Tuesday, March 09, 2010Last Update: 5:38 PM PT

     (CN) - The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to consider reinstating a $5 million judgment against Westboro Baptist Church members who picketed a Marine's funeral. It also agreed to decide if drug makers can be held liable for the allegedly damaging side effects of vaccines.
     The justices took up Snyder v. Phelps, an appeal filed by the father of a Marine killed in Iraq. Albert Snyder accused the Westboro Baptist Church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and other torts for displaying signs that said, "Thank God for dead soldiers" and "Fag troops" at his son's funeral.
     A jury awarded him $5 million, but the 4th Circuit ruled that the judgment violated the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. Members of the Topeka, Kan.-based church believe that military deaths are God's way of punishing America and the Army for tolerating homosexuality and other forms of immorality.
     The 4th Circuit said the members' speech is protected, "notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the words."
     In the vaccine case, the high court will decide if the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act bars parents in Pittsburgh from suing Wyeth over the side effects allegedly caused by its diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis vaccine.
     Robalee and Russell Bruesewitz claimed their daughter developed a seizure disorder after getting the vaccine when she was 6 months old. The 3rd Circuit in Philadelphia dismissed their claims as pre-empted by the Act.
     The Act was passed in 1986 to ensure a stable supply of childhood vaccines. Because it shields drug makers from most lawsuits, state and federal courts have typically dismissed liability lawsuits over vaccines. Only the Georgia Supreme Court has ruled that a family can sue in a vaccine case, though the family has since withdrawn its lawsuit, possibly to avoid an unfavorable Supreme Court ruling.
     These cases are Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, no. 09-152; and Snyder v. Phelps, no. 09-751. Oral arguments will likely take place in the fall.

     (CN) - Bankruptcy attorneys must identify themselves as "debt relief agencies" and can't advise consumers to rack up more debt before filing for bankruptcy, the Supreme Court ruled Monday, reinstating a ban on counsel aimed at exploiting bankruptcy protections.
     The high court upheld the 8th Circuit's ruling that bankruptcy attorneys are "debt relief agencies" under federal law. This means that law firms must disclose this identity in advertisements with a statement such as, "We are a debt relief agency. We help people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code."
     Attorneys must also abide by a regulation barring them from telling consumers to incur more debt before filing for bankruptcy, the high court ruled.
     This part of the decision overturned the lower court's ruling that such a ban is too broad, as it bars a debt relief agency from telling a client "to incur any additional debt," even debt that doesn't abuse bankruptcy laws.
     Congress had blocked this type of advice out of concern that consumers would "load up" on debt with the expectation that it would be discharged in bankruptcy.
     "[I]t is hard to see how a rule that narrowly prohibits an attorney from affirmatively advising a client to commit this type of abusive prefiling conduct could chill attorney speech or inhibit the attorney-client relationship," Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote for the court.
     The ruling is a defeat for the law firm Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, one of its attorneys and two clients, who argued that the regulations violated the firm's First Amendment right to freely advise clients.

     (CN) - A convicted felon might be entitled to have the charges against him dismissed because he wasn't put on trial soon enough, the Supreme Court ruled Monday. The justices voted 7-2 that pretrial preparation time is not automatically excluded from the 70-day deadline from indictment to trial.
     The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 requires a criminal defendant's trial to begin within 70 days of his indictment or initial appearance, whichever is later.
     In August 2006, Taylor James Bloate was indicted on drug and gun charges.
     He asked for an extension on the Sept. 7 deadline to file pretrial motions, and the district court gave him until Sept. 25.
     When the deadline arrived, he told the court that he didn't wish to file any pretrial motions. A magistrate judge found this waiver to be "voluntary and intelligent" on Oct. 4.
     Over the next three months, Bloate's trial was repeatedly delayed for various reasons.
     He moved to dismiss the indictment on Feb. 19, 2007 - 179 days after he was first charged - on the basis that prosecutors missed the 70-day trial window.
     In denying the motion, the district court excluded the period from Sept. 7 through Oct. 4 as "within the extension of time granted to file pretrial motions."
     Bloate was found guilty on both counts and was sentenced to 30 years in prison.
     He appealed, but the 8th Circuit in St. Louis upheld the lower court's rationale for excluding the pretrial preparation time from the 70-day limit.
     Seven other federal appeals courts have endorsed this interpretation, while two sister circuits have found the opposite: that pretrial preparation time can be counted toward the 70-day window.
     The high court took up the case to resolve this division.
     Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas said the 28-day period at issue "is not automatically excludable."
     The court reversed and remanded, but noted that its ruling didn't address "whether any other exclusion would apply to all or part of the 28-day period."
     Justice Samuel Alito dissented, saying the majority's decision fosters a "strange result."
     "Under the court's interpretation, petitioner may be entitled to dismissal of the charges against him because his attorney persuaded a magistrate judge to give the defense additional time to prepare pretrial motions and thus delayed the commencement of his trial," Alito wrote.
      Justice Stephen Breyer joined the dissenting opinion.