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Gov. Code §6103]

[Deemed verified per Code

Civ. Proc. § 446]

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Attorneys for Plaintiffs, CITY OF BEAUMONT and BEAUMONT UTILITY AUTHORITY

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE (RIVERSIDE BRANCH)

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CITY OF BEAUMONT, a municipal corporation; and BEAUMONT UTILITY AUTHORITY a public agency blended component unit of the City of Beaumont,

Plaintiffs.

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JOSEPH AKLUFI, an individual; DAVID WYSOCKI, an individual; AKLUFI & WYSOCKI, a California partnership; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. RIC 1712036

COMPLAINT FOR:

- 1. Legal Malpractice
- 2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
- 3. Breach of Written Contract

Plaintiffs City of Beaumont ("City") and Beaumont Utility Authority (collectively, "Plaintiffs" or "City and City-related entity") allege as follows:

PARTIES

- 1. Plaintiff City is a municipal corporation and a general law city in Riverside County, organized and existing under the laws of the State of California.
- 2. Plaintiff BEAUMONT UTILITY AUTHORITY is a public agency blended component unit of the City and is operating in the County of Riverside, and is organized and existing under the laws of the State of California.

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- 3. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendant Joseph Aklufi ("Aklufi") is, and at all times herein mentioned was, an individual residing in Riverside County, California. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe that Aklufi, as a partner of Aklufi & Wysocki ("A&W"), was the City Attorney for the City and City-related entity for a continuous period beginning on or about March 1, 1992, and ending in or about 2014. Aklufi is named in both his official and personal capacities.
- 4. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendant David Wysocki ("Wysocki") is, and at all times herein mentioned was, an individual residing in San Bernardino County, California. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe, that Wysocki, as partner of A&W, acted as Deputy City Attorney for the City and City-related entity during the continuous period beginning on or about March 1, 1992, and ending in about 2014. From 2014 until about May 2015, Wysocki served as City Attorney until in or about May 2015, when Plaintiffs terminated their relationship with Defendants. Wysocki is named in both his official and personal capacities.
- 5. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendant Aklufi & Wysocki is a California partnership and was doing business at all times herein mentioned in the County of San Bernardino, California, and was organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, and was, and at all times mentioned herein, licensed to do business in the State of California, and was doing business in the County of Riverside.
- 6. Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as Does 1 through 20, inclusive, and therefore sues these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will amend this Complaint to allege their true names when ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that each fictitiously named Defendant is responsible in some manner for the acts and/or omissions alleged in this Complaint, that Plaintiffs' damages as herein alleged were proximately caused by these Defendants' acts and/or omissions, and that each of said Defendants is liable to Plaintiffs upon the claims alleged herein.
- 7. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that the Defendants, and each of them, including Does 1 through 20, in doing the acts and/or omissions herein

alleged, were acting as the agents, representatives, servants or employees of each of the other Defendants, and were acting with the course and scope of their employment or agency with the full knowledge and consent of the other Defendants (hereinafter collectively referred to as Defendants").

8. Plaintiffs have assigned each and every claim alleged herein against defendants, and each of them, to the Western Riverside Council of Governments ("WRCOG") pursuant to a 2017 settlement agreement and assignment of claims. Plaintiffs assigned their claims after WRCOG prevailed in a lawsuit against the City in a case entitled Western Riverside Council of Governments v. City of Beaumont, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2010-00357976 (the "WRCOG Action). The WRCOG Action resulted in a judgment against the City in excess of \$60 million, and the City and WRCOG settled the matter after the judgment had been entered and while the City was appealing the judgment against it. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that WRCOG is bringing a separate action against defendants, and each of them, for similar claims as are asserted herein. Plaintiffs bring the claims herein in the event that defendants, or any of them, challenge Plaintiffs' right to assign their claims to WRCOG.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 9. Jurisdiction is proper in this court as the subject matter is within the general jurisdiction of this court and the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of this Court.
- 10. Venue is proper in the County of Riverside in that the violations, breaches, acts and/or omissions which are the subject of this action occurred in the County of Riverside.

GENERAL BACKGROUND ALLEGATIONS

- 11. The City and City-related entity bring this lawsuit against A&W, Joseph Aklufi, and David Wysocki, for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duties, and breach of contract arising out of Defendants' acts and/or omissions while acting as City Attorney for the City and City-related entity.
- 12. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendant Aklufi was at all times relevant a partner of Defendant A&W, and he was the City Attorney for

the City and City-related entity for a continuous period beginning in or about March 1, 1992 and ending in or about 2014.

- 13. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendant Wysocki was at all times relevant a partner of Defendant A&W, and he acted as Deputy City Attorney for the City and City-related entity during the continuous period beginning in or about March 1, 1992 through in or about 2014, after which time he took over as City Attorney, which position he held until in or about May 2015, at which point, Plaintiffs terminated Defendants.
- 14. Thus, for over 20 years, Defendants, and each of them, were responsible for providing comprehensive legal representation to the City as its City Attorney and to the City-related entity as its General Counsel. Defendants' representation of the City as City Attorney and the City-related entity as General Counsel included, but was not limited to, advising City officials in all legal matters pertaining to City business; framing ordinances and/or resolutions required by the legislative bodies of the City and related entities; and/or performing other legal services required from time to time by the legislative bodies of the City and City-related entity. Defendants, and each of them, as City Attorney for the City and General Counsel for the City-related entity, served at the pleasure of the City Council and the City-related entity's Boards, and owed all ethical obligations to the City and City-related entity themselves—as clients—and not to any individual public official, employee, independent contractor, or community member.
- 15. As City Attorney for the City and General Counsel for the City-related entity, Defendants, and each of them, were responsible for and had a duty to provide legal advice to the City and City-related entity regarding material issues that impacted the City and City-related entity and to oversee any and all outside counsel to whom matters requiring special expertise were referred. Moreover, Defendants, and each of them, had a duty to and were obligated to serve as independent advisors to the City Council and other City-related entity Boards, and to provide a check and balance to insure that actions undertaken by the City Council/Boards and City officials and employees were lawful and undertaken consistent with all applicable laws, regulations, and standards.

- As City Attorney for the City and General Counsel for the City-related entity, 16. Defendants, and each of them, had a duty to attend public Council/Board meetings, as well as closed sessions of the City Council/Boards, and to provide legal representation to the City and related entities during the Council/Board meetings, and otherwise to ensure conformance by the City and City-related entity with legal requirements. Specifically, such duties included, but were not limited to, preparation and review of contracts on behalf of the City and City-related entity, reviewing materials submitted by City staff to the City Council/Boards, and drafting, preparing and approving as to form legal documents for the City and City-related entity, including employment contracts, ordinances and resolutions. Additionally, Defendants, and each of them, were or should have been aware and fully familiar with applicable State law, including the Brown Act, and the requirements for placing matters on the Agenda, noticing the Agenda, posting the Agenda, and properly considering Agenda items to ensure the Council/Boards have acted lawfully. Moreover, Defendants, and each of them, were aware or should have been aware and fully familiar with applicable State law governing the award and approval of public contracts, agreements for professional services, and public bidding.
- 17. Finally, as City Attorney for the City and General Counsel for the City-related entity, Defendants had a duty to supervise, monitor and oversee the actions of the City Council/Boards and City officials, contractors and employees to insure that they acted lawfully.
- 18. As City Attorney for the City and General Counsel for the City-related entity, Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care and skill in performing legal services and giving legal advice to the City and City-related entity, including but not limited to the following:
 - a. Defendants, and each of them, negligently failed to supervise, monitor and/or oversee the actions of City officials, contractors and/or other City employees who were tasked with the daily administration of the City and City-related entity, and defendants negligently permitted members of the City staff, contractors and employees, including, but not limited to, the City Manager, the City Finance Director, the City Engineer, the City Public Works Director, the Economic Development Director, and the Planning Director to manipulate and ignore legal requirements regarding conflicts of

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interest, to overcharge the City and City-related entity for purported services, and to act secretly and unlawfully and to engage in self-dealing to the detriment of the City and City-related entity, including but not limited to the following:

- i. Defendants, and each of them, negligently allowed the City and City-related entity to enter into, renew and/or amend agreements with various companies, including but not limited to, Cherry Valley Automotive and Beaumont Tire, despite City officials, including the Finance Director, Bill Aylward, having a direct or indirect financial interest in the businesses, in violation of the City's Conflict of Interest Code, Government Code section 1090 and the Political Reform Act. Defendants, and each of them, further permitted Aylward to approve and process payments and requisitions for these businesses despite the clear conflict of interest.
- ii. Defendants, and each of them, negligently allowed the City and City-related entity to employ as City officials, individuals who owned Urban Logic Consultants ("ULC"), a corporation that had a planning, economic development, public works, engineering and other services contract with the City since 1993. ULC was owned by Deepak Moorjani, David Dillon, and Ernest Egger. Despite never being acknowledged or placed on City payroll, Moorjani served as City Engineer and Public Works Director, Dillon served as Economic Development Director, and Egger served as Planning Director. All three of these individuals served in positions requiring compliance with the City's Conflict of Interest Code and State conflict of interest laws, including Government Code section 1090. However, on information and belief, defendants, and each of them, negligently permitted Moorjani to improperly approve invoices/requisitions for ULC, and Defendants, and each of them, negligently allowed Dillon, Mooriani. and Egger to unlawfully profit from ULC contracts with the City in violation of conflict of interest laws. On information and belief, Defendants, and each of them, further allowed ULC, Dillon, Moorjani, Egger and/or other contractors of

Plaintiffs to grossly overcharge Plaintiffs for purported services. Despite having direct knowledge of the conflicts of interest and other overcharges, Defendants, and each of them, did nothing to inform/disclose to the City Council and/or other City-related entity Boards the conflicts of interest and/or overcharges or otherwise to prevent the conflicts of interest and/or overcharges from occurring.

- b. Defendants, and each of them, negligently failed to discover, impede or otherwise disclose to the City Council/City-related entity Boards the City officials', contractors' and employees' conflicts of interest and overcharges, and on information and belief, defendants, and each of them, know of and/or negligently permitted the conflicts of interest and overcharges to continue, and/or actively concealed the existence of the conflicts of interest and overcharges from the City Council/City-related entity Boards. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants, and each of them, knew or should have known, of the conflicts of interest of the City officials and of the overcharges as alleged above, and defendants, and each of them, had a duty to report these conflicts of interest and overcharges and to prevent the same, and Defendants, and each of them, failed to do so.
- c. Defendants, and each of them, negligently permitted the City to enter into contracts in violation of State law and the City Code. In violation of State law and City Code, Defendants, and each of them, permitted the City and City-related entity to enter into agreements without complying with competitive procedures required by state law and the City Code. Furthermore, Defendants, and each of them, negligently failed to require ULC contracts to be submitted and approved in an open and competitive process. Defendants, and each of them, also negligently permitted the City to enter into contracts for procurement of electrical supplies and equipment and contracts for services with Beaumont Electric without complying with proper procurement procedures or competitive bidding.
- d. Defendants negligently failed to discover and/or prevent the City from making improper loans to public officials and gifting public funds.

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- i. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants, and each of them, negligently permitted the City Manager, Kapanicas, to improperly authorize the wife of Deepak Moorjani to receive City healthcare/COBRA benefits, despite having never been an employee of the City.
- Defendants, and each of them, negligently advised and/or failed to advise the City regarding the collection of Transportation Uniform Mitigation Fees ('TUMF") and implementation of the City's TUMF program on development projects, which the City was obliged to collect and remit to WRCOG pursuant to the City's participation in WRCOG's TUMF program, which was designed to mitigate traffic congestion in western Riverside County. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that ULC, Dillon, Egger, Moorjani, Kapanicas, and/or other City officials, contractors and/or employees, devised a scheme to avoid collecting and/or remitting TUMF payments to WRCOG, and that defendants, and each of them, knew of should have known of this improper scheme, and they failed to fully disclose this improper scheme to the then City Council, which had voted for the City to participate in the TUMF program, thereby setting the policy directive of the City to fully participate in the TUMF program in good faith as a member of WRCOG. As a result of the City's failure to collect and/or remit TUMF payments to WRCOG due to the improper scheme as alleged herein, WRCOG filed the WRCOG Action and prevailed in its suit against the City, resulting in a judgment against the City for roughly \$60 million. As alleged above, the City and WRCOG settled the WRCOG Action in 2017 after judgment had been entered, but while the City was appealing the matter. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants, and each of them, negligently gave the City improper and/or incorrect legal advice to the City regarding its obligations to collect and remit TUMF payments to WRCOG, both before and during the TUMF Action, which resulted in the substantial judgment against the City, which the City has since settled.
- f. Defendants, and each of them, negligently failed to require City staff to keep proper accounting and records of bond issuances, fixed assets and inventory; failed

to provide adequate oversight over contract awards; failed to advise the City and related entities regarding State law and the City Code; failed to require the City to maintain written administrative policies and procedures; and failed to require adequate financial reporting or control over fiscal functions, which caused a massive deficit in the City's General Fund to go unreported for many years.

- g. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants, and each of them, negligently or intentionally delayed in timely providing Plaintiffs with a copy of all of their files related to Plaintiffs' matters when requested following their termination as City Attorney and General Counsel for the City-related entity. In or about April 2016, Plaintiffs requested copies of their files from Defendants, and each of them, and yet it was not until September or October 2016 that Defendants, and each of them, provided some, but clearly not all, files to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are also informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants, and each of them, intentionally and/or negligently failed to provide all of Plaintiffs' files to Plaintiffs, even though Defendants, and each of them, had a legal duty to do so. As an example, but without limitation, Defendants, and each of them, have not given to Plaintiffs any of their files regarding the WRCOG Action, which resulted in a judgment against the City in excess of \$60 million, even though Plaintiffs had timely requested all of their files be returned upon termination of defendants.
- 19. As a direct result of Defendants', and each of their, gross negligence and failure to fulfill the duties of City Attorney for the City and General Counsel for the City-related entity, the City and City-related entity were damaged in an amount to be determined at trial, but in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this Court.
- 20. On or about April 1, 2016, Plaintiffs and Defendants, and each of them, entered into a tolling agreement, which tolled the running of all applicable statutes of limitation for all claims asserted herein. The original tolling agreement was set to expire on December 31, 2016, but on or before December 30, 2016, the parties executed a first amended tolling agreement,

which further tolled the running of all applicable statutes of limitation for all claims asserted herein through and until June 30, 2017.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Legal Malpractice against all Defendants)

- 21. Plaintiffs hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraph 1 through 20 above as though fully set forth herein.
- 22. As a consequence of the attorney-client relationship that existed between Defendants and Plaintiff as alleged above, at all times relevant herein, Defendants owed a legal duty Plaintiffs to exercise reasonable care and skill in performing legal services and giving legal advice to City, and to refrain from acts of negligence and carelessness in discharging said duties.
- 23. Defendants, and each of them, owed a duty to Plaintiffs, in their capacity as City Attorney for the City and General Counsel to the City-related entity, to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as members of its profession commonly possess and exercise when acting in such capacities.
- 24. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants, and each of them, breached the duties owed to Plaintiffs by, *inter alia*, failing to properly supervise, monitor and/or oversee the actions of former City officials, contractors and/or employees, and negligently permitting former members of the City staff and contractors to manipulate and ignore the requirements of the law regarding conflicts of interest, and to act secretly and unlawfully and engage in self-dealing to the detriment of the City, and to overcharge the City and City-related entity for purported services rendered; by failing to discover, impede or otherwise disclose to the City Council/City-related entity Boards, the City Officials' conflicts of interest, and by negligently permitting the conflicts to continue and/or actively concealing the existence of conflicts of interest thereof; by negligently permitting the City to enter into contracts in violation of State law and the City Code which require competitive procedures; by negligently failing to discover and/or prevent the City from making improper loans to public officials and gifting public funds; by negligently advising and/or failing to advise the City

regarding the collection and remittance of TUMF fees on development projects to WRCOG; by negligently failing to require City staff, contractors and/or employees to keep proper accounting and records of bond issuances, fixed assets and inventory; by negligently failing to provide adequate oversight over contract awards; by negligently failing to advise the City regarding State law and the City Code; by negligently failing to require adequate financial reporting or control over fiscal functions, and by negligently (or intentionally) delaying in providing Plaintiffs with their files upon termination of the attorney-client relationship, or for some matters, including but not limited to the WRCOG Action, failing to return to Plaintiffs any of their files.

25. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' negligence in failing to exercise proper care and skill as alleged herein, Plaintiffs sustained actual damages and continue to sustain actual damages. Plaintiffs' damages are in an amount to be determined at trial, but are in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this Court.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Fiduciary Duty against all Defendants)

- 26. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in paragraph 1 through 25 above as though fully set forth herein.
- 27. By virtue of the attorney-client relationship that existed between Defendants and Plaintiffs, and by virtue of Plaintiffs having placed confidence in the honesty, fidelity, and integrity of Defendants, and each of them, a confidential relationship existed between the City and City-related entity, on the one hand, and Defendants, and each of them, on the other hand, at all times mentioned herein. Defendants, and each of them, thereby owed Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty to act at all times in the best interests of the City and City-related entity.
- 28. Despite having accepted the trust and confidence of Plaintiffs, and in violation of this relationship of trust and confidence, Defendants, and each of them, abused the trust and confidence of Plaintiffs by, *inter alia*, failing to properly supervise, monitor and/or oversee the actions of City officials, contractors and/or employees, and negligently permitting former

members of the City staff and contractors to ignore the requirements of the law regarding conflicts of interest, and to overcharge the City for purported services rendered, and to act secretly and unlawfully and engage in self-dealing to the detriment of Plaintiffs; by failing to discover, impede or otherwise disclose to the City Council and City-related entity Boards the City officials', contractors' and/or employees' conflicts of interest, overcharges and selfdealings, and by negligently permitting the conflicts, overcharges and self-dealings to continue and/or actively concealing the existence thereof; by negligently permitting the City to enter into contracts in violation of State law and the City Code; by negligently failing to discover and/or prevent the City from making improper loans to public officials and gifting public funds; by negligently advising and/or failing to advise the City regarding the collection and remittance of TUMF fees to WRCOG on development projects; by negligently failing to require City staff and contractors to keep proper accounting and records of bond issuances, fixed assets and inventory; by negligently failing to provide adequate oversight over contract awards; by negligently failing to advise the City regarding State law and the Municipal Code; by negligently failing to require adequate financial reporting or control over fiscal functions, and by delaying in providing Plaintiffs with their files upon termination of the attorney-client relationship, or for some matters, including but not limited to the WRCOG Action, failing to return to Plaintiffs any of their files.

- 29. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' negligence in failing to exercise proper care and skill as alleged herein, Plaintiffs sustained actual damages and continue to sustain actual damages. Plaintiffs' damages are in an amount to be determined at trial, but are in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this Court.
- 30. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that the conduct of Defendants, and each of them, as alleged herein, was malicious and unconscionable, and that an award of exemplary or punitive damages is warranted as against these defendants, and each of them, in an amount to be proven at trial.

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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

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(Breach of Contract against Defendant A&W)

- Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in paragraph 31. 1 through 30 above as though fully set forth herein.
- On or about March 1, 1992, Defendant Aklufi and Defendant Wysocki, as 32. partners of Defendant A&W, entered into an agreement with the City for general legal services, which was later formalized in writing and renewed and amended periodically ("Agreement").
- Pursuant to the Agreement, A&W was appointed as the Plaintiffs' legal counsel: 33. Defendant Aklufi was to represent the City as City Attorney and City-related entity as General Counsel; Defendant Wysocki was to function as Deputy City Attorney for the City and Deputy General Counsel for the City-related entity. Pursuant to the Agreement, Defendants, and each of them, were to "provide such legal services to the City as are requested by the City including, but not limited to, attending all meetings of the City Council; conferring with and advising any and all officers and employees of the City and furnishing written opinions relating to City matters when requested to do so; drafting and preparing any and all ordinances, resolutions, legal instruments or documents requested by the City; preparing pleadings and other documents relating to matters involving the City pending before the courts, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies, and making appearances to represent the City before any court, quasi-judicial, administrative or legislative body."
- 34. Plaintiffs have performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required to be performed in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, except for those conditions, covenants and promise which were excused by the Defendants and/or conditions, covenants, and promises which City was prevented from performing by the acts or omissions on the part of Defendants.
- 35. Defendants, and each of them, have breached the Agreement by, inter alia, failing to properly supervise, monitor and/or oversee the actions of City officials, contractors and/or employees, and negligently permitting former members of the City staff and contractors to manipulate and ignore the requirements of the law regarding conflicts of interest, to

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overcharge the City and City-related entity for purported services, and to act secretly and unlawfully and engage in self-dealing to the detriment of Plaintiffs; by failing to discover, impede or otherwise fully disclose to the City Council and City-related entity Boards the City officials', contractors' and employees' conflicts of interest, and by permitting the conflicts, overpayments and self-dealings to continue and/or actively concealing the existence thereof; by permitting Plaintiffs to enter into contracts in violation of State law and the City Code; by negligently failing to discover and/or prevent the City from making improper loans to public officials and gifting public funds; by negligently advising and/or failing to advise the City regarding the collection of TUMF fees on development projects; by negligently failing to require City Management to keep proper accounting and records of bond issuances, fixed assets and inventory; by negligently failing to provide adequate oversight over contract awards; by negligently failing to advise the City regarding State law and the Municipal Code; by negligently failing to require adequate financial reporting or control over fiscal functions, and by delaying in providing Plaintiffs with their files upon termination of the attorney-client relationship, or for some matters, including but not limited to the WRCOG Action, failing to return to Plaintiffs any of their files.

- 36. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that as a direct and proximate result of A&W's breaches of the Agreement as alleged herein, Plaintiffs sustained actual damages and continue to sustain actual damages. Plaintiffs' damages are in an amount to be determined at trial, but are in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this Court.
- Further, the Agreement provides that "[s]hould it become necessary to file an 37. action or proceeding to enforce this agreement, or any provision of this agreement, the prevailing party in such an action shall be entitled to recover, in addition to damages, the reasonable amount of his attorneys' fees and costs incurred in such action."

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, the City and City-related entity pray for judgment as follows:

- 1. For compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
- 2. For exemplary and punitive damages in amount to be determined at trial:

1	3.	3. For costs of suit incurred herein;		
2	4.	For reasonable attorneys' fees, as allowed by law;		
3	5.	For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper; and		
4	6.	For disgorgement of profits and attorney's paid to Defendants as a result of		
5 [.]	egregious breaches of their duty and standard of care.			
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7	Dated: June	30, 2017 SLOVAK BARON EMPEY MURPHY & PINKNEY LLP		
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9		By: Can M mylling		
10		SHAUN M. MURPHY		
11		Attorneys for Plaintiffs		
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ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar Shaun M. Murphy, Esq. (SBN 194965) / K. Slovak Baron Empey Murphy & Pinkney, 1800 E. Tahquitz Canyon Way	FOR COURT USE ONLY				
Palm Springs, California 92262					
ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Plaintiffs City of Bea	<u>n.</u>				
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE					
STREET ADDRESS: 4050 Main Street					
MAILING ADDRESS: 4050 Main Street	4				
CITY AND ZIP CODE: Riverside, California BRANCH NAME: RIVERSIDE					
CASE NAME:					
City of Beaumont, et al. v. Joseph A					
CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET		CASE NUMBER: 4 7 1 2 0 7 6			
Unlimited Limited	Complex Case Designation	RIC 1712036			
(Amount (Amount	Counter Joinder				
demanded demanded is	Filed with first appearance by defend	dant JUDGE:			
exceeds \$25,000) \$25,000 or less)	(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.402)				
Items 1-6 be	low must be completed (see instructions	on page 2).,			
1. Check one box below for the case type that	The state of the s				
Auto Tort	Contract	Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation			
Auto (22)	Breach of contract/warranty (06)	(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.400–3.403)			
Uninsured motorist (46)	Rule 3.740 collections (09)	Antitrust/Trade regulation (03)			
Other PI/PD/WD (Personal Injury/Property	Other collections (09)	Construction defect (10)			
Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort	Insurance coverage (18)	Mass tort (40)			
Asbestos (04)	Other contract (37)	Securities litigation (28)			
Product liability (24)	Real Property	Environmental/Toxic tort (30)			
Medical malpractice (45)	Eminent domain/Inverse	Insurance coverage claims arising from the above listed provisionally complex case			
Other PI/PD/WD (23)	condemnation (14) Wrongful eviction (33)	types (41)			
Non-PI/PD/WD (Other) Tort	Other real preparty (26)	Enforcement of Judgment			
Business tort/unfair business practice (07	, —	Enforcement of judgment (20)			
Civil rights (08)	Unlawful Detainer	• • • • •			
Defamation (13)		Miscellaneous Civil Complaint			
Fraud (16)	Residential (32)	RICO (27)			
Intellectual property (19)	LI Drugs (38)	Other complaint (not specified above) (42)			
Professional negligence (25)	Judicial Review	Miscellaneous Civil Petition			
Other non-Pt/PD/WD tort (35)	Asset forfeiture (05) Petition re; arbitration award (11)	Partnership and corporate governance (21)			
Employment Wrongful termination (36)	Writ of mandate (02)	Other petition (not specified above) (43)			
Other employment (15)	Other judicial review (39)				
		ulas of Court If the coop is compley mark the			
2. This case is complex under rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court. If the case is complex, mark the factors requiring exceptional judicial management:					
a. Large number of separately repre		er of witnesses			
b. Extensive motion practice raising		with related actions pending in one or more courts			
issues that will be time-consuming to resolve in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court					
c. Substantial amount of documenta	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	ostjudgment judicial supervision			
		Dept.			
3. Remedies sought (check all that apply): a		declaratory or injunctive relief c. punitive			
4. Number of causes of action (specify): Three (3)					
5. This case is is not a class action suit.					
6. If there are any known related cases, file and serve a notice of related case (You may use form CM-015.)					
Date: June 30, 2017					
Shaun M. Murphy, Esq.					
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)		SIGNATURE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY FOR MARTY)			
NOTICE NOTICE Plaintiff must file this cover shoot with the first paper filed in the selien or proceeding (except ampl) slains.					
Plaintiff must file this cover sheet with the first paper filed in the action or proceeding (except small claims cases of bases filed under the Probate Code, Family Code, or Welfare and Institutions Code). (Cat. Rules of Court, rule 3.220) Failure to file may result					
in sanctions.					
• File this cover sheet in addition to any cover sheet required by local court rule.					
• If this case is complex under rule 3.400 et seq. of the California Rules of Court, you must serve a copy of this cover sheet on all other parties to the action or proceeding.					
Unless this is a collections case under rule 3.740 or a complex case, this cover sheet will be used for statistical purposes only.					
Page 1 of 2					
Judicial Council of California CM-010 [Rev, July 1, 2007]	CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET	Cal, Rules of Court, rules 2:30,3,220,3,400–3,403, 3,740; Cal, Standards of Judicial Administration, std. 3.10 www.coutlinfo.ca.gov			

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 4050 Main Street Riverside, CA 92501 www.riverside.courts.ca.gov

NOTICE OF DEPARTMENT ASSIGNMENT FOR ALL PURPOSES

CITY OF BEAUMONT VS AKLUFI

CASE NO. RIC1712036

This case is assigned to the Honorable Judge Daniel A Ottolia in Department 04 for all purposes.

The Case Management Conference is scheduled for 12/28/17 at 8:30 in Department

The plaintiff/cross-complainant shall serve copy this notice all defendants/cross-defendants who are named or added to the complaint and file proof of service.

Any disqualification pursuant to CCP Section 170.6 shall be filed in accordance with that section. The court follows California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a) (1) for tentative rulings (see Riverside Superior Court Local Rule 3316). Tentative Rulings for each law and motion matter are posted on the Internet by 3:00 pm on the court day immediately before the hearing at http://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov/tentativerulings.shtml. If you do not have internet access, you may obtain the tentative ruling by telephone at (760)904-5722.

To request oral argument, not later than 4:30 pm on the court day before the hearing you must (1) notify the judicial secretary at (760)904-5722 and (2) inform all other parties. If no request for oral argument is made by 4:30 pm, the tentative ruling will become the final ruling on the matter effective the date of the hearing.

Requests for accommodations can be made by submitting Judicial Council form MC-410 no fewer than five court days before the hearing. See California Rules of Court, rule

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that I am currently employed by the Superior Court of California, County of Riverside, and that I am not a party to this action or proceeding. In my capacity, I am familiar with the practices and procedures used in connection with the mailing of correspondence. Such correspondence is deposited in the outgoing mail of the Superior Outgoing mail is delivered to and mailed by the United States Postal Service. postage prepaid, the same day in the ordinary course of business. I certify that I served a copy of the foregoing NOTICE on this date, by depositing said copy as stated above.

Court Executive Officer/Clerk

by:

ERIKA L OLIVAS, Deputy Clerk

Date: 06/30/17