) and penalties for failure to provide semi-monthly statements of hours worked and all applicable hourly rates (pursuant to California Labor Code section 226) in an amount to be established at trial. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, as set forth herein, Plaintiffs and California Class Members are entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant to California Labor Code section 218.5 and 1194 and/or California Civil Code section 1021.5, among other authorities.
- 56. In addition to asserting class action claims, pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17204, Plaintiffs assert claims as private attorney generals on behalf of the general

public. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendants from engaging in the unfair, unlawful and/or deceptive business practices alleged in this Complaint, and to require Defendants to make restitution of all monies wrongfully obtained by them through their unfair, unlawful and/or deceptive business practices. A private attorney general (representative) action is necessary and appropriate because Defendants have engaged in the wrongful acts described herein as a general business practice.

#### **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

57. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated and proximately damaged by MetLife's conduct, including, but not necessarily limited to, the following Plaintiff Class:

#### California Class:

All persons who are, or have been, employed by the Defendants MetLife, Inc., Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and/or MetLife Securities, Inc. in the State of California to sell and/or assist in selling and/or to market and/or assist in marketing securities and other financial products on their behalf to the public within the applicable statutory periods.

- 58. Defendants, their officers and directors are excluded from this Class.
- 59. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action under California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and related case law because there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed Class is easily ascertainable.
- a. Numerosity: A class action is the only available method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical, if not impossible, insofar as Plaintiffs are informed and believe and, on that basis, allege that the total number of Class Members exceeds hundreds of individuals. Membership in the California Class will be determined upon, among other things, analysis of employee and payroll records maintained by Defendants.

b. Commonality: Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members share a community of interest in that there are numerous common questions and issues of fact and law that predominate over any questions and issues solely affecting individual members, thereby making a class action superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. These common questions include, but are not necessarily limited to:

- i. Whether Defendants violated California Labor Code sections 200, 202, 204 and portions of applicable California Wage Orders by subjecting their "Financial Services Representatives" to improper deductions from wages, including commissions and losses claimed by Defendants' customers;
- ii. Whether Defendants violated California Labor Code secitons 400-410 and 2802 by charging and/or otherwise requiring their "Financial Services Representatives" to pay directly or indirectly all or a portion of the compensation of other agents/employees of the Defendants, as well as other normal business expenses of the Defendants;
- iii. Whether Defendants violated, and continue to violate, California Labor Code section 1174 by failing to keep accurate records of employees' hours of work;
- iv. Whether Defendants violated, and continue to violate, California Labor Code sections 201-203 by failing to pay wages due and owing at the time California Class Members' employment with Defendants terminated;
- v. Whether Defendants violated, and continue to violate, California Labor Code section 226 by failing to provide semi-monthly itemized wage statements to Class Members of total hours worked and all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period;
- vi. Whether Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members are entitled to "waiting time" penalties/wages pursuant to California Labor Code section 203.
- c. Typicality: Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the California Class. Plaintiffs and all members of the California Class sustained injuries and damages arising out of and caused by MetLife's common course of conduct in violation of California labor laws, as alleged herein.

d. Superiority of Class Action: Since the damages suffered by individual California Class Members while not inconsequential, may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation by each member makes, or may make, it impractical for California Class Members to seek redress individually for the wrongful conduct alleged herein. Should separate actions be brought or be required to be brought by each individual Class Member, the resulting multiplicity of lawsuits would cause undue hardship and expense for the Court and the litigants. The prosecution of separate actions would also create a risk of inconsistent rulings, which might be dispositive of the interests of other California Class Members who are not parties to the adjudications and/or may substantially impede their ability to adequately protect their interests. Moreover, Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based thereon allege, that Defendants, in refusing to properly pay wages and reimburse Class Members for their reasonable business expenses, have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to all claims, thereby making appropriate injunctive and monetary relief for all members of the Class. Consequently, class certification is proper under California Code of Civil Procedure section 382.

e. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiffs in this class action are adequate representatives of the California Class, in that Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the California Class and Plaintiffs have the same interests in the litigation of this case as the other Class Members. Plaintiffs are committed to vigorous prosecution of this case and have retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature. Plaintiffs are not subject to any individual defenses unique from those conceivably applicable to the Class as a whole. Plaintiffs anticipate no management difficulties in this litigation.

# FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Failure to Reimburse Expenses and/or Prohibited Case Bond (Against all Defendants)

- 60. Plaintiffs incorporate in this cause of action each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
- 61. During the Class Period, Defendants required Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members to pay additional sums to Defendants' other agents or employees for the labor

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necessary to complete the job of Financial Services Representative, as well as other normal business expenses of the Defendants.

- 62. Thus, Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members had expenditures and losses that were incurred in direct consequence of the discharge of their duties, or of their obedience to the directions of the employer which have not yet been reimbursed by Defendants.
- 63. At all relevant times, Defendants were aware of and were under a duty to comply with various provisions of California Labor Code sections 406, 407 and 2802(a).
  - 64. California Labor Code section 2802(a) provides:

An employer shall indemnify his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her obedience to the directions of the employer, even though unlawful, unless the employee, at the time of obeying the directions, believed them to be unlawful.

65. California Labor Code section 406 provides:

Any property put up by an employee, or applicant as a part of the contract of employment, directly or indirectly, shall be deemed to be put up as a bond and is subject to the provisions of this article whether the property is put up on a note or as a loan or an investment and regardless of the wording of the agreement under which it is put up.

66. California Labor Code section 407 provides:

Investments and the sale of stock or an interest in a business in connection with the securing of a position are illegal as against the public policy of the State and shall not be advertised or held out in any way as a part of the consideration or any employment.

67. By requiring Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members to incur uncompensated expenses in direct consequence of the discharge of their duties, Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members were forced and/or brought to contribute to the capital and expenses of the Defendants' business which is legally a cash bond and which must be refunded by Defendants to each California Class Member.

- California Labor Code section 2802 (b) and (c) provides for interest at the statutory post judgment rate of 10% simple interest per annum from the date of the expenditure
- Therefore, Plaintiffs demand reimbursement for expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her obedience to the directions of the employer, plus return of all cash bonds or other coerced investments in the business of the employer, with interest at the statutory rate and attorneys' fees.

## SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION **Prohibited Wage Chargebacks**

Plaintiffs incorporate in this cause of action each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 59 above with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.

As used in this article: (a) "Wages" includes all amounts for labor performed by employees of every description, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained by the standard of time, task, piece, commission basis, or other method of calculation; (b) "Labor" includes labor, work, or service whether rendered or performed under contract, subcontract, partnership, station plan, or other agreement if the labor to be paid for is performed personally by the person demanding payment.

If an employee not having a written contract for a definite period quits his or her employment, his or her wages shall become due and payable not later than 72 hours thereafter, unless the employee has given 72 hours previous notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case the employee is entitled to his or her wages at

- There was no definite term in any California Class Member's employment
- California Labor Code section 204 requires all wages other than salaries to be paid not less than twice a month. California Labor Code section 204(a) states:

All wages, other than those mentioned in Section 201, 201.3, 202, 204.1, or 204.2, earned by any person in any employment are due and payable twice during each calendar month, on days designated in advance by the employer as the regular paydays. Labor performed between the 1st and 15th days, inclusive, of any

calendar month shall be paid for between the 16th and the 26th day of the month during which the labor was performed, and labor performed between the 16th and the last day, inclusive, of any calendar month, shall be paid for between the 1st and 10th day of the following month. However, salaries of executive, administrative, and professional employees of employers covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, as set forth pursuant to Section 13(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended through March 1, 1969, in Part 541 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as that part now reads or may be amended to read at any time hereafter, may be paid once a month on or before the 26th day of the month during which the labor was performed if the entire month's salaries, including the unearned portion between the date of payment and the last day of the month, are paid at that time.

75. California Labor Code section 204(b)(1) further states:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, all wages earned for labor in excess of the normal work period shall be paid no later than the payday for the next regular payroll period.

76. Section 8 of the Order of the Industrial Wage Commission, 8 C.C.R. § 11040(8) (Professional, Technical, *et al.*) states:

No employer shall make any deduction from the wage or require any reimbursement from an employee for any cash shortage breakage, or loss of equipment, unless it can be shown that the shortage, breakage, or loss is caused by a dishonest or willful act, or by the gross negligence of the employee.

- 77. Defendants charged back both commissions and the actual value of the stock losses allegedly caused by the employee through simple negligence or no fault of the employee at all.
  - 78. This is a species of cash shortages prohibited from being charged back.
- 79. Defendants systematically underpaid their employees by holding back a significant portion of commissions for their own purposes to pay others, and then either paying the wages later than the time required under California Labor Code section 204 or simply not paying them at all.
- 80. Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members all wages due as required by California Labor Code section 204.
- 81. Therefore, Plaintiffs demand an accounting and payment of all wages due, plus interest provided under California Labor Code section 218.6 and attorneys' fees allowed by law.

#### THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

## Unlawful Failure to Provide Itemized Wage Statements (Against All Defendants)

- 82. Plaintiffs incorporate in this cause of action each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 59 above with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
  - 83. California Labor Code section 226(a) provides in pertinent part:

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An employer, semimonthly or at the time of each payment of wages, shall furnish to his or her employee, either as a detachable part of the check, draft, or voucher paying the employee's wages, or separately if wages are paid by personal check or cash, an accurate itemized statement in writing showing (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the employee . . . , (4) all deductions, provided that all deductions made on written orders of the employee may be aggregated and shown as one item, (5) net wages earned, (6) the inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid, (7) the name of the employee and only the last four digits of his or her social security number or an employee identification number other than a social security number, (8) the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer . . . , and (9) all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee . . . . The deductions made from payment of wages shall be recorded in ink or other indelible form, properly dated, showing the month, day, and year, and a copy of the statement and the record of the deductions shall be kept on file by the employer for at least three years at the place of employment or at a central location within the State of California.

- 84. The IWC Wage Orders also establish this requirement in Section 7(B) thereof, Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations section 11010, *et seq*.
  - 85. Moreover, California Labor Code section 226(e)(1) provides:

An employee suffering injury as a result of a knowing and intentional failure by an employer to comply with subdivision (a) is entitled to recover the greater of all actual damages or fifty dollars (\$50) for the initial pay period in which a violation occurs and one hundred dollars (\$100) per employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period, not to exceed an aggregate penalty of four thousand dollars (\$4,000), and is entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees.

86. Finally, California Labor Code section 1174 provides:

Every person employing labor in this shall: . . . (d) Keep, at a central location in the state . . . payroll records showing the hours worked daily by and the wages paid to . . . employees . . . . These records shall be kept in accordance with rules established for this purpose by the commission, but in any case shall be kept on file for not less than three years.

- 87. Plaintiffs seek to recover actual damages, costs and attorney's fees under these provisions on behalf of themselves and the other California Class Members.
- 88. Defendants failed to provide timely and accurate itemized wage statements to Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members in accordance with California Labor Code section 226(a) and the IWC Wage Orders. None of the statements, or any writings, provided by Defendants have purported to accurately reflect actual gross wages earned, net wages earned, or the appropriate deductions of such California Class Members.
- 89. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, as set forth herein, Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members have sustained damages in an amount to be established at trial, and are entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs of suit.

# FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Unlawful Failure to Pay Wages on Termination (Against All Defendants)

- 90. Plaintiffs incorporate in this cause of action each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 59 above with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
  - 91. California Labor Code section 203 provides that:

If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction, in accordance with Sections 201, 201.3, 201.5, 201.9, 202, and 205.5, any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days.

- 92. Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members were employed by Defendants during the class period and were thereafter terminated or resigned from their positions, yet they were not paid all wages due and owing upon said termination or within seventy-two (72) hours of said resignation and/or termination of employment therefrom. Said non-payment was the direct and proximate result of a willful refusal to do so by Defendants.
- 93. More than thirty (30) days has elapsed since Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members were terminated and/or resigned from Defendants' employ.
  - 94. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' willful conduct in failing to pay

said Class Members for all hours worked, Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members are entitled to recover "waiting time" penalties of thirty days' wages pursuant to California Labor Code section 203, in an amount to be established at trial, together with interest thereon and attorney's fees and costs.

# FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Unlawful Underpayment of Wages (Against All Defendants)

- 95. Plaintiffs incorporate in this cause of action each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 59 above with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
- 96. At all times during the California Class Period, the applicable California Labor, Code of Regulations and IWC Wage Orders referenced herein applied to Plaintiffs' and the other California Class Members' employment as regulated and controlled by Defendants.
- 97. During the Class Period, Defendants underpaid Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members during applicable pay periods by failing to pay them their proper wages due under the California Labor Code as hereinabove alleged.
- 98. Section 558(a)(1) of the California Labor Code provides that for the initial violation by Defendants underpaying Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members in a pay period Defendants shall pay to Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members fifty dollars (\$50) as a civil penalty for each underpaid employee for each pay period to which the employee was underpaid in addition to any amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages;
- 99. Section 558(a)(2) of the California Labor Code provides that for each subsequent violation by Defendants of underpaying Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members in a pay period Defendants shall pay to Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members one hundred dollars (\$100) as a civil penalty for each underpaid employee for each pay period to which the employee was underpaid in addition to any amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages;
- 100. By failing to fully compensate Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members for the wages that they earned, Defendants violated the California Labor Code provisions cited hereinabove, as well as various Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders.

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#### SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

## Unlawful Untimely Payment of Wages (Against All Defendants)

- 101. Plaintiffs incorporate in this cause of action each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 59 above with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
- 102. At all times during the California Class Period, the applicable California Labor Code sections, Code of Regulations and IWC Wage Orders referenced herein applied to Plaintiffs' and the other California Class Members' employment as regulated and controlled by Defendants.
- 103. During the Class Period, Defendants failed to timely pay Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members during applicable pay periods by failing to comply with applicable time requirements for the full payment of wages which were due to be paid under the California Labor Code as hereinabove alleged.
- 104. Under the California Labor Code earned wages are required to be timely paid. In particular, section 204(a) of the California Labor Code provides for the payment of regular wages as follows:

All wages, other than those mentioned in Section 201 [wages due upon discharge or layoff], 201.3 [temporary service employment], 202 [wages due upon resignation], 204.1 [commission wages of vehicle dealer employees], or 204.2 [executive, administrative, and professional employees], earned by any person in any employment are due and payable twice during each calendar month, on days designated in advance by the employer as the regular pay days. Labor performed between the 1st and 15th days, inclusive, of any calendar month shall be paid for between the 16th and the 26th day of the month during which the labor was performed, and labor performed between the 16th and the last day, inclusive, of any calendar month, shall be paid for between the 1st and 10th day of the following month.

- 105. In the case of the payment of overtime wages, California Labor Code section 204(b)(1) further provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, all wages earned for labor in excess of the normal work period shall be paid no later than the payday for the next regular payroll period."
  - 106. As a general matter, "[t]he requirements of this section [204] shall be deemed

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satisfied by the payment of wages for weekly, biweekly, or semimonthly payroll if the wages are paid not more than seven calendar days following the close of the payroll period." California Labor Code § 204(d).

107. Defendants during the Class Period did not pay Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members regular wages in compliance with the time requirements of California Labor Code section 204(a), and did not pay Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members their full wages in compliance with the time requirements of California Labor Code section 204(d).

### **SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

## Private Attorneys General Act (Against All Defendants)

- 108. Plaintiffs incorporate in this cause of action each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
- 109. Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members are aggrieved employed as defined in California Labor Code section 2699(a)
- 110. Defendants committed violations of the California Labor Code against Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members by, among other things, failing to pay regular wages in compliance with the time requirements of the California Labor Code section 204 as previously alleged.
  - 111. Labor Code section 2699(f) provides:

For all provisions of this code except those for which a civil penalty is specifically provided, there is established a civil penalty for a violation of these provisions, as follows:

- (1) If, at the time of the alleged violation, the person does not one or more employees, the civil penalty is five hundred dollars (\$500).
- (2) If, at the time of the alleged violation, the person employs one or more employees, the civil penalty is one hundred dollars (\$100) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred dollars (\$200) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation.
- 112. Pursuant to Labor Code section 2699.3(a), prior to the filing of this complaint, Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the other California Class Members gave written notice by

certified mail postmarked November 3, 2017 to Defendants and online filing to to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") of the specific provisions of the California Labor Code alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories to support the alleged violations.

- 113. The LWDA did not provide notice within 65 calendar days of the online filing date of the foregoing written notice that it intended to investigate the alleged violations.
- 114. Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the California Class Members requests that Defendants be ordered to pay all applicable penalties as authorized by California Labor Code section 2699.

### **EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

## **Unfair Business Practices** (Against All Defendants)

- 115. Plaintiffs incorporate in this cause of action each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
- 116. Plaintiffs further bring this claim for relief seeking equitable and statutory relief to stop the misconduct of Defendants, as complained of herein, and to seek restitution from Defendants of the amounts they have acquired through the unfair, unlawful and fraudulent business practices described herein.
- 117. California Labor Code section 90.5(a) articulates the public policy of this State to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards, including the requirement to pay regular wages. Through the wrongful and illegal conduct alleged herein, Defendants have acted contrary to the public policy of this State.
- 118. As a result of Defendants' violations of the California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), California Business and Professions Code section 17200, *et seq.*, they have unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of Plaintiffs, the other California Class Members, and the general public.
- 119. To prevent this unjust enrichment, Defendants should be required to disgorge their illegal gains and should be required to make restitution to the members of the California Class.

120. Plaintiffs and the other California Class Members also request that this Court enter such orders or judgment as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money which may have been acquired by means of such unfair practices, as provided in the UCL, California Business and Professions Code section 17203, and for such other relief as set forth below.

- 121. Plaintiffs are "persons" within the meaning of California Business and Professions Code section 17204 and have standing to bring this claim for injunctive and equitable relief.
- 122. Injunctive relief is necessary to prevent Defendants from continuing to engage in unfair business practices, as alleged herein. Defendants and persons acting in concert with them, have done, or are now doing, and will continue to do or cause to be done, the above-described illegal acts unless restrained or enjoined by the Court.
- 123. The conduct of Defendants and their agents, as alleged herein, has been and continues to be deleterious to Plaintiffs, the other California Class Members, and the general public. By this action, Plaintiffs seek to enforce important rights affecting the public interest within the meaning of California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
- 124. Pursuant to California Business & Professions Code section 17203, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all current and former members of the California Class, requests injunctive relief, restitution and/or disgorgement of all sums obtained by Defendants in violation of California Business & Professions Code sections 17200, *et seq*.
- 125. The conduct of Defendants, as alleged herein, constitutes an unfair, unlawful and/or fraudulent business practice, as set forth in California Business and Professions Code sections 17200-17208. Specifically, Defendants conduct business activities while failing to comply with the legal mandates cited herein.

### RELIEF SOUGHT

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class, pray for judgment and the following specific relief against Defendants as follows:

A. That the Court declare, adjudge and decree that this action is a proper class action

and certify the proposed California Class under California Code of Civil Procedure section 382;

- B. That the Court declare, adjudge and decree that Plaintiffs and their counsel are appointed to represent the California Class and/or any other appropriate subclasses;
- C. That the Court declare, adjudge and decree that Plaintiffs were jointly employed by Defendants;
- D. That the Court declare, adjudge and decree that for the initial violation of underpaying Plaintiffs and the California Class Members in a pay period Defendants pay to Plaintiffs and the California Class Members fifty dollars (\$50) as a civil penalty for each underpaid employee for each pay period to which the employee was underpaid in addition to any amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages, pursuant to California Labor Code section 558(a)(1);
- E. That the Court declare, adjudge and decree that for each subsequent violation of underpaying Plaintiffs and the California Class Members in a pay period Defendants shall pay to Plaintiffs and the appropriate California Class Members one hundred dollars (\$100) as a civil penalty for each underpaid employee for each pay period to which the employee was underpaid in addition to any amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages, pursuant to California Labor Code section 558(a)(2);
- F. That the Court declare, adjudge and decree that Defendants violated the record keeping provisions of California Labor Code sections 226(a) and 1174(d) and section 7 of the IWC Wage Orders as to Plaintiffs and the California Class Members, and willfully failed to provide accurate semi-monthly itemized wage statements thereto;
- G. That the Court, upon finding that Defendants violated the record keeping provisions of California Labor Code sections 226(a) and 1174(d) and section 7 of the IWC Wage Orders as to Plaintiffs and the California Class Members, and willfully failed to provide accurate semi-monthly itemized wage statements thereto, further order Defendants to pay as to Plaintiffs and each California Class Member the greater of all actual damages or fifty dollars (\$50) for the initial pay period in which a violation occurs and one hundred dollars (\$100) per employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period, not exceeding an aggregate penalty of four thousand

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dollars (\$4,000), separately to Plaintiffs and each California Class Member;

- H. That the Court declare, adjudge and decree that Defendants violated California Labor Code section 203 by willfully failing to pay all compensation owed at the time of termination of the employment of Plaintiffs and other terminated California Class Members;
- I. That the Court declare, adjudge and decree that Defendants by failing to timely pay wages to Plaintiffs and the California Class Members in accordance with California Labor Code section 204 be ordered to pay all applicable penalties as authorized by California Labor Code section 2699.
- J. That the Court declare, adjudge and decree that Defendants violated California Business and Professions Code section 17200, *et seq*. by failing to pay Plaintiffs and the California Class-Class Members all wages due on termination, failing to provide Plaintiffs and California Class Members with accurate itemized wage statements, and/or by violating other provisions of the California Labor Code;
- K. That the Court order Defendants to pay restitution to Plaintiffs and the California Class Members due to Defendants' unlawful activities, pursuant to California Business and Professions Code sections 17200-17208;
- L. That the Court further enjoin Defendants, ordering them to cease and desist from unlawful activities in violation of California Business and Professions Code sections 17200, et seq.;
- M. For interest on the amounts of any and all economic losses, at the highest prevailing legal rate;
- N. For reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to California Labor Code sections 218.5 and 1194, California Civil Code section 1021.5, and/or California Government Code section 12965(b);
- O. For an accounting to determine all monies wrongfully obtained and held by Defendants; and
- P. For costs of suit and any and all such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

#### JURY DEMAND

Plaintiffs and the California Class hereby demand trial by jury on all issues triable of 2 3 right by jury. 4 DATED: January 29, 2018 WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER 5 FREEMAN & HERZ LLP BETSY C. MANIFOLD (182450) 6 7 BET&Y C. MANIFØLD 8 750 B Street, Suite 2770 San Diego, CA 92101 9 Telephone: (619) 239-4599 Facsimile: (619) 234-4599 10 11 **WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER** FREEMAN & HERZ LLP 12 JEFFREY G. SMITH (133113) MARK C. RIFKIN 13 270 Madison Ave. 14 10th Floor New York, NY 10016 15 Telephone: (212) 545-4762 16 Facsimile: (212) 545-4653 17 THE LAW OFFICES OF JOHN M. KELSON JOHN M. KELSON (75462) 18 483 Ninth Street, Suite 200 19 Oakland, CA 94607 Telephone: (510) 465-1326 20 Facsimile: (510) 465-0871 21 **JERRY K. CIMMET** (33731) 22 Attorney at Law 177 Bovet Road, Suite 600 23 San Mateo, CA 94402 Telephone: (650) 866-4700 24 Attorneys for Plaintiffs TILLMAN PUGH, 25 MARGARET SULKOWSKI and ROY REESE, and the California Class. 26 27

METLIFE:24223.v4

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F. ADDENDUM TO CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET

Short Title: Tillman Pugh, et al. v. MetLife, Inc., et al.

Case Number:	 	 	

#### **CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET ADDENDUM**

		N ALL NEW <u>UNLIMITED</u> CIVIL CASE FILINGS IN THE
·	SUPERIOR COUR	T OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA  [ ] Hayward Hall of Justice (447)
[ X] Oakland, Re	ene C. Davidson Alameda County Courth	
Civil Case Cover		(116) [ ] Tricasaritori, Cale-octienorie Hair Or Justice (446)
Sheet Category	Civil Case Cover Sheet Case Type	Alameda County Case Type (check only one)
Auto Tort	Auto tort (22)	[ ] 34 Auto tort (G)
	1	Is this an uninsured motorist case? [ ] yes [ ] no
Other PI /PD /	Asbestos (04)	[ ] 75 Asbestos (D)
WD Tort	Product liability (24)	[ ] 89 Product liability ( <u>not</u> asbestos or toxic tort/environmental) (G)
	Medical malpractice (45)	[ ] 97 Medical malpractice (G)
•	Other PI/PD/WD tort (23)	[ ] 33 Other PI/PD/WD tort (G)
Non - PI /PD /	Bus tort / unfair bus. practice (07)	[ ] 79 Bus tort / unfair bus. practice (G)
WD Tort	Civil rights (08)	[ ] 80 Civil rights (G)
٠	Defamation (13)	[ ] 84 Defamation (G)
	Fraud (16)	[ ] 24 Fraud (G)
	Intellectual property (19)	[ ] 87 Intellectual property (G)
	Professional negligence (25)	[ ] 59 Professional negligence - non-medical (G)
	Other non-PI/PD/WD tort (35)	[ ] 03 Other non-PI/PD/WD tort (G)
Employment	Wrongful termination (36)	[ ] 38 Wrongful termination (G)
	Other employment (15)	[X] 85 Other employment (G)
		[ ] 53 Labor comm award confirmation
		[ ] 54 Notice of appeal - L.C.A.
Contract	Breach contract / Wrnty (06)	[ ] 04 Breach contract / Wrnty (G)
	Collections (09)	[ ] 81 Collections (G)
	Insurance coverage (18)	[ ] 86 Ins. coverage - non-complex (G)
Real Property	Other contract (37)	[ ] 98 Other contract (G)
Real Property	Eminent domain / Inv Cdm (14)	[ ] 18 Eminent domain / Inv Cdm (G)
	Wrongful eviction (33) Other real property (26)	[ ] 17 Wrongful eviction (G)
Jnlawful Detainer	Commercial (31)	[ ] 36 Other real property (G)
omawidi Detamer	Residential (32)	[ ] 94 Unlawful Detainer - commercial Is the deft. In possession
	Drugs (38)	[ ] 47 Unlawful Detainer - residential of the property? [ ] 21 Unlawful detainer - drugs [ ] Yes [ ] No
Judicial Review	Asset forfeiture (05)	[ ] 41 Asset forfeiture
	Petition re: arbitration award (11)	[ ] 62 Pet. re: arbitration award
	Writ of Mandate (02)	[ ] 49 Writ of mandate
	·	Is this a CEQA action (Publ.Res.Code section 21000 et seq) [ ] Yes [ ] No
	Other judicial review (39)	[ ] 64 Other judicial review
Provisionally	Antitrust / Trade regulation (03)	[ ] 77 Antitrust / Trade regulation
Complex	Construction defect (10)	[ ] 82 Construction defect
•	Claims involving mass tort (40)	[ ] 78 Claims involving mass tort
	Securities litigation (28)	[ ] 91 Securities litigation
	Toxic tort / Environmental (30)	[ ] 93 Toxic tort / Environmental
	Ins covrg from cmplx case type (41)	[ ] 95 Ins covrg from complex case type
inforcement of .	Enforcement of judgment (20)	[ ] 19 Enforcement of judgment
udgment		[ ] 08 Confession of judgment
lisc Complaint	RICO (27)	[ ] 90 RICO(G)
	Partnership / Corp. governance (21)	[ ] 88 Partnership / Corp. governance (G)
	Other complaint (42)	[ ] 68 All other complaints (G)
lisc. Civil Petition	Other petition (43)	[ ] 06 Change of name
		[ ] 69 Other petition