MINNEAPOLIS (CN) — Attorneys on both sides of former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin’s murder case for the killing of George Floyd lined up their arguments on sentencing for Chauvin early Friday evening.
Prosecutors are seeking an aggravated sentence for Chauvin, convicted April 20 of second- and third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter, on the basis of five factors: that Floyd was a particularly vulnerable victim, that Chauvin treated him with particular cruelty, that he abused his position of authority as a police officer in doing so, that he committed the crime as part of a group of three or more, and that the crime was committed in the presence of children. They argued for, and Chauvin’s defense attorney Eric Nelson opposed, all five of those factors in memoranda of law published Friday.
Chauvin was shown kneeling on Floyd’s neck for about nine and a half minutes in a viral video taped by a bystander on May 25, 2020. Floyd stopped breathing and was found to have no pulse well before Chauvin let up; he was pronounced dead at a hospital shortly afterward. Floyd’s death sparked protests and riots in Minneapolis and across the nation in the early summer of 2020, and Chauvin’s trial was widely viewed via livestream in a first for Minnesota courts.
Chauvin faces a maximum sentence of 30 years for his highest charged offense, second-degree unintentional murder. The charge carries an absolute maximum sentence of 40 years, but other state statutes make that a near-impossibility in this case. Minnesota sentencing guidelines recommend 12.5 years in prison as a baseline for a first-time second-degree murder conviction, but Judge Peter Cahill has discretion to sentence him to as much as 15 years or as few as 10 years and 8 months if no aggravating factors are found. With a finding that any of the aggravating factors apply, the judge would have leeway to raise Chauvin’s sentence as high as that 30-year maximum.
Assistant Attorney General Matthew Frank, who took the lead of Chauvin’s prosecution after Attorney General Keith Ellison’s office took it over from that of Hennepin County Attorney Mike Freeman, argued in his memorandum that Floyd was rendered particularly vulnerable by the fact that he was handcuffed and pinned to the ground in the prone position. Floyd’s intoxication and health conditions, he said, could also render him particularly vulnerable.
Frank also argued that Chavin’s treatment of Floyd, who repeatedly cried out in pain and said that he couldn’t breathe before falling unconscious, was cruel.
“This use of force went well beyond the minimum amount of force necessary to commit unintentional second-degree murder,” he wrote. “Defendant’s prolonged restraint of Mr. Floyd was much longer and more painful than, for example, a near-instantaneous death by gunshot, which is one ‘typical’ scenario for this type of offense.”
He pointed out that Chauvin “responded dismissively to Mr. Floyd’s pleas,” saying “uh-huh” and telling him “it takes a heck of a lot of oxygen to say things.”
Nelson objected to the state’s arguments on both of those factors. “Officers were authorized to both handcuff Mr. Floyd and restrain him as part of their lawful duties. Mr. Chauvin did not place the handcuffs on Mr. Floyd,” he wrote. “At the time Mr. Floyd was placed on the ground and restrained, he was not particularly vulnerable and there is no reason for Mr. Chauvin to have suspected that he was. Mr. Floyd was handcuffed in the course of a lawful arrest, and not as a part of the offenses for which Mr. Chauvin was convicted.”
He also pushed against the “particular cruelty” factor, arguing that Chauvin was aware that his colleagues had called for an ambulance and that the state could not prove that he’d inflicted gratuitous pain on Floyd. “The infliction of substantial bodily injury necessarily causes pain. The assault of Mr. Floyd occurred in the course of a very short time, involved no threats or taunting, such as putting a gun to his head and pulling the trigger, and ended when EMS finally responded to officers’ calls,” he wrote.
